

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
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Somalia a country study

Somalia
a country study

Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Edited by
Harold D. Nelson
Research completed
October 1981

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On the cover: The camel, indispensable in the Somali nomad's search for pasture and water

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
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Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books prepared by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program. The last page of this book provides a listing of other published studies. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political, and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the views, opinions, and findings of Foreign Area Studies and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future new editions.

William Evans-Smith
Director, Foreign Area Studies
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The appearance of this volume has been greatly enhanced by Carlyn Dawn Anderson, who designed the cover and the illustrations on title pages of the chapters. The inclusion of photographs was made possible in part by the generosity of various individuals and public and private agencies. We acknowledge our indebtedness especially to those persons who contributed original photography not previously published.

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Preface

In November 1977, a year after completion of the research and writing of the second edition of the *Area Handbook for Somalia*, the republic's military government broke ranks with the Soviet Union, whose arms support and presence in the Horn of Africa had excited much international controversy. Moscow's transfer of its military assistance to Ethiopia in that country's traditional territorial struggle with Somalia led in 1978 to the latter's defeat in combat. In light of the Mogadishu government's search for renewed military and economic support and the United States' increasing interest in the strategically important Indian Ocean area, a fresh look at Somali society and its changing role in world affairs is warranted.

Like its predecessor, *Somalia: A Country Study* seeks to provide a compact and objective exposition of the African republic's dominant social, political, economic, and national security aspects and to give the reader some idea of the forces involved at this time in Somalia's history. In presenting this new study the authors have relied primarily on official reports of governmental and international organizations, journals, and newspapers, but knowledgeable individuals also have been consulted on a number of points. Detailed information on many aspects of Somali affairs was not always readily available, however, and gaps in data and varied interpretations of certain matters existed among some of the sources considered. Such gaps and differences have been noted where appropriate in the text. Where available books and articles provide greater amplification of detail and interpretation of material presented, each author has noted them in a final bibliographic statement. Full references to these and other sources used are included in the detailed Bibliography.

The literature regarding Somalia frequently is confusing because of changes that have occurred in the spelling of names for places, persons, and Somali terms. Historically such spellings have varied with the extent of British or Italian influence. Moreover variants occurred within any one tradition as Somalis and outsiders sought to provide spellings that approximated sounds within the Somali language. In 1973 the government in Mogadishu decided that an existing Latin alphabet orthography (with minor modifications) was to be used to write Somali, but in 1981 there were indications that the new spellings were not always used consistently, particularly in the case of personal names. For the most part the authors of this book have attempted to reduce this confusion by adhering to the system known as BGN/PCGN, one agreed to by the United States Board on Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for Brit-

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ish Use. The place-names, again with minor exceptions to accommodate historic international familiarity, are those approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names in its official gazetteer, an indispensable document that was in the final stage of revised publication in 1981.

In Chapter 1, Historical Setting, an attempt has been made to assist the reader in associating the modern spelling of place-names with their more recognizable forms. This has been accomplished by expressing parenthetically the conventional spelling after each initial use of the modern version. Thereafter throughout the book only the BGN/PCGN spellings appear.

Personal names and Somali terms have been given conventional spellings largely because an exhaustive and authoritative dictionary using the Somali orthography was not available to the research team. Inasmuch as the BGN/PCGN system reflects elements of the Somali orthography in its gazetteer of place-names, some indication of the sounds symbolized by letters in that orthography may assist the reader who encounters their pronunciation for the first time. Vowels in Somali are Italianate in pronounced form; double vowels (as in Shabeellaha Hoose Region) indicate a change in the length of their pronunciation, which is important to meaning among Somali speakers. With some important exceptions consonants are pronounced approximately as they are in English. Those that sound different include the letter *x*, which in spoken Somali becomes an unvoiced pharyngeal, and the letter *c*, which becomes a voiced pharyngeal. In conventional spellings the spoken sounds are sometimes indicated by the letter *h* or are omitted. Thus the Somali name Xuseen appears conventionally as Hussein, Maxamed becomes Mohamed, and Cabdul is seen as Abdul. The letter *q* in Somali stands for the uvular voiceless stop; thus the conventional Mogadishu becomes Muqdisho.

An effort has been made to limit the use of foreign and technical terms. When this has not been appropriate, such terms have been defined briefly where they first appear in any chapter, or reference has been made to the Glossary, which is included for the reader's convenience. All measurements are presented in the metric system. A conversion table will assist those readers who may not be familiar with metric equivalents (see table 1, Appendix).

Country Profile



Country

Formal Name: Somali Democratic Republic.

Short Form: Somalia.

Term for Citizen: Somali (pl., Somalis).

Capital: Mogadishu.

Preindependence Political Status: British Somaliland attained independence June 26, 1960; Italian Somaliland (since 1950 the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian Administration) attained independence July 1, 1960; the two regions united on July 1, 1960, to form Somali Republic.

Geography

Size: Land area 637,540 square kilometers; coastline 2,960 kilometers; sovereignty claimed over territorial waters up to 200 nautical miles.

Topography: Flat plateau surfaces and plains predominate; principal exception rugged east-west ranges in far north that include Shimbir Berris, highest point at 2,407 meters.

Climate: Continuously hot except at higher elevations in north; two wet seasons bring erratic rainfall, largely April to June and October and November, averaging under 500 millimeters in much of country; droughts frequent; only Juba River in somewhat wetter southwest has permanent water flow. Shabeelle River, also in southwest, flows about seven months of year.

Society

Population: Preliminary results of 1975 census show population of 3.7 million. Estimated growth rate of 2.5 percent yields 4.3 million in 1981; predominantly rural—nomads and seminomads make up about three-fifths of total; sedentary rural about one-fifth; urban (chiefly in Mogadishu) about one-fifth.

Languages: Somali (script officially introduced January 1973) spoken by all but very few inhabitants. Several dialects; Common Somali most widespread. English and Italian used in some newspapers; English in official documents intended for international use or organizations; Italian in Somali National University. Arabic second official language, but used chiefly in religious circles or contexts.

Ethnic Groups: Most nationals ethnic Somalis; traditionally divided into Samaal (pastoral nomadic), about 75 percent, and Sab (sedentary or semisedentary in south on and between Juba and Shabeelle rivers), about 20 percent. These in turn traditionally organized into descent groups of greater or lesser inclusiveness and size. National government trying to end significance of these descent groups in social and political matters and in law.

Religion: Somalia officially Islamic state; most nationals Sunni Muslims.

Education and Literacy: Modern education offered free at all levels; school attendance grew rapidly in 1970s; in settled areas shortage of classrooms and teachers remained constraining factor at postprimary levels; mode of life limited establishment of facilities and attendance among nomads. Introduction of new Somali script and massive literacy campaigns resulted in substantial literacy increase in 1970s but somewhat less than government's estimate of 60 percent.

Health: Weak modern medical infrastructure suffering from

geographic imbalance, difficulty of caring for large mobile population, and shortage of medical personnel. Malaria, tuberculosis, parasitic and venereal infections, and childhood diseases serious health problems, complicated by malnutrition and poor sanitary conditions.

Economy

Salient Features: Socialist-oriented economy. Private ownership eliminated in financial sectors and wholesale trade; large-scale and some small industry restricted mainly to public enterprises. But largest part of economy still in hands of private sector in 1981 including livestock raising, traditional agriculture, retail trade, and most small manufacturing and traditional crafts. Economic development and national viability above subsistence level largely dependent on foreign and international agency aid.

Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Forestry: Crop and livestock production, fisheries, and forestry provided employment for about 80 percent of labor force in 1981. Livestock predominant sector, source of livelihood of large nomadic population, and important supplementary means of support for settled cultivators. Livestock and animal products principal foreign exchange earners. Crop cultivation largely for subsistence; main crops sorghum, maize, beans. Small monetized sector produced bananas for export; sugarcane and food crops for domestic consumption; almost all under irrigation. Fisheries production promoted from mid–1970s but remained minor economic activity; forests chief source of fuel but little timber produced; frankincense and myrrh important exports.

Mining: Mining contribution to gross domestic product relatively negligible. Some potentially valuable mineral resources known, but exploitation remained minimal; mining operations largely limited to construction materials in 1981.

Manufacturing: Modern manufacturing sector had fewer than 15,000 employees in 1980. Sector dominated by handful of relatively large and about 40 smaller state enterprises that accounted for over 75 percent of modern manufacturing work force and gross output. In late 1970s most state firms earned little or no profit or recorded losses, resulting from shortages of qualified managers, skilled workers, and materials, lack of production incentives, and lack of export markets. Modern private sector consisted of over 200 medium and small enterprises engaged mainly in producing consumer goods. Informal manufacturing sector of over 6,000 small operations (under five workers) produced wide range of consumer goods; source of substantial employment in urban centers.

Energy: Domestic wood and charcoal and imported petroleum

provide basic sources of energy. Ma ·· state-owned generating and distributive facilities furnished electricity in Mogadishu area; other small state units provided power in about eighty other towns and locales through local grids. Some industrial and public sector activities had own generating units. Significant hydroelectric potential in Juba River; development only in preliminary stage in 1981. Exploration for gas and petroleum actively under way but no major discoveries by late 1981.

Foreign Trade: Exports almost entirely agricultural products. Livestock and products largest item; bananas only significant crop export. Trade balance strongly negative through late 1970s. Consumer goods about 40 percent of imports; intermediate goods and mineral fuels roughly 30 percent; capital goods about 30 percent. Arab countries main destinations of exports; Saudi Arabia largest customer. About half of imports from noncommunist Europe; Italy largest single supplier. Communist Eastern Europe only minor supplier since 1977 rift with Soviet Union.

Currency: Somali shilling (Sh). Two-tier rate system—US$1 equaled Sh12.46 for most imports; Sh6.35 for certain essential items as of October 1981 (see Glossary).

Fiscal Year: January 1 through December 31.

Transportation

Railroads: None.

Roads: Country lacks much of road infrastructure needed to open up large unexploited areas and to tie together isolated local economies. Roads of all categories totaled 19,380 kilometers in 1978: 2,153 kilometers hard-surfaced; 7,247 kilometers gravel- or earth-surfaced—stretches frequently impassable in rainy seasons; 10,280 kilometers of rudimentary dirt tracks. In late 1970s about 10,500 motor vehicles reported in operation; camels and donkeys still transported large amount of cargo.

Civil Aviation: International airports at Mogadishu and Hargeysa; Kismaayo only other airport having hard-surfaced runway in 1981. Fewer than twenty additional widely scattered civilian airfields and usable landing strips, all gravel-surfaced. Somali Airlines provided domestic, regional, and international services. International services also furnished by several foreign carriers.

Ports and Shipping: Three deep-water ports: Mogadishu, Kismaayo, and Berbera. Only other significant port (at Marka) required lighterage. Cargo handling equipment minimal; ship's tackle used to unload and load cargo. State Somali National Shipping Line operated five small oceangoing vessels in 1980. Somalia provided flag-of-convenience registry for foreign shipping until 1975.

Government and Politics

Government Structure: Country in effect under military rule since 1969; Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) of military and police officers, which replaced previous civilian government, supplanted by Central Committee of Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) in 1976 having both military and civilian members. New Constitution in 1979 provided for national legislature (People's Assembly) while reaffirming political supremacy of SRSP. Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, chief of state since 1969 military coup, elected to six-year term as president by People's Assembly in January 1980. Assembly had authority to pass legislation, approve budgets, and ratify treaties but in practice subservient to Siad Barre. SRC reactivated in 1980, but influence believed limited.

Administrative Divisions: Sixteen administrative regions *(gobolkas)* subdivided into eighty districts *(degmadas)*; both governed by military councils corresponding to national SRC until 1976 when local SRSP secretaries became governors. Beginning in 1980 district council members directly elected after nomination by SRSP. Regional councils remained appointive and dominated by military.

Politics: One year after military takeover Siad Barre proclaimed policy of scientific socialism on Marxist-Leninist lines with Islamic and nationalist overtones. Commitment to socialism has moderated, but pattern of state ownership in industrial and financial sectors prevailed in early 1980s. Government policies increasingly subject to personal direction of Siad Barre in spite of reduced popularity resulting from defeat in 1977–78 Ogaden war and economic setbacks. Removal of longtime military collaborators from key posts in 1981 seen as part of effort by Siad Barre to consolidate authority by installing relatives and members of own Marehan clan in high government posts.

Judicial System: Four-tier court system—Supreme Court, courts of appeal, regional courts, and district courts—based on Western models; separate military courts at national, regional, and district levels dealt with cases involving state security, public order, and malfeasance. Unified penal and civil law codes introduced in late 1960s and early 1970s, but some features of Islamic law retained in civil matters.

Foreign Relations: Member of Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of League of Arab States since 1974. Paramount foreign policy issue has been status of ethnic Somalis in Ogaden area of Ethiopia, in Kenya, and in Djibouti. Government claims only to seek self-determination for Somalis in adjacent territories, but suspicion of Somali irredentism remains source of tension in Horn

of Africa. Close alliance with Soviet Union formalized by treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1974; rupture in 1977 over Soviet arming of Ethiopia resulted in shift to nonaligned foreign policy. Beneficiary of generous development and relief aid from West after rift with Moscow and influx of refugees from Ogaden war; entered into military facilities agreement with United States in 1980. Recipient of military aid from Egypt and financial support from conservative Arab oil states.

National Security

Armed Forces: In 1981 personnel in Somali National Army numbered approximately 50,000. Air force (Somali Aeronautical Corps) of 1,000 and navy of 550 institutionally subordinate to army; paramilitary forces served as reserves. Conscription not officially practiced.

Major Tactical Units: Army ground forces organized into three regionally defined corps; seven infantry divisions composed from total of three armored/mechanized brigades, sixteen infantry brigades, three commando brigades, and twenty-three artillery battalions. Serious equipment shortages aggravated by poor maintenance. Air force had four tactical strike squadrons and one transport squadron. Equipment included thirty-three combat aircraft but most grounded for maintenance. Thirty Chinese F–6 fighter-bombers being delivered in 1981. Navy, organized for coastal defense, had twenty vessels, including ten fast attack craft; serviceability poor.

Major Military Suppliers: Exclusively supplied by Soviet Union until 1977 when treaty of friendship and cooperation was terminated. Has since received limited supplies of weapons from China, Egypt, Italy, and other countries. United States in 1981 agreed to deliver limited quantities of defensive weapons.

Military Costs: As result of 1977–78 war with Ethiopia defense spending rose from 25 percent of total government ordinary expenditures in 1976 to 39 percent in 1979; 1979 budget allocated Sh592 million for defense. Military procurement supported largely by foreign, mostly Arab, financial assistance.

Paramilitary and Internal Security Forces: Under control of presidency. National police (Somali Police Force) totaled about 8,000 in 1981; People's Militia (Victory Pioneers) numbered fewer than 10,000 men and women serving as police, military reserves, and political organizers; National Security Service and other organizations provided domestic intelligence to president.




Figure 1. Somalia

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Introduction

KNOWN IN ANCIENT times as the Land of Punt and renowned for its frankincense and myrrh—which it still exports—Somalia is a developing country whose modern image is marked by a struggling economy, a largely nomadic population, and a history of serious conflict with neighboring states. Beset by periodic drought and the burden of roughly 1 million refugees, the nation has been sorely tested in its efforts to achieve—and maintain—political stability and economic development in the strategically important and volatile Horn of Africa.

When the country gained independence in 1960, a parliamentary government—democratic in form, substance, and function—was established in a culturally, religiously, and linguistically homogeneous society of little more than 2 million people. The new state incorporated two colonial territories: British Somaliland and the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian administration (formerly Italian Somaliland). Its boundaries were those agreed to by the two colonial powers as well as Ethiopia and France, which retained claim to a postage-stamp-sized territory along the Gulf of Aden known as French Somaliland (present-day Djibouti).

In newly independent Somalia the land was poor, and commercially exploitable natural resources were limited. As they had for centuries, most Somalis relied for their livelihood on pastoral nomadism or seminomadism in a harsh, arid environment. Pursuing the pragmatic tradition they and their forebears had always adhered to, they followed their livestock in a seasonal search for pasture, paying little attention to national frontiers. A minority of the people along the Juba and Shabeelle rivers in the south and a smaller number in the northwest depended for all or part of their subsistence on irrigated or rainfed cultivation. Some of them received limited income from the sale of livestock and a few cash crops, but subsistence pastoralism and agriculture—often interchangeable depending on the seasons and fickle weather—were the basic ways of life.

Sharing a common culture, the Somali people nonetheless were separated traditionally into a variety of kin-based groups of diverse size. Membership in each of them was based on the claim of descent, through the male line, from a common male ancestor. The largest of these descent groups (of which there were six) was what modern anthropologists refer to as the clan-family, a unit that many observers and most Somalis call a tribe. Each of the clan-families comprised a number of individual clans, which in turn were made up of different lineages. The characteristic relationship between any two of the descent groups was traditionally one of competition for scarce resources or, at best, temporary

alliance against other groups. Every man was entitled to a voice in his clan or lineage council but had to earn his own prestige.

The significance of descent groups was transferred with modifications to the national scene when Somalia attained its freedom from colonial domination. Among the modifications was an increasing emphasis on the clan-families, which had become the building blocks for the formation of political parties. Sometimes parties were built of a single such block; others resulted from an alliance of two or more descent groups. To some extent these clan-families corresponded to specific regionally based interests, but some were so large and widely dispersed that the interests of component clans and lineages reflected great intergroup diversity.

During the first nine years of independence the young country's political life was marked by multiparty competition for office through elections and within the party in power. A large number of parties, most of them ephemeral and representing a limited local or descent-group constituency, contested each election. One—the Somali Youth League (SYL)—became clearly dominant and throughout most of the 1960s served as the power broker for all matters political. Its membership accordingly was heterogeneous, and its greatest task was coping with the general assumption of most Somalis that government existed only to provide citizens with resources and opportunities. Because these commodities were scarce, intraparty competition for their allocation was continuous. Political leaders quickly found it necessary to give members of the country's parliament material compensation for their continued political support. In time the legislators became increasingly accustomed to a broad range of personal perquisites in addition to whatever government help they could obtain for their constituents.

Although some of the leading personalities in the SYL stressed Somali unity as opposed to clan-family divisions, the party was careful to allocate important governmental posts on a descent-group basis. For example, the president and the prime minister were always of different clan-families. The Somali people expected this and interpreted intraparty and intragovernmental conflict in these terms rather than in an ideological context.

Its internal difficulties and conflicts notwithstanding, the parliamentary regime did make attempts to develop the country's economy—an extraordinary task given the low level at which it was forced to begin. Slow progress was attributable in part to an inadequate base in resources and skilled personnel. But the inexperienced and inefficient bureaucracy, which became increasingly corrupt with the passage of time, was also blameworthy. Moreover the government was reluctant to undertake strong measures that might lead to conflicts it could not control.

The country's homogeneity and the people's sense of nationhood eliminated one of the obstacles to national unity so common among new African states. That sense of oneness was heightened by an abiding awareness that even after the country had become a recognized independent state many Somalis still resided in adjacent countries—Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland. All citizens strongly supported unification of their people according to the concept of a Greater Somalia but were divided over how it should be accomplished. A good deal of political energy and time went into attempts to deal with the issue, and these efforts led to rather difficult relations—and on occasion to direct conflict over territorial integrity—with Ethiopia and Kenya.

Soon after national independence, foreign aid was sought for economic development and for improving Somalia's military position. The aim of establishing a Greater Somalia had been incorporated in the constitution, a move that drew angry responses from neighboring states. Unable to obtain support from the United States for development of a large army, the government turned to the Soviet Union, which willingly provided military equipment, advice, and training.

Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who came to power through the electoral process in 1967, turned Somali relations with neighboring countries from confrontation and hostility to accommodation—but without abandoning the ultimate Greater Somalia goal. Moscow's assistance was retained, and the army continued to grow. Many foreign observers, including the government in Washington, remained wary but felt that Soviet influence was offset by the general pro-Western orientation of Egal and other Somali leaders and by the equipment and training aid provided for Somalia's national police force by the United States and other Western countries. But the army, whose leaders were influenced by Soviet political and military doctrine, had clearly become the best organized and strongest institution in the state.

On October 21, 1969, Somalia's parliamentary government was overthrown in a coup d'etat led by a group of senior military officers. Initially the coup's leaders, headed by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, argued that their action had been motivated by the increasing corruption and nepotism prevalent within the civilian regime, which was accused of misusing public funds and catering to tribal (descent-group) interests. Having altered the form of government, the coup leaders established themselves as the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and set about their goal of revolutionizing the society and its economy. Parliament and political parties were abolished, and the country's formal name was changed to the Somali Democratic Republic. Although ordi-

nary citizens were aware of the corruption and nepotism that had existed in former government circles, many foreign analysts reasoned that the parliamentary system's failure to provide expected resources and opportunities led most Somalis to accept the new military regime without protest.

Under the direction of Siad Barre, who was named president of the republic, the SRC soon made clear that it intended to establish a society and economy guided by what it called scientific socialism—the doctrine of Marx, Engels, and Lenin adapted to the needs and conditions of Somalia. Heavy emphasis was placed on educating the people to accept socialist goals and specific programs to achieve them. The SRC began in 1970 by nationalizing a large part of the country's economic assets. Additional attention was given to self-help and crash programs to develop social and economic infrastructure. At the same time a number of austerity measures were introduced, including a pay reduction for the civil and military services and a development levy on the pay of employees in private and state-controlled industries. These measures notwithstanding, the country was unable to overcome its requirement for foreign aid to finance a continuing need for imported capital and consumption goods.

The revolutionary government's optimistic plans for economic development were just getting under way when nature dealt them a severe blow. Drought had long been endemic in Somalia and had always led to temporary abandonment of pastoralism by those who suffered the greatest losses. Conversely, semisedentary Somalis who relied on cultivation were sometimes forced by seasonal flooding or lack of rainfall to forego crops and local forage for a time and take their livestock elsewhere. The extraordinary drought of 1974–75 led to an extensive loss of livestock and famine for large numbers of nomads. The government was forced to expend large sums to assist roughly 1 million needy people, including the operation of relief camps and the settlement of hundreds of thousands in areas where they could become cultivators or fishermen. The food grain harvests failed, and many cultivators also required help. At the same time, however, the SRC noted that the necessary settlement of nomads and their conversion to cultivation had made possible the partial realization of the government's ultimate objective. Increased production of food crops had been a long-term government goal, as had the always difficult task of establishing firmer control over the preponderant nomadic population.

As part of its effort to educate Somalis for economic development and a socialist way of life, the government adopted several social reforms to accommodate these goals. One of long lasting import was the move to promote a rapid increase in the literacy

rate, an effort made possible by the acceptance of a Latin script for the Somali language that had been pending for years. Similarly, steps were taken to grant women certain political and economic rights that traditionally had been restricted to men. In a society where roughly 99 percent of the people were adherents of the Sunni branch of Islam, this change in the status of women drew heated opposition from traditional Muslim religious leaders.

Throughout the first seven years of power, the Siad Barre regime received substantial military assistance and lesser amounts of economic aid from the Soviet Union. Much of Africa and the Western world looked askance at the implied dangers introduced by Moscow's success in achieving a foothold in the Horn of Africa. With Soviet backing the military government sponsored its own replacement through the formation in 1976 of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. Aimed at creating a mass-based political organization uniting all revolutionary forces in the country, civilian authority ostensibly replaced the military regime. But the process proved to be a facade as basic doctrine and the wielders of power remained unchanged.

Despite the laudatory allusions by Siad Barre and his government to Moscow's economic and military assistance and Soviet leadership, many Somalis grew resentful of the large number of Soviet advisers and technicians in their midst. Few were comfortable in their routine interactions with the Communists, regardless of the treaty of friendship and cooperation that had been entered into by the two governments. But most foreign observers felt that Siad Barre was unlikely to respond to Soviet demands unless they were equally advantageous to Somali interests. A major case in point was his permission—granted in exchange for limited economic aid and large quantities of military assistance—for the Soviets to construct and use naval and air facilities at Berbera on the Gulf of Aden.

In 1977, however, Moscow was caught in the middle of an undeclared war between Somalia and Ethiopia over the unresolved Greater Somalia issue. The government in Mogadishu had long supported organized Somali guerrilla groups operating in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia with the goal of attaining the right of self-determination for the largely Somali population in roughly one-third of that country's traditionally recognized territory.

In mid–1977 Siad Barre committed large elements of his Soviet-equipped army to assist the beleaguered Somali guerrillas in the Ogaden. The Marxist Ethiopian military regime, which had replaced Emperor Haile Selassie, responded with forces that before the emperor's downfall had been equipped and supported by the United States. Ethiopia appealed to Moscow for assistance, and the response was a massive airlift of military equipment, Soviet advisers, and Cuban combat units. In return for Moscow's shift of support in the Ogaden war, Siad Barre abrogated the treaty of

friendship and cooperation and evicted all Soviet personnel from his country. In early 1980 Somalia's military intervention was brought to a humiliating conclusion as its forces, badly beaten by a superior enemy and suffering vast losses of equipment, abandoned their effort to annex the Ogaden. The president's primary task in the aftermath of military defeat became one of refurbishing his tarnished image among his unhappy people.

By early 1982 Somalia's population had risen to roughly 4 million, and its economy remained severely depressed. An annual per capita income equivalent to US$130 ranked Somalia eighth among the world's least developed countries. A growing exodus of managerial and skilled workers to nearby Arab countries and the impact of caring for nearly 1 million refugees had placed further strains on the fragile economy. A Department of State report to the United States Congress indicated that "while the government has made earnest efforts to improve the economic lot of its citizens, its bureaucratic inefficiency and doctrinaire approach to problem-solving and the nomadic nature of much of the population have weakened significantly the impact of these efforts."

Real authority remained in the hands of Siad Barre and a few close associates. A state of emergency had been declared in late 1980, and the president continued to rule through decrees approved by a reconstituted SRC. Despite the zeal with which his regime had once attacked its predecessors' reliance on "tribalism" to assure political dominance, the tradition had resurfaced as Siad Barre increasingly surrounded himself by members of his own clan in all critical positions of authority. The government's pervasive security apparatus remained alert to perceived threats of latent opposition within the country and from organized groups abroad. Increasing attention was given to sporadic bombings and other disturbances for which the growing membership of the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) claimed credit. The government carefully analyzed continuing reports that the SSF, which openly opposed Siad Barre's role as national leader, was supported financially by radical Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhaafi.

Siad Barre, recalling how he had achieved power in 1969, had thwarted several coup attempts and could be expected to remain alert to the possibility of others. He also was reported to be concerned that the Soviet-armed Ethiopian forces, aware of his own depleted military strength, might one day invade his country. His requests for military assistance had achieved a cautious response from Washington, where the Congress appeared reluctant to permit the rearming of Ethiopia's traditional enemy and risk having the United States drawn into a possible superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union on the African continent. Thus


United States acquiescence to Somali demands had been limited to the provision of modest military aid for "defensive" use and more substantial assistance for economic development. But Somalia's strategic position on the Indian Ocean—and its Soviet-built military facilities—figured prominently in United States plans to protect vital oil interests in the Persian Gulf area. As a result the government in Mogadishu had responded with the same opportunistic enthusiasm it had shown in an earlier era toward communist overtures.

Some foreign observers felt it was unlikely that, after an eleven-year flirtation with the Soviet Union, Somalia would ever again turn to Moscow for help in satisfying its national needs. Others, however, reflected on Siad Barre's history of political pragmatism (characterized by some as "vigorous opportunism") and refused to discount the possibility of such a move should his newfound alliance with the West fail to produce the desired results. Given the atmosphere of instability in the Horn of Africa and the increasing opposition to the Siad Barre government at home and abroad, it seemed clear that Washington would continue to pursue a policy of circumspection regarding the role of this ally in the United States' Persian Gulf protection strategy.

Harold D. Nelson

May 1982

Chapter 1. Historical Setting



THE SOMALI PEOPLE have inhabited portions of present-day Somalia for 1,000 years. The emergence of a sense of nationhood among them, however, awaited the imposition of colonial rule by three European powers (Britain, Italy, and France) on Somali-occupied territory and the extension of Ethiopian claims there in the late nineteenth century. Between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, sections of the Somalis settled in the relatively fertile river valleys of southern Somalia, where they made cultivation the basis of their economy. Most Somalis living in the surrounding drier regions continued to engage in nomadic pastoralism, allowing differences in social structure, culture, and language to develop between them and their settled brethren. Despite these differences the agricultural Somalis and the more numerous pastoral groups have come to consider themselves one people. At an early date in their migrations, the Somalis came into contact with the Arab world and in time formed a strong attachment to Islam, which has further served to unite them as a people.

During the colonial era the Somalis were grouped into two major divisions—Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland—and three lesser ones—the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and those areas of Ethiopia and French Somaliland populated predominantly by Somalis. Although the Italian and British territories followed different patterns of development and education, they were successfully amalgamated on July 1, 1960, into the independent Somali Republic.

Somalia's transition to independence differed radically from that of most African states. In 1950 the former Italian colony was placed under a United Nations trusteeship administered by Italy. Although British Somaliland retained its colonial status until independence, changes instituted by the United Nations in the trusteeship territory influenced political developments there as well. As a result Somalia's independence as a unified, multiparty parliamentary democracy was attained relatively painlessly.

The early postindependence period was dominated by two difficult problems: the political and administrative integration of the former colonial territories and the conflict with Ethiopia and Kenya arising from Somalia's irredentist demands. Internal political conflicts revolved around methods of handling these difficulties. Competition for electoral support both exploited and widened cleavages within the nation as politicians sought the backing of rival regional and clan groups, often obscuring the country's pressing need for development by overemphasizing party politics.

Party composition and leadership fluctuated as new parties were formed and others declined. A great many parties, some with only a single candidate, participated in each national election, but one party—the Somali Youth League—was clearly dominant and had been even before independence. The important

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political parties were not divided by significant ideological differences, and all their leaders had at one time or another served together in the Somali Youth League. The most significant tendency was for parties to be organized on the basis of clan-families or their constituent descent groups, but political alliances existed across clan-family boundaries.

The conflicts generated by competing interest groups within the parties, the time and energy given over to aggrandizing each of them as opposed to dealing with the country's more general problems, and the extent to which corruption had come to pervade the operation of government and the parliament led to disillusionment with the democratic process. On October 21, 1969, senior officers of the Somali National Army deposed the government in a bloodless coup and established the Supreme Revolutionary Council, headed by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre.

The Supreme Revolutionary Council made clear that it intended to establish a new economic, social, and political order based on an ideology it called scientific socialism. Somalia's long tradition of democracy was extinguished as all important decisions were made by the military-dominated leadership in Mogadishu and conveyed to the largely military structure in control at the regional and local levels. Opposition to the new government's policies was not tolerated. The Supreme Revolutionary Council initiated a number of development projects aimed at exploiting resources to best advantage. Priority was also given to the settlement of the nomadic and seminomadic peoples who constituted about 60 percent of the country's population.

In 1976 the Supreme Revolutionary Council was abolished and its authority transferred to the executive organs of the newly formed Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. Executive positions in the party were taken over by members of the former Supreme Revolutionary Council who also retained the key posts in the government. Therefore the changes appeared only to broaden, not replace, the existing hierarchy.

Somalia's relations with neighboring Ethiopia deteriorated in the early 1970s when Siad Barre's government gave support to guerrilla operations conducted by Somali separatists in the Ogaden, an action that appealed to strong pan-Somali sentiment in the country. By mid–1977 well-equipped elements of the army were openly cooperating with the separatists and had engaged Ethiopian troops in the predominantly Somali region.

In 1974 Somalia concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, which became a primary military benefactor. In exchange for continuing assistance, Moscow obtained rights to strategically located naval and air installations. After the Soviet Union—then in the process of establishing close

ties with Ethiopia—embargoed further supplies to Somalia in 1977, Siad Barre abrogated the treaty and expelled Soviet personnel. A massive infusion of Soviet military aid to Ethiopia and the introduction of Cuban troops ensured Somalia's subsequent defeat in the Ogaden.

Early History

Because systematically collected archaeological evidence is lacking, the prehistory of the area encompassed by present-day Somalia is obscure by comparison with that of neighboring countries. But bushmanoid hunters and gatherers, who inhabited much of eastern and southern Africa, are believed to have roamed the southern interior in search of their subsistence as early as the eighth millennium B.C. Negroid peoples subsequently settled as cultivators in the valleys of the Juba and Shabeelle rivers.

The ships of enterprising Egyptian, Phoenician, Persian, Greek, and Roman traders visited the coast of Guban (the ancient Land of Punt) for cargoes of the aromatic and medicinal resins frankincense and myrrh, tapped from trees on its parched hills. Descriptions of the northern region and its inhabitants first appeared in *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, written by an anonymous Greek mariner ca. A.D. 60, and in Ptolemy's *Geography*. A Chinese source dating from the ninth century mentions the area, and a later document indicates the continued existence of trade between its ports and China in the fourteenth century. By the tenth century Arab and Persian merchants had established a number of towns along the Benadir and Guban coasts that were links in an extensive trading network connecting East Africa with Southwest Asia and the Indies.

The origins of the Somalis and the location of the core area from which they embarked on their centuries-long migrations are matters of debate among scholars as is the chronological framework of those migrations in relation to parallel movements by the Oromo people. There is no doubt, however, that the Somalis were established in much of the region several hundred years before the first recorded use of their name in the early fifteenth century.

Coastal Towns

In pre-Islamic times Arab merchants already were conducting a thriving trade from depots along the African shore of the Gulf of Aden. The most important of these was at the walled town of Seylac (Zeila), which developed after the sixth century as an emporium for the coffee trade from the Abyssinian highlands and as a market for slaves brought from the Arab outpost at Harer in the interior. Seylac eventually became the center of Muslim culture in the region, noted for its mosques and schools. Its ruling house was also linked historically to the Muslim emirates that, after the elev-

enth century, challenged the Christian Abyssinians for domination of the highlands. The town never recovered after being sacked by the Portuguese in 1516 and was succeeded by Berbera as the northern hub of Arab influence in the Horn of Africa. After a brief Abyssinian occupation in the mid-sixteenth century, the Arab towns on the north coast became dependencies of the sharif of Mocha in Yemen and in the seventeenth century passed to the Ottoman Turks, who administered through locally recruited governors.

Arab and Persian traders began settling on the Benadir Coast in the ninth century. The merchant colony they founded at Mogadishu was initially responsible for handling gold shipped from the Sofala fields in south central Africa. When the concession for this trade passed in the twelfth century to Kilwa (an Arab colony much farther south), Mogadishu and other Arab towns on the Benadir Coast, such as Baraawe (Brava) and Marka (Merca), redirected their attention to the immediate hinterland, developing specialized markets for livestock, leather, ivory, amber, and slaves. In the thirteenth century the merchant communities organized a confederation of towns under Mogadishu's ruling dynasty. The prosperity of the Benadir towns declined in the sixteenth century, however, as a result of Somali interference with the trade routes and active Portuguese intervention in the region. Mogadishu was bombarded, and other towns were occupied periodically by the Portuguese until they were ousted in the mid-seventeenth century by the sultan of Oman, who thereafter maintained a loose suzerainty over the Benadir Coast.

The coastal towns—in which Arabic was the language of religion, commerce, and government—were an integral part of the Islamic world, tied to it culturally, economically and, in theory, politically. Arab writers, like the famous fourteenth-century traveler, Ibn Battuta, left vivid descriptions not only of the ports on both coasts but also of the peoples who inhabited the hinterlands. They referred to the Somali in the north as berberi ("barbarians"; hence Berbera) and the pre-Somali cultivators of the southern river valleys as the *zengi* (blacks). A thirteenth-century visitor, Ibn Saiid, was the first to identify by name a Somali clan-family (see Glossary), the Hawiye.

The Somalis: Origins, Migrations, and Settlement

Somali social and political organization is based on kinship groups that range in size from the clan-families, of which there are six, to lineage segments, of which there are thousands (see The Segmentary Social Order, ch. 2). Their traditional genealogies trace the ancestry of clan-families to eponymous Arab forebears who belonged to the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad, and ultimately to a common ancestor. According to these

accounts and other traditional history, these Arabs arrived in the northern part of the Horn of Africa at various times between the tenth and fourteenth centuries and established lineages that in the course of several hundred years moved to the south and west, displacing the Oromos as they went.

Although versions of the traditional genealogies varied in their telling from group to group, it was believed that the clan-families stemmed from the sons of Aqiil—Sab and Samaal (hence, Somali). From Sab were descended the Digil and the Rahanweyn, while the Dir (recognized as the oldest of the clan-families), the Hawiye, and the Isaaq were in patrilineal descent from Samaal. (The Isaaq, however, insisted in their account on direct descent from Aqiil.) The Darod, largest of the clan-families, claimed matrilineal descent from Samaal through Dir's daughter, who was taken as wife by its founder, Jabarti ibn Ismail, himself a Quraysh and a descendant of Aqiil (see fig. 2).

Scholars (among them the noted anthropologist I.M. Lewis) who have accepted traditional history (with important modifications) as a framework for reconstructing the actual history of the Somalis acknowledge that many of its references to the Somalis' Arab ancestry will not stand careful scrutiny and are probably a result of the efforts of the deeply Islamic Somalis to attach themselves to the people of the Prophet. Some scholars also point to traditional history as an attempt to recount in poetic terms a real but unverifiable historical process in which parties of Arabs came to the Horn of Africa in search of trade, adventure, or a religious following and over a period of several centuries established kinship ties with the Somalis and Oromos through intermarriage.

Even those scholars who reject the applicability of this framework—or who are critical of much traditional history—accept that there has been substantial Arab influence and an infusion of Arab blood among the Somalis. They do, however, question whether the point of origin of the Somalis was in the north, as the modified version of traditional history implies, and they have queried the pre-Somali presence of the Oromos in much of present-day Somalia.

On the basis of linguistic evidence supported by critical reading of documentary sources, anthropologist Herbert S. Lewis has argued that the core area for speakers of Eastern Cushitic languages, of which Somali is one and Oromo another, lay in southern Ethiopia. He has suggested further that the Somalis began their northward and eastward expansion out of the core area substantially before the Oromos commenced their movements in the same directions and that Somali groups not only preceded them in the north but were present in southern Somalia as early as the twelfth century, three to four centuries before there is any clear record of the Oromos in that area. In Lewis' view, sections of the Oromos began their migrations only in the fifteenth and sixteenth




Figure 2. Simplified Traditional Genealogy of the Somali People

centuries, and their contact with the Somalis, usually hostile, dated from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In this he is supported by the work of historian E. R. Turton and by the history of Oromo migrations in Ethiopia.

Among all sources, however, there is considerable agreement that the Somalis were in much of present-day Somalia and in parts of present-day Ethiopia known as the Haud (see Glossary) and the Ogaden at least by the twelfth century and probably earlier. The process of their conversion to Islam appears to have begun at about that time in the north under Arab influence but was not completed until several centuries later in the south. In the coastal towns and hinterlands—to which Arabs continued to migrate for centuries—intermarriage produced a distinct integrated Arab-Somali class of Arabic-speaking officials, merchants, craftsmen, and landowners similar to the Swahili-speaking Arab-Bantu class that emerged to the south along the East African coast. In some cases Arabs moved inland and established enclaved villages where, as the ***gibil'aad*** (pale skins), they became clients of the Somalis.

It was commonly held that the Shabeelle River marked the extreme limit of northward expansion of Bantu-speaking people along the East African coast and that it was reached by them in the tenth century. The black cultivators encountered by the Somalis in the Juba-Shabeelle area—the *zengi* referred to in Arab commentaries—were likewise assumed to have been Bantu-speakers, some of whom may have been assimilated by Somali clans. Although the issue remains an open one, the evidence for that hypothesis has been seriously questioned in the light of recent research. It can be demonstrated, for instance, that the ancestors of some of the Bantu-speaking population of the southern coastal area and interior were brought there as slaves after the arrival of the Somalis.

The two branches of the Somali people—the Samaal and the Sab—were differentiated culturally, physically, and linguistically, and they also developed divergent patterns of social and political organization. The Samaal nomads practiced what I. M. Lewis has described as "pastoral democracy," without permanent chiefs or formal courts. Whatever government that existed was conducted in the *shir*, an assembly composed of all adult males in a clan or lineage group. Although no less warlike, the Sab, by contrast, characteristically confederated under the leadership of a dominant lineage that held title to the land and defined themselves by the area in which they lived as well as by ties of kinship. In the southern river valleys where they settled, the Sab practiced a sedentary economy based on trade and herding and on the crops raised by their non-Somali clients. Affiliation with a landholding lineage, either by kinship or by adoption as a client, conferred the right to use its arable resources.

By the twelfth century the ancestors of some clan-families were established in the territories where most of their present-day descendants live, but movements of specific groups continued into the nineteenth century, both over long distances and as slight shifts within a given clan-family area or lands contiguous to it. For example the Dir clan-family, located primarily in the extreme northwest of the Somali distribution, has one clan, the Bimal, who lives in two segments more than 1,000 kilometers away on the southern coast and claim to have arrived there in the sixteenth century. The Darod, the largest of the Somali clan-families, range from the north to contiguous areas of Ethiopia. They are also situated west of the Juba River and into Kenya, an area from which they drove the Oromos in the mid-nineteenth century after the Darod had been forced out of the region between the Juba and Shabeelle rivers by the Rahanweyn, who had already settled there. It has been suggested that an important reason for the

conflict between the two groups was that the Rahanweyn, who were cattle herders and cultivators, could not tolerate the presence of the pastoral Darod whose camels, sheep, and goats would have destroyed crop and pastureland.

The continuing Somali migrations were in large part the result of conflict between groups of a pastoral nomadic people for access to grazing and water in a harsh environment. Such conflicts took place at least as often between clans and lineages of the same clan-family as between segments of different clan-families. Indeed from time to time there were temporary alliances between clans of one family and clans of another. In some cases confederacies were formed in which one lineage came to dominate the others, and its head, sometimes referred to as sultan, acquired a great deal of prestige. If successful in war a sultan might also exercise real political power. But with few exceptions such confederacies rarely endured for very long periods, and they did not lead to the establishment of administrative hierarchies. More often the title of sultan, when it was retained within a lineage, had only religious significance. In troubled times groups of Somalis sometimes rallied to war leaders who combined demonstrated military ability with what were seen as charismatic religious qualities. Periodically, puritanical religious orders also launched holy war against "lax" Muslims in the coastal towns or from the sedentary and ethnically mixed clans.

Ahmed Grañ

The Muslim emirates in the Horn of Africa carried on a centuries-long war of attrition against Abyssinia. The oldest and most famous of them was Adal, which had its capital at Seylac and whose line of emirs belonged to the town's ruling house. Adal was in turn part of the large sultanate of Ifat whose hegemony stretched at its height as far as the foothills of eastern Shewa. The northern Somali clans fell nominally under its suzerainty and fought in the sultan's armies. War was always waged as a religious crusade, but unity in the Muslim forces was difficult to sustain beyond a single campaign.

In 1415 Ifat was decisively beaten by the Abyssinians, and its sultan, Sad ad-Din, was killed in battle, subsequently to be revered as a saint by the Somalis. An Abyssinian victory song in celebration of the event makes the earliest recorded reference to the Somalis (or Samaal), who were listed among the defeated foes.

The sultanate fell apart, and Muslim power receded for a time, but in the second decade of the sixteenth century Adal became the base for a new assault on Abyssinia under the leadership of Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi, better known as Ahmed Grañ—the left-handed. A famous warrior who had assumed the religious title of imam, Ahmed Grañ overthrew the ruling dynasty on the grounds

that it was more interested in the value of Seylac's trade with Abyssinia than in holy war against the Christians. Having moved his headquarters inland to Harer, the imam rallied an army of Somali and Afar warriors, reinforced by Turkish mercenaries who introduced field artillery in the Horn of Africa. In less than ten years he had conquered most of Abyssinia and divided it among Muslim emirs. Perhaps out of concern that the Ottoman sultan would attempt to impose suzerainty over the region, Ahmed Grañ dismissed his Turkish troops at a crucial point in the campaign before his victory over the Abyssinians was complete.

In 1542 the Abyssinian emperor Galawdewos, with Portuguese aid, inflicted a decisive defeat on the Muslims at Lake Tana, and Ahmed Grañ was killed in the fighting. The unity of purpose that the imam's personality had imposed on his Somali fighting force disappeared with his death, and their highland conquests were abandoned. The wars continued into the 1570s, ending only when both Somalis and Abyssinians had to face an invasion by the Oromos who, in the course of their northward migrations, drove a wedge between the older antagonists.

The Ottoman Empire cited Turkish participation in Ahmed Grañ's early campaigns to justify its territorial claims in the Horn of Africa, but otherwise the imam, through his conquests, left no lasting political legacy. Even at the apogee of his military success, he was unable—perhaps unwilling—to impose a government on the land he controlled and over the people who owed him allegiance. The nomadic pastoral Somalis were willing to fight in his cause and for Islam, but they were not amenable to being administered. Ahmed Grañ did become a folk hero among the Somalis, who tend to regard him as one of their own although there is no clear evidence of his origins. President Siad Barre has referred to him as the first significant character in Somali history.

Trade and Agriculture on the Benadir Coast

The turmoil caused by Ahmed Grañ's defeat generated the further movement of Somali clans from the north into the Juba and Shabeelle river basins. Of the two Sab clan-families living in that region, the Digil have apparently been there from an early date, but traditions of the much larger Rahanweyn speak of a continuing emigration lasting from late in the fifteenth century to the early seventeenth. As they arrived they confronted the Ajuran confederation, which was led by the Arab-influenced Hawiye, a Samaal clan-family that had entered the region from the Ogaden in the fourteenth century. The newcomers brought Ajuran rule to an end by the mid-seventeenth century, and political arrangements in the area thereafter involved the formation of confederations in which one or another Rahanweyn clan or lineage was dominant.

Non-Somali clients of the Digil and the Rahanweyn had farmed the limited fertile land in the southern river valleys for some time. Given the reluctance of Somalis to engage directly in farming, however, there were limits to the quantity of land cultivated. The increased availability of slaves, usually taken from Bantu-speaking farming peoples, permitted the extension of agriculture in the region in the nineteenth century. Slaves in turn were also the most important commodity in a network of trade carried on by the Somalis. That network brought ivory, rhinoceros horn, and aromatic woods and gums to the coastal towns for export and took up-country imported and locally made cloth, iron, dates, sugar, and jewelry. In pursuit of this trade the Somalis engaged in transactions with the peoples of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, who included the Oromos. Some trade goods from the interior never reached the coast, as coffee, salt, and, above all, slaves were absorbed by the Somalis themselves. Clans bitterly contested the control of trade routes and in some instances established monopolies over the caravan trade into particular towns—the Bimal, for example, into Marka and their rivals, the Rahanweyn Geledi, into Mogadishu and Baraawe.

Originally slaves had been brought in by sea from southern East African ports as a small part of the slave trade to the Middle East. As Britain's Royal Navy became increasingly successful in cutting off the seaborne trade, however, slaves were walked in from the south. When the British also reduced the overland slave trade near the end of the century, agriculture declined, and some southern Somalis, who had become partially reliant on farming, reverted to nomadic pastoralism.

It was during this period of expanding trade and agricultural development that the Somali clans took advantage of the control they exercised over the trade routes to displace the ruling dynasties and merchant oligarchies of Arab origin that had dominated the towns of the Benadir Coast for centuries. These towns, however, remained under the nominal suzerainty of the Omani sultanate, which early in the nineteenth century had transferred its base to Zanzibar.

The Colonial Period

In the second half of the nineteenth century, several countries vied for control of Somali-populated territories, encountering little opposition from the Somalis. The contending powers were not only European but included Egypt (at that time an autonomous Ottoman province) and the independent African kingdom of Ethiopia. The division of territory was carried out by local representatives of the colonial powers rather than over negotiating tables in Europe. The process by which boundaries were delim-

ited contributed directly to the irredentism that became a significant political issue for the Somalis in the postcolonial period.

In 1865 the Ottoman sultan issued a decree ceding port towns on the western shore of the Red Sea to the khedive of Egypt, who was nominally his subject. The khedive cited the grant as pretext for assuming Ottoman claims to jurisdiction in the Horn of Africa. By 1874 Egypt had occupied towns on the Somali north coast, but Britain blocked additional Egyptian efforts to establish the khedive's authority in Baraawe on the Benadir Coast, which was loosely administered by Zanzibar. During a ten-year presence in Berbera, Seylac, and smaller northern coastal towns, the Egyptians improved port facilities, built mosques, and introduced limited control over the hinterlands by utilizing Somali clan headmen nominated by the khedive. Determined Egyptian attempts to expand inland met with tough Ethiopian resistance, but their troops succeeded in taking Harer. The Mahdist rebellion in Sudan compelled the khedive to recall his forces in 1883, however, and to abandon Egyptian holdings in the Horn. The Ethiopians occupied Harer the next year.

Britain's initial interest in the Somali coast was logistical. After the British annexation of Aden in 1840, treaties were entered into with two Somali sultanates to ensure an uninterrupted supply of cattle to feed the garrison there. Richard Burton's expedition to Harer in 1854, which attracted British attention to the region, was the first visit by a European explorer to the interior. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made more apparent the strategic importance of the coastal towns, and vice consuls were assigned to Berbera, Seylac, and Bulhar to protect British interests. In 1884, following the Egyptian departure, a resident political agent was appointed, and further treaties were concluded with the clans, leading to the establishment of the Somali Coast Protectorate (subsequently British Somaliland Protectorate) administered by the India Office in London. Under the treaties, protected clans allowed Britain to represent their interests in return for a subsidy paid by the British government. But as the name of the new dependency indicated, colonial authorities made no specific claims to jurisdiction in the interior. In 1898 responsibility for administering the protectorate was transferred to the Foreign Office, operating through a consul general, and in 1907 to the Colonial Office.

In 1859 France had obtained a treaty with the Afar people for rights to the small port of Obock, north of present-day Djibouti, but had used the area only as a trading station. Anglo-French rivalry along the route to India in the 1880s led the British to close the port of Aden to French shipping. As a result in 1883 the French began to develop a coaling station at Djibouti.

The Italians entered the colonial race quite late and became interested in the Horn as one of the few parts of the continent not

already claimed by a major power. The port of Aseb in Eritrea had been purchased by an Italian shipping firm for a coaling station in 1870. Ownership passed to the Italian government in 1882, and in 1885, with the agreement of the British, the Italians took over Mitsiwa from the departing Egyptians, simultaneously laying claim to the entire Eritrean coast. In 1889 Italy and the new Ethiopian emperor, Menelik II, agreed to the Treaty of Uccíali. According to a unilateral Italian interpretation of its provisions, the treaty made Ethiopia a protectorate within the Italian sphere of influence and authorized Italy to act on Ethiopia's behalf in dealing with Britain and France on border questions.


The Italian entry into Somalia proper started in 1889, when the Somali sultans of Hobyo (Obbia) on the coast of the Indian Ocean and of Caluula (Alula), facing the Gulf of Aden, began to accept annual payments from Italy in exchange for protectorate status. That same year Italy obtained rights to the Benadir Coast, partly by direct twenty-five-year lease from the sultan of Zanzibar and partly by sublease from the Imperial British East Africa Company, which had earlier leased territory from the region's nominal ruler. The leases covered the area from Warshiikh (Uarsciech) southward to the mouth of the Juba River and included Mogadishu, Marka, and Baraawe. The Italian government chartered a commercial firm, the Filonardi Company, as its representative to administer and develop the leasehold. Agents of the company expanded the area under Italian control, signing treaties with local clans in return, in some cases, for armed protection against the Ethiopians.

Division of Somali-Occupied Territory

Without consulting Ethiopia, Britain and Italy agreed to treaties in 1891 and 1894 that defined the boundaries between their respective zones of influence. The inland boundaries divided the territories claimed by Ethiopia by placing the Ogaden region in the Italian sphere and the Haud region in the British sphere (see fig. 3).

In 1896 Italian forces invading Ethiopia from Eritrea to enforce Italy's claim to a protectorate were resoundingly defeated by Menelik's army at the battle of Adowa. Despite the resulting opposition in Italy to colonial ventures and the financial collapse of the Filonardi Company, the military disaster did not weaken Italy's position in Somalia. But it did make necessary a redefinition of the interior boundaries between the European-held territories and Ethiopia.

Arrangements for delimitation began in 1897 when a British negotiator, Rennell Rodd, led a special mission to Menelik, the main purpose of which was to ensure Ethiopian neutrality in the British campaign against the Mahdists in Sudan. The Ethiopian



Source: Adapted from Irving Kaplan, et. al., *Area Handbook for Somalia,* Washington, 1977, p. 22.

Figure 3. Frontiers and Colonial Boundaries, 1891–1960

position was strengthened by the fact that Ethiopia had already claimed suzerainty over the whole of Somalia and had rapidly expanded its control over Somali-populated areas. A strong Ethiopian garrison had been established at Harer, just beyond the border tentatively claimed by Britain in its role as protector of Somali clans inhabiting the area. Furthermore Ethiopia had recently obtained territorial concessions from Britain's colonial rivals, the Italians in Eritrea and the French in Djibouti, the latter having voluntarily withdrawn their claimed boundaries by 100 kilome-

ters. These factors, combined with the British government's lack of enthusiasm for extending its commitments in the Horn of Africa, placed Rodd in a poor bargaining position.

Britain's only claims in the interior were based on the treaties signed with Somali clans whose primary motivation for signing had been to obtain protection against the better armed Ethiopians. Nevertheless the British agreed to pull back the protectorate's boundaries by about eleven kilometers opposite Harer and to concede most of the Haud region to the east. The only reflection of Britain's promised protection of the Somalis appeared in two clauses of the treaty, one requiring the Ethiopian government to provide them with "good treatment" and orderly government and the other guaranteeing the nomads pasturage on either side of the new frontier. Rodd expressed misgivings over the loss of territory, which included half of the generally fertile northern highlands and the vital seasonal grazing area of the Haud, but the Foreign Office considered that Ethiopia's goodwill was of primary consequence. The treaty was not published, the boundary was not immediately demarcated, and Ethiopian rule over the region was only lightly felt.

Immediately after the Rodd treaty was concluded, Italy's representative in Ethiopia, Cesare Nerazzini, conducted negotiations to define the border between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. The treaty arrangements, while definitive, were arrived at informally. Nerazzini and the emperor marked out the agreed boundary on two copies of a German map without recording in writing the limits on the treaty itself. Both copies of the map promptly disappeared and have never been found. The only information on the location of the border was Nerazzini's report on his return that the agreed line was parallel to the coast about 300 kilometers inland and terminated at the cataracts of the Juba River. The Ethiopians claimed that the boundary line decided on was much closer to the coast. In 1908, eleven years after the Menelik-Nerazzini Treaty, an attempt was made to resolve the matter. Italy paid an indemnity to Ethiopia for the territory it had already occupied, but no agreement was reached except for the delimitation of the point at which Kenya, Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia met and the tracing of the border to a location 130 kilometers north of Doolow (Dolo) on the Juba.

Somalia's present-day border with Kenya is a result of the secret arrangements that brought Italy into World War I on the side of the Allies. Britain promised to cede part of its own colonial holdings in compensation for Italy's exclusion from the division of German colonial territory already agreed to by Britain and France. A treaty drawn up in 1920 and ratified in 1924 provided that Italy take over the area west of the Juba River up to the

forty-first parallel, including the port of Kismaayo (Kisimayo). Known as Jubaland, it was incorporated into Italian Somaliland the following year. The new boundary left a Somali-populated area (Northern Frontier District) within Kenya that was equal in size to the ceded territory.

Mohamed Abdullah

The only impediments to the expansion of colonial rule were the competing territorial claims of the European powers and the Ethiopians. Somali clans acquiesced in—and frequently sought—treaties of protection offered by Britain and Italy as well as the subsidies and trading privileges that accompanied them. Direct European involvement was limited to the ports, which historically had been under non-Somali control, and was primarily concerned with improving trade. During the 1890s, for example, the British presence in the protectorate consisted of only about a dozen civilian officials, a company of Indian troops, and some local employees stationed in Berbera, Seylac, and Bulhar.

In 1899, however, the process of peaceful colonial occupation was brought to an abrupt halt by an insurrection inspired by a remarkable figure, Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan. An imam of the puritanical Salihiya *tariqa* (religious order or brotherhood), Mohamed Abdullah preached his order's fundamentalist version of Islam in Berbera, inveighing against the foreign influences that violated its precepts. He was particularly enraged by the availability of alcohol and by the opening of a French-run Roman Catholic orphanage that had taken in Somali children.

Mohamed Abdullah won few converts in Berbera where urban Somalis, who had prospered from improved opportunities for trade under colonial rule, cooperated with British authorities. Opposed by members of the larger and less severe Qadiriya order and the Isaaq, who were prominent traders in the town, the imam departed for the interior to preach to nomadic pastoralists less susceptible to foreign blandishments than were the coastal people. His ability as an orator and a poet—much-valued skills in Somali society—won him a large number of disciples, especially among his own Dolbahante and Ogaden clans (both of the Darod clan-family). He referred to his followers as dervishes rather than calling them by their customary lineage names.

The imam's followers venerated him as a saint endowed with a charisma that conferred on him not only prestige as a teacher but also personal immunity from attack. The authority that he exercised over them was essentially religious rather than political or military, but British officials who dismissed him as a religious fanatic—calling him epithetically the "Mad Mullah"—seriously underestimated the strength of Mohamed Abdullah's appeal to the Somalis. His insurgency was apparently touched off when

authorities demanded that he surrender one of his followers who had been accused of stealing a government-issue rifle. (To promote peace on the frontier with Ethiopia and to discourage clan warfare, the colonial administration had as a matter of policy sought to deny modern rifles to protected Somali groups, who complained as a result that they were deprived of the means of defending themselves against harassment by soldiers in Ethiopian-controlled areas.)

Summoning an army of 3,000 dervishes, Mohamed Abdullah seized the traditional watering place of the Isaaq at Bura and massacred the inhabitants of a Qadiriya settlement at Sheekh (Sheikh) about sixty kilometers from Berbera. His warriors also laid seige to the Ethiopian garrison at Jijiga and spread the insurrection among their Darod kinsmen in Kenya. Between 1901 and 1904 four expeditions were mounted to hunt down the imam. The first two were composed of British-led Ethiopian soldiers and Somali irregulars, and the last two were upgraded with several thousand reinforcements that included British regulars, Indian units, elements of the King's African Rifles, and Afrikaner mounted troops from South Africa. The Somali contingent was the largest in each of these military exercises. Although British troops met the dervishes in several engagements, the imam always eluded capture.

Still smarting from the disaster at Adowa in 1896, Italy refused to cooperate with British efforts to suppress the insurrection, but in 1905 Britain accepted Italian mediation in arranging a truce that conferred on the imam an Italian subsidy and autonomous protected status in the Nugaal (Nogal) Valley. Mohamed Abdullah did not gain extensive support in Italian Somaliland, although some clans there declared themselves dervishes and robbed cattle from the herds of other Somalis who were deemed too accommodating to the Italians.

The truce lasted only three years—long enough for Mohamed Abdullah to regroup the dervishes for a jihad (holy war) against the British and Ethiopians as well as Somalis who rejected his teachings. At the height of his strength the imam had as many as 10,000 dervishes under arms.

In 1910 the British government, unwilling to invest more manpower and resources in the colony, ordered a withdrawal to the coastal area and abandoned the interior to him. Protected Somalis were issued rifles and left to devise their own defenses. Over the next few years the dervishes terrorized the entire region, taking a heavy toll among the clans that opposed them. (It has been estimated that one-third of the male population of British Somaliland died during this period as a result of the insurrection.) In 1913 they annihilated the British-led Somali Camel Constabu-

lary in an action at Dul Madoobe (Dul Madoba). During World War I Mohamed Abdullah received German and Turkish support, including assistance in building a formidable stronghold at Taleex (Taleh), and he made an accommodation with the pro-German Ethiopian emperor, Lij Iyasu, who had lately converted to Islam.

At the end of the war London's attention turned to colonial trouble spots that had been neglected for the duration, but the dervish movement in British Somaliland had already been weakened by desertion and the defection of entire clans grown discontented with the imam. Pacification, assigned to several Indian battalions and the newly formed Somaliland Camel Corps, was carried out efficiently. In February 1920 British warplanes bombed Taleex, where Mohamed Abdullah had chosen to make his stand. Rejecting surrender and pursued by Somali irregulars, the imam fled to a camp in Ethiopia to reorganize his followers but died there of natural causes later in the year. Leaderless and demoralized, the dervish movement dissolved.

Mohamed Abdullah's twenty-year defiance of the British Empire was more than a local insurgency against colonial rule. To some modern Somali observers, it contained the elements of a war of national liberation. For the imam it was a holy war aimed not only against the infidel but also against the Muslims who collaborated with the nonbeliever. In proclaiming the holy war, Mohamed Abdullah had cited as his objectives the purification of Islam, the ousting of foreigners from Somali territory and, significantly, the unification of the Somali people. So great was his personal appeal that he could command a loyalty that superseded that of lineage. But to a great extent the insurrection was a continuation of the traditional feuds among rival clans, a confrontation between nomadic and coastal Somalis, and an excuse for large-scale cattle rustling.

In the final analysis Mohamed Abdullah was defeated as much by his fellow Somalis as by the British. They turned against him, tired of the chaos, destruction, and famine that were the consequences of his insurgency. British-led Somali forces took part in all the campaigns against him. Yet, with the emergence of nationalism in its modern form, Mohamed Abdullah has been hailed as a popular hero in Somalia and the prime source of the Somali sense of national identity.

Italian and British Colonial Administration

After suppressing Mohamed Abdullah's insurgency, Britain determined for security reasons to extend effective control to the borders with Ethiopia. Italian territorial expansion occurred during the same period but was largely the result of a desire to exploit the agricultural potential of the region between the Shabeelle and Juba rivers and to provide economic opportunities for Italian colo-

nists. In 1905 the Italian government had terminated the charter of the Benadir Company, successor to the failed Filonardi Company, and assumed direct responsibility for governing the colony. Not until 1927, however, when a military campaign was required to end the semiautonomous status claimed by the sultans of Obbia and Majerteyn, did all of Italian Somaliland actually come under direct colonial administration.

Completion of the railroad connecting the French port of Djibouti with Addis Ababa in 1917 diminished the value of Seylac and Berbera as depots for trade with the interior, but the Italians were able to exploit the ancient trade routes between the Ogaden and Mogadishu and thus to gain control of the import and export trade with southern Ethiopia. Intensified economic activity in the region facilitated gradual infiltration of the underadministered areas of Ethiopia adjoining Italian Somaliland. Early hopes for resettling farmers from Italy's poorer regions in the colony's fertile areas foundered, and other ambitious agricultural schemes involving concessions for large commercial plantations were slowed by the unforeseen difficulty involved in recruiting local labor. The potential labor market was composed largely of the sedentary peoples who had formerly been slaves or clients of the dominant Somalis. These people, however, preferred work on their own lands to wage labor, whereas the pastoralists were uninterested in agriculture. The colonial government at an early date began compulsory labor recruitment, which continued even after passage of new labor laws that provided for better conditions for workers.

Despite these difficulties, agricultural production in the colony increased at a good rate. In some measure this was due to the initiative of a member of the Italian royal family, Prince Luigi Amedeo of Savoy, duke of Abruzzi, who in 1920 found the Italo-Somali Agricultural Society (Societá Agricola Italo-Somala—SAIS) to develop about 200,000 hectares of concessionary land in the Shabeelle valley for mechanized commercial agriculture. Export crops intended for the Italian market included bananas, sugarcane, and cotton. The colony's only other significant products were livestock, hides, skins, and salt from an Italian plant begun at Ras Hafun in 1920.

SAIS was liberally underwritten by financial and industrial interests in Italy, but it was obvious that the colony's economic development required substantial public funding which the government of the day was not prepared to provide, to supplement private investment. Widely felt changes in the colonial policy were instituted by Benito Mussolini's fascist regime, which came to power in 1922. The first fascist governor of Italian Somaliland, Cesare Maria de Vecchi, brought with him to the colony a pro-



Remains of fortress at Taleex from which the dervish movement of Mohamed Abdullah resisted the British authority
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

pensity for construction. By 1928 more than 6,000 kilometers of earthen and gravel roads had been built, and a light railroad (subsequently destroyed in World War II and never reconstructed) connected the plantations at Villagio Duca degli Abruzzi (Jowhar) and Afgooye (Afgoi) to Mogadishu.

The fascist administration was highly centralized, although amenable indigenous leaders were allowed to exercise a degree of influence not permitted in the British colony and were employed by the Italians to open the way for the "peaceful penetration" of the interior. Somali judges were appointed to administer Islamic and customary law. Somalis staffed the lower ranks of the paramilitary colonial gendarmerie (Corpo Zaptié) established in 1923. Limited educational facilities were created at the primary level for Somalis, a small number of whom held minor clerical positions in government offices. During the 1930s the fascists adopted racial legislation intended to ensure, in theory as well as in fact, the superior status of the Italian colonists and the subject status of the Somalis, who sometimes were made to endure brutal treatment at the hands of officials. Colonial society was more open than would appear, however, and individual settlers, who eventually num-

bered about 8,000, often bent the rules to accommodate the Somalis.

Economic development in British Somaliland between the two world wars was limited. After 1920 the colonial administration was required by the home government to finance all operations in the country from its own resources, but attempts to impose direct taxation proved impossible to implement because of Somali intransigence. Most revenue was derived from import and export duties, but the important trade route to Ethiopia, initially cut during the insurgency, was permanently closed by the completion of the Djibouti railroad. As a consequence, government expenditure for development was largely restricted to well digging and the provision of veterinary services. Some assistance was also given to encourage improvements in agriculture carried out by the Somalis on their own initiative in the better watered areas of the northwestern highlands.


Other British efforts were aimed at the expansion of the extremely limited educational facilities. The first effort to increase the number of schools, however, was linked to the imposition of direct taxation, and opposition to taxation became popularly linked with opposition to the schools. This opposition was reinforced by conservative religious sentiment that considered British-sponsored education a threat to Islam.

Wartime Somalia

The Italian infiltration of the Somali-populated Ogaden area had begun before 1930 and was assisted by several factors. Italians had come to dominate the economy through their control of the external trade routes. Moreover the boundary between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland, although confirmed by a 1908 convention, had never been marked off on the ground and was subject to different interpretations by the two parties. Because of shortages of trained personnel, the Ethiopian government had never been able to extend its administration into the eastern half of the region. In addition some Somali clans demanded Italian protection for their people who lived in Ogaden.

The Italians posed as the champions of Somali irredentism and attempted, with some success, to win the support of the Somalis of the Ogaden. Since 1930 Somali troops of the Corpo Zaptié had occupied territory to a depth of more than 150 kilometers inside Ethiopia, a fact that was evidently known but tacitly accepted by the Ethiopian government. In November 1934 the Italians provoked an armed confrontation with Ethiopian troops at Wal Wal, the site of wells used by Somalis regularly traversing the Ogaden in an area clearly inside Ethiopia.

Despite feeble attempts by the League of Nations to mediate the dispute, Mussolini used the incident as an excuse for opening hostilities with Ethiopia. Italian forces invaded Ethiopia from



Monument to Somali patriot Mohamed Abdullah occupies a prominent site in Mogadishu
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

Somaliland and Eritrea without a declaration of war in October 1935, commencing a seven-month campaign that concluded with the capture of Addis Ababa and the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in May 1936. The Ogaden was detached from Ethiopia and included in the new, enlarged province of Somalia, which together with Eritrea and a reduced Ethiopia constituted Italian East Africa. Nearly 40,000 Somalis had been mobilized for service in the war with Ethiopia in combat, support, and labor units—6,000 of them in the Corpo Zaptié.

Italy entered World War II in June 1940, declaring war on Britain and France. In August three Italian columns invaded British Somaliland and within two weeks had overrun the protectorate, forcing the evacuation of the small British garrison there. Meanwhile an Italian brigade had crossed into Kenya and advanced toward Lake Rudolf. By the end of the year, however, the Italians had drawn a defense line at the Juba River in the face of a British buildup in East Africa. In early February 1941 the British launched an offensive against Italian forces in Somalia with three divisions—one South African and two composed largely of East African colonial troops—that was coordinated with a simultaneous attack on Eritrea. Mogadishu was taken within the month, and in March British units based in Aden effected a landing at Berbera. Addis Ababa was liberated in April, and the last isolated pocket of Italian resistance in East Africa was compelled to surrender in November. British forces captured nearly 200,000 Italian prisoners, including Somali troops, during the campaign, in addition to large quantities of war matériel.

The British Military Administration

British military administrations were set up in the protectorate and in both Somalia and the eastern portions of Ethiopia that had been annexed to it in 1936. Nearly all of the Somalis—except some in southern Ethiopia and the small number in French Somaliland—had thereby come under British control. No common administration for the three areas was contemplated, however, and Britain agreed to an eventual return of the Ogaden to Ethiopian jurisdiction. In British Somaliland a military governor, assisted by an army council, carried on the work formerly assigned to civilian colonial service officers. In Somalia a small corps of army political officers reported to the area military commander.

The priority of the British military administration in wartime was naturally to restore order and provide security in the region. The Somaliland Camel Corps was reorganized in the protectorate, and five battalions were raised for the Somaliland Scouts, incorporating former irregular units. In the south the Italian security organization was dismantled, and the Somalia Gendarmerie was formed to police the occupied territory under British officers. Initially manned by askari (African soldiers) from Kenya, serving with British forces, and reinforced by Somali irregulars, the par-



Relatives of Mohamed Abdullah and other Somali patriots are buried in these tombs near Taleex. Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

amilitary organization was later composed of local recruits who received training in a police school established by the military administration. Forces in the two territories cooperated in rounding up Italian stragglers and in the difficult task of disarming Somali nomads in the interior who had taken advantage of the windfall in weapons provided by the war. Combating the well-armed bands of *shifta* (bandits), who raided the Ogaden from Ethiopia, remained a troublesome problem throughout the period of military administration.

But the British military administrators who controlled the two Somali colonies from 1941 to 1949 also accomplished more social and political change than had their Italian and British predecessors since colonial rule was first imposed. London's reversal of the prewar policy requiring that British Somaliland be self-supporting allowed additional funds to be made available for development. The protectorate's capital was moved from Berbera to Hargeysa (Hargesa), a religious and trading center for the nomadic herders in the interior, to indicate greater British involvement in Somali problems. Although the civil service remained inadequate in

numbers, efforts were undertaken to improve agricultural and health services and to influence Somali opinion in favor of development. The military administration succeeded in opening a number of secular schools where there had been only subsidized Quranic schools before 1939.

The local court system was also reorganized, and local advisory and planning committees were established in the towns. In 1946 the Protectorate Advisory Council was created in which districts were represented by Somali appointees of both modern and traditional orientation.

In Somalia the military administration ensured better pay and working conditions for the agricultural labor force. By 1947 the number of pupils in the elementary schools had increased to twice the prewar figure, and a center for training elementary school teachers was opened. The British also provided the opportunity for Somalis to qualify as junior officials in the civil service and the gendarmerie. In addition the first chance for Somali political activity opened up as Italian-appointed clan chiefs were gradually displaced by elected advisory assemblies at the clan level. District and provincial councils were also created to advise the military administration.

The military administration continued to depend on Italian civilians in the colony to keep the economy functioning and to operate public services. Only those civilians who were regarded as security risks were interned. In early 1943 Italians were allowed to form political associations. New Italian organizations of all political persuasions immediately sprung up and began to agitate for an eventual return to Italian rule. In the face of such pressure the British and Somalis saw each other as allies. The British accordingly encouraged the formation of the first modern Somali political organization, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), founded in Mogadishu in May 1943.

SYC was strengthened from the beginning by the inclusion of better educated civil servants and police officers in its membership and leadership. Under any other British jurisdiction this group would have been prevented from engaging in politics by civil service rules, but in Somalia they were allowed to join SYC because it served as a counterweight to the Italian interests.

The SYC grew rapidly in popularity and had gained an estimated membership of 25,000 by 1946. Its name was changed to the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1947, at which time branches operated not only in Somalia but also in British Somaliland and in the Somali-populated areas of Ethiopia and Kenya. The SYL had announced as its aims the unification of Somali territory, creation of widespread opportunity for modern education, development of the Somali language through the adoption of a standard written

form, and general protection of Somali interests, including opposition to the reimposition of Italian colonial rule. The organization's thirteen founding members represented five of Somali's six clan-families, and its members made strong efforts to promote the concept of a common Somali nationality without regard for clan divisions, going so far as to refuse to use their clan names. A second political body, initially called the Patriotic Benefit Union, was established in the same period. In 1947 it became the Somali Digil Clan Party (Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Somali—HDMS). The HDMS represented the agricultural clans of the regions between the Juba and Shabeelle rivers against what its supporters saw as the dominance of the SYL by pastoral interests. In its opposition to these interests, the HDMS was willing to accept considerable financial support from the Italians. Although the SYL had some northern supporters, the chief parties in British Somaliland were the Somaliland National League (SNL), which represented the dominant Isaaq clan-family, and the United Somali Party (USP), which had the backing of the Dir and northern Darod.

Technically, British-administered Somalia remained an Italian possession at the end of World War II, but at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 the Allies agreed that Italian colonies seized during the war would not be returned to Italy. Responsibility for deciding their disposition fell to the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers, which delegated the Four Power Commission (composed of representatives of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States) to study the question of Somalia's future. In January 1948 the commission arrived in Mogadishu to hear testimony. The SYL obtained permission from the military administration for a rally to demonstrate popular support for its opposition to the reimposition of Italian jurisdiction in any form. Rioting occurred, and fifty-one Italians and seventeen Somalis lost their lives when Italian-backed groups attempted to disrupt the rally and discredit the SYL in the commission's eyes. In spite of the disorder the commission continued its hearings and was impressed by the program presented by the SYL's spokesmen, Abdullahi Issa and Haji Mohamed Hussein. In addition to the unification of all Somali territories, the SYL requested a trusteeship under an international commission for a ten-year period to be followed by full independence. The HDMS offered a similar solution, breaking with its stance that Italy should be the administering power but recommending a thirty-year trusteeship. Also presenting their views were Somali groups and Italian interests that favored an Italian trusteeship or even a return to Italian rule.

Although the Four Power Commission reported favorably on a trusteeship similar to that envisioned by the SYL, the Council of Foreign Ministers could not agree on a formula for guiding the country to independence. The United States called for international administration of a trusteeship and France, for a return to

Italian control. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin outlined a plan calling for a British-supervised trusteeship over all territory then under military administration and leading—on condition of Ethiopian approval—to eventual independence for Greater Somalia. Bevin's proposal, which mirrored in most respects the position of the SYL, was withdrawn when the United States and the Soviet Union accused Britain of seeking its own aggrandizement at the expense of Ethiopia and Italy. Prospects that a communist regime might come to power in Italy explained Soviet concern for Italian interests at that time.

In 1948 Britain turned over the Ogaden to Ethopia, in effect dashing nationalist hopes for an international agreement creating Greater Somalia. Although it had historical claims to the region, Ethiopia attempted for the first time to impose effective control over the Ogaden. The blow of the transfer was softened somewhat for the Ogaden clans, whose chiefs had unsuccessfully petitioned the British government to retain its jurisdiction there, by the payment to them of a large indemnity from Britain. The following year Britain also ended its administration of the Haud but, with Ethiopian consent, continued to station liaison officers in the so-called Reserved Areas. Their mission was to ensure the security of nomadic pastoralists who grazed their herds in the Haud six months out of the year and whose protected clans made up half the population of British Somaliland.

Meanwhile the unresolved issue of Somalia was passed by the Council of Foreign Ministers to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) for a solution. In November 1949 the General Assembly assigned a trusteeship over the former colony to Italy for a period of ten years under UN supervision, with the clear proviso that the Italian administration was to prepare the former colonial territory for independence before the end of 1960. In coming to that decision the General Assembly accepted the argument that Italy was the best qualified power to undertake the task by virtue of political experience and economic interests in its former colony. Although the SYL had continually opposed any return to Italian control, the UN decision was accepted without protest because of the guarantee that independence would be obtained in so short a period.

Trusteeship and Protectorate: Creating the Somali State

The Trust Territory of Somalia entered the 1950s under Italian administration with a political advantage not held by other colonial territories: it had a date set for independence and the opportunity to prepare purposefully for self-government. British Somaliland, which was to be merged with the trust territory in forming the new Somali state, had no such advantage. Accordingly its development, although greatly accelerated by the colo-

nial administration, proceeded haphazardly. The marked disparity between the two areas continued until their independence in 1960.

In view of the expressed opposition to renewed Italian administration of Somalia, the Italian trusteeship was carefully circumscribed. The UN Trusteeship Agreement placed responsibility for the trust territory in the hands of a special government agency, the Italian Trusteeship Administration (Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana della Somalia—AFIS). The agreement also created the UN Advisory Council, which was based in Mogadishu and reported directly to the Trusteeship Council. This international panel was empowered to examine AFIS programs and to recommend further actions to ensure the implementation of the agreement's objectives. The agreement provided for the establishment of political institutions, expansion of the education system, social and economic advancement, and guarantees of complete freedom of speech and press and the right to petition.

Despite these guarantees of political and civil rights, relations between the new Italian administrators and the Somali nationalists were strained. The Italians, fearing a violent display of opposition to their return, arrived with a show of military force and immediately attempted to suppress the SYL, which was seen as the center of anti-Italian feeling. Some SYL leaders were jailed, and others were dropped from the high civil service positions they had obtained under the British. The Somalis reacted with rioting that was forcibly suppressed. The antagonism lasted for three years, until economic and political development programs began to provide an outlet for the energies of the nationalists.

A series of seven-year development programs was inaugurated in 1954. These programs were based on plans drawn up by the UN and by the United States International Cooperation Administration (predecessor of the United States Agency for International Development). They concentrated on efforts to stimulate indigenous agriculture and to improve infrastructure. Exports were trebled during the seven-year program period, but a severe balance of payments deficit persisted, and government revenues, largely dependent on import and export duties, continued to be wholly inadequate.

The development plans for education were more successfully implemented. The number of students in 1957 had risen to double the 1952 figure. Nearly 2,000 were enrolled in secondary, technical, and university-level programs in Somalia, Italy, and Egypt. In addition attention was directed to the adult literacy program and to training the civil servants who would be the new nation's political leaders.

The development of institutions to serve as bases for the country's future self-government was also far more encouraging than the economic picture. In line with the UN resolution, the AFIS

established a national consultative body, the Territorial Council, in 1950. The council immediately became an active body, engaging in the full-scale debate of proposed AFIS legislation. The thirty-five-member body, which AFIS was required to consult on all important issues, included representatives of both traditional interests and the political parties, the latter gradually gaining a dominant position during the five years that the council sat. Those who participated in its deliberations gained experience in legislative and committee procedure, as well as a first-hand view of the political, social, and economic problems that the government would confront when Somalia attained its independence. The council's support for legislation also gave legitimacy to the AFIS operation in Somali eyes.

Other Somalis gained executive and legislative experience through participation in the forty-eight municipal councils created after 1950. With the aid of secretaries trained in municipal administration, the members handled matters of town planning, public services, and (after 1956) fiscal and budgetary matters. The central government retained the power to overrule council decisions and to dismiss mayors and councillors.

The district councils, responsible for rural areas, were considerably weaker than their urban counterparts and were concerned primarily with settling disputes over grazing and water rights according to customary law. Attempts to give the councils wider powers were limited by the nature of the pastoral economy. The nomads' search for pasture for their herds required nearly constant movement, which made any identification with political boundaries—even international borders—all but impossible. The Advisory Council's intention that the district councils could be used as channels for development proved impossible to fulfill, and the reins of government in nomadic areas remained largely in the hands of district commissioners.

The 1954 municipal elections provided the first opportunity for widespread political participation, and the elections were conducted in a spirited but orderly fashion. Eleven of the fifteen competing parties won seats, but only the SYL, which gained approximately 45 percent of the vote, and the HDMS, winning almost 25 percent, commanded the support of significant portions of the electorate.

The first national elections were held in 1956 to choose delegates to the new seventy-seat Legislative Assembly that replaced the Territorial Council. Again only the SYL, which won forty-three seats, and the HDMS, gaining thirteen seats, made significant showings in the ten-party race for sixty Somali-held posts. Ten seats in the assembly were reserved for elected representatives of the Italian, Arab, and Indian communities.

The leader of the SYL in the assembly, Abdullahi Issa, was called on to become the first premier of a government that included five

other ministers—all Somalis. The new assembly possessed full legislative power in all domestic matters, although the senior official of AFIS retained the power of absolute veto as well as the right to issue emergency regulations without prior assembly approval. The AFIS retained control over external relations including the sensitive issue of resolving the frontier dispute with Ethiopia. Foreign financial affairs remained under Italian control until February 1957, and defense and public order did not pass entirely into Somali hands until 1958.

The 1956 election was conducted in sedentary areas by secret ballot and male suffrage. In the interior the nomadic nature of the society made registration much more difficult, and for this reason a clan voting system was approved. Nomadic pastoralists of each clan met in an assembly and decided jointly on the candidate for whom all their votes would be cast. (There were 600 such assemblies.) Clan leaders then informed the authorities of the assembly's decision and the number of individual votes. The total number of votes cast in the territory far outnumbered the estimated size of the actual electorate. This incident did little to diminish the enthusiasm of the Somali people for their first opportunity at political expression, but it left a residue of interparty distrust for a number of years. Because the SYL was the strongest party in the nomadic areas, its opponents charged that it had gained the most from the alleged irregularities.

At the time of the 1956 election the clan-family distribution of the SYL's strength was estimated at 50 percent Darod, 30 percent Hawiye, 10 percent Digil and Rahanweyn, and 10 percent from other groups. (These figures may be compared with the estimated division of the trust territory's population: 18 percent Darod, 38 percent Hawiye, and 29 percent Digil and Rahanweyn.) The HDMS found nearly all of its support among Digil and Rahanweyn agriculturalists, although the party's strength was primarily along lines of common economic interest rather than clan ties.

One of the first acts of the new SYL-dominated assembly was to make it illegal for political parties to bear the name of clans or clan-families. The HDMS immediately changed its full title to the Somali Independent Constitutional Party (Hizbia Dustur Mustaquil Somali), eliminating reference to a clan while retaining the familiar acronym.

The Issa government remained in power for four years until independence and thus was able to oversee the terms under which the new state was created. Its attitudes were modernist, pan-Somali, and nationalist, although it became and remained strongly pro-Italian once Italy was no longer seen as a threat to Somali independence. The government's first concerns were to improve the country's economic stability so as to ensure foreign

assistance to replace the support Italy would continue to provide until independence. It also fulfilled its pledge to grant voting rights to women in time for municipal elections in 1958. It strongly supported the promotion of Somalis into all important government positions, but this did not constitute a major political issue because Somalization was well under way before 1956. For example all the sensitive posts of district commissioner had been turned over to Somalis in 1955. All other posts were being Somalized as fast as candidates could receive the required minimum educational background. Other efforts at modernization included attempts to weaken clan ties, particularly by limiting the payment of *dia* (see Glossary), and to further the breakup of the low status traditionally ascribed to persons in certain occupations. These changes, however, came slowly (see The Segmentary Social Order, ch. 2).

The government's second major concern was to draft the constitution that would become effective with independence. The most difficult provisions were those concerning the concept of Greater Somalia, that is, for the ultimate inclusion of the Somali-populated areas in Kenya, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, and British Somaliland into the Somali state. Such draft provisions became embroiled in the controversy over the choice of having either a unitary structure of government or a federal one that would allow the other parts of Greater Somalia to be incorporated into the state more easily. This choice was complicated by HDMS support for federalism on a lower level, which might have lessened the dominance of the numerically superior nomads over the farmers of the interriverine region, who backed the party. The SYL favored the concept of a unitary state, fearing that federalism would stimulate divisive clan interests. The SYL's political strength allowed its position to prevail without difficulty in framing the new constitution.

Because of the way in which the SYL dominated the political scene, conflicts over outstanding political issues gradually began to take place within the party rather than between the SYL and other groups. Internal divisions formed as factions within the SYL strove to win a greater voice in the party for their views or those of their clans. Individual politicians made efforts to widen the cleavage between the party's Hawiye and Darod supporters. Others accused the Issa government of being too friendly to the Italians and of doing nothing to achieve the goal of a Greater Somalia. In July 1957 Haji Mohamed Hussein, who had been president of the SYL in the early years, was again elected to lead the party. His own views conflicted strongly with those of the Issa government and with the party's leader in the legislature, assembly president Aden Abdullah Osman. Hussein led the party wing that favored

loosening ties with the West and establishing closer relations with the Arab world, particularly with the United Arab Republic (Egypt).

In April 1958 Hussein and his supporters were expelled from the SYL without causing a major split in the party. Hussein then formed a new party, the Greater Somali League (GSL), and its militant platform incorporated his pan-Arab and pan-Somali philosophy. Although Hussein remained an important political figure, the GSL was unable to draw significant support away from the SYL.

After its victory in the 1958 municipal elections, the SYL further strengthened its position on the national level at the expense of the HDMS, when some Rahanweyn politicians switched their allegiance to what was clearly the country's real power center. These changes came in time to assist the SYL in the final preindependence election for the National Assembly, which was expanded to ninety seats. The GSL and the major portion of the HDMS alleged interference in their election campaigns and boycotted the election in protest. As a result sixty-one seats were uncontested and went to the SYL candidates by default in addition to the twenty-two contested seats won by the party's candidates.

The new government formed in June 1959 was again under the premiership of Abdullahi Issa. The great expansion of the SYL allowed nearly all clans to be represented in it. Accordingly attempts were made to divide the fifteen cabinet positions among the representatives of all clan-families, but conflicts continued within the party and cabinet between conservative elements and those with a more modern outlook led by Abdirashid Ali Shermarke.

The civilian colonial administration that had been reinstated in British Somaliland in 1948 worked to expand educational opportunities in the protectorate, but the number of Somalis who had qualified for important administrative positions remained limited. There was little economic development, and exports were largely confined to livestock, hides, and aromatic wood and gum. Improvements were made in watering facilities and agricultural and veterinary services that benefited farming and herding, but intensified geological surveys failed to reveal exploitable mineral resources.

Political preparation for assuming responsibility for eventual self-government did not go beyond the extension of participation in local government. The SYL opened branches in British Somaliland, but neither it nor the SNL was able to stimulate widespread interest in party politics. In late 1954, however, a catalyst to popular involvement in political issues was provided by the withdrawal of British liaison officers from the Reserved Areas as part of

London's agreement with Ethiopia confirming that country's claims to the Haud under the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty and returning full jurisdiction there to Ethiopian authorities. British colonial authorities with responsibility in the region were embarrassed by their government's action, which some considered a betrayal of the trust put in them by the protected Somali clans whose herds grazed in the Haud.

The protest was immediate and massive. The revitalized SNL and SYL jointly supported the National United Front (NUF), which had been formed under the leadership of Michael Mariano, a Christian Somali civil servant who had been active in the formative years of the SYL. The NUF voiced demands for the return of the Haud to British Somaliland. It sent missions to London and to the UN in New York in an attempt to win support for its position and to have the question of the Haud brought before the International Court of Justice. Britain sought unsuccessfully to purchase the disputed area from Ethiopia, which filed counterclaims attesting to its historical sovereignty over both the Somali territories. The Ethiopian move served only to fuel Somali nationalism still further.

In 1956 Britain agreed to the gradual introduction of representative government in the protectorate and accepted eventual independence and union between British Somaliland and Somalia. As a first step the Legislative Council was created in 1957, its six members selected by the governor to represent clan-families. The following year the body was expanded to include a total of twelve elected members, two appointed members, and fifteen ex-officio members. As in the trust territory, this first countrywide election was by secret ballot in the towns and elsewhere by acclamation by each clan assembly. Elections—the first contested along party lines—were held in February 1960 for the Legislative Assembly. The SNL and its affiliate, the USP, won all but one of the thirty-three seats in the expanded body. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was named to lead a four-man government.

Ties between the political leaders in both Somali territories had been strengthened by the Issa government's adoption of Somali unification as a priority program. Although the leadership of the SNL would have preferred to postpone unification until British Somaliland had drawn closer to Somalia in its political development, popular opinion in the protectorate was too strongly in favor of unity for a delay to be countenanced.

In April 1960 the British government agreed in principle to end its rule in time for British Somaliland to unite with the trust territory on the July independence date that had already been set by the UN. Leaders of the two territories met in Mogadishu in April and agreed to amalgamate in a unitary state under a president

elected as head of state and a parliamentary form of government responsible to a democratically elected national legislature (initially composed of the 123 members of the two territorial assemblies). British Somaliland was granted independence on June 26, 1960, and merged with the trust territory to form the independent Somali Republic on July 1, 1960. Shermarke, leader of the SYL, was called on to form a coalition government in which his party was joined by the SNL and USP—northern clan-based parties that had no constituencies in the south. The legislature's appointment of Osman to the presidency of the republic was confirmed in a national referendum the following year.

From Independence To Revolution

During the nine-year period of parliamentary democracy that followed Somali independence, freedom of expression was widely regarded as being derived from the traditional right of every man to be heard. The national ideal professed by the Somalis was one of political and legal equality in which historic Somali values and acquired Western practices appeared to coincide. In accord with both traditional and modern democratic values, modern politics was viewed as a realm not limited to one profession, clan, or class but open to all male members of society. Politics was at once the Somalis' most practiced art and favorite sport. A radio was the most desired possession of most nomads, not for its entertainment value but for news broadcasts. The level of political participation often surpassed that in many developed Western democracies. Indeed some observers believed that Somalia's institutions suffered from a surfeit of democracy.

Problems of National Integration

Although officially unified as a single nation at independence, the former Italian colony and trust territory in the south and the former British protectorate in the north were, from an institutional standpoint, two separate countries. Italy and Britain had left them with separate administrative, legal, and education systems where affairs were conducted according to different procedures and in different languages. Police, taxes, and the exchange rates of their separate currencies were also different. The orientations of their educated elites were divergent, and economic contacts between the two regions were virtually nonexistent. The Consultative Commission for Integration, an international board headed by UN expert Paolo Contini, was appointed in 1960 at the behest of the UN to guide the gradual merger of the new country's laws and institutions and to reconcile the differences between them. (This body was succeeded in 1964 by the Consultative Commission for Legislation. Composed of Somalis, it was directed to continue the former commission's work under the chairmanship

of Michael Mariano.) But the problem of mending the cleavage created by Somalia's disparate colonial legacies proved more troublesome in the year after independence than had been anticipated. Many southerners harbored a feeling that because of experience gained under the trusteeship, theirs was the better prepared of the two regions for self-government. Northern political, administrative, and commercial elites were reluctant to accept the fact that they now had to deal through Mogadishu.

At the time of independence, the northern region had two functioning political parties: the SNL, representing the Isaaq clan-family that constituted a numerical majority there, and the USP, supported largely by the Dir and the Darod. In a unified Somalia, however, the Isaaq were a small minority, while the northern Darod were able to join with members of their clan-family from the south in the SYL. The Dir, having few kinsmen in the south, were pulled on the one hand by traditional ties to the Hawiye and on the other hand by common regional sympathies to the Isaaq. The southern opposition party, the GSL, pro-Arab in outlook and militantly pan-Somali in attitude, attracted the support of the SNL and the USP against the SYL, which had adopted a moderate stand before independence and had been responsible for a constitutional provision calling for unification of all Somali territories by peaceful means.

Northern misgivings at being too tightly harnessed to the south were demonstrated by the voting pattern in the June 1961 referendum to ratify the constitution, which was in effect Somalia's first national election. Although the draft was overwhelmingly approved in the south, it was supported by less than 50 percent of the northern electorate.

Dissatisfaction at the distribution of power among the clan-families and between the two regions boiled over in December 1961 when a group of British-trained junior army officers in the north rebelled in protest over the posting of higher ranking southern officers (who had been trained by the Italians for police duties) to command their units. The ringleaders urged a separation of north and south. The strength of Somali unity was displayed, however, in the reaction of the northern noncommissioned officers who arrested the rebels. Despite that action, discontent in the north persisted.

In early 1962 the GSL leader, Haji Mohamed Hussein, seeking in part to exploit northern dissatisfaction, attempted to form an amalgamated party, to be known as the Somali Democratic Union (SDU). It would enroll northern elements, some of which were displeased with the northern SNL representatives in the coalition government. Hussein's attempt failed. In May 1962, however, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and another northern SNL minister re-



One of many parades in Mogadishu celebrating national independence on July 1, 1960
Courtesy United Nations



Somalia's sovereignty was achieved in 1960 when its Legislative Assembly ratified the unification of former British Somaliland and the United Nations Trust Territory of Somalia.
Courtesy United Nations

signed from the cabinet and took many SNL followers with them into a new party, the Somali National Congress (SNC), which received widespread support in the north. The new party also gained support in the south when an SYL faction (predominantly composed of Hawiye) joined it. The move gave the country three major political parties having national appeal, further serving to blur north-south differences.

Pan-Somalism

Despite the considerable difficulties encountered in integrating the two regions, the most important political issue in postindependence Somali politics was the unification of all areas populated by Somalis into one country—a concept identified as pan-Somalism. It was presumed that this issue dominated popular opinion and that any government would fall if it did not demonstrate a militant attitude toward neighboring countries that were seen as occupying Somali territory.

This preoccupation with the pan-Somali issue was emphasized by the formation of the country's institutions. The exact size of the National Assembly was not established by law in order to facilitate the inclusion in the future of representatives of the contested areas after unification. The national flag displayed a five-pointed star whose points were said to represent those areas claimed as part of the Somali nation—the former Italian and British territories, the Ogaden, Djibouti, and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya. Moreover the constitution approved in 1961 stated prominently in its preamble that "the Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means, the union of the Somali territories," and its fundamental laws provided that all ethnic Somalis, no matter where they resided, were citizens of the republic. The Somalis did not directly claim sovereignty over adjacent territories but rather demanded that Somalis living there be granted the right of self-determination. Somali leaders asserted that they would be satisfied only when their fellow Somalis outside the republic had the opportunity to decide for themselves what their status would be (see Greater Somalia, ch. 4).

At talks on Kenya's future held in London in 1961, Somali representatives from the NFD demanded that Britain arrange for the NFD's separation before Kenya was granted sovereignty. The British government appointed a commission to ascertain popular opinion on the question in the NFD. The results of its investigation indicated that separation from Kenya was almost unanimously supported by the Somalis and their fellow nomadic pastoralists, the Oromos. These two peoples, it was noted, represented a clear majority of the NFD's population.

Despite considerable Somali diplomatic activity, the British government did not act on the commission's findings. It was felt that the federal format then proposed in the Kenya constitution would provide a solution through the degree of autonomy it allowed the

predominantly Somali region within the federal system. This solution did not ease Somali demands for unification, however, and the modicum of federalism disappeared after the new Kenya government opted for a centralized constitution in 1964.

The denial of Somali claims led to steadily increasing hostility between the Kenya government and Somalis in the NFD. Adapting easily to life as *shifta*, as the Kenyans called them, the Somalis conducted a guerrilla campaign against the police and army for more than four years. The Somali government denied Kenya's charges that the guerrillas were trained in Somalia, equipped there with Soviet arms, and directed in their activities from Mogadishu. But it could not hide the fact that the Voice of Somalia radio was able to exert an influence on the level of guerrilla activity by the militant tone of its broadcasts beamed into Kenya.

Somalia refused out of hand to acknowledge in particular the validity of the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty recognizing Ethiopia's claim to the Haud or in general the relevance of treaties defining Somali-Ethiopian borders. Its position was based on three points: first, that the treaties disregarded agreements made with the clans that had put themselves under British protection; second, that the Somalis were not consulted on the terms of these treaties and in fact had not been informed of their existence; and third, that such treaties violated the principle of self-determination.

Incidents began to occur in the Haud within six months after Somali independence. At first they were confined to minor clashes between Ethiopian police and armed parties of Somali nomads, usually arising over such traditional sources of conflict as smuggling, livestock rustling, or tax collecting rather than from irredentist agitation. Despite their actual causes, these incidents tended to be viewed in Somalia as expressions of Somali nationalism. Hostilities grew steadily in scope, eventually involving small-scale actions between Somali and Ethiopian armed forces along the border. In February 1964 armed conflict erupted along the entire length of the Somali-Ethiopian frontier, and Ethiopian warplanes conducted raids on targets well within Somalia. Open hostilities were brought to an end in April through the mediation of Sudan, acting under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Under the terms of the cease-fire, a joint commission was set up to examine the causes of frontier incidents, and a demilitarized zone ten to fifteen kilometers in depth was established on either side of the border. Although further military confrontation did not occur, the potential for future armed clashes remained high.

Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a mutual defense pact in 1964 in response to what both countries perceived to be the continuing threat from Somalia. Most OAU members were alienated by Somali irredentism and feared that, if Somalia were successful in

detaching the Somali-populated portions of Kenya and Ethiopia, the example might inspire their own restive minorities divided from their brothers by frontiers imposed in the colonial period. In addition the Somalis had challenged two of Africa's most important elder statesmen, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.

Foreign Relations (1960-69)

Somalia's democratic government was in the hands of leaders who were well disposed toward the Western democracies, particularly Italy and Britain, in whose political traditions many of them had been educated. Nevertheless as a reflection of their desire to demonstrate Somalia's self-reliance and nonalignment, the Somali government established close ties with both the Soviet Union and China soon after the country attained independence.

The growth of Soviet influence in Somalia dated from 1962 when Moscow agreed to provide loans to finance the training and equipping of the armed forces. (A buildup of the country's military capability was considered necessary by the Somali government to lend credibility to its irredentist claims.) By the late 1960s a large number of Soviet personnel were serving as advisers with Somali forces whose inventories had been stocked almost entirely with equipment of communist bloc manufacture. During the same period more than 800 Somalis received military training in the Soviet Union. As a result of their contact with Soviet personnel, some Somali military officers developed a Marxist perspective on important issues that contrasted with the Western outlook of most of the country's civilian leaders.

The Soviet Union also provided a substantial amount of nonmilitary assistance, including scholarships for technical training, printing presses and broadcasting equipment for the government, and agricultural and industrial development aid. By 1969 considerable nonmilitary assistance had also been provided by China.

Somalia's relations with Italy after independence remained consistently good, and Italian influences generally continued in the modernized sectors of social and cultural affairs. The number of Italians residing in Somalia had dropped to about 3,000 by 1965, but they still dominated many of the country's economic activities. Italian economic assistance during the 1960s totaled more than a quarter of all the nonmilitary foreign aid received, and Italy was an important market for Somali goods, particularly food crops produced on the large Italian-owned commercial farms in the river valleys. Italy's sponsorship enabled Somalia to become an associate of the European Economic Community (EEC), which formed another source of economic and technical aid and assured preferential status in West European markets for Somali exports.

In contrast to the cordial relations maintained with Italy, Somalia severed diplomatic ties to Britain in 1962 to protest British

support for Kenya's position on the NFD. Somalia's relations with France were likewise strained because of opposition to the French presence in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (formerly French Somaliland, later independent Djibouti). Meanwhile the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) provided Somalia with a moderate amount of aid, notably sharing with Italy and the United States the training of the police force. (The Somali government purposely sought different foreign sponsors for training security forces, and Western-trained police were seen as counterbalancing the Soviet-trained armed forces. Likewise, the division of training missions was believed to offset reliance on either the West or the communist countries for Somali security needs.)

During the 1960s the United States supplied nonmilitary aid to Somalia, a large proportion of it in the form of grants. But the image of the United States in the eyes of most Somalis was influenced more by its support for Ethiopia than by any assistance to Somalia. The large scale of United States military aid to Ethiopia was particularly resented. Although aid to that country had begun long before the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and was based on other considerations, the Somalis' attitude remained unchanged as long as the United States continued to train and equip a hostile neighbor.

The Hussein Government

Countrywide municipal elections, in which the SYL won 74 percent of the seats, were held in November 1963. These were followed in March 1964 by the country's first postindependence national elections. Again the SYL triumphed, winning sixty-nine out of 123 parliamentary seats. The party's true margin of victory was even greater, as the fifty-four seats won by the opposition were divided among a number of small parties.

After the 1964 election for the National Assembly, a crisis left Somalia without a government until the beginning of September. President Osman, who was empowered to propose the candidate for prime minister after an election or a fall of government, chose Abdirazak Haji Hussein as his nominee instead of the incumbent, Shermarke, who had the endorsement of the SYL party leadership. Shermarke had been prime minister for the four previous years, and Osman decided that new leadership might be able to introduce fresh ideas for solving national problems.

In drawing up a cabinet for presentation to the National Assembly, the newly nominated prime minister picked ministers for their abilities without regard to their origins. But his choices strained intraparty relations and broke the unwritten rules of clan and regional balance. Only two members from the Shermarke cabinet were retained, and the number of posts in northern hands was increased from two to five, one-third of the seats in the new cabinet.

The SYL's governing Central Committee and its parliamentary groups were split. Hussein had been a member of the party since 1944 and had participated in the two previous Shermarke cabinets. His primary appeal was to younger and more educated members of the party. A number of the political leaders who had been left out of the cabinet joined the supporters of Shermarke to form an opposition group within the party. As a result the Hussein faction found it necessary to seek support among the non-SYL members in the National Assembly.

Although the disagreements primarily involved personal or group political ambitions, the debate leading to the initial vote of confidence centered on the issue of pan-Somalism. Both Osman and the prime minister-designate were interested in giving priority to solving the country's internal economic and social problems. Although Hussein had made clear his support for militant pan-Somalism, he was portrayed as being willing to recognize the legitimacy of continued exercise of sovereignty by Ethiopia and Kenya over Somali areas.

The proposed cabinet failed by two votes to obtain an affirmation of confidence. Seven National Assembly members, including Shermarke, abstained, while forty-eight members of the SYL voted for Hussein and thirty-three opposed him. Despite the apparent split in the SYL, it continued to attract recruits from other parties. In the first three months after the election, seventeen members of the parliamentary opposition resigned from their parties to join the SYL.

Osman chose to ignore the results of the vote and again nominated Hussein as prime minister. After extensive intraparty negotiation, which included the reinstatement of four party officials expelled for voting against him, Hussein presented a second cabinet list to the National Assembly that included all but one of this earlier nominees. The new cabinet, however, contained three other ministerial positions filled by men chosen to mollify opposition factions. The new cabinet was approved with the support of all but a handful of SYL members in the National Assembly. Hussein remained in office until the presidential elections of June 1967.

The presidential elections, conducted by secret polling of the members of the National Assembly, pitted Shermarke, the former prime minister, against Osman. Again the central issue was moderation versus militancy on the pan-Somali question. Osman, through Hussein, had stressed the need to give priority to internal developments. Shermarke, by contrast, had led the country as prime minister during the period when pan-Somalism was at the height of militancy. This distinction was decisive in Shermarke's election as president of the republic.

The Egal Government

The new president nominated as prime minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, who raised the membership of the cabinet from thirteen to fifteen members and included representatives of every major clan-family as well as some members of the rival SNC. His appointment was confirmed by the National Assembly in August 1967 without serious opposition. Although the new prime minister had supported Shermarke in the presidential election, he was a northerner and had led a defection of the northern SNL assembly members from the government in 1962. He had also been closely involved in the founding of the SNC but, with many other northern members of that group, had rejoined the SYL after the 1964 elections.

A more important difference between Shermarke and Egal, other than their past affiliations, was the new prime minister's moderate position on pan-Somali issues and his desire for improved relations with other African countries. In these areas he was allied with the "modernists" in the government, parliament, and administration who favored redirecting the nation's energies from confrontation with its neighbors to combating social and economic ills. Although many of his domestic policies seemed more in line with those of the previous administration, Egal continued to hold the confidence of both Shermarke and the National Assembly during the eighteen months preceding the March 1969 national elections.

Egal's policy of regional détente resulted in greatly improved relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. The prime minister did not relinquish Somalia's territorial claims, but he hoped to create an atmosphere in which the question could be peacefully negotiated. In September 1968 Somalia and Ethiopia agreed on establishing commercial air and telecommunication links. The state of emergency in force in the border regions was ended, allowing for a resumption of free access by Somali pastoralists to their traditional grazing lands and for the reopening of the road across Ethiopian territory between Mogadishu and Hargeysa. In general, foreign affairs became a less consuming issue, releasing the government's energy and the country's meager resources to deal more effectively with problems of internal development. The relaxation of tensions, however, had another unanticipated effect. To some extent the conflict with its neighbors had promoted Somalia's internal political cohesion and solidified public opinion at all levels on at least one issue. As the tension subsided from that source, old cleavages based on clan rivalries tended to attract greater attention.

The March 1969 elections were the first to combine voting for municipal and National Assembly posts. A total of sixty-four parties contested the elections. Only the SYL, however, presented candidates in every election district, in many cases without opposition. Eight other parties presented lists of candidates for national

offices in most districts. Of the remaining fifty-five parties, only twenty-four gained representation in the assembly, but all of these were disbanded almost immediately when their fifty members joined the SYL.

Both the plethora of parties and the defection to the majority party were typical of Somali parliamentary elections. In order to register for elective office, a candidate needed only the support of either 500 voters or of his clan, expressed through a vote of its traditional assembly. After registering, the office seeker then attempted to become the official candidate of a political party but, failing this, was left as an individual contestant on the ballot. Voting was by party list, making the individual candidate in effect a party. (This explains not only the proliferation of small parties but also the transient nature of party support.) Many candidates affiliated with a major party only long enough to use its symbol in the election campaign and, if elected, abandoned it for the winning side as soon as the National Assembly met. Thus by the end of May 1969 the SYL parliamentary group had swelled from seventy-three to 109.

In addition the eleven members of the SNC had formed a coalition with the SYL, which held 120 of the 123 seats in the National Assembly. A few of these 120 left the SYL after the composition of Egal's cabinet became clear and after the announcement of his program, both of which were bound to displease some of those who had joined only to be on the winning side after the election.

In the enormous listing of candidates, the almost 900,000 voters in 1969 had the opportunity to defeat incumbents and evidently took delight in doing so. Of the former deputies, seventy-seven were not returned (including eight out of eighteen members of the previous cabinet), but these figures did not unequivocally demonstrate dissatisfaction with the government. Statistically they were nearly identical with the results of the 1964 election and, given the profusion of parties and the system of proportional representation, a clear sense of public opinion could not be obtained solely on the basis of the election results.

The fact that a single party—the SYL—dominated the field implied neither stability nor solidarity. As anthropologist I.M. Lewis has noted, "The SYL Government...could not be other than an extremely heterogeneous assemblage of competing personal, family, and lineage interests. The maintenance of any semblance of unity with such an ill-assorted crew would clearly prove a most costly business."

At the same time candidates who had lost seats in the assembly and those who had supported them were frustrated and angry. A number of charges were made of election rigging by the government—at least some firmly founded. Discontent was exac-

erbated when the Supreme Court, under its newly appointed president, denied that it had jurisdiction over election petitions, although it had accepted such jurisdiction on an earlier occasion. Moreover the Egal regime's increasingly friendly relations with Ethiopia and Kenya could always be used against the government by those whose primary discontents lay elsewhere.

"Finally," as Lewis has put it, "official corruption and nepotism seemed to be flourishing on a scale hitherto unknown in the Republic,...but there was little sign that either the [Prime Minister] or the President were unduly disturbed by their persistence." It may be argued that, in a society based on kinship and one in which kin groups perceive each other as either enemies or allies in competition for benefits, nepotism and corruption might be regarded as normal practices. Nevertheless there were some who were embittered by it and by the ineptitude of the National Assembly. "It had," reported Lewis, "been turned into a sordid marketplace where deputies traded their votes for personal rewards with scant regard for the interests of their constituents."

Among those most dissatisfied with the government were intellectuals and members of the armed forces and police. (General Mohammad Abshir Musa, the chief of police, had resigned just before the elections after refusing to permit police vehicles to transport SYL voters to the polls.) Of these the most significant element was the military, which since 1961 had remained outside politics. This was partly because the government had not called upon it for support and partly because, unlike most other African armed forces, the Somali National Army had a genuine external mission in which it was supported by all Somalis—that of protecting the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya.

Coup d'Etat

The stage was set for a coup d'etat, but the event that precipitated it was unplanned. On October 15, 1969, Shermarke was killed by a member of his bodyguard while Egal was out of the country. The assassin was a member of a lineage said to have been badly treated by the president, and he was subsequently tried and executed by the revolutionary government. Egal returned to Mogadishu to arrange for the selection of a new president by the National Assembly. His choice was, like Shermarke, a member of the Darod clan-family (Egal was an Isaaq). Critics of the government, particulary a group of army officers, apparently saw no hope for improvement of the country's problems through this course of action. In the early morning of October 21, 1969, when the results of the assembly' deliberations were apparent, army units took over important points in Mogadishu and rounded up government officials and other prominent political figures. In this enterprise

the police cooperated with the army, but according to some accounts its collaboration was initially somewhat reluctant.

Although not regarded as the author of the military takeover, army commander Major General Mohamed Siad Barre assumed leadership of the group of officers who deposed the civilian government. The new governing body was introduced as the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), and Siad Barre was installed as its president. Leading members of the democratic regime, including Egal, were arrested and detained at the presidential palace. Political parties were banned, the National Assembly abolished, and the constitution suspended. The goals of the new regime were said to be an end to "tribalism, nepotism, corruption, and misrule." Existing treaties were to be honored, but national liberation movements and Somali unification were to be supported. The country was renamed the Somali Democratic Republic.

The Revolutionary Regime

The military group that brought down the democratic regime retroactively defined its action as a Marxist revolution not only instituting a new political order but also proposing the radical transformation of Somali society through the application of what the regime referred to as "scientific socialism." Despite the presence of Soviet advisers with the armed forces, no evidence has been produced to indicate that the coup was Soviet-inspired, although this was suspected in the West at the time it occurred. SRC membership included officers ranging in rank from major general (Siad Barre and Jama Ali Korshel) down to captain, but the young Soviet-trained junior officers—well-versed in Marx and Lenin—who had encouraged the coup were excluded from important positions in the revolutionary regime.

The SRC, which was synonymous with the government, directed its attention to the systematic reorganization of the country's political and legal institutions, formulated a guiding ideology based on the Quran as well as on Marx, and purged corrupt civilian officials who were not susceptible to reeducation. The influence of lineage groups at all levels and elitism in public life based on clan affiliation were targeted for eradication. Although officially power was shared collectively by members of the SRC, Siad Barre quickly emerged as Somalia's strongman, spokesman for its revolution, and leader of its government. In 1971 he announced the regime's intention to phase out military rule after the establishment of a political party whose central committee would eventually supersede the SRC as a policy and decisionmaking body.

Supreme Revolutionary Council

On coming to power the SRC stated that the primary objectives of the revolution were to end widespread corruption in public life and to eliminate what it defined as "tribalism," a term commonly used in referring to clan particularism. But high priority was also

given to rapid economic and social development through "crash programs," to providing efficient and responsive government, and to establishing the Somali language in a standard written form as the country's single official language. The revolutionary regime also pledged to continue the policy of regional détente in its foreign relations without relinquishing Somali claims to the disputed territories.

The SRC's domestic program was spelled out in its initial declaration in 1969, known as the First Charter of the Revolution. With Law Number 1, an enabling instrument promulgated on the day of the military takeover, it was intended to provide the institutional and ideological framework for the new regime. Law Number 1 assigned to the SRC all the functions previously performed by the president, the National Assembly, and the Council of Ministers, as well as many duties of the courts. The role of the twenty-five-member military junta was clearly that of an executive committee involved in decisionmaking and holding ultimate responsibility for the formulation of policy and the supervision of its execution. Actions to be taken were decided by majority vote, but the content of discussion and conflicts within the group were rarely made public. SRC members met in specialized committees to oversee government operations in several given areas. They were assisted by a subordinate fourteen-man secretariat—the Council of the Secretaries of State (CSS)—which functioned as a cabinet and was responsible for the day-to-day operation of government, although as a body it was without political power. The CSS was largely composed of civilians, but until 1974 several key ministries were held by military officers who were concurrently members of the SRC. All existing legislation from the previous democratic regime remained in force unless specifically abrogated by the SRC, usually on the grounds that it was "incompatible...with the spirit of the Revolution." In Feb. uary 1970 the democratic constitution of 1960, suspended at the time of the coup, was formally repealed by the SRC under powers conferred by the enabling law.

Although under the revolutionary system the SRC monopolized executive and legislative authority as a body, Siad Barre filled a number of executive positions: titular head of state, chairman of the CSS (and thereby head of government), senior member of the armed forces, and president of the SRC. His titles were of less importance, however, than was his personal authority, to which a majority of the other members of the SRC deferred.

Military and police officers, including some members of the SRC, were placed at the head of important government agencies and public institutions to supervise economic development, financial management, trade, communications and public utilities. Top

civilian district and regional officials were replaced by military officers who took control of local administration. Meanwhile civil servants were made to attend reorientation courses that combined professional training with political indoctrination, and those found to be incompetent or politically unreliable were fired. A mass dismissal of civil servants in 1974, however, was in part dictated by economic pressures.

The legal system continued to function after the coup but was subject to modification. In 1970 a military tribunal, the National Security Court, was set up as the judicial arm of the SRC and using a military attorney as prosecutor, operated outside the ordinary legal system as a watchdog against counterrevolutionary activities. The first cases that it dealt with involved Shermarke's assassination and the charges of corruption leveled by the SRC against members of the democratic regime. The court subsequently heard a number of serious cases both with and without political content. A uniform civil code introduced in 1973 replaced predecessor laws inherited from the Italians and British and also imposed restrictions on the activities of sharia (Islamic) courts. The new regime subsequently extended the death penalty and prison sentences to individual offenders, formally eliminating collective responsibility through the payment of *dia* (see The Legal System, ch. 4).

The SRC also overhauled the system of local government, breaking up the old regions into smaller units as part of a long-range program of decentralization that was intended to destroy the influence of the traditional clan assemblies and—in the government's words—to bring government closer to the people. Local councils, composed of military administrators and representatives appointed by the SRC, were established under the Ministry of Interior at the regional, district, and village level to advise the government on local conditions and to expedite its directives.

Other institutional innovations included the organization (under Soviet direction) of the National Security Service (NSS), directed initially at halting the flow of professionals and dissidents out of the country and at counteracting attempts to settle disputes among the clans by traditional means. The newly formed Ministry of Information and National Guidance set up local political education bureaus to carry the government's message to the people and utilized Somalia's once freewheeling print and broadcast media for the "success of the socialist, revolutionary road." A censorship board, appointed by the ministry, ensured that information was tailored according to SRC guidelines.

The SRC took its toughest political stance in the campaign to break down the solidarity of the lineage groups that was officially defined as tribalism and condemned as the most serious impediment to national unity. Siad Barre denounced tribalism in a wider

context as a "disease" afflicting not only Somalia but also the whole Third World and obstructing efforts at development. Prison terms and fines were meted out for a broad category of proscribed activities classified as tribalism. The traditional headmen, who had been recognized a representatives of their groups and had been paid a govenment stipend under the democratic regime, were replaced by reliable local dignitaries known as peaceseekers (*nabod doan*), who were appointed by Mogadishu to represent the interests of the government. The concept of community identification to supersede lineage affiliation was implemented through orientation centers set up in every district as the focal point of local political and social activity. The SRC decreed, for example, that all marriage ceremonies were to take place at the orientation center rather than in the traditional lineage group setting. Siad Barre personally officiated from time to time at these ceremonies and took the occasion to contrast the benefits provided by socialism to the evils he associated with tribalism.

The resettlement of 140,000 nomadic pastoralists in farming communities and in towns on the coast far from their traditional grazing lands, where the herders were encouraged to engage in sedentary agriculture and fishing, had as its purpose increased production and better control over the nomadic Somalis. By dispersing the nomads and severing their ties with the land to which specific clans made collective claim, clan solidarity may also have been diminished. In many instances real improvement in the living conditions of resettled nomads was evident, but despite government efforts to eliminate it, clan consciousness as well as a desire to return to the nomadic way of life persisted. Concurrent attempts to improve the status of Somali women were unpopular in a profoundly Muslim society, and Siad Barre's argument that reforms in this area recommended by the SRC were compatible with a developing understanding of Islamic concepts met with determined opposition from traditionalists.

Challenges to the Regime

Potential opposition to the SRC following the coup and subsequent challenges to Siad Barre from within the revolutionary regime were unorganized and subject to intense surveillance by the security apparatus. Siad Barre also proved to be a skillfully manipulative politician who preferred to win over the opposition by a mixture of coercion and blandishments or to find compromise solutions if those solutions would move the country in a direction compatible with his ideas. From 1971, when the second of two coup attempts against him failed, until the war in the Ogaden in 1977, no divisions within the SRC became public. On a few occasions civilian members of the CSS resigned to protest specific policies of the SRC, but no reprisals were taken against them.

Within certain undefined limits, criticism of personalities and policies was permitted. What was not tolerated was anything that seemed to indicate active support for the old order, opposition to the major lines of the government's ideology, or anything that the authorities thought might serve as the basis on which significant opposition might build. The NSS attemped to ferret out and arrest those who verbally attacked the SRC, and stiff jail sentences were imposed for "rumor-mongering" against the revolution. Security forces were assisted in surveillance activities by members of the Victory Pioneers (Gulwadayal), a youth militia whose symbol was an ever-vigilant eye. At village meetings people were told that they must destroy the old order by isolating hostile elements who were still heeded by sections of the population. Political officers bragged that members of religious communities had been arrested for counterrevolutionary activities and that merchants had been jailed for "refusal to accept the new order." In the most notable case of this type, ten religious leaders were tried and executed in 1975 for accusing the SRC of violating the teachings of the Quran by attempting to improve the position of women before the law.

The SRC announced on two occasions that it had discovered plotters initiating coup attempts against it. Both involved SRC members. In April 1970 Korshel, the first vice-president, was arrested and charged with treason. Korshel had not been among the 1969 coup leaders who brought the SRC to power and was believed to have opposed them during the first few hours, so that he may have remained the odd figure in the ruling body. The detailed charges against him included the allegation that he had organized mercenaries among the nomadic clans to provoke border incidents with Ethiopia that could be used as an excuse for foreign intervention in Somalia. Whatever the basis for this indictment, Korshel apparently represented the more conservative elements within the police and army and thus was potentially if not actually in opposition to the socialist orientation of the majority of SRC members. He was convicted of treason in a trial before the National Security Court and sentenced to a prison term.

In May 1971 the second vice-president, Major General Mohamed Ainanche, and a fellow SRC member, Soviet-trained Lieutenant Colonel Salah Gaveire Kedie, who had served as head of the Ministry of Defense and later as secretary of state for communications, were arrested along with several other army officers for plotting the assassination of Siad Barre. The conspirators, who had sought the support of clans that had lost influence in the 1969 overthrow of the democratic regime, appeared to have been motivated by personal rivalries rather than by ideological concerns.

Accused of conspiring to assassinate the president, the two key figures in the plot and another army officer were executed after a lengthy trial.

By 1974 the SRC felt sufficiently secure to release Korshel and most of the leaders of the democratic regime who had been detained since the coup. Egal and three other former ministers were excepted from the amnesty, however, and were sentenced to long prison terms, Egal to thirty years on charges of embezzlement.

Siad Barre and Scientific Socialism

Somalia's adherence to socialism became official when Siad Barre proclaimed on the first anniversary of the military coup that Somalia was a socialist state, despite the fact that the country had no history of class conflict in the Marxist sense. For purposes of Marxist analysis, therefore, tribalism was equated with class in a society struggling to liberate itself from distinctions imposed by lineage group affiliation. At the time, Siad Barre explained that the official ideology was composed of three elements—his own conception of community development based on the principle of self-reliance, a form of socialism based on Marxist principles, and Islam. These were subsumed under the title of scientific socialism, although such a definition was clearly at variance with the Soviet and Chinese models to which reference was frequently made (see The Ideological Base, ch. 4).

The theoretical underpinning of the state ideology was a mélange that combined aspects of the Quran with the influences of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Mussolini, but Siad Barre was pragmatic in its application. "Socialism is not a religion," he explained, "it is a political principle" of use in organizing government and managing production. Somalia's close alignment with communist states, coupled with its proclaimed adherence to scientific socialism, led to frequent accusations by critics that the country had become a Soviet satellite. For all the rhetoric extolling scientific socialism, however, genuine Marxist sympathies were not deep-rooted in Somalia. But the ideology was acknowledged—partly in view of the country's economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union—as the most convenient peg on which to hang a revolution introduced through an essentially nationalist military coup that had supplanted a Western-oriented parliamentary democracy.

More important than the Marxist ideology espoused by the SRC for the success and popular acceptance of the revolutionary regime in the early 1970s was the personal power exerted by Siad Barre and the image he projected. Styled the Victorious Leader (Guulwaadde), Siad Barre fostered the growth of a cult of personality around himself. Portraits of him in the company of Marx and Lenin festooned the streets on public occasions. The epigrams, exhortations, and good advice of the paternalistic leader who had

synthesized Marx with Islam and had found a uniquely Somali path to socialist revolution were widely distributed for handy reference in Siad Barre's little blue-and-white book. For some Somalis he had become the "Big Man," the warrior often possessing a religious charisma who was a traditional figure in Somali history. Despite the revolutionary regime's avowed intention to stamp out the particularism that had led to political competition among clans and clan families under the democratic regime, the government was commonly referred to by the code name MOD—standing for Marehan (Siad Barre's clan), Ogaden (his mother's clan), and Dolbahante (the clan of a son-in-law who was head of the NSS), whose members formed its inner circle. In 1975, for example, ten of the twenty members of the SRC were from the Darod clan-family, of which these three clans were a part, while the Digil and Rahanweyn, the sedentary interriverine clan-families, were totally unrepresented.

The Language and Literacy Issue

One of the principal objectives of the revolutionary regime was the adoption of a standard orthography for writing the Somali language, enabling it to become the country's official language. Since independence in 1960 Italian and English had served as the languages of administration and of instruction in Somalia's schools, English being used universally in the north and Italian to a great extent in the south. All government documents had been published in the two European languages, and it had been considered necessary that some important civil services posts that carried nationwide responsibilities should be held by two officials, each proficient in one of them. During the periods of the Hussein and Egal governments when a number of English-speaking northerners had been brought into prominent positions, English had appeared to dominate Italian in official circles and had even begun to replace it as a medium of instruction in schools in the south. Arabic—or a heavily arabized Somali—also had been widely used in cultural and commercial areas and in Islamic schools and courts. Religious traditionalists and supporters of Somalia's integration with the Arab world had argued for its adoption as the official language, leaving Somali as a vernacular.

The Somalis possessed a splendid oral literary tradition manifested in highly stylized forms of poetry, some of which had been transcribed first in Arabic script and later in Latin or in one of several indigenous scripts. Despite attempts to adapt Arabic orthography more closely to the Somali language, the significant differences between the phonetic structures of Arabic and Somali presented substantial difficulties for accurate transliteration. In the 1920s the poet Osman Yusuf Kenadid worked out an indigenous script, known as Osmanya, which he used for writing in the

dialect spoken in northeastern Somalia. Because of the nationalistic symbolism offered by an indigenous script, the SYL for a time supported the adoption of Osmanya as the standard script for Somali, but its use in schools was suppressed by Italian colonial authorities. A Latin orthography had been favored by some educated Somalis, but it was difficult for them to espouse such a position in the face of opposition from religious leaders who held that a "Christian" script was unsuitable for the language of a Muslim country. Nevertheless in the 1950s Shire Jamac Ahmad devised a Latin script adapted to the writing of Somali and introduced it to the reading public through a literary journal that he published.

A few months after independence, the Somali Language Committee was appointed to investigate the best means of writing Somali. The committee considered nine scripts, including Arabic, Latin, and various indigenous scripts. Its report, issued in 1962, favored the Latin, which the committee regarded as the best suited to represent the phonemic structure of Somali and flexible enough to be adjusted for the dialects. Facility with a Latin system, moreover, offered obvious advantages to those who would find it necessary to seek higher education outside the country. Modern printing equipment would also be more easily and reasonably available for Latin type. Existing Somali grammars prepared by foreign scholars, although outdated for modern teaching methods, would give some initial advantage in the preparation of teaching materials. Disagreement had been so intense among opposing factions, however, that no action was taken to adopt a standard script, although successive governments continued to reiterate their intention to resolve the issue.

On coming to power the SRC made clear that it viewed the official use of foreign languages, of which only a small fraction of the population had an adequate working knowledge, as a threat to national unity, contributing to the stratification of society on the basis of language. In 1971 the SRC revived the Somali Language Committee and instructed it to prepare textbooks for schools and adult education programs, a national grammar, and a new Somali dictionary. No decision was made at the time, however, on the use of a particular script, and each member of the committee worked in the one with which he was familiar. The understanding was that on adoption of a standard script all materials would be immediately transcribed into it.

On the third anniversary of the 1969 coup, the SRC announced that a Latin script—a modified version of that devised by Jamac Ahmad—had been adopted as the standard script to be used throughout Somalia beginning January 1, 1973. As a prerequisite for continued service with the government, officials at all levels

were given three months (later extended to six months) to learn the new script and to become proficient in it. During 1973 educational material written in the standard orthography was introduced in elementary schools and by 1975 was also being used in secondary and higher education.

Somalia's literacy rate was estimated at only 5 percent in 1972. After adopting the new script the SRC launched a "cultural revolution" aimed at making the entire population literate in two years time. The first part of the massive literacy campaign was carried out in a series of three-month sessions in urban and settled areas and reportedly resulted in several hundred thousand people learning to read and write. As many as 8,000 teachers were recruited from among government employees, members of the armed forces, and others to conduct the program.

The campaign in settled areas was followed by preparations for a major effort among the nomads that got under way in August 1974 and was carried out by more than 20,000 teachers, half of whom were secondary school students whose classes were suspended for the duration of the school year. The rural program also compelled a privileged class of urban youth to share the hardships of the nomadic pastoralists. Although adversely affected by the onset of a severe drought, the program appeared to have achieved substantial results in the field in a short period of time (see Education, ch. 2).

School enrollment had increased dramatically by the mid-1970s in response to an ambitious building program and the introduction of free education at all levels. The Somali National University was established at Mogadishu in 1971 over the objections of some Somali educators and foreign experts who argued that the country lacked the professional resources to sustain a program of higher education at acceptable standards. In 1972 private schools, which had accounted for about 20 percent of the total enrollment, were brought under state control.

Economic Development

At the time of the coup that brought the SRC to power, Somalia was listed by the UN in the special category of least developed countries. Having an estimated per capita gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) equivalent to less than US$80, it was one of the world's ten poorest countries. Some 60 percent of the population consisted of nomadic and seminomadic pastoralists. Only about 15 to 20 percent were fully engaged in agriculture at or a little above the subsistence level. Industrial activities, mainly food processing, absorbed no more than 6 percent of the economically active work force, and in urban areas large numbers were idled by the lack of employment opportunities. Livestock sales, primarily to Saudi Arabia, accounted for over half of the country's

meager export earnings. Another 25 percent of earnings came from the export of bananas to Italy, but the traditional market there was declining. Having few other marketable resources to offer abroad and dependent on imports for all of its fuel, most of its manufactured articles, and some of its food supplies, Somalia suffered from a lopsided trade imbalance and chronic scarcity of foreign exchange. During the 1960s the country had relied on foreign assistance not only for development but also to meet basic economic needs. Despite Somalia's apparently limited economic potential and shortage of trained personnel, the SRC outlined ambitious plans for economic development shortly after taking power.

Although the revolutionary regime's development schemes depended on continued—and increased—technical and economic assistance, Siad Barre roundly condemned the former regime for having permitted undue interference by foreign donors. The SRC's approach, he emphasized, would insist on the broadest possible popular participation in keeping with his concept of self-reliance to develop resources, provide services, and alleviate the country's poverty. Self-help efforts, exemplified in a series of so-called crash programs that were aimed at achieving specific goals in agriculture, public works, and community development, maximized the use of unskilled labor—the resource in most abundant supply. Crash programs involved the construction of schools, mosques, and sports facilities, reclamation projects, road repair, and well digging. Maintenance of existing public facilities, improved sanitation, and clean-up campaigns in urban areas also ranked high among the regime's priorities. In 1972 the SRC unveiled a comprehensive five-year economic development plan for the period 1974-78, which it optimistically anticipated would increase agricultural production and processing for the export market while achieving self-sufficiency in food for domestic use.

Crash programs based on self-help were of two kinds. Short-term projects mobilized students, civil servants, and army personnel for specific periods of time and had the added ideological objective of inculcating social equality and an appreciation of the dignity of labor. Jail terms reportedly awaited those who failed to "volunteer" for work assignments. The unemployed and those in fringe occupations were also rounded up from the streets of Mogadishu and other towns and sent to join work gangs. In the second of the crash programs, which was concerned with public works and long-term agricultural development, the salient objective in recruiting laborers was to provide stable employment.

According to SRC declarations in the early 1970s, one of the aims of scientific socialism was to build a completely socialist economy in which the state would control the means of production. In the first of its development programs, however, the revolutionary regime recognized that the problems posed by limited capital

made "the continued existence of a mixed economy, as a transitional stage, inevitable." Private business and foreign participation in the economy were therefore allowed to continue, but emphasis was on expanding the public sector wherever feasible. Nationalization of key foreign-owned enterprises with compensation and the indigenization of management remained important items on the SRC's agenda. Already in 1970, for example, Italian- and British-owned banks and petroleum companies operating in Somalia were brought under state control as were foreign-owned utility companies and the sugar refinery. Responsibility for the marketing abroad of bananas, grown mostly on Italian-owned plantations, and some other crops was assumed by the state. Likewise the import trade and distribution of imports was put under direction of the National Agency for Trade, which was also in charge of providing vehicles and building material for public use. In an effort to eliminate price fluctuations and to ensure equal access to supplies throughout the country, the state also took over the distribution of some domestically produced goods such as sugar, but intervention resulted in steeply rising prices, food shortages, and the growth of an illegal private market that required the imposition of rationing to curb.

The Soviet Union provided the most generous bilateral economic and technical assistance to Somalia during the early 1970s, focusing primarily on the development of an export-oriented agro-industry based on meat and fish processing. China began a major road-building project and assisted the Somalis in introducing rice and tobacco cultivation. Chinese aid was also accepted in setting up a light industry to manufacture cigarettes and matches for domestic consumption, in order to save money otherwise spent abroad on those items. Italy continued to supply bilateral aid, particularly for education, and contributed to an EEC-sponsored assistance program. In 1970 the United States, which had been the second-largest Western donor after Italy, terminated its aid program in Somalia in retaliation for the merchant vessels flying the Somali flag-of-convenience that carried cargoes to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). Grants, credits, and loans were made available by UN agencies to fund irrigation and other agricultural development projects and to relieve the pressure on Somalia's foreign exchange. By the mid-1970s Somalia was becoming increasingly reliant on project financing from Arab countries.

Drought had always been a common phenomenon in Somalia. Occurring periodically, often at intervals of about five years, it caused extreme hardship, particularly among the nomads, but the herds were quickly replenished, and the pastoralists returned with them to their traditional grazing grounds when rain came again. The drought of 1974–75 was the worst in memory, however, and it lingered without relief. The loss of livestock, reckoned in the mil-

lions of cattle, goats, sheep, and camels deprived many pastoralists of their livelihood and seriously reduced Somalia's most important export commodity. In desperation the government suspended the five-year plan and diverted assistance funds earmarked for development projects to meet the needs of refugees, who by early 1975 numbered at least 200,000, quartered in famine relief centers. The conditions imposed by the drought also had the effect of encouraging participation in the governments's program for resettling nomads in sedentary occupations, and about 140,000 were reportedly relocated in the south—most with the aid of a Soviet airlift. The drought and the need to resettle refugees hastened the government's decision to proceed with nationalization of farmland for redistribution to family units (see Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure, ch. 3).

Creation of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party

One of the SRC's first acts was to prohibit the existence of any political association. Under Soviet pressure to create a communist party structure to replace Somalia's military regime, Siad Barre had announced as early as 1971 the SRC's intention to establish a one-party state. The SRC had already begun organizing what was described as a "vanguard of the revolution," composed of members of a socialist elite drawn from both military and civilian sectors. The National Public Relations Office (retitled the National Political Office in 1973) was formed to propagate the ideology of scientific socialism with the support of the Ministry of Information and National Guidance through orientation centers that had been built around the country, generally as local self-help projects.

The formative congress of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was convened by the SRC in June 1976 and voted to establish the Supreme Council as the new party's central committee. The council included the nineteen officers who composed the SRC in addition to civilian advisers, heads of ministries, and other public figures. Civilians accounted for a majority of its seventy-three members. On July 1, 1976, the SRC dissolved itself, formally vesting power over the country's government in the SRSP under the direction of the Supreme Council.

In theory the creation of the SRSP marked the end of military rule, but in practice real power over the party and the government remained with the small group of military officers who had been most influential in the SRC. Decisionmaking resided with the new party's politburo, a select committee of the Supreme Council that was comprised of five former SRC members, including Siad Barre and his son-in-law, NSS chief Colonel Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle. Siad Barre was also secretary-general of the SRSP as well as chairman of the Council of Ministers, which had replaced the CSS. (When the SRSP congress proposed to elevate

him to the rank of field marshal, however, he declined to accept the honor.) Military influence in the new government was increased when former members of the SRC were assigned to take over additional ministerial posts. Likewise, the MOD circle was widely represented on the Supreme Council and in other party organs. Upon the establishment of the SRSP, the National Political Office was abolished, and its functions were undertaken by the local party leadership.

Foreign Policy under Military Rule

The major foreign influence on Somalia after independence was clearly the Soviet Union. Soviet involvement in the country had begun with the extension of military and economic aid and scholarships to Somali students for training in the Soviet Union in the 1960s. By 1969 a large number of Soviet officers were serving as advisers to the Somali armed forces, which was equipped almost entirely with weapons of Soviet-bloc manufacture. Many officers, including leaders of the 1969 coup, had become ideologically disposed to some form of socialism and looked to Marxist solutions as the best means for ending their country's abysmal poverty. The SRC was favorably inclined, therefore, to turn first toward the Soviet Union for advice and continued assistance, and the Soviet response was prompt and substantial. Supplies were provided for a Somali military force that was nearly doubled in size to more than 20,000 by 1975. An estimated 1,000 Soviet advisers were present at all levels of the armed forces, training the Somalis in the use of an inventory that included fifty-two combat aircraft and at least 250 tanks. The Soviets reorganized the Somali intelligence and security services and cooperated in dealing with a contingent of dissident Somali army officers who were deported to the Soviet Union for "training." Cuban training cadre were also introduced, and advisers from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) were assigned to the national police.

Much of the Soviet aid was nonmilitary in nature and the Soviet Union scored its greatest success in cementing relations with Somalia through extensive humanitarian assistance provided during the disastrous drought of 1974–75. The basis for Somali-Soviet relations after 1974 was the treaty of friendship and cooperation signed during a visit of the Soviet president Nikolai V. Podgorny, to Somalia in July of that year. Although the resulting Soviet presence in Somalia became massive and Siad Barre declared that Marxism-Leninism was the basis of the country's revolutionary ideology, the alignment with Moscow was far from that of a Soviet satellite. Siad Barre claimed that a major reason for such intimate ties was that Moscow had not asked anything of Somalia in return for unconditional aid; however, the Soviet defense minister obtained access to Somali port and airfield facilities at Berbera after agreeing to improve them.

By 1977 a Soviet facility that included an airfield, harbor, storage depot for missiles, communications station, and barracks was operational at Berbera. The Somalis categorically denied the existence of the base at Berbera—even after detailed evidence had been revealed to the contrary—and offered to allow United States naval vessels to call at Somali ports along with the Soviet ships that regularly put in there.

The questions of United States military assistance to Ethiopia and the Soviet base at Berbera hampered improvement in United States-Somali relations, which had deteriorated after the termination of the United States aid program in 1970. A considerable amount of assistance from the United States continued to reach Somalia, however, in the forms of multilateral aid programs and emergency grain shipments during the drought. Relations with France were vexed by the continued French presence at Djibouti, while those with Britain had never recovered from the diplomatic rupture in the 1960s. Italy maintained its good contacts with Somalia despite the adverse impact that SRC policies had on Italian investments there.

Somalia was bound by historical and religious ties to the Arab world and had its most important trade links to Saudi Arabia. The country had also benefited in the past from aid provided by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war Somalia offered to send troops to the Sinai front and had allowed the Egyptian navy to use the port of Berbera. At the time of the 1973 world oil crisis, Somalia chose to accept the invitation to join the League of Arab States (Arab League) that had been extended years before, and in February 1974 it became that organization's only non-Arab member.

Somalia's decision to join the Arab League was announced without the prior public discussion that characterized most other major decisions. In explaining the move, Siad Barre stressed Somalia's historical associations with Arab countries and their common adherence to Islam. He foresaw a situation in which assistance and investment from oil-rich but food-importing states would be used to develop Somalia's agricultural potential to their mutual benefit. In addition a number of valuable foreign aid commitments were secured from the Arab states, and new marketing agreements were obtained for Somali livestock. Somalia's diplomatic reorientation toward the Arab world also came at a time when relations with neighboring African countries were once again becoming tense.

Although the armed forces had seen their mission as one of carrying forward the country's pan-Somali objectives, the SRC immediately made it clear that the revolutionary regime would adhere to the former government's policy of regional détente. This commitment was underscored during Haile Selassie's state

visit to Somalia in 1971, but comments by Somali leaders were no always reassuring to their neighbors. For example in 1973 at annual meeting of heads of state of the OAU, Siad Barre again raised the issue of Somalia's claims to the Ogaden, spurred apparently by new reports of the imminent discovery of oil and natural gas deposits there. The SRC asserted that Somalia's position did not place it in conflict with the OAU policy regarding the inviolability of national borders because, from the Somali viewpoint, theirs was not a border claim but rather a problem resulting from "continuing colonial occupation."

In response to a Somali request the OAU agreed to take up the question of the disputed territories and attempted mediation through the good offices of an eight-nation committee. To the embarrassment of many members, Siad Barre reopened the issue at the 1974 OAU summit, hosted by Somalia in Mogadishu. The SRC warmly welcomed the overthrow of Haile Selassie later that year by a military group that, like Somalia's ruling body, also pledged to bring about revolutionary change to its country. But friendly words were accompanied by the continued growth in size and capability of the Somali armed forces, the implications of which were not lost on Ethiopia or Kenya.

War in the Ogaden

Somalia promoted the organization of insurgent movements by Somalis and Oromos in Ethiopia's southern regions in the early 1960s and provided them with material as well as moral support. During the period of détente with Ethiopia, however, the Egal government and subsequently the SRC attempted to distance themselves from the insurgents and denied recognition to their representatives in Mogadishu. Encouraged by the apparent breakdown of authority in Ethiopia after the 1974 coup that deposed Haile Selassie, some members of the SRC urged active Somali intervention in the Ogaden to recover the "lost territories," but Siad Barre counseled patience, predicting that Ethiopia would collapse of its own accord. Following demonstrations of popular solidarity with the Ogaden Somalis early in 1975, the president ordered security forces to arrest and jail militant leaders in the capital.

Siad Barre continued to seek a negotiated settlement with the military regime in Addis Ababa that would allow for self-determination in the Ogaden. Only when his diplomatic initiative appeared to fail did Siad Barre agree to extend formal recognition late in 1975 to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which had recently been reorganized by new leaders who had been schooled in the old SYL. Operating in the Ogaden, the WSLF was committed to the Greater Somalia concept. Linked to it was the Somali-Abo Liberation Front, which incorporated



One of the Somali women who fought in the Ogaden as Western Somali Liberation Front guerrillas
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington



Western Somali Liberation Front guerrillas celebrating the capture of a village in the southern Ogaden. The sign in Somali reads "May all colonized peoples win their independence."
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

dissident Oromos and had its sphere of operations in Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi. Somalia also backed and armed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, a Marxist-Leninist group dedicated to establishing a civilian communist government, that fought a vicious underground war against Ethiopia's military regime.

WSLF guerrillas engaged Ethiopian troops in combat for the first time in 1975, systematically hitting police posts and army garrisons from base camps across the border in Somalia. As the tempo of fighting picked up, the WSLF acquired an armored and artillery capability. In June 1977 the Somali insurgents were successful in cutting the railroad bridges between Addis Ababa and Djibouti over which about one-third of Ethiopia's external trade was carried, and the WSLF claimed effective military control over 60 percent of the Ogaden. At that time the WSLF could count on about 6,000 men in well-disciplined units, an unspecified but reportedly substantial percentage of them volunteers from Somalia's armed forces who had apparently crossed into the Ogaden on their own initiative.

In July Somali mechanized units based in Hargeysa invaded Ethiopian territory in a preemptive thrust at Harer, the region's military command center, that was intended to decide the issue in the Ogaden before reinforcements and Soviet equipment in the pipeline to Ethiopia arrived on the scene. The capture of Jijiga in August, less than 100 kilometers from Harer, was to be the high-water mark in that latest attempt to secure the Ogaden for the Somalis.

The decisive factor in the debacle that followed was the complete shift in Moscow's support from Somalia to its enemy. In March 1977 Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro had sought to reconcile differences between the two socialist regimes during visits to Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, but Siad Barre continued to deny Somalia's active participation in the Ogaden fighting. But when Addis Ababa issued an urgent appeal for assistance after the fall of Jijiga, Moscow responded with a massive military supply effort, and deliveries of large quantities of modern equipment began to arrive at the front in September. Resupplied Ethiopian troops regrouped and were reinforced by Cuban combat units to turn the tide of battle against the Somalis. In November, as the weight of the Soviet intervention on Ethiopia's side began to be felt in the Ogaden, Siad Barre evicted the Soviet personnel from his country and abrogated the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union (see Greater Somalia, ch. 4; Performance in the Ogaden Conflict, ch. 5).

* * *

The available literature on the history of Somalia and the Somali people is limited in volume but not in the scope of scholarly atten-

tion conferred on it by a small body of specialists writing in English. I.M. Lewis, the prolific doyen of Somali studies, provides an easily accessible historical survey in *A Modern History of Somalia*, updated in the 1980 edition to cover the 1970s, with which any further study of the country should commence. Margaret Castagno's *Historical Dictionary of Somalia* is a helpful reference work for additional reading. The basic argument for the modified traditional view of Somali origins and migrations is given by I.M. Lewis in "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa." The revisionist view is presented by Herbert S. Lewis in "The Origins of the Galla and Somali." Based on persuasive linguistic evidence, his argument is supported and amplified by E.R. Turton's "Bantu, Galla, and Somali Migrations in the Horn of Africa." Robert L. Hess' *Italian Colonialism in Somalia* is a detailed study of the colonial episode in the south. The only available biography of Mohamed Abdullah is Douglas Jardin's vintage *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland*, but more recent research on his life and times has been published in excellent articles by Hess, B.G. Martin, and Leo Silberman. I.M. Lewis' *A Pastoral Democracy* and David D. Laitin's *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience* are invaluable for an understanding of the social and cultural aspects of Somali history. The origins and growth of nationalist sentiment and political movements are traced in Saadia Touval's *Somali Nationalism*. The problem of Somali irredentism is treated in its historical context by John Drysdale in *The Somali Dispute* and in its contemporary manifestation by Tom J. Farer in *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa*. I.M. Lewis calls on his thorough knowledge of Somali society and politics to analyze the background and initial consequences of the military coup in "The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup," while Laitin considers the ongoing development of the revolution in "Somalia's Military Government and Scientific Socialism," published in *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment



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Somali nomad, symbol of the country's predominantly pastoral life

SOMALI NATIONALS ARE CULTURALLY, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous people, sparsely scattered in a harsh dry land. There are, however, distinctions of some importance between sections of the population, related in part to variations in their means of livelihood and modes of adaptation to the environment. In the early 1980s roughly 60 percent of an estimated population of more than 4 million were still nomadic pastoralists or seminomadic herders, subject to the vicissitudes of an arid climate. From 20 to 25 percent were cultivators, most living on or between the country's two major rivers, the Juba and the Shabeelle. The remainder were town dwellers, by far the greatest number living in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu.

Although ethnic Somalis—95 percent of the population—shared a common culture, they were divided into descent groups of varying inclusiveness and size, all based on descent from a male ancestor through males. These ranged from the clan-family (of which there were six) to its constituent units, the clans, and then to the groups—lineages—that made up the clans. Lineages were in turn further segmented and differed in size and genealogical depth. Among the sedentary interriverine Somalis, however, descent gave way in part to territory as a framework for social, political, and economic organization.

Membership in clans and lineages set the stage for the allocation of rights and obligations of individuals. The principle of descent, however, was modified (if rarely overidden) by the principle of contract: contracts or treaties bound specified descent groups (and their individual members) together for war and peace and, above all, for the payment of compensation in cases of homicide and injury.

The social order of the Somalis was marked by competition and often by armed conflict between segments (clans and lineages), even between those of the same clan-family or clan. Within each unit, relations among Somali males were characterized by democracy and equality, although those considered better warriors, wiser dispute-settlers, or more able speakers might carry greater weight in council. In any case every man had to earn his prestige. There were however, exceptions to the characteristic democracy and equality. The pastoral Somalis looked down on the sedentary ones, and both looked down on the non-Somali clients of the sedentary Somalis and the members of despised occupational groups (a very small proportion of the population).

This segmented order, with relatively minor modifications, was carried into the independence period. In a very poor country, competition for power and wealth often took the form of shifting alliances and conflicts between greater and lesser clan and lineage segments and led to what, in the modern context, many Somalis

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saw as corruption. At the same time, other divisions emerged between these educated urban dwellers who commanded a foreign language and the ordinary rural Somali.

Soon after the military coup in October 1969, the self-proclaimed socialist government directed an attack on the traditional system. In principle, clans and lineages were given short shrift, women were encouraged to participate in government and to go to school, and low status groups were to be considered equals. The distance that had developed between educated English- or Italian-speaking Somalis and the rest of the population was in part bridged by the institution of a script for Somali and the establishment of Somali as the official language.

The government of Siad Barre had insisted that socialism was compatible with Islam, the religion of the overwhelming majority of Somalis. If the Somalis have not always conformed to what some would consider orthodox Islam, their identity has been bound up with being Muslim. With few, if any, exceptions the leaders of the regime were Muslims and had not attacked religion. They did not hesitate, however, to institute reforms that incurred the displeasure of conservative Muslim leaders. Despite government support for significant change, clan and lineage remained important in the early 1980s, even if the ways in which they affected daily life had been altered. There were indications that members of the regime, to the highest levels, were not unaffected by kinship considerations, and the Somalis certainly perceived this to be the case.

The workings of the lineage system were predicated on the solidarity of the segments of the same order vis-à-vis one another and the relative equality of the members of each segment. The growth of the state and the emergence of differences of wealth and access to other resources in the still important private sector have given rise to an incipient stratification that may override lineage solidarity as it diminishes equality.

Physical Setting

Africa's easternmost country, Somalia has a land area of 637,540 square kilometers, roughly comparable to that of the state of Texas. Somalia is the cap of a geographic region commonly referred to as the Horn of Africa, which includes Ethiopia and Djibouti.

The terrain consist largely of plateau surfaces and plains. In the north, however, rugged, east-west trending mountain ranges lie at varying distances from the Gulf of Aden coast. Temperatures are hot throughout the year, exceptions occurring at higher elevations in the north. Rainfall is sparse, and most of Somalia has a harsh semiarid to arid environment suitable only for the nomadic pastoralism characteristic of well over half the population. Only in lim-

ited areas of moderate rainfall in the northwest and particularly in the southwest, where the country's two perennial rivers are found, is agriculture practiced to any extent (see Agriculture and Pastoralism, ch. 3).

The local geology suggests the presence of valuable mineral deposits. As of 1981, however, only a few significant sites had been located, and mineral production played a very minor role in the economy (see Mining, ch. 3).

The country's long coastline (2,960 kilometers) has been of importance chiefly as it has permitted trade with the Middle East and the remainder of East Africa. The exploitation of the shore and the continental shelf for fishing and other purposes had barely begun by the early 1980s (see Fisheries, ch 3; Ports and shipping, ch. 3).

Climate

Climate is the overriding factor influencing much of Somali life. For the large nomadic population, the time of arrival and sufficiency of rainfall are major determinants in whether grazing will be adequate for their livestock and the enjoyment of relative prosperity, or whether pasturage and water will be in short supply, animals lost, and existence grim. Under conditions of drought, such as occurred during 1974 and early 1975, the situation can become disastrous. There are some indications that the climate has worsened in the last century and that the increase in the human and animal populations have put a great burden on water and vegetation.

Although less prominent in parts of the northern highlands and the southwestern coastal area of the Juba and Shabeelle rivers, four seasons are observable: two wet and two dry. These are determined by the northeast and southwest monsoonal winds and the transitional lulls between them that result in alternating periods of moisture and aridity. During the main periods of monsoonal air flow, winds blow parallel to the coast depositing little rainfall. In the first of these periods, from late December or early January, when the northeast monsoon is dominant, hot, dry, and dusty winds are prevalent. This season, known locally as the *jilal*, lasts until about March and is the harshest time of year for the nomadic groups.

Beginning in March or April and extending into May and sometimes June, during which the monsoonal winds change direction, a transitional period known as *gu* brings the country's heaviest, although still comparatively meager, rains. The third season, *hagaa*, begins in June as the southwest monsoon becomes ascendant. By July pastures and vegetation begin to dry up, and dust blown by the strong winds is everywhere. The *hagaa* season continues through August and is the hottest period of the year in the north

along the Gulf of Aden. Along the southwest coast, however, cooling breezes from the Indian Ocean make the period comparatively pleasant; showers also occur during this time in the coastal areas. The second wet season, called *dayr* by the Somalis, is shorter, but its intermittent rains during the lull between the southwest and northeast monsoons (mostly in October and November) account in some areas for about 30 percent of the local annual rainfall.

Most of the country receives under 500 millimeters of rain annually, and a large area encompassing the northeastern and much of the northern parts receives as little as 50 to 150 millimeters. Certain higher areas in the north, however, record more than 500 millimeters a year. The southwest receives an average of 330 to 500 millimeters; some coastal spots average about 500 millimeters (see fig. 4). Generally rainfall takes the form of showers or localized rains and is characterized by an extreme degree of variability.

Mean daily maximum temperatures throughout the country range from 30°C to 40°C, except at higher elevations and along the Indian Ocean coast. Mean daily minimum temperatures usually vary from roughly 20°C to more than 30°C. The northern part of the country has the greatest temperature extremes, readings ranging from below freezing in the highlands in December to more than 45°C in July in the coastal plain skirting the Gulf of Aden. The region's relative humidity ranges from roughly 40 percent in midafternoon to 85 percent at night, varying somewhat with the season. During the colder months from December to February, visibility at higher elevations is often restricted by fog.

The southern part of the country exhibits less extreme temperatures, which range from about 20°C to 40°C; the hottest season occurs from February through April. Coastal readings are usually from five to ten degrees cooler than those inland. There is little variation in the coastal zone's relative humidity, which usually remains about 70 percent even during the dry seasons.

Terrain, Vegetation, and Drainage

Somalia is, physiographically, a land of limited contrast. In the north, parallel to the Gulf of Aden coast is a maritime plain varying in width from roughly twelve kilometers in the west to as little as two or three kilometers in the east. Scrub-covered, semiarid, and generally drab, this plain, known as the *guban* (burnt land) because of its heat and dryness during much of the year, is crossed by broad, shallow watercourses that are beds of dry sand except in the rainy seasons. When the rains arrive, however, the vegetation—a subdesert association of low bushes and grass clumps—is quickly renewed, and for a time the *guban* provides some grazing for nomad livestock.

Inland from the gulf coast, the plain rises to the precipitous north-facing cliffs of dissected highlands. These form rugged

mountain ranges that extend from the northwestern border with Ethiopia eastward to the tip of the Horn where they end in sheer cliffs at Caseyr. The general elevation along the crest of these mountains averages about 1,800 meters above sea level south of the port town of Berbera, and eastward from that area it continues at between 1,800 and 2,100 meters almost to Caseyr. The country's highest point, Shimbir Berris, which rises to over 2,400 meters, is located near the town of Ceerigaabo.

Southward the mountains descend, often in scarped ledges, to an elevated plateau devoid of perennial rivers. This region of broken mountain terrain, shallow plateau valleys, and usually dry watercourses is known to the Somalis as the Ogo. In its especially arid eastern part, the plateau, interspersed by a number of isolated mountain ranges, gradually slopes toward the Indian Ocean and in central Somalia constitutes the Mudug Plain. A major feature of this eastern section is the long and broad Nugaal Valley with its extensive net of intermittent seasonal watercourses. The entire eastern area's population consists mainly of pastoral nomads and is in a zone of low and erratic rainfall. It was a major disaster area during the great drought of 1974 and early 1975.

The western part of the Ogo plateau region is characterized by shallow valleys and dry watercourses. Annual rainfall is greater, however, and there are flat areas of arable land that provide a home for dryland cultivators. Most important, it is an area of permanent wells to which the predominantly nomadic population returns during the dry seasons. The western plateau slopes gently southward and merges imperceptibly into a zone known as the Haud, a broad, undulating area that constitutes some of the best grazing lands for the Somali nomads despite the lack of appreciable rainfall for over half of the year. Enhancing the value of the Haud are the natural depressions that flood during periods of rain to become temporary lakes and ponds.

The Haud zone continues for more than sixty kilometers into Ethiopia, and the vast Somali Plateau, which lies between the northern Somali mountains and the highlands of southeast Ethiopia, extends south and eastward through Ethiopia into central and southwest Somalia. The portion of the Haud lying within Ethiopia was the subject of an agreement made during the colonial era permitting nomads from British Somaliland to pasture their herds there. Since Somali independence in 1960 it has been the subject of Somali claims and of considerable strife (see War in the Ogaden, ch. 1).

Southwestern Somalia is dominated by the country's only two permanent rivers, the Juba and the Shabeelle. These rivers, which originate in the Ethiopian highlands, flow in a generally southerly direction, cutting wide valleys in the Somali Plateau as





Figure 4. Terrain, Drainage, and Rainfall

the latter descends toward the sea; the plateau's elevation falls off rapidly in this area. A succeeding large coastal zone, which includes the lower reaches of the rivers and extends from the Mudug Plain to the Kenyan border, averages 180 meters above sea level.

The Juba River enters the Indian Ocean at Kismaayo. Although the Shabeelle River at one time apparently also reached the sea near Marka, its course changed in prehistoric times, and it now



turns southwestward near Balcad (about twenty miles north of Mogadishu) and follows a path parallel to the coast for more than eighty-five kilometers. The river is perennial only to a point southwest of Mogadishu; thereafter it consists of swampy areas and dry reaches and is finally lost in the sand east of Jilib, not far from the Juba River. During flood seasons in about April to May (the *gu* rainy period) and October to November (*dayr* rains), the Shabeelle River may be full to a point near Jilib and occasionally may

even break through to the Juba River farther south. Favorable rainfall and soil conditions make this entire riverine region a fertile agricultural area and the center of the country's largest sedentary population.

In most of northern, northeastern, and north-central Somalia where rainfall is low, the vegetation consists of scattered low trees, including various acacias, and widely interspersed patches of grass. This vegetation deteriorates into a subdesert association of low bushes and grass clumps in the highly arid areas of the northeast and along the Gulf of Aden.

As elevations and rainfall increase in the maritime ranges of the north, the vegetation becomes denser. Aloes are common, and on the higher plateau areas of the Ogo are woodlands. At a few spots above 1,500 meters the remnants of juniper forests—protected by the state—and areas of the *candelabra euphobia* occur. In the more arid highlands of the northeast, boswellia and commiphora trees are sources, respectively, of the frankincense and myrrh for which Somalia has been known since ancient times.

A broad plateau area encompassing the northern city of Hargeysa, which receives comparatively high rainfall, is covered naturally by woodland (much of which has been degraded by overgrazing) and occasionally by extensive grassland. Parts of this area have been under cultivation since the 1930s, producing sorghum and maize (corn); in the 1970s it constituted the only significant region of sedentary cultivation outside the southwestern part of the country.


The Haud south of the Hargeysa area is covered mostly by an open, semiarid woodland of scattered trees, mainly acacias, underlain by grasses that include species especially favored by livestock as forage. As the Haud merges into the Mudug Plain in central Somalia, the aridity increases and the vegetation displays a subdesert character. Farther southward it gradually changes to semiarid woodland and grass as the annual precipitation increases.


In comparison with these areas, the region encompassing the Shabeelle and Juba rivers is relatively well watered and constitutes the most promising arable zone in the country. The lowland between the rivers supports rich pasturage. The region's natural vegetation is arid to subarid savanna, open woodland, and thickets and underlying grasses that frequently are abundant. In places there are areas of grassland, and in the far southwestern part near the Kenyan border some dry evergreen forests are found.

Along the Indian Ocean from Mereeg southwestward to near Kismaayo lies a stretch of fixed coastal sand dunes. This area is covered with scattered scrub and grass clumps where rainfall is sufficient. Overgrazing, particularly in the area between Mogadishu and Kismaayo, has resulted in the destruction of the protective

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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vegetation cover and the gradual movement of the dunes inland. Since the early 1970s efforts have been made to stabilize these dunes by replanting (see Forestry, ch. 3).

Minor vegetation includes that found in swamps into which the Shabeelle River empties most of the year and in other large swamp areas in the lower course of the Juba River. Mangrove forests are also seen at points along the coast, particularly from Kismaayo to near the Kenyan border. Uncontrolled exploitation appears to have caused some damage to forests in that area. Other mangrove forests are located near Mogadishu and at a number of spots along the northeastern and northern coasts.

Population and Settlement Patterns

The first nationwide population census was carried out in February 1975. It included a complete enumeration in all urban and settled rural areas and a sample enumeration of the nomadic population. In the latter case the sampling units were chiefly watering points. Preliminary results of that census were made public in a document—Three Year Plan 1979–81—issued by the Ministry of Planning. The estimates for 1980, based on those results, are somewhat larger than those of the United Nations (UN) and the United States Bureau of the Census, which are based on extrapolations from earlier and more fragmentary sampling. Moreover Somali officials have suggested that the 1975 census undercounted the nomadic population substantially, in part because the census took place at the time of the worst drought in Somalia's recorded history and many people were moving in search of food and water.

The total population furnished by the 1975 census was 3.72 million. Assuming an annual growth rate of 2.5 percent (estimates range between 2.3 and 2.7 percent) and using the 1975 census results as a base, the 1980 population may be estimated at a little more than 4.2 million and the 1981 population at more than 4.3 million. Not included are substantial numbers of refugees who have fled from the Ogaden in Ethiopia to Somalia beginning in the mid–1970s (see Refugees, this ch.).

The Ministry of Planning's report of preliminary census data distinguishes three main categories—nomads, settled farmers, and persons in nonagricultural occupations. Settled farmers were defined as those in permanent settlements outside the national, regional, and district capitals, but some of these are in fact pastoralists, and others may be craftsmen and small traders. Those living in the various capitals were defined as nonagricultural regardless of their occupations. In 1975 nomads constituted nearly 59 percent of the population, settled persons nearly 22 percent, and nonagricultural persons more than 19 percent (see table 2, Appendix).

If Somali officials are correct in assuming that roughly 700,000 persons (probably all nomads) were not counted in 1975 and these

are added to the totals, then the proportions of the categories shift. The total population in that year becomes 4.4 million, a little more than 65 percent of which were nomads; settled farmers were then somewhat more than 18 percent of the total, and nonagricultural persons more than 16 percent. At a 2.5 percent annual rate of increase, the estimated population in 1980 becomes nearly 5 million, and in 1981 more than 5.1 million. Of the population categorized as nomads, about 30 percent have been considered seminomadic, because of their relatively permanent settlements and shorter range of seasonal migration.

Various segments of the population apparently increase at somewhat different rates. The fully nomadic population was said to be growing less than 2 percent a year and the seminomadic, fully settled rural, and urban populations (in that order) at higher rates—well over 2.5 percent in the case of the urban population. These differential rates of growth coupled with increasing urbanization and the efforts, even if of limited success, to settle nomads as cultivators or fishermen are likely to diminish gradually the proportion of nomads in the population.


The results of the 1975 census published as of 1981 do not provide a picture of the age and sex structure of the population, but a number of considerations and various estimates suggest a large base of young people. More than 45 percent of the total is under fifteen years of age, and only about 2 percent are over sixty-five. Those between fifteen and sixty-five were estimated to constitute about 53 percent of the population. Sample surveys in the 1960s and 1970s indicated that there were more males than females in the nomadic population and fewer in the urban areas. Whether that pattern has persisted as urbanization has increased is not known.

The estimated average density in 1981, assuming an indigenous population of 4.3 million, was not quite seven persons per square kilometer. Densities varied markedly, however. Moreover given the propensity of nomads to move seasonally, the densities in the areas ordinarily used by them change over the year. The areas of greatest rural density were the settled zones adjacent to the Juba and the Shabeelle rivers, a few spots between them, and several small areas in the northern highlands. Most of the least densely populated zones (fewer than six persons per square kilometer) were found in northeastern and central Somalia, but there were some very sparsely populated areas between the two rivers and in the far southwest adjacent to the Kenyan border (see fig. 5).

The nomadic and seminomadic segments of the population ordinarily engage in cyclical migrations related to alternation of the wet and dry seasons. Such movements result in periodic changes in settlement patterns, particularly in the largely nomadic north-



The Somali nomad is unburdened by personal possessions; he carries his own bowl for food and water, a staff for his herding activities, and a headrest for sleeping at night. Courtesy WORLD BANK PHOTO



Source: Based on information from Somalia, State Planning Commission, *Three Year Plan, 1979–1981*, Mogadishu, 1979, Table 19–2.

Figure 5. Population Density by Region, 1975

ern and northeastern parts of the country. During the dry season the nomads of the Ogo highlands and plateau areas in the north and the Nugaal Valley in the northeast are generally concentrated in villages or large encampments at permanent wells or other reliable sources of water. When the rains come, however, they

scatter with their herds throughout the vast expanse of the Haud where they form a pattern of dispersed small encampments during the wet season, or as long as animal forage and water hold out. When these resources are depleted, the area becomes relatively empty again, and reconcentration in the the home villages or settlements occurs. In most cases the fully adult men and women and their children remain with the sheep, goats, burden camels, and occasionally, cattle. The grazing camels are herded at some distance by boys and young, unmarried men.

A nomadic population also inhabits the southwestern part of the country between the Juba River and the Kenyan border. Little information was available on their migratory patterns or dispersal.

The country's best arable lands li ong the Juba and Shabeelle rivers and in the interriverine area, and the major portion of the sedentary rural population resides there in fixed agricultural villages and settlements. Nomads are also found in this area, but many pastoralists engage part time in farming, and the range of seasonal migration is more restricted. After the spring rains have begun, the herders move from the river edge into the interior. They return to the rivers in the dry season (*hagaa*) but move again to the interior in October and November if the second rainy season (*dayr*) permits. They then retreat to the rivers until the next spring rains. Some ebb and flow of population does occur with the seasons, but the overriding pattern is established by the sedentary population. In the mid–1970s this pattern was further reinforced by the settling of over 100,000 nomads from the drought-stricken north and northeast in sedentary agricultural occupations in the southwest.

The locations of many towns appear to have been determined largely by trade factors. The present-day major ports, extending from Kismaayo and Mogadishu in the southwest to Berbera and Seylac in the far northwest, were founded around the eighth to the tenth century A.D. by Arab and Persian immigrants. They became points for conducting trade with the interior, a function they continued to perform in the 1970s, although some towns, such as Seylac, have declined because of the diminution of the dhow trade. Unlike many other coastal areas of the continent, important fishing ports failed to develop despite the rather substantial fish resources of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. This appears to reflect the centuries-old Somali aversion to eating fish and the lack of any sizable inland market. Some of the towns south of Mogadishu have long been sites of non-Somali fishing communities, however. The fisheries' potential and the need to expand food production, coupled with the problem of finding occupations for nomads ruined by the 1974–75 drought, have resulted in government encouragement and assistance to nomad

families to settle permanently in fishing villages; some 15,000 nomads were reported established in such villages in late 1975.

Present-day inland towns in sparsely populated areas owe their location to their development as trading centers at caravan crossing points or at regular stopping places along caravan routes. In some cases the ready availability of water throughout the year led to the growth of substantial settlements providing market and service facilities for nomadic populations, such as Gaalkacyo, an oasis in the Mudug Plain having permanent wells.

Town and village distribution in the agricultural areas of the Juba and Shabeelle rivers is related in part to the development of market centers by the sedentary population. But a considerable number of such towns and villages owe their origin to the founding of agricultural religious communities (*jamaha*) by various Islamic brotherhoods during the nineteenth century; an example is the large town of Baardheere, which evolved from a *jamaha* founded in 1819 (see Religious Life, this ch.). Hargeysa, the largest town in northern Somalia, also started as a religious community in the second half of the nineteenth century. Its growth into the country's second largest city was stimulated mainly, however, by its selection in 1942 as the administrative center for the then-British Somaliland.

After the establishment of a number of new regions (sixteen as of 1981, including Mogadishu) and districts (second order administrative areas—sixty-nine as of 1981), the government defined towns to include all regional and district headquarters regardless of size. Also defined as towns were all other communities having populations of 2,000 or more. Some administrative headquarters are much smaller than that. Data on the numbers specifically urban in the 1975 census are not available except for the region encompassing and consisting solely of Mogadishu. At that time the capital had 380,000 residents, a little more than 52 percent of all persons subsumed under the rubric "non-agricultural" (taken to be very largely urban). Only three other regions—Woqooyi (West) Galbeed, Shabeellaha Hoose (Lower Shabeelle), and the Bay—had urban populations constituting 7 percent to 9 percent of the total urban population in 1975. The sole town of importance in Woqooyi Galbeed Region at that time was Hargeysa. Berbera was much smaller, but its role as a port town on the Gulf of Aden may lead to considerable growth. The chief town in Lower Shabeelle Region was Marka, of some importance as a port, but there were several other port towns (for example, Baraawe) and some inland communities that served as sites for light manufacturing or food processing. In Bay Region the major towns (Baydhabo, Buur Hakaba) were located in relatively densely settled agricultural areas. There were a few towns of some importance in other regions: one



Nomads erecting their portable hut, which is dismantled and transported by camel when the people and their herd move on. Courtesy WORLD BANK PHOTO

was the port of Kismaayo in Lower Juba, another Dijuuma in the agricultural land of Middle Juba.

The Segmentary Social Order

Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, devotion to Islam, and putative genealogical ties linking all of them to a common ancestor. Genealogical ties, however, have also provided the terms in which divisions among the Somalis have occurred, divisions historically more common than unity.

All Somalis trace their original to two brothers, Samaal and Sab, said to have been descended from members of Muhammad's tribe, the Quraysh of Arabia, a notion based in part on the Somali adherence to Islam, in part on actual Arab influence (see The Somalis: Origins, Migrations, and Settlement, ch. 1). According to tradition, the brothers are the ancestors of the largest descent-based units in Somali society, the clan-families of which six important ones existed in 1981. Four of these, the Dir, Darod, Isaaq, and Hawiye, constituted together an estimated 75 percent of the pop-

ulation; they trace their descent from Samaal. Of these groups, the majority, widely distributed, were nomadic and seminomadic pastoralists, but an increasing minority were settled cultivators. The Digil and Rahanweyn, who trace their descent from Sab, constituted about 20 percent of the population. They were settled in the riverine regions of southern Somalia and relied on a mixed economy of cattle husbandry and cultivation (see fig. 6).

Clan-families, too large and scattered for practical cooperation, had no real political or economic functions. For a time they served as rallying points in the formation of political parties and other political alliances, but their importance in this respect has probably diminished (see Problems of National Integration, ch. 1; see Politics and Ideology, ch. 4). The important units in the traditional system were the subdivisions of clan-families, the clans and the lineages each of these clans comprised. Membership in all of these groups was traced through males from a common male ancestor.

Descent as the basis for group formation and loyalty was modified, but not overridden, by the principle of contract. Membership in the same clan or lineage did not automatically entail certain rights and obligations. These were explicitly made the subject of treaties or contracts. Thus some of the clans in a clan-family might unite for political and military purposes, and some lineages within a clan might be associated for cooperation and the paying and receiving of blood compensation in cases of homicide, injury, and other offenses. These alignments had a kinship base in that those who joined were often descended from a particular wife of a common ancestor, but units formed by contract or treaty could be dissolved and new ones formed.

The traditional social structure was characterized by competition and conflict between descent groups. Among the Samaal the search for pasture and water drove clans and lineages physically apart or pitted them against each other. The Sab had a history of warfare over trade and religious matters and of fighting the encroachments of camel-herding nomads.

Whatever their common original condition, Samaal and Sab evolved differently as they adapted to different ecological conditions. With some exceptions Samaal lived in areas that supported only a pastoralism based mainly on camels, sheep, and goats. The Sab lived in the area between the rivers where they raised cattle and came to dominate the non-Somali cultivators found there when they arrived. After the end of slavery the Sab themselves undertook cultivation.

Except in their relations with members of despised occupational groups, the Samaal remained fiercely egalitarian but considered themselves superior to settled Somalis. The Sab developed a heterogeneous society that accorded high or low status to different groups depending on their origin and occupation. The lineage



Street scene in the older part of downtown Mogadishu
Courtesy Terry C. Eakin



Urban Somalis in Western dress at a busy open market (suq)

remained the focal point of loyalty for roaming pastoralists. Group cohesion assumed a territorial dimension among the settled agriculturists.


The nature of relations between and within groups underwent changes during the colonial era and after independence. Armed conflict between descent groups (or in the south, territorial units) became rare; slaves were freed. Nevertheless the basic modes of social organization and relations persisted, particularly among the pastoral nomads. Moreover national politics were often perceived and frequently operated in terms of relationships between segments of various kinds, e.g., clans, clan-families, and clan confederacies.

Several thousand persons, including some ethnic Somalis, were integrated into traditional Somali society but were not comprehended in the six clan-families. Among them were Somali clans descended from ancestors predating or otherwise not included in the genealogies of the six clan-families. Others were lineages of relatively unmixed Arab descent, often much inbred; most lived in the coastal towns. Such lineages or communities had varying relationships with local Somalis; some were clients subordinate to Somali groups, and others were independent entities in the larger towns. A second category comprehended the *habash*, cultivators (or hunters) of non-Somali origin who lived among the Rahanweyn and Digil in the interriverine area. A third category consisted of occupationally specialized caste-like groups, members of which were attached to Somali lineages or clans. Finally, until the last were freed in the 1920s, there were slaves attached to both pastoral and sedentary Somali groups but of greater economic importance among the latter.

Samaal

Among the Samaal clans were the largest political units, most of which had heads known as *soldaan* (sultan) or *bokor* (belt—to bind people together). With occasional and rarely institutionalized exceptions, a nomadic clan head's functions were honorary and ceremonial. The number of clans within a clan-family varied, and there was a good deal of difference in their sizes, but their numbers averaged roughly 100,000 people in the twentieth century. Clans were associated with a given territory, essentially defined by the circuit of nomadic migration but having unspecified boundaries, so that the territories of neighboring clans tended to overlap.

A Samaal clan kept careful count of the generations between living members of the group and the ancestor for whom it was named: the greater the number of generations, often implying substantial internal segmentation (many subclans or lineages), the greater the clan's prestige, which was validated by the numbers and power usually associated with generational depth and seg-



Source: Based on information from I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*, London, 1980, p. 253.

Figure 6. Distribution of Clan-Families and Non-Somali Ethnic Groups

mentation. Some ancient clans, however, dwindled, and found it necessary to attach themselves to other clans of the same or another clan-family. Similarly, small groups (lineages), detached from the main body of their clan, made alliances with the clan in whose territory they were then living.

Clans living in contiguous territories sometimes joined in confederacies often marked by internal subgroupings. The Majer-

teyn clan, for example, was part of the Kombe-Harti confederacy, and that in turn was a part of the Kablalla, one of the two sections of the Darod clan-family. A confederacy was constituted by related clans (perhaps tracing their descent to the same wife of a remote ancestor), but the decision to enter into a confederacy was historical rather than an automatic consequence of genealogy. The purposes of the entity were enumerated in a treaty or contract, often set down in one of the early Arabic script versions of Somali by a religious figure.


Clans were segmented into primary lineages whose genealogical depth ranged from twelve to fourteen generations. These lineages were in turn segmented into secondary and sometimes tertiary lineages (see fig. 7). The process of internal segmentation was continuous. In the words of I.M. Lewis, who has closely studied the pastoral Somalis, "Every ancestor who begets several sons is a point of segmentation into lineages, into corporate agnatic political groups. Every ancestor is at once a point of unity and division since through his sons his descendants are divided into separate descent groups, but united in him as one lineage-group." The political (and sometimes the economic) relevance of a clan or lineage of a given genealogical depth varies with context, and there are no specific Somali words that apply to different levels of segmentation. A commonly used term is *reer*, which in varying situations may be applied to any unit from a clan to a tertiary lineage. Despite the possibility of large numbers of genealogically deep or shallower segments, there are, in Lewis's words, three "points of unity and division at which political solidarity most frequently emerges...those of clan, primary lineage group, and *dia* -paying group."

The *dia*-paying group was an alliance formed by related lineages within a clan by means of a contract (*heer*), traditionally oral but filed in written form with district officials during the colonial era, at least in British Somaliland. The contract explicitly stated the rights and duties of members of the group with respect to the burdens of payment and the distribution of receipts of blood compensation when the parties were members of the same or different *dia*-paying groups. In the case of a homicide the lineages of the group shared in giving or receiving a specified portion of the compensation. A smaller but still substantial portion (the *jiffo*) was given or received by the relatively close kin of the killer or the deceased, that is, by an agnatic group descended from a common ancestor three or four generations back. In the case of offenses requiring the payment of a smaller compensation, sharing still occurred within the *dia*-paying group, but in minor cases the *jiffo* -paying group alone might have been involved.

The lineages constituting a *dia*-paying group were often of the kind called secondary; that is, the ancestors of each of them were fewer than the twelve to fourteen characteristic of a primary



Young unmarried Somali herdsmen of Bay Region. After they take wives, the length of their elaborate hairstyles will be shortened. Courtesy United States International Communication Agency



Source: Based on information from Irving Kaplan, et. al., *Area Handbook for Somalia,* Washington, 1977, p. 65.

Figure 7. Model of Nomadic Descent Group Segmentation

lineage, and the latter might contain two or more *dia*-paying groups. If, however, a group with a remote ancestor lacked the manpower to constitute its own *dia*-paying group, it might join with another such group to form one. Too small a group might find the burden too heavy. Moreover the ultimate traditional sanction was armed conflict, and here again lack of manpower was clearly a liability.

Both *dia*-paying and *jiffo*-paying groups were important units of social and economic organization aside from their stated purpose. They functioned as mutual aid groups in times of economic hardship or other emergencies. They established regulations and were able to enforce them. In 1964 it was estimated that more than 1,000 such groups existed in the republic. Among the nomads, membership ranged from 300 to more than 5,000 men and among the sedentary Somalis from 5,000 to 100,000.

The political and economic business of any functioning segment in Samaal society was managed by a council called *shir,* which included all the adult males in the group. Each member might speak and take part in deliberation. Age and seniority of lineage took precedence in that an older man or one from an older lineage would customarily be asked to speak before others did, but a persuasive speaker, whatever his seniority, could carry greater weight (see Language and Communication, this ch.). Moreover despite the basic egalitarianism of the Samaal, a wealthy herder

might also have a greater say. The term *oday* (elder) could be applied to any adult male, but those with more prestige and experience might be asked to judge disputes over a wide area and act as an ad hoc leader in political matters.

Most Samaal men followed a life as warriors and herders; a warrior (*waranle*) considered his status nobler than any other with the exception of lives devoted to religion. Religious persons (*wadaddo*, sing., *wadad*) were considered of equal dignity, but relatively few committed themselves to a life of religion. Many who did so retained their ties to clan and lineage, although in principle they should have avoided partisanship and armed conflict. (That rule did not pertain to religious warfare—jihad.) A few settled in religious communities (see Religious Life, this ch.).

Cultivating groups of Samaal origin existed in various places. These groups, which also kept livestock, were accepted as fellow Samaal by the pastoralists but were considered to have lost prestige, even if they had gained economically. Some Samaal attached themselves as cultivating clients to stockraising Sab in the riverine region, but the Samaal usually ended such relationships, either when they were able to resume their former pastoral activities or when the economic advantages of cultivation diminished. The lineage pattern remained intact among Samaal cultivators, and they defined themselves in terms of their lineage affiliation although the community also commanded loyalty.

Sab

The Sab are composed of the Digil and Rahanweyn clan-families. The Digil are believed to be the descendants of Sab and the Rahanweyn an offshoot of the Digil, but grown to be much larger than the latter. The term Sab has fallen into disuse because a similar term *sab* was used by the Samaal as a pejorative designation (*sab* means "low") for the groups that followed certain disdained specialized occupations. The Samaal did consider that the Sab had lowered themselves by their reliance on agriculture and their readiness to assimilate foreign elements into their clans.

The social structure of the Sab resembled that of the Samaal because it was putatively based on descent groups, but in fact there were significant differences. Sab clans were confederations of lineages and included persons originating in all Somali clan-families as well as assimilated peoples. They came into being through a pact or promise between the original founding segments, one of which, of Sab origin, was dominant; the name of the Sab segment became the name of the clan. By the twentieth century the descendants of that dominant lineage often constituted only a relatively small core of the clan. The constituent lineages of the clan, whatever their origin, tended to have much shallower genealogies than the Samaal.

Another important difference between the nomadic Samaal societies and the sedentary Sab was the significance of territoriality. Sab clans lived within clearly marked borders. The entire clan (or large subclan) often constituted the *dia*-paying group in relation to other clans. The term *reer*, which the Samaal used in connection with descent, was used with a place name, e.g., *reer barawa* (children of Baraawe).

Many clans were subdivided into three subclans, called *gember*, although some, as the Jiddu clans of the Digil clan-family, had only two subclans. Clans and subclans usually had single heads. In some cases however, as among the Helai clans of the Rahanweyn, there were no clan heads. Clan affairs were handled by leading elders called *gobweyn* who had assistants called *gobyar*.

Clans or subclans were subdivided into lineages that reckoned three to five generations from ancestor to youngest member. The lineage was the important economic unit. It traditionally owned land and water rights, which the head men distributed to individual lineage members.

The manner of formation of Sab clans led to the development of recognized social inequalities, sometimes marked by differences in physical appearance owing to stratum endogamy. Each stratum in a community consisted of one or more lineages. The basic distinction was that between nobles and *habash* (a mixture of pre-Somali cultivators and freed slaves—see Riverine and Coastal Peoples of Non-Somali Origin, this ch.).

In some Rahanweyn and Digil communities there was a further distinction between two sets of nobles. Within the Geledi clan (located in Afgooye and its environs), studied by anthropologist Virginia Luling, the nobles were divided into Darkskin and Lightskin categories, designations corresponding to the physical appearance of their members. The Darkskins were descendants of the core or founding group of the Geledi; the Lightskins had a separate line of descent, claimed partly Arab origin, and in fact resembled the Arab populations of the old coastal towns. They had been completely Somalized, however. The wealth and position of the Lightskins were similar to that of the Darkskins, but the latter had precedence in certain traditional rites.

Each of the lineages (of perhaps 300 to 400 persons) or Darkskins, Lightskins, and *habash* had its own set of elders and constituted a *dia*-paying group vis-á-vis the others but were bound in a common contract for rates of compensation and other matters. In principle *habash* lineages had equal rights in this system. Each lineage further controlled specific segments of the land and allocated to individuals as much land as his family could cultivate. Only the *habash*, however, were subsistence cultivators in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The nobles,

whether Darkskins or Lightskins, cultivated much larger areas of land by means of slaves and exported surpluses via the coastal towns to Arab lands. In the case of the Geledi, wealth accrued to the nobles and to the sultan not only from market cultivation but from their involvement in the slave trade and other enterprises, such as ivory, cotton and iron. Generally they also raised cattle.

The sultan of the Geledi (a member of the Darkskin stratum) had a political and religious role. A holder of the sultanate had somewhat greater authority than the sultans of Samaal clans, but their authority was by no means absolute. Nevertheless a strong incumbent of the position (like some of the Geledi sultans in the nineteenth century) could exercise considerable power.

The sociopolitical organization and processes of the Geledi resembled those of many Digil and Rahanweyn communities, but there were probably some differences. Not all such communities had a Lightskin component, and many were not located as auspiciously as the Geledi, for whom trade developed as a major factor in the economy. Most, however, had slaves who worked the land of the nobles.

The sedentary Somali communities (some of which were of Samaal origin) in the coastal and interriverine areas were more strongly affected by the colonial presence than the nomadic pastoralists. Clans, and sometimes large lineages, came to have government chiefs appointed by colonial authorities, sometimes where there had been no chiefs of any kind. In the case of the Geledi, the most important such chief was the sultan.

Whatever his origin, the government-appointed chief was expected to be the intermediary between colonial government and the people. Perhaps more important, first the slave trade and then slavery itself were outlawed, changing not only the lives of the slaves but the situation of the nobles whose economic and political power rested on the slave economy. This was clearly the case among the Geledi and probably in other sedentary communities. In Geledi areas (and elsewhere) many slaves left to take up other land as subsistence cultivators. A few remained, and their descendants maintained a quasi-dependent relationship as clients of their former owners. By the second decade of the twentieth century, nobles had to cultivate their own land for the first time. Neither nobles, ***habash***, nor ex-slaves worked voluntarily as wage labor as on the Italian plantations established at that time. Such labor was typically forced by colonial authorities.

Despite this radical change in the social, political, and economic orders, the nobles retained their superior position in Geledi (and probably in other Rahanweyn and Digil) communities. According to Luling, "What accounts for their remaining, though relatively impoverished, still head and shoulders above the...[rest] of

the community is...their sense of their own status: that they ought by rights to have wealth..." That sense disposed them to take advantage of new opportunities for gaining wealth. Such opportunities included paid employment with the Italians or trade in the growing Afgooye market.

The nobles (and less frequently, the *habash*) took advantage of commercial and employment opportunities through the entire colonial period and of educational and political opportunities when they were offered, particularly during the trusteeship period (1950–60). Independence introduced still other changes to which the nobles responded (see Social Change, this ch.).

Riverine and Coastal People of Non-Somali Origin

Along the southern coast, in the valleys of the Juba and Shabeelle rivers, and in a few places between the rivers live small groups of people—probably totaling less than 2 percent of the population—that differ culturally and physically from the Somalis. Some are descendants of pre-Somali inhabitants of the area who were able to resist absorption or enslavement by the Somalis. The ancestors of others were slaves who escaped to found their own communities or were freed in the course of European antislavery activity in the nineteenth century. The Somali term for these people, particularly the riverine and interriverine cultivators, is *habash*.

The relations of these communities with neighboring Somali groups varied, but most of them were attached in some way to a Somali lineage, and all but a few communities along the coast spoke Somali as a first language. Some *habash* communities had considerable independence. In others *habash* were much like serfs, cultivating land under the patronage of a Somali lineage. In such cases, however, it was understood that they could not be deprived of their land, and there was little reason for the pastoral Somalis to do so. Somalis and *habash* did not intermarry nor would a Somali eat a meal prepared by *habash*. As these restrictions suggest, Somalis—whether Samaal or Sab—considered the *habash* their inferiors. Nevertheless the political relationship of some *habash* groups to neighboring Somali groups was that of near equals.

The attachment of *habash* groups to sections of the Somalis usually entailed the participation of the *habash* community in the *dia*-paying group of their Somali patrons and in the ancient (non-Islamic) religious rites of Somali lineages or clans. Like the Somali, all but a few had been converted to Islam, and some *habash* had become leaders of religious communities in the interriverine area

Most of the non-Somali peoples were primarily cultivators, but some, like the Eyle, also engaged in hunting (which the Somalis would not do). A few groups, including the Boni, remained

largely or exclusively hunters into the twentieth century and were accordingly looked down on by the Somalis. By midcentury, however, most of these peoples were turning to cultivation, and some had gone into the towns and become laborers.

Along the coast live the Bajuni and Amarani. They are fishermen, sailors, and merchants, derived from a mixture of coastal populations. Their ancestors may include Arab and Persian settlers and seafaring peoples of India and the East Indies. Both speak dialects of Swahili. The Amarani, who were estimated to number fewer than a thousand in the 1960s, inhabit small fishing communities in and near Baraawe, Mogadishu, Marka, and the inland town of Afgooye on the Shabeelle River. The Bajuni inhabit the east African coast and Bajun Islands in a continuous strip from Kismaayo southward into Kenya as far as Lamu, and in scattered communities as far away as Mozambique. Both Amarani and Bajuni had little contact with outsiders except in towns. Partial geographical isolation and an active ethnic consciousness distinguished by differences in language separate them from the Somalis.

Specialized Occupational Groups

Certain occupational groups such as hunters, leatherdressers, and smiths were known as *sab* (low) among the Samaal and as *bon* (low caste) among the Sab. They physically resemble the Somalis, but their ethnic origin is uncertain. Some authorities suggest—and group members believe—that they may be derived from the original population of the land. They speak Somali but they also use what are usually referred to as secret languages, which might better be compared to localized slang or occupational jargon. Differences of custom also distinguished the *sab* from the Somalis.

In the late 1950s when the Somali population was estimated at roughly 2 million, the number of *sab* was estimated at somewhat more than 12,000, i.e., less than 1 percent of the total population. Of these, about three quarters were of the *midgaan* group whose men acted as barbers, circumcisers, and hunters. Less than a quarter of the total were the Tumaal, who were engaged chiefly in metalwork. An even smaller group was the Yibir (Yahhar in the south), who were magicians called upon to make amulets for the newborn, to bless Somali weddings, and act as soothsayers. In return for these services they were given gifts.

Occupational groups had lineages, but these were not usually the foundation for *dia*-paying groups before Somalia's independence. Except perhaps for the Yibir, who moved from one group of Somalis to another, families of occupational specialists were attached to Somali lineages, which acted as their patrons and claimed compensation on their behalf. By the end of the colonial period, change had begun to take place in the political, legal, and social status of these groups, a process that has continued.

Social Change

Although colonial domination had some effects (for example, the formal abolition of slavery) in the pre-World War II era, particularly in the interriverine area, the social and economic orders in which most Somalis lived was not greatly changed. After the war the institution of the trusteeship in the south and greater attention to education in the north gradually led to further change (see The Colonial Period, ch. 1).

The late colonial period and the first decade of independence saw the decline, in part legally enforced, of caste-like restrictions and impediments to the equality of *habash* and traditional occupational groups. In the south, although nobles were more likely to take advantage of educational opportunities, increasingly *habash* did so.

The growing importance of manual skills in the modern economy gave some occupational groups an economic (if not immediately a social) advantage. Many Tumaal blacksmiths, for example, became mechanics and settled in towns. In southern port towns, carpenters, weavers, and other artisans (often originating in traditional occupational groups) formed guilds to protect their common interests. As skilled manual work became more available, and some Somalis considered it acceptable work for themselves, there was increasing social acceptance of members of the traditional groups to the point where some intermarriage occurred in the towns. In the rural areas, members of these groups formed their own *dia*-paying units and in a few cases began to take part in the councils of the Somali lineages to which they remained attached. The appellation *midgaan*, referring to the largest of these occupational groups, was considered pejorative and forbidden by law.

Somali leaders made conscious efforts to eliminate the traditional disabilities of low-status groups. In early 1960, just before independence, the legislative assembly of the Italian trust territory abolished the status of client, that is, of those *habash* who were dependent on Somalis for rights to land and water. The law stated that Somali citizens had the right to live and farm where they chose, independent of hereditary affiliation. Patron lineages in the riverine area resisted the change and retaliated against *habash* assertion of their independence by withholding customary farming and watering rights, excluding them from *dia*-paying arrangements and, in some cases, seeking to oust them from the land they had farmed for generations as clients. Some *habash* brought cases in court, seeking to affirm their newly granted rights, but initially many continued the old arrangements. Fragmentary information on developments since the 1960s suggests that clientship diminished in fact as it had been abrogated in law.

While some features of traditional stratification were being eroded, another kind of stratification based on education and command of a foreign language—English or Italian—was emerging in the late colonial period (see Education, this ch.). The rise of a new elite and subelite became even more salient as independence made the highest political and bureaucratic positions available to Somalis. Posts in local and regional government were filled by persons with lesser (but for the Somalia of the 1960s, relatively substantial) educational qualifications. Those who filled the high- and mid-level positions had incomes a good deal greater than most Somalis. In many cases, however, they were the sons of men who had acquired a degree of wealth as landholders, traders, and herders in the colonial period, in part because the costs of secondary education in that era could be met only by relatively well-off parents.

Two somewhat contradictory forces were at work on educated urban Somalis in the 1950s and 1960s. On the one hand their income and education (above all, their literacy in a foreign language) tended to distance them from most other Somalis. On the other hand lineage and clan were still important to most of them as private individuals, and these descent groups acquired a new importance in national politics (see Problems of National Integration, ch.1).

Mixed middle groups arose at the local level, particularly in the larger towns. One part of such groups comprised the representatives of the national government (the subelite)—the district commissioner, the judge, the secretary to the municipality, the subordinates of some of these, teachers, and the national police—all outsiders. The other part consisted of the councillors elected by the community—all local. Some were lineage heads; others were businessmen or had some other basis for their status in the area. Some of the local notables had sons serving as district officials, but such persons were not permitted to serve in their home communities. In Afgooye in which the Geledi, the Wadan (a group of the Hawiye clan-family), and others were represented, the local people and the subelite meshed well at the time Luling studied them in the mid- and late 1960s, but Afgooye was not necessarily representative of local communities in the riverine areas or elsewhere.

Although the social relations of the pastoral Somalis were marked by a fundamental egalitarianism, there has been since the nineteenth century an incipient distinction between the Somalis in nomadic camps (the great bulk of them) and their kinsmen in the towns who acted as middlemen in the livestock trade with Aden. Some of these townsmen became relatively wealthy and

for that reason and because of their wider knowledge of the world may have carried more weight in council.

By the 1960s the demand for livestock in the oil-producing countries had led to a great expansion of the livestock trade through Berbera. Hargeysa and Burao became (and remain) the points from which 150 to 200 major livestock dealers and their agents—all but a few Somalis—operate. The nomadic producers have to a considerable extent directed their activity toward the commercial market, but the traders dominate it, controlling the terms of trade, feed lots, and some of the better grazing land. The government has not interfered; the livestock trade is too important as an earner of foreign exchange, and the traders have been efficient at getting the animals to market.

A new class of merchants, some of them very wealthy, has thus emerged. They apparently retain their connections with their lineages, but their interests are significantly different from that of the nomadic herder. If they are not educated, they try to make sure their children are, a process that makes members of their immediate families eligible for the government elite. There is some competition between livestock traders, but they have common interests that have led them to organize for their realization. The long-run consequences of these developments are uncertain, but a return to the old egalitarianism is unlikely.

After World War II and during the first decade of independence, much was made of the need to replace loyalty to clan and lineage with loyalty to the nation as a whole. The Somali segmentary system was seen as a divisive force, a source of nepotism and corruption, and Somali politicians denounced it as tribalism in the same way that ethnic loyalties were denounced elsewhere in Black Africa. A very few Somalis actually rejected reference to clan and lineage, and nominally clans were ignored as a framework for personal relations. Nevertheless persons meeting for the first time queried each other about their "ex-clans." Clan-families, once functionally unimportant, became increasingly significant as political rallying points, particularly as Somalia approached independence, and they continued to be so in the 1960s.

Smaller units (clans and lineages) remained the basic groups, functioning as regional and local social, political, and economic units. Although the government of independent Somalia was theoretically opposed to the salience of these entities, it continued to appoint and pay lineage heads; lineages and clans were in fact voting units. Supreme Court decisions in 1962 and 1964 effected a major change in the role of the *dia*-paying group. The court's judgments forbade collective payment for premeditated homicide. Payments for unpremeditated homicide and injury, however, were defined as compensation for a tort and were permitted.

In this era, too, the *dia*-paying group's responsibilities were extended to cover death in traffic accidents.

The military leadership that came to power in October 1969 enforced some of the changes initiated but only occasionally implemented by the previous regime. It also introduced new elements that constituted a radical break with the past. Scientific socialism was soon declared to be the new regime's guide and frame of reference (see The Revolutionary Regime, ch. 1). Its basic ideas were a pragmatic version of their understanding of Marxism adapted to local social and economic conditions. In this version the notion of the class struggle did not apply; the bourgeoisie was very small, composed of the new elite and subelite (chiefly employed in government), a few traders, and a few professionals. There was no significant proletariat, rural or urban, and no great Somali entrepreneurs or landholders.

In its initial zest for change, the new regime focused on the divisions in Somali society: the cleavages between clans and lineages, the settled and nomadic, strong and weak pastoral lineages that competed by forces for grazing and water, patrons and clients in the cultivating regions, urban and rural dwellers, and on the continuing disdain for those of low status. Clan and lineage affiliations were to be irrelevant to social relations, and pejorative language for specific groups thought inferior to Somalis was forbidden. All Somalis were asked to call each other *jaalle* (comrade), regardless of hereditary affiliation.

Within limits the language of public discourse can be changed by fiat; much pejorative language has been expurgated, at least in its original straightforward form. Nevertheless Somalis continue to learn each other's clan or lineage affiliation when it is useful to do so, as it seems to be in an economy marked by constant shortages, and in private it is not uncommon for Somalis to refer to *habash* by the phrase "kinky hair." The term *jaalle* is widely used in the media and in a range of public situations, but its use cannot be said to reflect a change in world view.

The government also sought to change the actual function of the clans and lineages. The title of elder was abolished and replaced by that of peacekeeper. Peacekeepers were the appointed spokesmen of what were officially regarded as local groups composed of individuals, whether cultivators or pastoralists. Ties of kinship and descent were, in principle, irrelevant to their responsibilities. In the early 1970s collective responsibility (*dia*-payments) in any guise was abolished.

Like almost all governments having substantial numbers of nomads as citizens, the pre- and post-revolutionary regimes were interested in finding ways to settle them, partly because it was considered a way to improve the pastoral economy, partly because

it was easier to control and to provide services for a settled population. Proposals to convert the nomads into ranchers did not get very far in the prerevolutionary era, and in the early 1980s most herders were still nomadic or seminomadic. The drought of 1974 (rather than the spread of revolutionary ideas) did drive large numbers of pastoralists to seek government help; by 1975 roughly 105,000 had been resettled, 90,000 as cultivators and 15,000 as fishermen. Clans were deliberately mixed within the settlements, and the settlers were expected to deal as individuals with local councils, committees, and courts, whose membership was also heterogeneous. Three years later nearly 45 percent of the adult males had left the cultivating settlements, perhaps to pursue herding. Most of those living in fishing communities remained. Neither the farmers nor the fisherman had been economically successful. The forms of social organization and social relations that have emerged in these new communities have not been described. It has been suggested, however, that members of the same lineage or clan seek out each other and build their houses in a specific section of the community.

The dismantling of the *dia* system, the institution of a variety of political and administrative offices intended to do away with power vested in the lineages and clans, and the establishment of committees, councils, cooperatives, and the like were meant to replace the descent group system as ways of organizing political, economic, and social life. For example weddings, burials, and religious rites held on a lineage or clan basis were banned in 1973. Wedding ceremonies were henceforth to be held at orientation centers or other public places. Money could not be collected from lineage members for the burial of a dead member, and the law banned religious rites tied to local traditions. It has been reported that certain ceremonies involving the participation of lineages or clans continue outside Mogadishu and a few other towns (see Folk Islam and Indigenous Ritual, this ch.). On these matters and others, however, no studies have been published nor have experienced observers set down their impressions.

Most published observations refer to the continuing role of clan affiliation in national politics. The clan-family, which rose to considerable importance in Somali politics of the 1950s and 1960s, seems to have lost its earlier force as a rallying point. The groups that carried weight or opposed the regime are all of the Darod clan-family: President Mohammed Siad Barre's clan, Marehan; his mother's clan, Ogaden; his son-in-law's clan, Dolbahante; and the opposition clan, Majerteyn. The interriverine sedentary clan-families were apparently omitted from the cabinet in the late 1970s and early 1980s but clan-family relations may not have been responsible for that omission.

There is some anecdotal material on the continuing importance of clan or lineage affiliation in obtaining jobs, services, and favors,

and there are indications that even those who try to ignore clan favoritism as much as possible sometimes find it necessary to use their lineage connections. Here again systematic study of the situation is not available.

The revolutionary regime also addressed the status of women. After World War II all political parties had established women's committees; in the Italian south women had voted for the first time in the 1958 municipal elections, and in the formerly British north in the 1961 national referendum on the constitution. Still their role in public affairs remained minimal, and little was done to change their legal situation.

Under Somali customary law and in practice a woman was under the legal protection of a male—her father or husband, or a kinsman of theirs in the event of their deaths. In blood compensation her life was usually valued at half that of a man. Islamic law permitted daughters to inherit half that inherited by sons, but in Somali practice daughters did not ordinarily share in the inheritance of valued property (camels or land). Few girls were sent to school and even fewer continued beyond the elementary level. Although Somali women lack status and power in the public domain, it has been noted that they had a good deal of influence in the domestic sphere.

The revolutionary government moved quickly to change the legal and political status of women. The question of *dia* payment for injuries to women became, in principle, moot following the formal termination of the traditional system. Soon after the revolution, committees were established to deal with women's affairs, and women were encouraged to take an active part in government, committees, sports, and the like. In early 1975 Siad Barre announced the decision by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and the Council of Ministers to give equal rights to women in several respects, including equal inheritance rights, a move that led to protests by some Islamic leaders (see Challenges to the Regime, ch. 1). Perhaps more important in the long run was the government's insistence that girls be sent to school, particularly beyond the elementary level.

There were women in visible public posts in Somalia in the early 1980s. For example six of 171 members of the People's Assembly were women. Increasing numbers of girls and young women were going to school at the secondary and university levels, although in the latter case they were likely to be less prepared than the young men, a condition that should change in time. Whether in fact daughters inherit as do sons has not been studied, nor are there useful observations concerning the status of women in daily life.

There have been no published descriptions of developments in the relationships between north and south, pastoral nomadic and settled agricultural peoples, or English-speaking and Italian-speaking Somalis. The categories of Somalis defined by these dis-

tinctions overlapped to a considerable extent. Specifically, Somalis of the interriverine, cultivating clan-families—Rahanweyn and Digil—were southern, and their elites in the prerevolutionary era were likely to be Italian-speaking. In the traditional hierarchy of status, pastoral Somalis looked down on them, and English-speakers seemed to be gaining an advantage in the quest for political and economic opportunities in the 1960s.

The institution of Somali as the official language and the language of instruction in primary and secondary schools presumably reduced the relevance of the distinction between English and Italian speakers. If any advantage still lies with a speaker of a foreign language in the educational field, it may lie with those who are fluent in Italian—at least as long as the Somali National University continues to be staffed largely by Italians, and most of the courses are taught in the language. A greater educational advantage may accrue to the settled peoples, of whatever origin, given that the school system was oriented chiefly to the settled communities, the children of nomads being educated, as of the early 1980s, in a special system (see Education, this ch.).

The Siad Barre government has fostered a flowering of agencies of the state at the national, regional, and local levels. These agencies include economic enterprises that either have come under state control or have been initiated by the regime. The growth of the state apparatus and the socialist orientation of the government notwithstanding, much productive and distributive enterprise—some relatively large-scale in the Somali context—remained in private hands (see Agriculture and Pastoralism, ch. 3). These developments have generated considerable differentiation in income, control of resources (including land), and access to services among Somalis, a process begun before the revolution but intensified since then.

In the rural areas in which 75 to 80 percent of the population still lived in the early 1980s, the process of differentiation and nascent stratification has most affected the sedentary and seminomadic Somalis, particularly those living on and between the Juba and Shabeelle rivers. There is no systematic study of who owns (or has the secure use of) the several kinds of arable land: rainfed, irrigated, and flood land (the latter cultivated after flood recession). Nevertheless it seems fairly clear that much of the irrigated land has been acquired by the government (beginning with the colonial government) or by large-scale private farmers (often Somali successors of Italian or other foreign landholders). In the late 1970s small-scale farmers worked some of the irrigated land and much of the flood land, but if the latter were converted to controlled irrigation, it was likely to come under state control. For the most part, rainfed land cultivation was still in the hands of



The role of Somali women has changed to one of greater participation in the government's efforts to achieve national development goals. Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

traditional smallholders engaged in subsistence farming, some of them gaining the cash they needed by working for state farms. Most extensions of the irrigation system have been oriented to the development of large-scale state farms rather than to benefit the smallholder. Some rural Somalis hold no land at all and rely exclusively on wage labor on state farms and large private holdings (chiefly banana plantations) for a livelihood. It is probable that the mass of Somalis living in the riverine area (and in the far northwest where some cultivation also takes place) are engaged in subsistence cropping combined with herding and, in some cases, wage labor.

Animal husbandry remains primarily in the hands of individual pastoral Somalis. The chief change lies in the readiness of these pastoralists to sell their livestock in response to a substantial overseas demand. Marketing is in the hands of private traders who have accumulated enough capital to construct water storage units and to invest in a transport fleet and who may enclose rangeland to produce hay, thereby excluding Somali herders who had formerly used the land. These traders benefit not only from the government construction of roads and other facilities but also from arrangements whereby their overseas earnings may be used in part to buy imports for private sales in Somalia. There are differences in wealth among the producers of livestock, although the extent to which that wealth can be maintained, given the environmental problems pastoralists face, is problematic. In this

part of rural Somalia, substantial wealth accrues not so much to the producer as to the trader. Whether the traders who have taken advantage of these developments came from families of traders—there have always been some—or emerged from the ranks of pastoralists is not known.

Although there are clearly distinctions of wealth and income among Somalis in the private sphere, those who combine comparatively large incomes with reasonable security are government employees whether administrators, technical personnel, or managers of state-owned enterprises. As under the first independence regime, administrators do not serve in their home territories and are therefore not linked by kinship to the better-off Somalis in the local private sector.

Despite the fluid character of the system and the lack of research that would permit a more precise delineation of its contours, it seems clear that the apex of a local hierarchy in a rural settled area consists of the higher (and to some extent mid-level) representatives of the state. Included are regional and local administrators, managers of state farms and agro-industries, such as the sugar refinery at Jowhar, technicians, and highly skilled workers. Not only do they dispose of relatively high incomes, but they have access to other resources, e.g., they can be reasonably sure that they will be able to see their children through school, which is important in finding a prestigious and remunerative position. In many cases they make the important decisions determining the flow of resources to various elements in the private sector. They therefore exercise not only political but also economic power greater than that of the wealthy merchant or large landholder whose income may be the same or larger. The extent to which these two components of the upper stratum in any settled rural area share the same outlook, are cooperative or antagonistic, and have more significant bonds with extra-stratum persons or groups than with those in the same stratum is not known.

At the other end of the scale, although not necessarily at the bottom of a pyramid, are most rural Somalis, whether sedentary or nomadic. Oriented primarily to subsistence cropping or herding, they nevertheless respond to the market and sell what they can. They have little contact with government, however, and have been relatively untouched by development projects because of their remoteness, lack of government effort to reach them, or their own lack of initiative. The farmers among them cultivate the poorest land and barely earned minimal incomes with wage work. The pastoralists are most affected by the exigencies of a difficult environment. Moreover in the late 1970s and early 1980s, limits imposed on their range of migration by the hostile relations between Somalia and Ethiopia caused futher hardship. Whether

lineage remains practically important among these Somalis is yet to be determined, as is the extent to which they maintain ties of some kind with their better-off patrilineal kinsmen.

The other two important categories in the rural areas are the rural workers whose wages derive from state-owned or state-sponsored activities and the landholders or herders who operate on a smaller scale than the plantation owners. The latter are oriented to the market and to any advantages, direct or indirect, that can be gained from government support. Neither of these categories is homogeneous. Wage workers range from landless and relatively unskilled agricultural workers whose income may be intermittent, to low-level workers in government agencies whose income is likely to be steadier and who may be heads of or members of families with subsistence farms or herds. Plots or herds owned by farmers or herders vary considerably in size and quality as does the income derived from them. Nevertheless farmers and herders fare better economically than the mass of subsistence farmers. They also join cooperatives, take advantage of adult education, and participate in government programs that promise to enhance their incomes and the status of the next generation. Members of this category send their children to school and may arrange for some of them to seek more lucrative or status-giving employment in Mogadishu or another town.

Not clearly in any of these categories are the petty traders in the rural areas. Their incomes are not large, but they may equal those of many lower level wage workers and small-scale market-oriented farmers.

In urban areas—particularly in Mogadishu, which is both the national capital and by far the largest town—another pattern of differentiation has developed, related to the one that had emerged in the decade immediately after independence. It has been affected, however, by the growth of government and state controlled enterprises. Unlike the rural pattern, in which the mass base is provided by subsistence farmers and herders having roots in the area, most of the urban population of the early 1980s consists of newcomers, many of whom have migrated in search of economic opportunity.

In this pattern, clearly at the apex of society in Mogadishu (and nationally) because of their incomes and the power they wield, are the highest officials of party and government. In the mid- and late 1970s the salaries and allowances of cabinet ministers were twice that of the next highest officials (the directors general of ministries) and nearly twenty-five times that of the lowest level in the civil service. Below the ministers and directors general but well above the clerks of the bureaucracy were other high-level administrators and the executives and skilled personnel. The

manager of a large state-owned factory earned somewhat less than a minister but more than a director general. He was followed by a department director, who earned a little more than a director general, and then by engineers, other technicians, and senior administrators. An unskilled laborer in a state farm earned less than the lowest level civil servant, but an unskilled worker in a factory earned a little more. All earned only from 5 to 10 percent of a manager's salary.

In the towns as in the rural areas there are substantial numbers of persons involved in the private sector, although there is no clear picture of the ratio of public to private sector employees (and owners) or of the relative income and wealth of those in the private sector. It is possible only to indicate the range of activities and occupations. In some respects the merchants and traders have the deepest urban roots. The bulk of them are petty traders and shopkeepers whose wealth and status are more akin to that of craftsmen than to the wealthier merchants.

In the mid–1970s a census of manufacturing indicated that there were roughly 6,000 enterprises employing five or fewer persons, most of them no doubt family members. Unlike the larger, often foreign-owned industrial concerns, these have not been nationalized. In 1981 enterprises like these must have accounted for a substantial (if minor) proportion of the urban population. Where their owners stand in relation to other urban dwellers with respect to social status, income, and outlook has not been reported.

The great mass of urban dwellers are wage workers, but they have various skills, sources of employment, and incomes. For example low and middle-grade clerks in the government bureaucracy and in state enterprises earn no more (and sometimes less) than skilled artisans in state firms, and both earn perhaps twice as much as an unskilled factory laborer in such firms. The wages of skilled and unskilled workers in private commercial and industrial enterprises were not available for comparison, but it is likely that they were lower. Not available were data on number of workers at specific income levels and in specific occupations or categories of occupations and a systematic appraisal of the prestige accruing to white-collar and manual workers data essential to the construction of a picture of income and occupational stratification.

Descriptions and analyses of the effects of incipient stratification in both rural and urban areas on intra- and inter-lineage relationships and vice versa were lacking. Further, although it seems that the heights of the hierarchies of power, status, and wealth are commanded by those who run (and are employed by) the state, the nature of relations between those at the various levels of the state apparatus and at comparable levels in the pri-



Townspeople putting a thatched roof on a new house
Courtesy United States International Communication Agency

vate sector has not been analyzed. Of particular interest is the observation that many at the higher levels of government have reacted to the ceilings on their salaries, intended as an egalitarian measure, by engaging (directly or through their close kin) in private enterprise.

Religious Life

The vast majority of Somalis are Muslims. (Less than 1 percent of ethnic Somalis are Christians.) Loyalty to Islam reinforces the

distinctions that set them off from their immediate African neighbors, most of whom either are Christians (particularly the Amhara and others of Ethiopia) or adhere to indigenous African beliefs.

The ideal of Islam is a society organized for the implementation of Islamic precepts in which no distinction between the secular and the religious spheres obtains. Among the Somalis this ideal had been approximated only occasionally—and less fully in the north than among some groups in the settled regions of the south where religious leaders were an integral part of the social and political structure. Among nomads, the exigencies of pastoral life gave greater weight to the warrior's role, and religious leaders were expected to remain aloof from political matters. Generally Somali belief and practice has differed to some extent from that required by Islam, either because ancient Somali ritual has persisted or because Somalis cannot or will not submit to the rigors of Islamic practice. Whatever the discrepancies between the requirements of Islam and Somali practice, their Islamic identity is integral to Somalis' conception of themselves.

The role of religious functionaries began to shrink little by little in the 1950s and 1960s as some of their legal and educational powers and responsibilities were transferred to secular authorities, but their situation changed substantially after the revolution, whose leaders introduced an ideology they called scientific socialism (see Siad Barre and Scientific Socialism, ch. 1). These leaders insisted that their version of socialism was not at odds with Islam but compatible with Quranic principles, and they condemned atheism. Nevertheless they relegated religion to the moral sphere, and religious leaders were warned not to meddle in politics.

The new government instituted changes in law that some religious figures saw as contrary to Islamic precepts. The regime reacted sharply to criticism, executing some of the protestors (see Islam in the Colonial Era and After, this ch.). Subsequently, religious leaders seem to have accommodated themselves to the government, but their private views cannot be known.

The Tenets of Islam

Islam, founded in A.D. 622 when the Prophet Muhammad left Mecca and marched with his followers to Medina, was brought to Somalia by South Arabian merchants and seamen who founded settlements along the Somali coast 1,000 or more years ago (see Coastal Towns, ch. 1). Before Islam reached the Somalis, quarrels over the succession to leadership had led to a split of the Islamic community into Sunnites (traditionalists) and Shiites (from Shiat Ali, or partisans of Ali). All ethnic Somalis are Sunnites.

Islam means submission to God, and a Muslim is one who has submitted. The religion's basic tenet is stated in its creed: "There

is no god but God (Allah) and Muhammad is His prophet." Recitation of the creed, daily prayers (of which the creed is always a part) performed according to prescribed rules, fasting during the lunar month of Ramadan, almsgiving, and the pilgrimage to Mecca constitute the so-called Five Pillars of the Faith. Four of these duties may be modified by the situation in which believers find themselves. If they are ill, they may pray without prostrations and reduce the number of times they pray from the obligatory five to three. Fasting (going without food, drink, tobacco, and sexual relations from two hours before dawn until sunset) may be omitted during a journey but should be made up for at a later time. Almsgiving and the pilgrimage depend upon one's ability to afford them.

The basic teaching of Islam is embodied in the Quran, believed to have been given to Muhammad by God through the angel Gabriel. After Muhammad's death his followers sought to regulate their lives scrupulously by his divinely inspired works; if the Quran did not cover a specific situation, they turned to the hadith (remembered doings and sayings of the Prophet). Together, the Quran and the hadith form the sunna (tradition), a comprehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of Muslims.

Islamic law (sharia) derives from the Quran, the hadith, and from a large body of interpretive commentary which developed centuries ago. Several schools of legal thought developed, among them the Shafii school, which is represented in Somalia. The sharia covers a number of categories of behavior: obligatory actions, desirable or recommended actions, indifferent actions, objectionable but not forbidden actions, and prohibited actions. The Five Pillars of the Faith would be in the first category; night-long prayer and watching in the second, and many ordinary secular activities in the third. Divorce is in the objectionable but permitted category, whereas adultery and other sins are prohibited.

Both settled and nomadic Somalis tend to conform to Muslim requirements for ritual purity, e.g., washing after contact with unclean things and after specific activities. Some settled Somalis, particularly in communities founded by religious orders, are more likely to observe Islamic requirements than are nomads. For example Muslims may omit (or put off) certain duties while traveling, and nomads may take advantage of this permission, although their laxity may arise from lack of instruction. Ordinary settled Somalis were also likely to pay less attention to religious observance by the 1960s. Luling (cited by David Laitin) states that only a few devout Somalis in Afgooye said their daily prayers regularly. Devout Somalis (and others who value the title of haji—pilgrim—for its prestige) may make the pilgrimage to Mecca, but many more to go to the tombs of the local saints (see Religious Orders and the Cult of the Saints, this ch.).

Religious Roles in Somali Islam

In Islam there are no priests who are intermediaries between the believer and God, but there are religious teachers, preachers, and mosque officials. In Somalia religious training is most readily available in urban centers or wherever mosques exist. These children learn to memorize parts of the Quran, often without understanding what they have memorized, in part because many of their teachers do not understand it either. It is customary for some teachers to travel on foot from place to place with their novices, depending on the generosity of others for their living. The teachers serve the community by preaching, leading prayers, blessing the people and their livestock, counseling, arbitrating disputes, and performing marriages. Few are deeply versed in Islam, and they rarely stay with one lineage long enough to teach more than rudimentary religious principles.

In the absence of a wandering teacher, nomads depend on a person associated with religious devotion, study, or leadership, called *wadad* (pl. *wadaddo).* The *wadaddo* constitute the oldest stratum of literate people in Somalia. They function as basic teachers and local notaries as well as judges and authorities in religious law. They are rarely theologians; some are active members of a religious brotherhood, or belong to a lineage with a strong religious tradition. In the latter case they were not necessarily trained but were nevertheless entitled to lead prayers and to perform ritual sacrifices at weddings, on special holidays, and during festivals held at the tombs of saints.

Religious Orders and the Cult of the Saints

Somali Islam is marked by the significance of religious orders (*turuq;* sing. *tariqa,* meaning way or path). The rise of these orders was connected with the development of Sufism, a mystical current in Islam that began during the ninth and tenth centuries and reached its height during the twelfth and thirteenth. In Somalia Sufi orders made their appearance for the first time in towns during the fifteenth century and rapidly became a revitalizing force. Sufism seeks a closer personal relationship to God through special spiritual disciplines. Escape from self is aided by poverty, seclusion, and other forms of self-denial. Members of Sufi orders are commonly called dervishes, from a Persian word perhaps denoting a mendicant. Leaders of branches or congregations of these orders are given the Arabic title "sheikh," a term usually reserved for such leaders or others learned in Islam and rarely applied to ordinary *wadaddo.*

Dervishes tend to wander from place to place as religious beggars and teachers. They are best known for their often spectacular ceremonies, called dikr (from the Arabic dhikr—meaning testifying or remembrance) in which states of visionary ecstasy are

brought on by group chanting of religious texts, by rhythmic gestures, dancing, and deep breathing. The object is to free oneself from the body and to be lifted into the presence of God. Dervishes have been important as founders of agricultural communities, called *jamaha*. A few of these contain only celibate men, but usually they are inhabited by families; specific regulations of behavior are applied to women. Most Somalis are nominally members of Sufi orders, attending services in mosques of the order with which they are affiliated, visiting the tombs of saints connected with that order, and so on. In fact few undergo the rigors of complete devotion to the religious life, even for a short time.

Three Sufi orders with various subdivisions are prominent in Somalia. In order of their introduction into the country they are the Qadiriya, the Ahmadiya-Idrisiya, and the Salihiya. The Rifaiya, an offshoot of the Qadiriya, is represented mainly among Arabs resident in Mogadishu.

Qadiriya, the oldest order in Islam, was founded in Baghdad by Sayyid Abd al Kadir al Jilani in A.D. 1166 and introduced into Harer (Ethiopia) in the fifteenth century. It spread during the eighteenth century among the Oromo and Somalis of Ethiopia, often under the leadership of Somali sheikhs. Its earliest known leader in northern Somalia was Sheikh Abdarahman al Zeilawi, who died in 1883. At that time Qadiriya adherents were merchants in the ports and elsewhere. In an apparently separate development the Qadiriya order was also introduced into the southern Somali port cities of Baraawe and Mogadishu at an uncertain date. In 1819 Sheikh Ibrahim Hassan Jebro acquired land on the Juba River and established a religious center in the form of a farming community, the first of the *jamaha* in Somalia.

Outstanding figures of the Qadiriya in Somalia include Sheikh Awes Muhammad Barawi (died 1909), who spread the teaching of the order in the southern interior. He wrote a great deal of devotional poetry in Arabic and also attempted to translate traditional hymns from Arabic into Somali, working out his own phonetic system. Another was Sheikh Abd ar Rahman Abdallah of Mogadishu, who stressed deep mysticism rather than teaching; a literary figure and an amateur astrologer, he attempted a series of prophesies on the future of the city. His reputation for sanctity caused people from a wide area to seek him out. His tomb at Mogadishu is a pilgrimage center for the Shabeelle area, and his writings are still circulated by his followers.

The Ahmadiya-Idrisiya order, founded by Sayyid Ahmad ibn Idris al Fasi (1760–1837) of Mecca, was brought to Somalia by Sheikh Ali Maye Durogba of Marka. A distinguished poet who joined the order during a pilgrimage to Mecca, his visions and reported miracles gained him a great reputation for sanctity, and his tomb became a place for pilgrimage. The Ahmadiya-Idrisiya, which has the smallest number of adherents of the three orders,


has few ritual requirements beyond a few simple prayers and hymns. During its ceremonies, however, participants attain spectacular states of trance.

A conflict over the leadership of the Ahmadiya-Idrisiya among its Arab founders led to the establishment of the Salihiya in 1887 by Muhammad ibn Salih. The order spread first among the Somalis of the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, entering Somalia from there about 1880. The most active proselytizer was Sheikh Muhammad Guled ar Rashidi, who became a regional leader. He settled among the Shidle (Bantu speakers occupying the middle reaches of the Shabeelle River) where he obtained land and established a *jamaha*. Later he founded another among the Ajuran (a section of the Hawiye clan-family) and then returned to establish still another community among the Shidle before he died in 1918. Perhaps the best known of the Salihiya leaders in Somalia was Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan, leader of a long lasting resistance to the British and what he saw as errant Somalis in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (see Mohamed Abdullah, ch. 1).

Generally both Salihiya and Ahmadiya-Idrisiya leaders have been more interested in the establishment of *jamaha* along the Shabeelle and Juba rivers and the fertile land between them than in teaching because few were learned in Islam. Their early work establishing farming communities had some importance, however. They not only cultivated and harvested cooperatively but developed some effective agricultural methods. In Somalia's riverine region, for example, only *jamaha* members thought of stripping the brush from areas around their fields to reduce the breeding places of tsetse flies.

Local leaders of brotherhoods customarily asked lineage heads in the areas where they wished to settle for permission to build their mosques and communities. A piece of land was usually freely given; often it was an area between two clans or one in which nomads had access to a river. The presence of a *jamaha* not only provided a buffer zone between two hostile groups or consisted of land with controversial title, but caused the givers to acquire merit and a blessing since the land was considered given to God. Tenure was a matter of charity only, however, and sometimes became precarious in case of disagreements. No statistics were available in the 1970s on the number of such settlements, but twenty years earlier there were more than ninety in the south, having a total of about 35,000 members. Most were in the Bakool, Gedo, and Bay regions or along the middle and lower Shabeelle River. There were few *jamaha* in other regions because climatic and soil conditions did not encourage agricultural settlements.

Membership in a brotherhood is theoretically a voluntary matter unrelated to kinship. Lineages, however, are often affiliated with a specific brotherhood and, generally, a man joins his father's



Aerial view of downtown Mogadishu; Four Corner Mosque (Arbaca Rukun) in foreground

order. Initiation is followed by a formal ceremony during which the order's particular dikr is celebrated. Novices swear to accept the head of the branch as their spiritual guide.

Each order has its own hierarchy that is supposed to be a substitute for the kin group from which the members have separated themselves. Previous heads of the order known as the Chain of Blessing *(silsilad al baraka)* are cherished rather than ancestors. This is especially true in the south where residence tends to be more important than descent.

Leaders of orders and their branches and of specific congregations are said to have baraka, a state of blessedness implying an inner spiritual power that is inherent in the religious office and may cling to the tomb of a revered leader who, upon death, is considered a saint. Some saints, however, are venerated because

of their religious reputations whether or not they led or were associated with an order or one of its communities. Sainthood has also been ascribed to others simply because of their status as founders of clans or large lineages. Northern pastoral nomads are likely to honor lineage founders as saints; sedentary Somalis revere saints for their piety and baraka.

Because of the spiritual presence of the saint at his tomb, pilgrims journey there to seek aid (such as a cure for illness or infertility). Members of the saint's order also visit the tomb, particularly on the anniversary of the saint's birth and death.

Folk Islam and Indigenous Ritual

The Somalis have interpreted or modified much of Islam in terms of their pre-Islamic heritage and their particular situation. The social significance of the idea of baraka is a case in point. It is considered a gift of God to the founders and heads of Sufi orders who also inherit it through their personal genealogies going back to Muhammad. It is likewise associated with secular leaders and their clan genealogies.

A leader has power to bless, in some cases even to perform miracles and bring good luck to his people, but his baraka may have potentially dangerous side effects. His curse is greatly feared and his power may harm others. When a leader of a clan or strong lineage visits that of another, it is customary for the host's relative to receive him first in order to draw off some of the power so that his own chief may not be injured.

The traditional learning of a *wadad* includes a form of folk astronomy or astrology based on actual stellar movements and related to the changes of the seasons. Its primary objective is to signal the times for migration, but it may also be used for other predictions such as determining the dates of rituals that are specifically Somali (and not Muslim). It is also used in connection with ritual and magical methods of healing and averting misfortune as well as for divination.

Wadaddo help avert misfortune in other ways. For example they make protective amulets and charms that transmit some of their own baraka to others, or they add the Quran's baraka to the amulet in the form of a written passage. The baraka of a saint may be obtained in the form of an object that has touched or been laid near his tomb.

Wadaddo may use their power to curse as a sanction. Occasionally they are suspected of misusing this power against rivals. Generally, however, misfortune is not attributed to curses or witchcraft, nor is it considered a special punishment from God; man's basic sinfulness would then make misfortune a permanent condition. Somalis have accepted the orthodox Muslim view that a man's conduct will be judged in an afterlife. It is thought,

however, that a person who behaves in a shockingly antisocial manner, as in committing patricide, is possessed of supernatural evil powers.

Despite formal Islam's uncompromising monotheism, Muslims everywhere believe in the existence of mortal spirits (jinn), said to be descended from Iblis, a spirit fallen from heaven. Most Somalis consider all spirits to be evil, unbelieving, and a source of difficulties, but some think that there are believing and benevolent spirits. Somalis have accepted the Arabic notion of jinn, but they lay greater practical and ceremonial stress on spirits of their own pre-Islamic traditions. Sometimes, however, they identify indigenous spirits with jinn.

Certain kinds of illness, including tuberculosis and pneumonia or symptoms such as sneezing, coughing, vomiting, and loss of consciousness, are believed to come from spirit possession. The *wadaddo* of the spirit world who attack without reason are said to be involved. The condition is treated by a human *wadad*, preferably one who has recovered from the sickness. He reads portions of the Quran over the patient and bathes him with perfume, which in Somalia is associated with religious celebrations.

Although there is scriptural support for the existence of jinn, and the spirit *wadaddo* are considered to be in the same category, many Somalis regard the belief in spirit possession as superstition. This is especially so in the case of possession by the *zar* (a spirit). This form of possession and the ceremony of exorcism used to treat it are sometimes referred to as the "cult of the *zar*." The cult in various forms is found in Ethiopia among the Amhara and some Oromo. The victims are women with grievances against their husbands. The symptoms are extreme forms of hysteria and fainting fits.

The exorcism ritual is conducted by a man who has had the disease and is thus supposed to have some authority over the spirit. The ritual consists of a special type of dance in which the victim and others participate. The victim tends to reproduce the symptoms and fall into a trance during the dance. The illness enables a disgruntled wife to express her hostility without actually quarreling with her husband. Moreover there is always the threat that the attack may recur. If this happens too often, however, the husband may suspect that the agent is an old woman whose malicious suggestions have brought on the condition. In the colonial era the religious authorities disapproved of *zar* dances and had them banned in many districts.

A third kind of spirit possession is known as *gelid* (entering), in which the spirit of an injured person troubles the offender. A jilted girl, for example, cannot openly complain if a promise of marriage, arranged by the respective families, has been broken. Only her spirit, entering the young man who was supposed to marry her and stating the grievance, brings the matter into the

open. The exorcism consists of readings from the Quran and commands from a *wadad* that the spirit leave the afflicted person.

The same type of possession is thought to be caused by the curse or evil power of a poor and helpless person who has been injured. The underlying notion is that those who are weak in worldly matters are mystically endowed. Such persons are supposed to be under the special protection of God, and kind acts toward them bring religious merit, whereas unkind acts bring punishment. The evil eye, too, is associated with poor unfortunates, especially women, but also with covetousness in a way that suggests the European medieval idea of a witch. It is consistent with this attitude that the Yibir, who are the least numerous and the weakest of the special occupational groups and traditionally the least acceptable socially, are the most feared for their supernatural powers.

Somalis also engage in rituals that seem to derive from pre-Islamic practices and in some cases resemble that of other Eastern Cushitic-speaking peoples. Perhaps the most important of these were the annual celebrations of the clan ancestor among northern Somalis—an expression of their solidarity—and the collective rain-making ritual (*roobdoon*) held by sedentary groups in the south.

Islam in the Colonial Era and After

Islamic law has its origin in prophecy and revelation. In principle, religious officials have the duty to ascertain the precise will of God by interpreting the Quran and the hadith. Ingrained in Islam is a certain inflexibility that has made it difficult to cope with the social, economic, and political changes beginning with the expansion of colonial rule in the late nineteenth century.

Nevertheless adaptations have taken place, often without direct reference to the relation of those changes to the apparent requirements of Islam. Some, however, have sought in Islam sanctions for change they have thought desirable or necessary and have found them. As in any long-lived and widespread religion, interpretations of scripture may vary. In the Somali context none have rejected Islam, despite quite varied responses to the impact of colonialism, independence, and revolution.

One response was to stress a return to orthodox Muslim traditions and to oppose Westernization totally. The Sufi brotherhoods were in the forefront of this movement, personified in Somalia by Mohamed Abdullah, the noted early nationalist. Generally the leaders of Islamic orders, fearing a weakening of their authority, tended to oppose the spread of Western education.

Another response was to reform Islam by reinterpreting it in modern terms. Those responding in this way pointed out that early Islam was a protest against abuse, corruption, and inequalities, and they attemptd to prove that Muslim scriptures contained all the elements needed to deal with the forces of modernization.

To this school of thought belongs Islamic socialism, identified particularly with Egypt's late Gamal Abdul Nasser. His ideas appealed to a number of Somalis, especially those who had studied in Cairo in the 1950s and 1960s.

The constitution of 1961 guaranteed freedom of religion but also declared the newly independent republic an Islamic state. The public course followed by the first two governments was vaguely defined as following the principles of Islamic socialism. The coup of October 21, 1969, installed a radical regime committed to deep-rooted changes. Shortly afterward *Stella d' Ottobre*, the official mouthpiece of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), published an editorial that dealt with the relations between Islam and socialism and with the differences between scientific and Islamic socialism. Islamic socialism, it said, had become a servant of capitalism and neocolonialism and a tool manipulated by a privileged, rich, and powerful class. In contrast scientific socialism had the same altruistic values that inspired genuine Islam. Religious leaders should therefore leave secular affairs to the new leaders, secure in the knowledge that they were striving for goals that conformed to Islamic principles. Those who attacked scientific socialism were actually opposing Islam itself, the editorial argued. A short time later a number of protesting religious leaders were arrested and accused of counterrevolutionary propaganda and of conniving with reactionary elements in the Arabian Peninsula. Several members of religious tribunals were dismissed for corruption and incompetence.

When the Three Year Plan 1971–1973 was launched in January 1971, the SRC leaders felt compelled to win the active support of religious leaders for the transformation of the existing social structure of which these leaders were an integral part. "A good Muslim must espouse scientific socialism because of its goals of justice, equality, and plenty for all," said a member of the SRC in a February interview. "Who is against scientific socialism is against the only system compatible with our religion," proclaimed *Stella d'Ottobre* in March.

On September 4, 1971, more than a hundred religious teachers were assembled in the capital and exhorted by Siad Barre to participate actively in the building of a new socialist society. He criticized their method of teaching in the Quranic schools and said that some of them used religion as a source of personal profit.

The campaign for scientific socialism and, parallel to it, the attack on what the regime referred to as the traditional upper classes (including the religious leaders) intensified in 1972. On the occasion of Id al-Adha (the most important Islamic festival of the year in January), the president defined scientific socialism as half practical work and half ideological beliefs. He declared that work

and belief were entirely compatible with genuine Islam because the Quran condemned exploitation and moneylending and urged compassion, unity, and cooperation among fellow Muslims. But he stressed the distinction between religion as an ideological instrument for the manipulation of power and as a moral force. He condemned the antireligious attitude of confirmed Marxists. Religion, he said, was an integral part of the Somali world view, but it belonged in the private sphere whereas scientific socialism dealt with material concerns such as poverty. Religious leaders should exercise their moral influence but refrain from interfering in political or economic matters. In the years since that time, the compatability of Islam and scientific socialism has been reiterated in print and orally. For example in 1980 Somalia's English-language newspaper *Heegan* carried an editorial essentially on that point.

In 1973 the National Adult Education Center in Mogadishu began a training program for Quranic teachers. After one session in July the press reported that the sixty participants had accepted the truth of scientific socialism and had promised to pray for its success henceforth. Whether they did this out of conviction, out of opportunism, or out of a deep-seated feeling that scientific socialism represented only a short-lived threat to their ancient religion it is not possible to say.

In early January 1975, Siad Barre, recalling the message of equality, justice, and social progress contained in the Quran, announced a new family law that gave women the right to inherit equally with men. The occasion was the twenty-seventh anniversary of the death of a national heroine, Hawa Othman Tako, who had been killed in 1948 during political demonstrations. Apparently this was seen by some Somalis as proof that the SRC wanted to undermine the basic structure of Islamic society. In Mogadishu twenty-three religious leaders protested inside their mosques. They were arrested within hours and charged with acting at the instigation of a foreign power and with violating the security of the state. Ten of them were executed on January 23. Most religious leaders, however, kept silent. The government has continued to organize "training courses...for our sheikhs from time to time, thus keeping them abreast of development," according to *Heegan*. There have been no clear public signs of opposition by religious leaders since the mid–1970s, but their private views have not been reported. One observer, Somali historian Abdi Sheik-Abdi, has suggested that the regime remains skeptical of religious leaders.

Education

Few educational facilities and opportunities were available to Somalis in the colonial era, although the British and Italian authorities paid more attention to education in the last decade before independence. The prerevolutionary independence government

made relatively little progress in the field from 1960 to 1969. Unlike many other new African states it did not assign a very high priority to education in the Western mode, and it was not initially pushed to do so. Until well after World War II there was not a strong demand for secular education from the nomadic majority; indeed many of them and some of the sedentary minority considered such education an attack on Islam. Many sedentary Somalis, however, were receptive to educational opportunities in the trusteeship era. The existence of two official languages—English and Italian—and a third—Arabic, widely revered as the language of the Quran if not so widely used and understood—posed problems for a uniform educational system and for easy training in literacy at the primary school level.

Although the speakers of one Somali dialect may have initial difficulty in understanding the speakers of another dialect, Somali is a single language spoken by the vast majority of Somali nationals. For a number of political and religious reasons, however, agreement on an orthography for Somali could not be reached, and the prerevolutionary government was unwilling to risk a decision in favor of one of the several orthographies that were available.

The revolutionary government considered education crucial to Somali economic and social development; moreover it was prepared to impose an existing orthography (devised many years earlier by a Somali), and it did so in 1972. By 1974 and 1975 a mass literacy campaign was undertaken. The development of education and literacy has not been easy, however. The demands placed on Somalia's extremely limited resources by drought and war have limited the funds available for education. Nevertheless enrollment has grown substantially; materials in Somali for use in the schools and elsewhere have been developed, and the language itself has been adapted for use in technical and scientific fields.

Language and Communication

Except for a few communities along the southern Somali coast where dialects of Swahili (a Bantu language) and Arabic are spoken, Somali nationals (including persons of non-Somali origin) speak one on the several dialects of Somali. Somali is a member of a set of languages called lowland Eastern Cushitic spoken by peoples living in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Eastern Cushitic is one section of the Cushitic language family, which is in turn part of the great Afro-Asiatic stock.

Of the several Somali dialects the most widely used is Common Somali, a term applied to a number of subdialects, the speakers of which seem to be able to understand each other easily. Common Somali is spoken in most of Somalia and in adjacent territories (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti), and it is used by broadcasting

stations in Somalia and in Somali-language broadcasts originating outside the country. Coastal Somali is spoken on the Benadir Coast (From Cadale to south of Baraawe) and its immediate hinterland. Central Somali is spoken in the interriverine area, chiefly by members of the Rahanweyn clan-family. Speakers of Common and Coastal Somali are said to be able to understand each other after a few weeks of close contact, speakers of Common and Central Somali only after a few months.

Facility with speech has been highly valued in Somali society; the capability of a suitor, a warrior, or a political or religious leader has been judged, at least in part, by his adroitness in the use of words. In such a society oral poetry was well developed, and a person's ability to compose verse in one or more of its several forms enhanced his status. Oral skills have not lost their importance. In the conflict between the regime and its opponents, both sides have mobilized poets in what Sheikh Abdi has called their radio war.

In the traditional social order (and probably still in local communities and small groups) the art of negotiation involved the careful use of language. Because pride is important in Somali society, a blunt request or a blunt refusal that might lead to loss of face by either party was to be avoided. For example one seeking another's cooperation in a project and not wishing to make an issue of it approached the subject indirectly to discover the other's probable attitude. If it were unfavorable he might have refrained from asking the favor in order to avoid a direct rejection. The other, in trying to sound out the first person's intent, would try to reply in a way that gave the correct impression. Traditionally all serious negotiation was carried on in this way. The avoidance of direct confrontation was consistent with a social order in which most important decisions were made and disputes resolved not by a person in a position of authority but by agreement among equals.

Humor is important as a means of softening criticism or unpalatable advice or of extricating oneself from embarrassing situations. Most Somali humor is based on puns, plays on words, and the manipulation of shades of meaning.

Speakers in political or religious assemblies and litigants in courts traditionally were expected to ornament speech by appropriate use of poetry or poetic proverbs. Even everyday talk tended to be marked by a terse, vivid poetic style, characterized by carefully chosen words, condensed meaning, and alliteration.

The extent to which egalitarian, nonconfrontational communication persists in the political domain is not certain. The government of Siad Barre has been authoritarian in character, but the nature of the interplay between traditional Somali style and that authoritarianism has not been closely examined.

Until the establishment of the Somali script in 1972, there were two languages of government—English and Italian. In the prerevolutionary era, English became increasingly dominant in the school system and in government, leading to a degree of conflict between elites from northern and southern Somalia (see The Language and Literacy Issue, ch. 1). The important issue was the development of a socioeconomic stratum based on mastery of a foreign language. The relatively small proportion of Somalis (less than 10 percent) who had a grasp of such a language—preferably English—had access to positions in government and the few managerial or technical jobs in modern private enterprises. Such persons became increasingly remote from their nonliterate Somali-speaking brethren whether in the towns or the rural areas, but because the secondary schools and most government posts were in urban areas the socioeconomic and linguistic distinction was in good part a rural-urban one. To some extent it was also a north-south distinction as those educated in the Italian system and even in Italian universities found it increasingly difficult to reach the higher levels of government.

Even before the revolution, Somalis had become aware of and publicly decried social stratification and the growing distance, based on differences in language and literacy, between ordinary Somalis and those in government. The decision in 1972 to make official a Somali script and its use in government demolished the language barrier and an important obstacle to a rapid growth in the literacy rate.

Several steps have been undertaken in the years since the institution of the Somali script, among them the early requirement that Somali officials learn the script and the attempt to inculcate mass literacy—in 1973 among urban and rural sedentary Somalis, in 1974–75 among the nomads. The long-term effects of the mass literacy campaigns of the mid–1970s are problematic, however (see The Schooling of Somalis, this ch.). Even before 1972 a few texts and manuals had been prepared in the new script, and this process has continued. In most cases wholly new texts were prepared, focusing on Somali experience and presenting the government's perspective on Somali history and development. In others, materials were translated from European sources. Closely related to the publication of printed matter in virtually all fields was the development of a vocabulary to deal with a range of subjects from mathematics and physics to administration and ideology, a task accomplished by Somali scholars with an extraordinary degree of success. In many cases they have adapted Somali terms to new uses. In others they have converted words in international use, e.g., atom, to Somali *atam*.

By the late 1970s a sufficient quantity of materials in Somali were available to permit the language to be the medium of in-

struction at all school levels below the university. There, because Italians dominated the senior faculty, Italian was still in use, although some texts had been translated into Somali and some lectures were given in that language. Hussein Adam, Dean of the Social Sciences at the Somali National University, wrote in 1978 that "...by 1981, a predominantly Somali-language freshman class will enter the SNU [Somali National University]. Plans are under way to Somalize the university as best as possible." That class would have been educated in Somali through secondary school, and students would have been familiar with other tongues only as second languages. Of these Arabic was said to have been taught to all students beginning at the elementary level and continuing into the secondary phase. English was offered as a subject. Students entering the university were first given a course in Italian.

The Schooling of Somalis

The relative lack of direction in educational policy in the prerevolutionary period was replaced under the SRC by the enunciation in the early 1970s of several definite goals reflecting the philosophy of the revolutionary regime. Among these goals were the expansion of the school system to accommodate the largest possible number of students, including a substantial increase in the number of girls; the introduction of courses geared to the country's social and economic requirements; the expansion of technical education; and the provision of higher education within Somalia so that most of the students who went on to advanced studies would acquire their knowledge in a Somali context. Also announced was the intention to eliminate illiteracy. All of these efforts depended on the introduction of an orthography for Somali, which was to become the language of instruction through the secondary level and to the greatest feasible extent at the university level. A considerable degree of success with respect to all of these goals had been achieved by 1980, although much remained to be done as indicated in the presentation of Somalia's program (and hopes) for education in the 1980s at the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (January 1981).

In 1981 the Somali school system had four basic levels—preprimary, primary, secondary, and higher. All but the first of these, however, were divided into sublevels or separate streams or both. All schools were directly under government control, private schools having been nationalized in 1972 and Quranic education made an integral part of existing schools in the late 1970s.

The preprimary training given by Quranic schools remained a part of the educational scene until the late 1970s. Quranic teachers traveled with nomadic groups, and many children received only the education offered by such teachers. There were a num-



Literacy among Somalis has risen as a result of classes in rural areas that provide instruction in the use of the Somali language. Courtesy United Nations

ber of fixed religious schools in the urban areas as well. The decision to bring Islamic education more firmly into the national system reflected a long-standing concern by some that the Quranic learning imparted by most teachers was rudimentary at best and generally inadequate. But the change may have also reflected a wish to institute tighter government control over what was an autonomous source of perspective and information.

Until the mid–1970s primary education consisted of four years of elementary schooling followed by four grades designated as intermediate. In 1972 promotion to the intermediate grades was made automatic (a competitive examination had been required until that year). The two cycles have subsequently been treated as a single continuous program, although some government statistical data distinguishes the first four from later years in the primary

system. In 1975 universal primary education was established in principle, and primary education was reduced to six years. By the end of the school year 1978–79, however, it appeared that the system was not working, and the eight-year primary school was reintroduced.

The primary system is intended to be universal, and there has been a substantial increase in the numbers of students enrolling each year, beginning in 1969–70, but particularly after 1975–76 (see table 3, Appendix). Primary schooling should begin at age six, but data from the late 1970s suggest that many children begin at ages seven through nine or even later. At that time, however, schooling of some kind had only recently become accessible to much of the rural population, and it is likely that children will enter primary school earlier as time goes on. Despite the increase in numbers it is clear that many, especially girls, do not go to school, and that some drop out, particularly after they have completed four years. Although many Somalis see some point in an elementary education for girls, they are not persuaded that is must continue beyond the age of menstruation, which it is likely to do if they do not begin schooling until the age of eight or nine.

In 1981 Somalia's presentation to the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries stated that the nomadic population was omitted "from the formal education program for the purposes of forecasting primary education enrollment." In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a three-year educational program for nomadic children. For six months of each year (when seasonal conditions permitted the aggregation of substantial numbers of nomads) the children were sent to school. For the remaining six months, when nomads were dispersed, they accompanied their families. Nomadic families that wanted their children to attend a school throughout the year had to arrange to board them in a permanent settlement, sometimes at a considerable cost.

There is little information on the content of the primary school curriculum. In addition to training in reading and writing (made much easier by the use of the Somali script) and arithmetic, the teaching of which draws upon some novel techniques, social studies courses are offered, using new textbooks that apparently focus on Somali materials and contexts. How much scientific socialism was inculcated at this level in the early 1980s is not clear. Arabic was to be taught as a second language beginning in primary school, but it was doubtful that there were enough Somalis able to teach it beyond the rudimentary level. Another goal, announced in the mid–1970s, was to acquaint the students with some modern knowledge of agriculture, animal husbandry, and other useful skills. It was not expected, however, that primary school graduates would be in a position to earn a living at a skilled trade.

In the school year 1978–79 the number of students enrolled in secondary schools was only 7 percent of the total in primary

schools, a function of the constraints of lack of teachers and materials, and demography. Despite the growth in the number of secondary schools, most were still in urban areas, and given the rural and largely nomadic nature of the population, they were necessarily boarding schools. Further if Somali was to be used at the secondary level, the teachers had to be Somalis, and training a sufficient number of them would take time. Presumably the ratio of secondary to primary school students will grow as the flow of primary school graduates becomes more regular. Until the late 1970s a rather large proportion of those who had finished eight years of primary school did go on to secondary education of some kind. In the mid–1970s there was considerable interest in developing technical and vocational schools as alternatives to the standard four-year general secondary school, but there was no definite information on the kinds of courses (and their duration) taken by secondary students. Beginning in the 1980–81 school year, however, a formula for the allocation of postprimary students was to be put into effect. It was assumed that 80 percent of all primary school graduates would go on to further education. Of those who do, 30 percent would go to the four-year course of general secondary education, 17.5 percent to either three- or four-year courses in technical education, and 52.5 percent to vocational courses of one to two years duration. The criteria governing the allocation were not known.

The principal institution of higher education was Somali National University, founded in 1970. Its physical plant in Mogadishu was still being developed, and its programs expanded in the early 1980s. Nine faculties had been in place for some time: law, education, economics, the sciences, agriculture, veterinary sciences, engineering, geology, and medicine. Added in the late 1970s were the faculty of languages and the combination of journalism and Islamic studies. Still others were proposed, among them a faculty of marine sciences. The College of Education, which prepares secondary schoolteachers in a two-year program, is part of the university, but the faculty of education has other programs including a division of social sciences.

There were about 3,600 students in the various faculties of the university in the early 1980s, but it is not known whether all were engaged in a continuous program leading to a degree or other formal qualification. The Somali presentation to the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries noted that "there are dropouts in appreciable numbers in between the course years. Compared to the intake, the output tends to be small...It has not been possible to work out an average...of dropouts and those finally qualifying. No attempt has...been made...to arrive at the total enrollment in each year." About 700 students were admitted

to the university each year in the late 1970s—roughly 15 percent of those completing the general secondary course and the four-year technical course. Despite the frequency of dropouts (for which no explanation has been offered), the country's needs and the demand from prospective students has led the authorities to project an intake of roughly 25 percent of general and technical secondary graduates.

Given the comparative lack of reading and research materials in Somali at the university level and the relatively few Somalis educated to the level required for university teaching, most university courses were conducted in Italian. Some courses in Somali language and literature were held in Somali, and a few used Arabic. The senior professors were, with few exceptions, expatriates, but a number of the junior teaching staff members were Somalis. It was proposed in the late 1970s to establish a master's degree program in several subjects in order to provide university teaching staff and research personnel, but the program did not get underway in 1979 as it was to have done. The Ministry of Culture and Higher Education intended to begin it in the 1981–82 academic year when a little more than fifty students were to be admitted to it.

In 1981 there were also a number of institutes admitting secondary school graduates. Among them were schools for nursing, veterinary science, and telecommunications and a polytechnic institute. The numbers enrolled and the duration of the courses are not known.

In addition to the standard system encompassing primary through tertiary education, there were several programs directed to adults and women. Of particular importance was the adult education program intended to extend and consolidate the literacy of Somalis. The Somali government had claimed 60 percent literacy after the mass literacy campaign of the mid–1970s, but by early 1977 there were already signs of relapse, particularly among the nomadic population. The government then established the National Adult Education Center to coordinate the work of several ministries and many voluntary and part-time paid workers in what became an extensive program directed to persons between sixteen and forty-five years of age. The program was intended to provide a firm basis for literacy and knowledge of practical value to the largely rural population. Although many people have attended such courses in the years since 1975, the proportion that has retained a functional literacy is not known, and a firm literacy rate for the early 1980s cannot be given. Nevertheless it was substantially higher than the 5 to 10 percent rate that was estimated in the late 1960s and early 1970s before institution of the Somali script, the several literacy drives, and the growth of enrollment in the school system.

Health

The high incidence of disease that persisted into the early 1980s reflected a difficult environment, inadequate nutrition, and insufficient medical care. In the years since the revolutionary regime came into power, drought, flood, warfare (and the refugee problem that is a consequence of the latter) have, if anything, left diets more inadequate than they had been. Massive changes that would make the environment less hostile, such as the elimination of disease vectors, had yet to take place as of 1981. The numbers of medical personnel and health facilities had certainly increased, but they did not meet Somali needs in the early 1980s and were not likely to do so for some time.

The major diseases prevalent in Somalia include pulmonary tuberculosis, malaria, and infectious and parasitic diseases. In addition schistosomiasis (bilharzia), tetanus, venereal disease (especially in the port towns), leprosy, and a variety of skin and eye diseases severely impair the population's health and productivity. As elsewhere, smallpox has been virtually wiped out, but occasional epidemics of measles can have devastating effects.

Ecological, economic, and social conditions are apparently conducive to a high incidence of tuberculosis among young males who graze camels under severe conditions and transmit the disease in the course of movement and regrouping characteristic of nomadic life. Efforts to deal with tuberculosis have had some success in urban centers, but control measures have been difficult to apply to the nomadic and seminomadic population. The development of adequate treatment centers for the disease was a major goal of the Three Year Plan 1979–1981.

Malaria may affect the entire population, but it has been more prevalent in the southern regions, particularly those traversed by the country's two major rivers. By the mid–1970s a malaria eradication program had been extended from Mogadishu to other regions; good results were then reported, but there are no useful statistics for the late 1970s. The Three Year Plan indicates that much remains to be done.

Spot checks have revealed that 75 percent of the population are affected by one or more kinds of intestinal parasites, a problem that will persist as long as the use of contaminated water sources remains common and the way of life of most rural Somalis (pastoral and agricultural) remains unchanged. Schistosomiasis is particularly prevalent in the marshy and irrigated areas along the rivers in the south. Whatever their sources, parasites are not often lethal, but they contribute to general debilitation and make the population susceptible to other diseases.

Underlying Somali susceptibility to disease is widespread malnutrition, exacerbated from time to time by drought and since the

late 1970s by the refugee burden (see Refugees, this ch.). Although reliable statistics were not available, the rate of child mortality is thought to be very high because of inadequate nutrition.

The organization and administration of health services is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, although regional medical officers are given some authority. All medical personnel are employed by the government, private practice having been brought to an end in 1972.

In the years 1973–78 there was a substantial increase in the number of physicians, and a far greater proportion of them were Somalis; of 198 physicians in the latter year 118 were Somalis, whereas only thirty-seven of ninety-six were Somalis in 1973. The operation of the medical school of the Somali National University is expected to continue that trend. An effort has also been made to expand the number of other health personnel and to foster the construction of health facilities (see table 4, Appendix). To that end two nursing schools and several other educational programs have been instituted. Of equal importance is the distribution of personnel and facilities throughout the country. In the early 1970s most facilities and personnel were concentrated in Mogadishu and a few other towns. The situation had improved somewhat by the late 1970s, but the difficulties of serving a rural and particularly a nomadic population posed substantial problems, and the distribution of health care was still unsatisfactory from any point of view including that of the government (see table 5, Appendix). Here again, the Three Year Plan projected the development of facilities and the allocation of personnel to districts suffering from an acute lack of them.

Refugees

The conflict between Ethiopian military forces and ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia has led to a massive influx of Somalis from that region (and to a lesser extent from others) into Somalia. Beginning in March 1978 the decisive advance of the Ethiopians, aided by Soviet arms and Cuban manpower, generated substantial numbers of refugees. The bulk were ethnic Somalis, but there were also many Oromo, an ethnic group located primarily in Ethiopia. In September 1979 the Somali government, no longer able to cope with the influx, appealed for help to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but it was another six months before the UNHCR (and the UN secretary general) formally set in motion requests for international aid.

The number of refugees actually in Somalia from 1979 through 1981 is not precisely known. In its first public appeal to the UN, the Somali government estimated 310,000 in the camps in September 1979. By mid–1980 estimates had risen to 750,000 persons



Refugees in one of the many camps erected to care for displaced Somalis
Courtesy UNICEF/Arild Vollan


in camps and at least half that number outside them. In early 1981 the government in Mogadishu estimated more than 1.3 million refugees in the camps and an additional 700,000 to 800,000 at large, either attempting to carry on their pastoral nomadic way of life or quartered in towns and cities.

In 1980 representatives of international agencies and other donors of aid expressed skepticism at some of these claims, and in 1981 these agencies asked UN demographers to carry out a survey. According to Jean-Pierre Langelier (in *Le Monde*) the survey yielded an estimate of between 450,000 and 620,000 refugees in the camps. That may not have been the peak figure, nor was an estimate made of refugees outside the camps. The Somali government has rejected the results of this survey, but international agencies have subsequently based their budgeting on a figure of 650,000.

The age and sex structure of the refugees deviated from what may be assumed to have been the structure of the Ogaden Somali population. Some reports have referred to a refugee population that was 90 percent women and children. The Somali government in April 1981 estimated that 60 percent of the overall refugee population in the camps were under age fifteen and that 20 to 30 percent were women; the remainder were chiefly elderly men. A team of epidemiologists from the Center for Disease Control of the United States Public Health Service sought to determine the demographic characteristics of a sample of refugee camps in mid–1980. They found the very young (under five years) to range from 15 to 18 percent of the camp population; those from five to fifteen ranged from 45 to 47 percent; from 29 to 33 percent were between fifteen and forty-four; and 6 to 8 percent were forty-five and older. They did not find the male-female ratio unusually distorted even in the fifteen to forty-four age group, although they noted relatively fewer males in the fifteen to twenty-five group. The UN survey generally supports other estimates of the age and sex structures of the camp population.

In February 1981 there were forty refugee camps in Somalia located in four of Somalia's sixteen regions (see fig. 8). The number of persons in these camps ranged from under 3,000 to more than 70,000, but most held 35,000 to 45,000 refugees. According to a government document the fifteen camps in Gedo held more than 450,000 persons, the ten in Hiiraan more than 375,000, the twelve in Woqooyi Galbeed well over 400,000, and the three in Shabeellaha Hoose nearly 70,000. (In light of the 1980 UN survey, this figure may be considered overestimated.)

The burden of the influx of refugees on Somalia (even of the reduced numbers recognized by international agencies in 1981) was heavy. Somalia is one of the world's poorest countries, an importer of food in ordinary circumstances and lacking crucial elements of physical and social infrastructure (transportation and



Source: Based on information from Somalia, Ministry of National Planning, *Short and Long Term Programme for Refugees in the Somali Democratic Republic,* Mogadishu, 1981.

Figure 8. Refugee Camps in Somalia, 1980

health facilities, for example). The general poverty of the indigenous population and the ad hoc character of the National Refugee Commission and other government agencies dealing with the refugee problem have contributed to the misuse and even outright stealing of food and medical supplies intended for refugees. Somali officials acknowledged the problem and claimed that they were dealing with it.

In a country having limited arable land and fuels and visited fairly often by drought or flash floods, the refugees were hard put to it to contribute to their own support. Some of the refugee camps were so located that transportation of food and medical supplies has been fairly easy, but that has not been the case for many of the others. Similarly some were in or near areas where, in a year of good rain, crops may be grown, but others were not. In almost all cases easily accessible firewood had been rapidly depleted by early 1981, and the refugees had to go long distances for what little could be found.

Despite the responses of a number of countries—including the United States—to the food and medical requirements of the refugees, their situation in mid–1981 remained difficult. The epidemiologists from the Center for Disease Control reported in early 1980 that the "major problem affecting the refugee children was protein energy malnutrition...[Their] nutritional status is worse than that observed in the general population during the Sahel drought in 1974...[However] malnutrition was more prevalent in newly arrived children than those who had been in camp for longer periods...." Child mortality was high, particularly among newly arrived refugees. A 1980 epidemic of measles was responsible for many deaths in camps in Gedo and Woqooyi Galbeed. Another leading cause of children's deaths was diarrhea, a consequence in part of the severe lack of adequate sanitation, particularly with respect to water sources.

As the data in the Center for Disease Control's survey suggest, extreme malnutrition declines when refugees have been in the camps for some time, although none can be said to be well fed. But to sustain the refugee population even at a low level requires reliable (in amount and timing) contributions from other countries, an adequate and competently managed distribution system and, if possible, some contribution by the refugees themselves to their own subsistence. In April 1981 Somalia's Ministry of National Planning issued its *Short and Long Term Programme for Refugees* detailing projected needs and proposals, all of which require international support in various forms—money, food, medical supplies, and expatriate staff, among others. When the program was published, overall responsibility for refugees lay with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and its


National Commission for Refugees. That seemed still to be the case in late 1981. Other ministries, including those of health and education, were assigned responsibility for implementing specific projects. By 1981 most of those ministries had special divisions or sections devoted to refugee matters.

To the extent that it may be inferred from projections in the proposals of the Ministry of Planning, the short term comprehended the year 1981 and the long term 1982, 1983, and the first half of 1984. How long the refugees were likely to be in Somalia was not predictable in 1981 given the unsettled conditions in the Ogaden and the antagonism between Ethiopia and Somalia. But the government in Mogadishu did not intend permanent settlement of the refugees within Somalia.

* * *

The classic work on the social and political system of the pastoral nomadic Somalis (based on research done in the 1950s) is I.M. Lewis' *A Pastoral Democracy.* Lewis has also written a number of articles on specific topics, several dealing with aspects of Somali Islam and indigenous religion. His "From Nomadism to Cultivation" provides an introduction to the traditional social and political orders of the interriverine sedentary Somalis. Virginia Luling has published some of her findings on one group of sedentary Somalis (the Geledi clan and its neighbors) in "Colonial and Postcolonial Influences on a South Somali Community." David Laitin's *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience* deals with the politics of deciding on a written form for the Somali language and presents a controversial theory on the relation between that language and social and political behavior. No systematic research has been published on the consequences for the Somali social system of the changes wrought by the revolutionary regime, but Dan R. Aronson's "Kinsmen and Comrades" provides some indication of emerging structure among Somali pastoralists consequent upon intensified commercialization of the livestock sector. Statesments concerning such consequences are based on piecing together fragmentary information. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 3. The Economy



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Bananas, Somalia's principal commercial crop

IMPLEMENTATION OF SOMALIA's economic policies, which in theory are based on socialist concepts, has given the public sector a dominant role in the economy since 1970. The government has declared its ultimate objective to be the organization of all economic activities so that the means of production are owned and operated by and in the interest of the people, and the resulting benefits are distributed equitably. Steps were taken during the 1970s toward attaining this goal through the nationalization of various, though not all, existing private enterprises, the creation of a substantial number of large parastatals covering a wide range of economic activities, and a start on the formation of producer and service cooperatives. Private ownership was completely eliminated in the areas of banking, insurance, and wholesale trade, and large-scale and some small industry were essentially restricted to the public sector. In 1981, however, the private sector still encompassed a large part of the economy including traditional agriculture, livestock raising, retail trade, and most small manufacturing and traditional crafts, although the introduction of cooperatives had begun in some areas. Foreign private investment capital remained acceptable in certain joint ventures, and several agreements for oil exploration were entered into in the late 1970s. A place for small private investors existed, according to the government, which has encouraged their participation in productive activities. But the extent of the future role of private investment had not been clearly stated.

Despite substantial development expenditures, the economy made only limited gains during the 1970s. The gross domestic product grew at about the rate of growth of the population. The country was unable to feed itself, and increasing quantities of foodstuffs were imported. A per capita income estimated by the World Bank at the equivalent of US$130 in 1978 ranked Somalia eighth among the least developed countries. Certain developments during the decade, however, had imposed unusual hardships on the economy. In 1974 and 1975 the already harsh environment was greatly worsened by a severe drought that affected almost two-thirds of the country, resulting in great loss of livestock and human suffering that required emergency measures and diversion of efforts from economic development. In 1977 the severance of relations with the Soviet Union, long a major source of development aid and essential technical assistance, halted a wide range of economic activities. This was followed by a further serious blow to the economy from the Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1977–78, which caused the government to allocate development funds to security purposes—a condition that continued in 1981. A massive influx of refugees occasioned by the war had

placed a further heavy burden on the economy, despite continuing large-scale foreign assistance.

Natural resources were limited, but the population size has remained relatively low, and foreign economists were of the opinion that measures for proper utilization of those resources could materially improve conditions for the predominant agricultural and pastoral sectors. Implementation of several foreign-funded projects to that end was under way in 1981. Reportedly there had been some degree of success, but considerable further effort would be required for effective improvement of the livelihood of much of the rural population.

Economic Development

Little economic development occurred in the area of present-day Somalia during the long period of colonial administration. Neither of the two colonial territories that eventually became independent Somalia possessed the rich mineral resources or the potential for large-scale development of industrial crops that had attracted foreign investors to other African countries. Private sector activities were largely limited to the establishment of banana plantations and the cultivation of some other irrigated crops in the southern area that was under Italian rule. Limited government programs in both colonies were concerned mainly with the social sectors. During the 1950s some effort was made in the Italian trusteeship to prepare the economy for independence, and from 1954 several concurrent seven-year sectoral programs were implemented. They were based on plans developed by the United Nations (UN) and the United States International Cooperation Administration (later United States Agency for International Development—USAID). The principal economic achievements were in the livestock and agricultural sectors and included construction of new wells and catchments in the drier regions to aid livestock development, and grain storage facilities, catchments, and flood control works in the cultivated area between the Juba and Shabeelle rivers. In the British area, efforts were also made to aid livestock development. During this period individual Somali promoters and groups constructed a considerable number of additional water tanks in the rangelands. Largely as a result, a marked increase in the livestock population and livestock exports occurred after the late 1950s.

Postindependence economic development, which commenced with the First Five Year Plan (1963–1967), was hampered greatly by the lack of statistical data on the economy and the dearth of trained professional and technical staff. Systematic planning based on knowledge of manpower availability and material resources was almost impossible, and the plan was very largely a presentation of desirable projects, most of which were dependent on external aid for implementation. Only about half of planned

expenditures were made during the plan period, and foreign aid commitments were not fully utilized. At the end of the period a large number of projects in which substantial funds had already been committed remained uncompleted. A three-year plan, the Short Term Development Programme 1968–1970 was drawn up for the completion of ongoing projects. It represented basically an interim measure for consolidation of the efforts initiated under the first plan and for creation of more favorable basic conditions—improvement in administration and more effective mobilization of domestic resources—essential to better formulation and implementation of later plans. Overall the development effort had achieved only limited success by the time of the military coup in October 1969. A number of important projects were completed, however, including construction of a major cotton textile plant, fish and meat canneries, and a milk plant, development of deep-water ports at Kismaayo and Berbera, and hard-surfacing of several roads to facilitate banana exports. Several surveys and other projects in the agricultural and livestock sectors had also been carried out. One of the principal reasons given at the end of the first plan for its lack of marked achievement was the need in government to concentrate attention on attaining political stability. Inadequate attention by the government to development was an important reason given by the military regime for its takeover.

Soon after the coup the military government announced a new set of objectives for economic development that centered on raising the standard of living of the people, providing opportunities for employment to the entire labor force, and eradicating all forms of exploitation. Self-help, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency were emphasized. The Development Programme 1971–1973 launched by the new regime was overambitious, but it attained considerable success in extension of the agricultural crash program. Progress also was made in animal disease control, food grain marketing, and other agricultural and livestock projects. But major projects such as the Baardheere dam irrigation scheme had to be carried over to the succeeding Five Year Development Programme 1974–1978 (see Agriculture and Pastoralism, this ch.).

The 1974–78 plan was seriously affected by unforseeable factors that included the increase in world oil prices after 1973 and the subsequent inflation. The latter, in particular, forced the recosting of projects and caused serious difficulties in project management because of reduced financing and related supply problems. Financing difficulties were further affected by the drain on local resources because of the 1974–75 drought and the war with Ethiopia in 1977–78. Important achievements were registered, however, including formation of agricultural cooperatives, resettlement of nomads in agricultural and fishing cooperatives

(under a separate drought relief program) and new additions to irrigated crop areas. Major accomplishments were completion of a petroleum refinery, addition of substantial mileage to the paved road system, and development of a deepwater port at Mogadishu. Considerable advances were also made in the social sectors. Nonetheless a large number of the projects in the plan had to be carried forward to the Three Year Plan 1979–1981. In retrospect the government has noted that the major cause of plan delays continued to be the lack of skilled personnel at all levels from administrative, managerial, professional, and technical, to craftsman. The emigration to the Middle East petroleum producing countries by trained professional and technical people frustrated by wage constraints in Somalia has been especially damaging.

In 1981 the government had in process the preparation of a new development plan. According to foreign economists the government made commendable efforts to mobilize domestic financial resources for development during the 1970s (see Government Finance, this ch.). But the extent to which development plans were implemented—as during the 1960s—was related in great part to the amount of external financing, both as support in meeting domestic development expenditure and to pay for the imported materials and technical assistance components. Somali planners expected this situation to continue in the plan that follows the Three Year Plan 1979–1981, which had anticipated that about two-thirds of programmed development funds would come from foreign sources. (Preliminary data on the financing of the development projects actually implemented in the earlier Five Year Development Programme 1974–1978 indicated that close to 54 percent of expenditures were derived from foreign loans and grants.) In the period covering the several plans, domestic resources have been used mainly to fund investment in the social sectors, whereas foreign financing has gone principally into projects in the productive sectors and economic infrastructure.

Development related loans have been furnished by the UN and several African multilateral banks and funds. These accounted for about 32 percent of Somali's outstanding public debt, repayable in foreign currencies or merchandise at the end of 1979. A dozen other countries had extended bilateral loans amounting to 68 percent of the outstanding debt, of which half had been provided by Arab states. The largest single donor was China (see table 6, Appendix).

Agriculture and Pastoralism

The agricultural sector, including crop and livestock production, forestry, and fisheries, was estimated in the late 1970s to employ about four-fifths of the labor force. It accounted for roughly three-fifths to two-thirds of the gross domestic product

(GDP—see Glossary), and more than 98 percent of the country's merchandise exports were derived from the sector (see table 7; table 8, Appendix). The livestock subsector was by far the most important, providing the livelihood of the large nomadic population and supplementing that of the smaller sedentary farming segment. Climatic factors have led to the separate development of crop and livestock production; settled cultivation has centered in the somewhat higher rainfall areas of the southwestern and northwestern parts of the country and livestock raising has been carried on in the vast intervening expanses where low participation permits the growth only of semiarid and arid vegetation suitable for grazing (see Climate, ch. 2).

In the early 1980s crop production still was largely a subsistence pursuit. Only a comparatively small segment of the farming population—engaged almost entirely in growing irrigated crops—produced principally for market sales. The large traditional sector carried on cultivation under rainfed conditions and to a limited extent used flood irrigation. Its members participated only marginally in the monetized economy, marketing at most 25 to 30 percent of their grains, the principal crop, of which 15 to 20 percent was sold to the state purchasing monopoly, the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), and perhaps another 10 percent in local markets. Incentives for the traditional farmer to produce surpluses for sale were few. Most did not use any inputs other than seeds and their own labor, and the narrow range of consumer goods usually available locally did little to encourage extra production for cash sales. The pastoralist mode of life tended to dissociate many nomads from the monetized sector, but the great growth of animal exports since independence had brought a major increase in the commercialization of the livestock sector; although production still basically followed traditional patterns, there had been a change from a primary emphasis on subsistence to production for marketing.

The state had become involved in a major way in agriculture through state farms, the so-called Agricultural Crash Program, promotion of agricultural cooperatives, and establishment of agricultural settlements. The crash program was initiated by the military government in 1970 as an emergency measure to absorb unemployed youths in the urban areas. The goal was to provide them with agricultural and mechanical training and at the same time to instill a sense of national consciousness, proper attitudes toward work, and the like. The program seems to have become a permanent fixture that in the late 1970s operated seven large state farms—six of them encompassing about a twelfth of the land under controlled irrigation in the southwest and one in Woqooyi Galbeed Region occupying a large area of good, rainfed land in the

northwest. Mechanized farming and the use of modern inputs characterized their operations. The intention was that they become self-supporting; but productivity has remained low, and they have been continuously subsidized from the government budget and at times, grant aid from international agencies.

The military government placed great stress on the development of agricultural cooperatives as part of the effort to build a socialist society. The legal status of the cooperatives was established by the Law on Cooperative Development of 1974, which provided the framework for formation of what was called a truly socialist cooperative system (in contrast to the "token systems" that had emerged in various other African countries). Three kinds of cooperatives were provided for, essentially based on foreign models; the final form was the collective. The first kind, of which forty-seven were reported formed by the end of 1978, was the Multipurpose Cooperative Society, encompassing two to four villages. Property (land, equipment, and livestock) remained individually owned, but marketing, supply, and community self-help projects were handled cooperatively. Most of the cooperatives established were in irrigated areas. At a higher stage (the Group Farm Cooperative) land was communally owned and cultivated. Four-fifths of the income from production was to be distributed on the basis of work furnished. In practice, group farms actually in operation have not made use of the traditional individual holdings but have cultivated communally an area of adjacent land. Some workers on the communal areas were landless laborers. There were 224 of these cooperatives at the end of 1978.

The highest level cooperative envisaged use of all land, equipment, and labor on a completely communal basis. There was to be no private ownership of land. As of late 1981 there were no reports that any of these collectives had been established. The worth of the functioning cooperatives remained open to question, and there was nothing to indicate that they had been of significant value to members. Little use of cooperative marketing appeared to be made by the multipurpose cooperatives. In the case of the Group Farm Cooperatives, members tended to devote more time to their own holdings, and because seasonal tasks came at the same time, the group farm often suffered from shortages of labor that, according to the cooperative law, could not be made up by hiring workers. Thus, despite the use of mechanized equipment and other inputs, group farm yields were reported to be low. In view of the overall mediocre results of the cooperative program, it has been observed that the formation of new cooperatives and perpetuation of existing ones had apparently come to relate more to political than pragmatic considerations.

The government has sought to encourage nomads to take up settled farming, but through 1981 it had been directly involved in

a significant way only through the emergency settling of pastoralists who were the victims of the severe drought of 1974–75. In 1975 about 90,000 nomads from relief centers were transported, with Soviet help, to settlement locations in Dujuuma (18,000 hectares), Kurtun Waarey (6,000 hectares), and Sablaale (6,000 hectares), districts situated between the lower Juba and Shabeelle rivers. The Dujuuma settlement proved impractical because of poor soil, and most of the settlers were later moved to an area near Fanole farther up the Juba River. In 1976 the Kuwait Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the International Development Association (IDA), a part of the World Bank (see Glossary), provided funds to aid in the development of both irrigated and rainfed cultivation. Other assistance was furnished by USAID and the World Food Program. Substantial areas were prepared for cultivation, but rainfed cropping in particular failed to come up to expectation. Settlers began moving out to look for other opportunities, and by 1979 fewer than three-fifths of the original group was left. During 1980 the settlements continued to require outside aid to remain viable.

Land Use, Soils, and Land Tenure

Estimates of land use in 1981 were very rough, and differences in classification by the reporting sources resulted in large variances in some category totals. About 8.2 million hectares, or 13 percent of the land area, were generally considered suitable for cultivation. The social and physical infrastructure necessary for exploitation existed only in limited areas, however, and the land actually in crops or in fallow was believed by the Ministry of Agriculture to be, at most, 700,000 hectares in the late 1970s. Development of access roads and potable water sources was relatively feasible for about 2 million hectares more, but opening up much of the remaining potentially cultivable land for farm settlement would require far greater preparatory work. Land suitable for grazing was the largest single category. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) classified almost 28.9 million hectares (46 percent of the land area) as permanent pasture, but other sources placed the total suitable for grazing at 35 million hectares (56 percent). About 8.6 million hectares were classified as forest and woodland, although about 6 million hectares of this actually had only a bush or shrub vegetation cover. The remaining land, excluding built-up areas, was desert wasteland or land having vegetation capable of providing only marginal grazing.

Broad areas of northern and north-central Somalia have sandy calcareous, gypseous, or saline soils. Depending on the amount of rainfall received, they support grasses and other vegetation ranging from adequate for normal livestock grazing to sparsely covered arid wastelands of marginal or no economic value. Well-

drained, sandy calcareous soils are found in the broad plateau that encompasses Hargeysa. The heavier vegetation permitted by the comparatively high rainfall in this area has resulted in a moderate organic content in the soil, and dry farming has developed extensively since the 1930s. In 1981 the sedentary agricultural economy of the region was the country's largest outside the southern agricultural zone.

South of Hargeysa the semiarid region known as the Haud is characterized by red calcareous soils that continue on into the Ogaden area of Ethiopia. They support vegetation that in normal times provides some of the country's best grazing. East of the Haud lies the vast expanse of pink and orange tinged sands of the Mudug Plain, which merges into a wide coastal strip of coarse, gray sands. A rich grass growth and other vegetation on the latter provide excellent grazing. Among the country's best agricultural soils are those found in the area of the Juba and Shabeelle rivers. Soils between the rivers vary from reddish to dark clays. Fine-textured alluvium parallels the rivers, and situated behind these alluvial soils are fertile black soils. The soils along the Shabeelle have a poor water-retaining capacity and tend to be saline because of the alkalinity of the river's water; those along the Juba are less saline. An extensive stretch of reddish to yellowish sandy soils containing small amounts of organic matter and some plant nutrients characterize the fixed sand dunes along the coast from Mereeg to the vicinity of Kismaayo. They support some growth where rainfall is adequate.

Before the establishment of the colonial governments there appears to have been no individual ownership of farming or grazing land. Grazing land in certain areas was generally used by associated lineages, but rights of occupancy ultimately stemmed from the effective military strength of the occupiers. Within such areas the use of pastures was communal, and where land was allotted to farmers it was on the basis of need and remained inalienable. In the principal areas of cultivation—the lands along and between the Juba and Shabeelle rivers, and to a much more limited extent in the northwest—holdings belonged by custom to members of the clans and lineages who traditionally had tilled the land, and these rights were passed on to descendants or other kin. Although the constitution adopted at independence stated that "in principle" all land belonged to the state, in practice such traditional occupancy rights continued to be respected.

Italian acquisition of land for plantations in the Juba-Shabeelle region was under way in the early 1900s. Somali entrepreneurs in time also purchased land, and especially after independence numbers of wealthy Somalis bought large landholdings from local clans for the commercial production of bananas and other crops. The

concept of legal occupancy rights was strengthened by legislation in the late 1960s that gave district heads the authority to grant ninety-nine-year leases to qualified applicants. This occurred most frequently in the urban areas, but some leases were also granted in the interriverine area, and in the northwest the private enclosure of both arable and pastureland went on. In October 1975 the country's first major land tenure law declared that all land was state property, in effect nationalizing all holdings. This concept, that the land belonged to the state, was later incorporated in the 1979 Constitution. Dealing more specifically with arable land, the 1975 act assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture the responsibility for issuing set-term concessions for agricultural land (the only way such land could be held legally) and established statutory limits on the size and the transfer of holdings. The law's basic intent apparently was to change traditional landholdings into a system of leaseholds. In principle, after the law's passage individual families could hold their land only under a concession, but available information indicated that in 1981 existing customary rights continued to be honored. Plantations existing when the law was passed had to register in order to obtain a concession grant. Thereafter land had to be excluded from the selling price, the sale covering only improvements and use value. A new concession was given to the purchaser.

In the case of grazing land, the government appeared to favor communal landholding by grazing cooperatives—whose legal status was provided for in the Range Law of 1979—of which some fourteen were reported in existence in the northern part of the country in the late 1970s. Although the total area preempted by the existing cooperatives was not known in late 1981, the average of 16,000 hectares held by an initial twelve would indicate well over 200,000 hectares. The communal land tenure concept was also evident in the grazing reserves allocated to the less formally organized grazing associations. In 1981, however, although some of the better grazing land had been reserved for the cooperatives and associations, the greater part of the nomadic population still retained customary rights to most of the country's grazing land.

Livestock

Livestock is the dominant sector in the Somali economy. Its contribution to GDP increased in the 1970s, although toward the end of the decade, when the sector was estimated to account annually for almost half of total GDP, growth had generally stagnated. Milk and meat provided about half of the diet of the roughly 60 percent of the population who were nomadic pastoralists. Many of the other foodstuffs they consumed and the miscellaneous items they purchased were obtained through sales of animals and animal products. Livestock was an important adjunct

to crop cultivation for the roughly 20 percent who were settled farmers, and meat and milk were by preference a large component of the urban diet. Industrially, livestock supported meat processing, tanning, and other related agro-businesses. Live animals and livestock products were also the major source of the country's foreign exchange earnings, accounting in the late 1970s for over 70 percent of export receipts (see Foreign Trade, this ch.).

There were in 1975 almost 34 million domestic animals in the national herd, according to a government census. Estimates by foreign economists varied greatly, but most were far below that figure, the highest being 21 million estimated in 1973 by the Planning and Economic Advisory Group from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The government total included 5.3 million camels, 4 million cattle, 9.5 million sheep, and 15 million goats. Camels were the principal animals in the northern and central regions and in parts of the interriverine area. Cattle, of which there were four main strains of the shorthorn zebu type, were of comparatively minor significance in the north, more important in the central regions, and the dominant animal in the valleys of the Juba and Shabeelle rivers. Sheep and goats were of least importance in the latter area. These latter two animal categories were the pastoralist's most important tradable stock, and black-headed, white-bodied indigenous Somali sheep were preferred in Middle Eastern markets and commanded premium prices.

The size of individual herds has fluctuated substantially as the result of periodic droughts. There were very few large herds having hundreds of animals, apparently because of the problems involved in managing them. Nomadic pastoralists usually kept a mixture of animals based on pragmatic considerations. The different grazing habits of camels, goats, sheep, and cattle permit more effective use of the vegetation. Resistance to drought also differs, as do reproductive rates—factors that act as safeguards against total animal loss in times of extreme drought and for restoration of herd size afterward. Camels are kept mainly for milk and transportation. Sheep and goats are the principal sources of meat and some cash income, and cattle are raised for milk and also for marketing. Although only meager information was available on the factors that influenced nomadic herders to retain or sell their stock, the development of the large-scale export trade in animals since the 1960s seemed to indicate that livestock owners have had little reluctance to dispose of surpluses in contrast to the situation in many other African countries, where herd size has been a prime consideration as a measure of wealth and prestige. (Nevertheless prestige and influence in Somalia are still related to the number of camels owned.) The importance of economic considerations to the Somali nomad in herd management is also evi-



Livestock and its by-products are Somalia's major export earners.
Courtesy Somalia Embassy, Washington

dent in the age and sex ratios found by surveys that show heavy culling of male animals. For example one survey found seven times as many female sheep as males in a flock over fifteen months old, and another revealed thirteen times as many adult female cattle as males, only enough of the latter being retained for herd reproduction or buildup.

Along with its large livestock herd, Somalia in 1981 apparently still possessed one of the most abundant and varied stocks of savanna and other wildlife in Africa. Most prevalent throughout the country among the larger herbivores were antelopes and gazelles, skins of which were exported in large numbers in the 1960s (for example, 535,000 in 1965 and 393,000 in 1966). After the military coup in 1969 all hunting and trapping were forbidden, but many species continued to be affected by the growing numbers of livestock, exclusion from watering spots by human preemption, and the cutting of trees and bush vegetation that destroyed natural cover and damaged grazing capacities. Al-

though game reserves had been designated in different parts of the country only two were in existence, and poaching was the only form of wildlife exploitation. Foreign economists consider the wildlife an important economic resource that could be profitably put to use by the harvesting of surplus animals through sport hunting under proper supervision.

Important to the future of the livestock industry and the betterment of the livelihood of the country's pastoralists is proper management of the rangelands (roughly half of the country's land area), whose annual 50 to 200 millimeters of irregular rainfall make them suitable only for grazing livestock. Over time a pattern of grazing and herd management had been developed by the nomadic pastoralists that fitted the ecosystem and its periodic droughts and diseases. Herd sizes were also effectively restrained by both interclan and intraclan territorial pressures that on occasion were accompanied by warfare (see The Segmentary Social Order, ch. 2). By the 1950s, however, changing circumstances had resulted in reported damage to some areas of rangeland, and in 1966 an FAO aerial survey, supplemented by overland and spot checks, found widespread overgrazing. The factor believed mainly responsible was the growing size of the national herd, which had accompanied the growth of the human population and the increase in the latter's subsistence needs. The increase in the herd size had been made possible by better veterinary disease control and greater range water supply. Law enforcement, which had restrained armed clashes, also permitted wider migration and consequent enlargement of individual herds, and gradually improving marketing channels provided further encouragement to raise more animals.

Efforts at range management and grazing control were unsuccessful until the mid–1970s. An early United States-sponsored project initiated in 1956 in present-day Afmadow District, Jubbada Hoose Region, demonstrated that rangeland around publicly constructed watering points could be improved rapidly by rotational and deferred grazing. But because of the failure to take into consideration social factors—in this case the customary right of free access to public wells—the project area, designed to support 3,000 head of cattle, was overrun by 30,000 head and destroyed. Another project in the 1960s at a government livestock station near Hargeysa that was closed to general grazing met a similar fate when guards were driven away and the range subsequently devastated. Accordingly, in reporting on its 1966 survey, FAO in 1967 stressed the need to precede range management projects by surveys designed to evaluate the sociological impact on the area's nomadic population and to carry out massive adult edu-

cation programs on range management accompanied by demonstrations of the practical benefits.

By 1970 a joint rangeland conservation and development survey created by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and FAO was under way, designed to classify Somalia's northern rangeland and water resources. This was followed by a project started in 1974 under which according to government sources, twenty-one grazing reserves were marked out; the project ended in 1976 becaues of UNDP financing problems. In 1976 the IDA, utilizing in part the UNDP/FAO findings, prepared the Northern Rangelands Development Project. Initiated at the beginning of 1977 and financed by the Kuwait Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the project covered the three northern regions of Togdheer, Sanaag, and Nugaal, an area of about 140,000 square kilometers. By 1980 fifteen village and town grazing areas were reported in operation. Each reserve covered 400 square kilometers, half of which initially was closed during the *gu* wet season and the other half during the *dayr* period of rains (see Climate, ch. 2). The pattern was changed later to reserves divided into four 100-square-kilometer sections, one of which was closed to grazing for an entire year, followed in rotation by the other sections.

In 1979 the similar Central Rangelands Project was started. This project covered about 149,000 square kilometers encompassing Mudug, Galguduud, and Hiiraan regions. Some seventeen village and town grazing reserves were said to have become operational by 1980. Initial financing for the project was by IDA. Additional funding has included a grant from USAID. Overall rangeland development was under the National Range Agency (NRA), established in 1976, which also furnished guards to prevent nomadic herds from grazing the closed sections. NRA planned to establish larger grazing reserves of about 900 square kilometers each, divided into four sections that were based on new water boreholes. It was also reported to have undertaken to set up so-called drought or famine reserves of 500 or 600 square kilometers in each district that were to be used only in time of drought. Information on implementation of this aspect of the program was unavailable in late 1981.

As part of the effort to improve the rangelands, the government has encouraged the formation of range and livestock grazing associations that are basically representative groups for the pastoralists of a given area. Members are elected by the community and consist ordinarily of respected elders whose status gives them considerable influence over the attitudes of the pastoralists and enables them to act as mediators between the community and the government authorities. The members also are directly involved in marking out the reserves and have responsibility for ensuring

that the grazing regulations are respected by the community after they have been agreed on. About forty-five such associations were said to be functioning at the end of the 1970s.

The government's ultimate goal has appeared to be the establishment of a system of grazing cooperatives, a course also recommended by the International Labour Organisation's Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa (JASPA) Employment Advisory Mission in the mid–1970s. The first cooperatives were started in 1974 under the supervision of the Ministry of Livestock, Forestry, and Range but they were subsequently placed under the NRA after formation of that agency. Fourteen cooperatives reportedly had been organized in the northern rangeland area by the end of the 1970s—eight by pastoralists and six by livestock traders. The existing cooperatives each had been allocated an exclusive area that averaged well over 200 hectares—and in some cases over 300 hectares—of grazing land available to each family. In time of drought the members of the cooperative were able to graze traditionally common land. Establishment of the cooperatives also opened a way to provide social services (educational, health, and other facilities), group procurement of goods, marketing, and the like.

Poultry raising constitutes only a very minor segment of the livestock sector. It is practically nonexistent among the nomads where the mode of life is unsuited to raising poultry. Chickens are kept principally for subsistence purposes by sedentary farmers and by families in urban areas. In 1972 the government established a modern poultry and egg production facility near Mogadishu, and two other units were built subsequently. Another unit that started operations at Hargeysa in 1974 was under further development in 1981. In addition chickens were raised commercially at a poultry resettlement farm near Baraawe and at the three refugee agricultural resettlements. The total capacity at government developed projects was some 165,000 birds in 1980. Only one private commercial poultry producer was reported in 1980, operating a small unit at Afgooye.

Crop Production

In the early 1980s it was estimated that fewer than 200,000 families were engaged in sedentary cultivation. Of the approximately 700,000 hectares devoted to crops, about four-fifths were located in the valleys of the Juba and Shabeelle rivers, the areas immediately to the east and west of the rivers, and the upland between them. The only other area of significant settled farming was in the northwest, between Hargeysa and Booraama in Woqooyi Galbeed Region. Of the total cultivated area, roughly 50,000 hectares, or 7 to 8 percent, was under controlled irrigation, including an estimated 35,000 to 38,000 hectares along the Sha-

beelle River and 12,000 to 14,000 hectares in the Juba valley. Controlled irrigation in other parts of the country probably totaled under 1,000 hectares. At the beginning of the 1980s ongoing irrigation schemes were believed to be adding 1,000 to 2,000 hectares a year to the irrigated total.

There is a substantial amount of additional irrigable land in the Shabeelle valley, but the government has estimated that only another 50,000 hectares could be irrigated because of water flow conditions, and even this total has been questioned by outside experts. The Shabeelle maintains a full flow usually only about seven months a year, depending largely on the amount of precipitation in the two rainy seasons. In the late 1970s parts of the existing lower Shabeelle systems were reported already to experience an occasional water shortage, although this was due in part to inefficient use of available water. In contrast the water flow in the Juba was usually year-round. In 1981 the government was seeking external funding for a major multipurpose dam to be constructed near Baardheere on the middle Juba that would have the potential to provide assured irrigation for an estimated 150,000 to 160,000 hectares. Actual development of irrigation under this project, however, appeared unlikely at least until near the end of the 1980s, according to government sources.

The cultivation of irrigated market crops began in the early 1900s when private interests established the country's first banana plantations. The number of plantations gradually increased, and by independence over 200 were in existence, all having controlled irrigation. Meanwhile commercial cropping was extended to sugarcane, cotton, rice, sesame, groundnuts, and grapefruit. Since independence the state has become a major factor in market crop production. In the early 1960s the civilian government began the establishment of state farms to ensure, it stated, proper utilization of new land in view of the early stage of development of Somali peasant agriculture. The government declared at the time that this step did not necessarily indicate the adoption of a socialist system but that it was based essentially on pragmatic considerations. This policy of establishing state farms was continued by the military government in the belief also that they represented the best way to increase agricultural output rapidly and at the same time reduce the need for food imports.

Most of the state farms of the 1960s involved the development of irrigated land. During the 1970s the expansion of irrigation became even more closely associated with the state farms and government-sponsored agricultural cooperatives, and a significant concomitant was the state's assumption of large areas of irrigable land from traditional cultivators under the right of eminent domain. Through mid–1981 government policy on the extent of

individual smallholder participation in irrigated agriculture had not been clearly defined, but continuing planned expansion of public sector and cooperative irrigated farms in the 1980s carried the implication that further alienation of land from traditional occupiers might be anticipated. It appeared that if the trend were to continue, most of the best land along the Juba and Shabeelle rivers would eventually be in the hands of the state or private plantations.

Uncontrolled irrigation has long been used by cultivators taking advantage of river floodwaters, and in 1981 an estimated 110,000 hectares were farmed using traditional irrigation practices. The principal method was to plant crops successively as the water receded from the floodplain. Ditches were also used to divert the flowoff to adjacent fields. In some cases channels were constructed leading from the river, but these were of value only if the river rose sufficiently for the water to reach the fields. Flood-irrigated cultivation was more intensive than for ordinary dryland farming, and under favorable water supply conditions yields were reasonably good, resulting in surpluses that produced cash income. The principal crop grown under uncontrolled irrigation was maize, but beans, cotton, and sugarcane were also raised.

The most general form of cultivation is rainfed farming, practiced by close to 700,000 cultivators in the late 1970s. Rainfed crop production involves high risks beause of the erratic nature of the rainy seasons, the amount of rainfall, and the low technology of traditional cultivation. The latter consists of clearing the land of bushes, shallow hoe preparation of the soil, use of usually poor quality seeds, and later, inadequate weeding. Seeds are sown unevenly and are widely dispersed, and this has helped to reduce the drain on the soil and with reasonable rainfall has produced a somewhat sparse but full crop. Land is readily available, and when yields begin to decline, the cropped field is left in fallow up to about three years. The principal dryland crop is sorghum, which is grown on about 55 percent of the cultivated land. Crops of lesser importance are pulses, maize, millet, sesame, and occasionally groundnuts. One-third to one-half the land is double-cropped—sorghum being planted by many farmers in both wet seasons. In the main cultivated areas of the southwest farm families usually crop from three to five hectares, about the maximum possible under the intensive labor requirement of the traditional system. Comparatively few farmers have adopted improved practices that include using animal power for plowing, better seeds, crop diversification, and some pesticides. The government has undertaken to improve agricultural services for the dryland farmer, but such services still remained poorly developed in the early 1980s.

Production estimates for staple crops, including sorghum, maize, beans, and rice show that output stagnated during the

1970s except for rice, the production of which increased substantially toward the end of the decade. Oilseeds and cotton production also stagnated, and output of the two most important industrial crops—sugarcane and bananas—declined, in the case of the latter quite markedly (see table 9, Appendix). Estimates for 1980 showed little change except for rice, which although increasing in volume, still constituted only a small part of total grain production. Foreign observers were of the opinion that an overall relative decline in output had occurred because of the probably greater area devoted to crops as the sedentary agricultural population increased in numbers during the decade through natural growth and the addition of new settlers.

Bananas, the principal commercial crop, are grown for the international market on plantations situated almost entirely in an area near Shalanbood on the lower Shabeelle River and a roughly equal area on the Juba River in Jubbada Hoose Region. A small number of privately owned operations—somewhat over half owned by Somalis, a few by mixed Somali-Italian interests, and the remainder by Italians—accounted for about 90 percent of production. The remainder was produced on state farms of the National Banana Board (NBB), which was also the sole purchasing agent for export. (Three-quarters to four-fifths of production was usually exported annually.) Output dropped considerably from the mid–1970s, attributable to a decline in the overall area cultivated from 8,300 hectares in 1975 to 6,000 hectares in 1979 and in the area of production from 6,100 hectares in 1975 to 5,100 hectares in 1978 (although the later increased again to 5,800 hectares in 1979). Yield per hectare also dropped during this time. Factors behind the decline included inadequate investment (apparently because of uncertainties over possible nationalization), low producer prices (believed to be a main cause), short supplies of fertilizers and pesticides, and management skill inadequacies.

Sugarcane, the second largest commercial crop, is grown for the milling of sugar for domestic use. A major drop in production occurred from the early 1970s from an average of over 400,000 tons harvested annually in the early 1970s to 261,000 tons in 1979. A major factor was the reduction in cultivated area because of developing soil salinity at the Jowhar Sugar Estate on the Juba River. Other factors included shortages of fertilizers and pesticides, degeneration in the quality of planting stock and, in the late 1970s, labor shortages. In 1978 work began on the development of another state-owned sugarcane plantation at Jilib on the lower Juba River having a planned irrigated area of 8,000 hectares. A sugar factory constructed at the site officially went into operation in September 1980. Data on the actual size of the cultivated area, cane production, and other pertinent facts were unavailable in late 1981.

Fisheries

Somalia's coastal and offshore seas appear to have considerable potential for fisheries, as shown by studies of nutrient levels and estimates of fish populations obtained from surveys by research vessels, including a joint FAO/Norwegian survey conducted during 1975–76. Potential annual catches of pelagic (open sea) fish such as anchovies, sardines, herring, tuna, and mackerel were estimated at about 108,000 tons. Availability of demersal (bottom dwelling) fish, including flounder, groupers, porgies, and snappers, was estimated at 40,000 tons. In addition roughly 30,000 tons of sharks and rays, about 2,000 tons of spiny lobsters, and 400 tons of shrimp could be taken. Squid, cuttlefish, octopus, oysters, clams, and sea cucumbers also appeared exploitable, but insufficient data were available in 1981 to determine sustainable catches.

Commercial demersal fishing is affected by the rocky, uneven character of much of the sea bottom of the relatively narrow continental shelf (about thirty kilometers wide along parts of the Gulf of Aden, up to fifty kilometers off the northeast coast, and seldom wider than fifteen kilometers from Ras Hafun southward to the Kenyan border). As a result trawling can be conducted only in certain areas of the gulf and Indian Ocean coasts (see fig. 9). A major problem in pelagic fishing is the unpredictability of fish locations caused by the irregularity in the start of the monsoons and the subsequent changes in direction of the fish-bearing surface currents (see Climate, ch. 2). The winds during a good part of the year also cause heavy seas that make fishing by small motorized craft unsafe.

Fishing is the main source of livelihood of many of the estimated 90,000 people living in the small fishing towns and villages along the coasts. Full-time fishermen were believed to number about 4,000 in the early 1980s. Historically fishing had been of little significance to the economy as a whole, and in the 1970s it still contributed less than 1 percent of GDP. In the past the non-Somali inhabitants of the Giuba Islands off the southwest coast and the Somali fishermen of the villages to the north disposed of their catches in local markets or sold them to the traders who traveled by dhow along the coast about twice a year. Sun-dried and salted fish, tortoiseshell, sharkfins, and other marine products were taken by these dhow traders in exchange for fishing gear, dugout canoes (from India), and other supplies. There was extremely limited marketing of fish inland, which was made difficult by the lack of road communications and even more so by the widespread aversion of Somalis to eating fish (although some fresh fish were sold in the larger ports).

By about 1970 the dhow trade had declined greatly, affecting the prosperity of the fishing communities, and some fishermen moved inland seeking other opportunities. The government be-



Bananas are Somalia's principal commercial crop.
Courtesy United Nations




Figure 9. Fishing Towns, Villages, Settlements, and Potential Trawl Fishing Areas

gan encouraging the formation of fishing cooperatives under the provisions of the Law on Cooperative Development of 1974, and a total of eighteen were reported in existence in 1979. The basic principles of the cooperatives included joint handling, marketing,

and the purchase of boats, gear, and other fishing needs. Cooperatives at Berbera, Mogadishu, Marka, and Kismaayo were able to sell most or all of their fish fresh, and several cooperatives on the north coast were able to dispose of part of their catches to the fish canneries there (see Manufacturing, this ch.). Fish not used fresh locally had to be salted and sold to the government monopoly corporation SOMALFISH. The cooperatives reportedly have not had a marked effect on raising production. Management staffs have consisted largely of untrained local personnel, and individual incentives have apparently been weakened by the absence of direct responsibility for the use and maintenance of the several hundred motorized fishing boats, gear, and equipment furnished by the government to the cooperatives for communal use without financial obligation. Particularly damaging to production has been the deterioration of the motorboats, use of which had been expected to increase the catch materially. As many as three-quarters of the total boats provided had become unserviceable within three years largely because of the lack of individual accountability for proper care and use, although the government's failure to train mechanics and shortages of parts was also responsible.

Four new fishery settlements were established along the coast in the mid–1970s, populated by a total of about 15,000 nomads made destitute by the 1974–75 drought. They were organized along the lines of collectives under the administration of the Coastal Development Project, an autonomous government agency, and efforts were made (at first with Soviet aid) to train them as fishermen and in skills associated with fisheries. Fishing operations and conditions, including unusability of motorized boats, appeared generally similar to those in the cooperatives. Two of the settlements (at Eyl and Cadale) were isolated from inland markets by lack of road communications, and all fish were sun-dried, salted, and sold to SOMALFISH. Those at El Hamed and Baraawe were close to the Mogadishu-Kismaayo main road and were able to sell some of their catch fresh. About 9 to 10 percent of the refugees were reported to have left the settlements by some time in 1979.

Modern commercial fishing dates from late 1971 after the establishment of the joint Somali-Soviet company SOMALFISH. Subsequently ten Soviet trawlers equipped to freeze catches operated until late 1977, when the Soviet Union withdrew from the venture after the expulsion of its advisers from Somalia. The total catch during the period of operation was 9,670 tons of fish, and 3,730 tons of spiny lobsters. Training of Somalis was to have been carried out, but little actually occurred. The Soviet vessels, moreover, did not provide the government the detailed operational information that could have been useful for planning and execut-

ing future fishing ventures. In 1977 Somalia entered into a joint venture with Iraq under which Iraqis were to operate trawlers in Somali waters. Fishing began that year, but information on later operations was unavailable in late 1981. Somalia also licensed several Italian freezer trawlers, three of which fished in 1978 and at least to mid–1979. Additionally SOMALFISH acquired fishing vessels of its own, including two prawn trawlers constructed in Australia that were launched in 1979; these have been operated under contract by an Australian company. In 1980 three freezer trawlers were also ordered from Italy (financed by the Italian government), which were to be delivered about mid–1981. Another nine smaller trawlers were secured from Yugoslavia, but did not appear to be in use because of unsuitability for Somalia's rough-water coastal conditions. According to foreign observers the number of vessels operating or expected to be operating in offshore waters in about 1981 did not appear to offer any immediate threat to either pelagic or demersal fish stocks, but concern has been expressed about overfishing of spiny lobsters.

During the early 1970s the overall annual catch averaged possibly 4,000 to 5,000 tons, mostly taken in inshore coastal waters. The provision of motorized fishing boats tc the cooperatives and fishing settlements in the mid–1970s resulted in substantial increases in catches, which reached an estimated high of 7,900 tons in 1975. They declined thereafter, however, as more and more motorboats became inoperable and in 1978, the latest year for which statistics were available, the catch had dropped to about 3,550 tons. The Soviet fishing fleet reported 1,370 tons of fish and 680 tons of lobsters taken in 1974, in its first period of operations. The 1977 total had reached 4,550 tons at the time the fleet was withdrawn late in the year. The catch in 1978 by licensed Italian operators was reported at only 255 tons. Offshore operations were continued in 1979 by Italian vessels, which through June (latest data) had taken close to 460 tons of fish and lobsters.

Forestry

The country's forests—broadly defined as areas of vegetation dominated by trees of any size—cover about 8.6 million hectares, or 13.7 percent of the land area. They consist almost entirely of savanna woodlands, o[r] which about 2.5 million hectares have dense tree stands and about 6 million hectares only scattered tree covering. In addition there are about 100,000 hectares of largely degraded high forests located partly in the mountain ranges of the north and partly in the far southwest (see Terrain, Vegetation, and Drainage, ch. 2). The forestry sector was estimated roughly to have contributed an average of somewhat over 8 percent of GDP at factor cost annually during the 1970s. Frankincense and myrrh



President Mohamed Siad Barre opening a fishing cooperative project
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

obtained from forests in the northeast were important earners of foreign exchange, but little timber was produced. The principal economic value of the forests was as the main source of fuel (either used directly as firewood or converted into charcoal) and as a supplementary supplier of forage.

Excessive cutting and overgrazing have led to steady deterioration of the forests. One of the most serious consequences has been expanding desertification, which follows deforestation almost immediately in many areas because of climatic conditions. Government efforts to protect and restore the forests were included in the First Five Year Plan (1963–1967) and each subsequent development plan through the Three Year Plan (1979–1981). Only minor progress appeared to have been made until the mid–1970s when aid was received from the World Food Program and FAO, and under the Five Year Development Programme (1974–1978), a tree planting program averaging about 150 hectares a year was carried out. Two main nurseries were also expanded, twelve

small regional ones were established, and trial plantings of teak, gmelina (an Australisian hardwood), mahogany, and eucalyptus were completed. Some planting of tree stands near towns to provide future fuel was also initiated. In the coastal area of southern Somalia, where sand dune drifting (caused primarily by overgrazing) poses a serious threat to agricultural areas and human installations, experimental stabilization planting was carried out.

The Three Year Plan (1979–1981) had as one of its main projects an increase in the size of the forestry staff and improvement of its quality—factors that were considered vital for adequate implementation of future forest policies. Among other projects, forestry reserves were to be established, including reserves protected from grazing and others where controlled production of charcoal was to be instituted. Additional forestry plantations, some to provide firewood to nearby towns, were also planned. The program to stabilize dunes along the coast was being continued. Implementation of many of the projects was dependent, however, on international assistance. Preparation of a ten-year forestry development program, which would include use of expatriate forestry consultants to carry out investigative studies, was planned, but this effort was also dependent on funding by external donors.

Mining

Mineral resources believed to have considerable potential value have been found in various parts of Somalia. Through late 1981, however, development of the mining sector had been minimal, and mining's contribution to GDP was relatively small. Although production data were negligible, government sources estimated that during the 1970s the sector's annual contribution to total GDP had, at most, been only slightly over 1 percent and in the late 1970s had been even lower. During the colonial period the British administration in the north established a geological department that discovered tin ores in present-day Boosaaso District that were mined commercially until World War II. Significant deposits of gypsum and anhydrite were found near Berbera, and occurrences of columbite, lead-zinc, tantalite, and several other metalic minerals were also located. In the south exploration was left to private interests by the Italian administration, and little systematic information on mineral potentials was developed. After independence a major program of exploration was undertaken from the early 1960s by the UNDP. Among significant finds were a sizable deposit of low-grade iron ore and deposits of uranium, thorium, and several rare earth minerals. UNDP activities in the direct investigation of mineral potentials continued to the mid-1970s; further exploration has been carried on by the Somali Geological Survey with UNDP help. Exploration for petroleum and natural gas (the possible existence of which is indicated by geologi-

cal conditions) began after World War II. It was continuing in 1981 under cooperative ventures between the government and private oil companies, but commercial deposits had not been located through mid–1981 (see Petroleum Supply and Domestic Resources, this ch.).

Actual mineral exploitation had been limited through late 1981 and principally involved materials quarried for construction. Salt was obtained through solar evaporation, and some sepiolite (meerschaum), of which large high-grade deposits are located in Galguduud Region, was apparently also mined for local consumption. The principal nonhydrocarbon potentials for development in 1981 included limestone suitable for making cement, large quantities of which were situated in the area of Berbera, where a cement plant was under construction in 1981, and near Baardheere in Gedo Region (see Manufacturing, this ch.). Other nonmetallic minerals of importance were the gypsum-anhydrite deposits near Berbera—reportedly among the world's largest—quartz sands suitable for the domestic manufacture of glass, kaolin, and high-grade piezoquartz (used in electronics and optical instruments) found in pegamite dikes throughout an extensive area in the northwest.

At least two large uranium deposits—estimates of sizes varied—had been identified: one in Galguduud Region and the other in Buur Hakaba District of Bay Region. The latter deposit also contained thorium. Several foreign firms secured prospecting concessions in Bay Region in the 1960s, but by about the mid–1970s all had relinquished their holdings. In the early 1980s the Somali Arab Mining Company, a joint venture between the governmental Somali Mining Company (two-thirds interest) and the Jordanian Arab Mining Company (one-third interest), held an exclusive license for exploration and mining in an area covering 57,000 square kilometers. The area encompassed the deposit in Galguduud Region and other deposits in adjacent Madug Region. Iron ore deposits, estimated at about 200 million tons and having an average content of about 35 percent iron, were found in Dhiinsoor District of Bay Region, and other deposits had been reported from several parts of the country. In 1981 development both of the uranium and iron deposits remained in the exploratory and evaluation stage.

Manufacturing

At independence the country's modern manufacturing establishments (defined as enterprises having five or more workers) consisted of one large operation—the Italian-owned sugar refinery at Jowhar—a few medium-sized, and roughly 100 small-sized manufacturing operations. In the 1960s about a dozen new large and medium-sized enterprises were built. Most were state-owned

plants for which financing had been provided from abroad. The state enterprises included five large plants: a meat processing factory at Kismaayo, a dairy plant at Mogadishu, and a fish cannery at Laas Qoray on the northern coast, all constructed with Soviet assistance; the SOMALTEX cotton textile plant at Balcad north of Mogadishu, largely funded by West Germany; and a fish factory in Caluula District on the northern coast, financed by the United States. Public sector involvement was further extended during the decade by the government's acquisition of a 50 percent interest in the Jowhar sugar plant in 1963.

In the 1970s the funds for manufacturing expansion were again overwhelmingly from foreign sources for government projects and, although private sector involvement occurred, the major additions to manufacturing facilities were state operations. They included a cigarette and match factory, a packaging plant making cardboard boxes and polyethylene bags, a fruit and vegetable canning plant, a wheat flour and pasta factory, several grain mills, an iron foundry, and a petroleum refinery. Extensive rehabilitation of the Jowhar sugar plant (nationalized in 1970) also was carried out. New machinery was installed at a long inoperative brick and tile factory near Afgooye, and SOMALTEX facilities were greatly expanded. (In 1981 SOMALTEX reportedly was among the best equipped textile plants in Africa.) At the end of the decade work was under way on a second sugar factory, situated near Jilib in Jubbada Hoose Region—this plant commenced operations in September 1980—and a cement plant at Berbera that was still under construction in late 1981. Foreign grant and loan assistance again played a major role and included Chinese aid for the cigarette and match factory; Saudi Arabian, United Arab Emirates, and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) development fund assistance toward construction of the second sugar factory; and IDA funds and Yugoslav technical assistance for setting up the iron foundry. Iraq furnished the funds for the oil refinery.

According to a government industrial survey, there were fifty-three modern state-owned manufacturing enterprises in 1978, of which about a dozen were in the large-size category. They employed 9,735 workers, who constituted 78 percent of the modern manufacturing labor force, and their combined production accounted for more than three-quarters of manufacturing gross output. The underlying reason for state ownership of the large plants constructed in the 1960s appears to have been the size of the required investments, which were beyond the capability of the private sector. Although this same factor remained equally important in the 1970s, the belief that all major productive facilities should be publicly owned so that profits would accrue to the gov-

ernment for use in other socially desirable undertakings has been preeminent since the military takeover in 1969 and the subsequent adoption of a socialist program.

In the late 1970s the state industries (except the wheat flour and pasta factory) showed little or no profit or suffered losses. Production was stagnant or, at the end of the decade, below earlier highs (see table 10, Appendix). Among contributory factors were the lack of managerial staff and skilled workers, and declining productivity attributed largely to inadequate financial incentives for employees. Other major factors were production capacities in excess of domestic demand, insufficient domestic and import supplies and, in the case of the fish canneries and meat packing plant, the lack of export markets. Examples were the cardboard box and plastic bag company's output, which was taken mainly by the banana trade and to a lesser extent by the fish and meat canneries. Its capacity was far beyond requirements at the beginning of the 1980s. The canneries, whose production was aimed at the export market, were plagued by inadequate supplies, a shortage of spare parts, and after the departure of Soviet personnel in 1977, by loss of the Soviet Union as a main market. Facilities of the fruit processing plant were regularly underutilized because of shortage of domestic raw materials, and the cigarette and match factory suffered similarly from a scarcity of imported raw materials. Shortages of supply at the milk plant appeared to be caused mainly by payment to producers of prices that were well below those in the open market. The output of neither the fruit nor milk plant satisfied domestic demand. Epitomizing the problems of the state sector in general was SOMALTEX. After a sharp rise in output resulting from earlier installation of new machinery, the plant registered a major production decline in 1979 caused by a shortage of skilled workers to operate effectively its sophisticated equipment, its management's inability to coordinate production flows, inadequate raw material supplies, and production interruptions because of fuel and energy shortages.

In 1978 there were in operation 224 private enterprises having five or more employees. Total employment was almost 2,750, or 22 percent of the modern manufacturing sector work force. Almost half of the plants were engaged in the processing or production of food, beverages, clothing, and footwear. Among the larger private establishments in production in the late 1970s were a plant that manufactured chemicals, detergents, shampoos, and insecticides; two soft drink plants; and two tanneries. Between 70 and 75 percent of the raw materials used by the chemical plant were imported, as were most of the main ingredients of the beverage plants. The tanneries—one at Mogadishu, the other at Baraawe—processed domestic raw materials and produced shoes, sandals,

and boots. A meat cannery had been in operation at Mogadishu until 1977 when it closed because of supply problems and financial difficulties; it remained closed through 1980, the latest date for which information was available. Two private fish canneries were also closed in 1979 (1980 and 1981 status unknown) because of a lack of fish, a shortage of spare parts, and the need for new machinery.

Outside the modern sector, according to a survey taken in the mid–1970s, there were more than 6,000 manufacturing units belonging to what has frequently been called the informal sector. These establishments having fewer than five workers were mainly single proprietor and family operations. They produced a wide range of goods that included handloomed cloth, clothing, footwear, furniture, baskets, pottery, various other ceramic products, hand tools, rope, vegetable oils, and baked goods. These small industries were a major provider of employment and livelihood, especially for the urban population.

Energy Supply and Potentials

In 1981 Somalia's basic sources of energy were domestic wood and charcoal and imported petroleum. Oil shale deposits had been discovered in the north, but their potential had not yet been assessed. Drilling for hydrocarbon fuels carried out in several parts of the country had resulted only in trace finds of natural gas. There were no reports of coal or lignite. The known deposits of uranium had no direct bearing on the domestic energy situation. The most significant unexploited domestic energy source was the large hydroelectric generating potential present in the flow of the Juba River, but its development was in a preliminary stage in 1981.

Electric Power

All public electric-power generating facilities have been state-owned since 1970, when the country's largest power plant and distribution system (an Italian-owned enterprise at Mogadishu) was nationalized. In 1981 public facilities consisted of about eighty widely separated oil-fired thermal and diesel plants that were completely dependent on imported oil for operation. Because of the great distances between most plants, interconnections were uneconomical, and individual towns and localities were served only by local grids. This situation had led various industrial and public sector operations to install their own generating units. However, the remoteness of some plants from fuel sources and poor access road conditions reportedly resulted in fuel shortages from time to time and reduction or interruption of power supply.

In late 1981 information on generating capacity and use of electric power was available only for Mogadishu. At the time of its nationalization in 1970 the Mogadishu plant (an oil-fired installation) had an installed capacity of 7,100 kilowatts. Increased de-

mand resulting from the rapid growth of the city and its environs and the establishment of new industries in the area led to installation of additional generating units that more than doubled the installed capacity to 17,980 kilowatts in 1978. Capacity was again almost doubled in 1979 to 34,480 kilowatts when a power plant newly constructed at Gesira, a suburb of Mogadishu, went into service. This plant had been equipped with diesel generators in order to use residual fuel from the nearby oil refinery that opened in 1978. Electric power production by the Mogadishu facilities rose from 21 million kilowatt hours in 1970 to 47.9 million in 1979. In 1970 lighting needs accounted for almost four-fifths of total consumption. Slightly over one-fifth was consumed in the operation of industrial and other equipment. This proportion remained relatively constant through 1979.

The National Electric Energy Authority, the government corporation responsible for public power generation and supply, planned to expand and modernize the generating facilities in the three northern towns of Berbera, Burco, and Hargeysa and at Kismaayo and Baydhabo in the south. Feasibility studies were reportedly completed in mid-1981, but further action was dependent on securing the foreign financing needed to carry out the projects. The major program for increasing the country's power supply during the 1980s was the development of hydroelectric generating facilities at the proposed multipurpose dam near Baardheere on the Juba River. An installed capacity of about 100,000 kilowatts was planned. The estimated overall cost of the project was relatively enormous for Somalia (US$640 million in early 1981, mostly in foreign exchange). Foreign funding, which had not yet been assured in late 1981, was the absolute requisite for proceeding with the undertaking.

Petroleum Supply and Domestic Resources

Somaia was entirely dependent on imports to meet its petroleum needs in 1981. Until their nationalization in 1970, three foreign-owned firms imported and distributed all petroleum products. Thereafter, until the rift between Somalia and the Soviet Union in 1977, the latter was the sole supplier to the state-owned successor distributing operations. Saudi Arabia subsequently became the chief oil source until late 1978 when Iraq began providing crude oil for a newly opened refinery at Gesira built under a joint Somali-Iraqi government project. The new plant had a design capacity of 10,000 barrels a day, or 500,000 tons a year, and was equipped to produce gasoline, kerosine, and various other fuel oils. During 1979 it operated at about 40 percent of capacity, producing 223,259 tons of refined products. Output was expected to expand; but after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, Iraq suspended deliveries, and Somalia was again forced

for the time being to import refined products. The refinery was reportedly back in operation, according to information available in mid–1981, although the source of its crude petroleum was unknown.

The possibility of finding petroleum and/or natural gas deposits in Somalia is sufficiently promising that foreign oil companies have engaged from time to time since the end of World War II in exploratory drilling. The principal active operations in 1981 were by a subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) of the United States; Deutsche Texaco, the West German subsidiary of the American Texas Corporation (Texaco); and a joint venture by Cities Service Company of the United States and AGIP (Afrique), owned by the Italian government. ARCO received a two-year exploratory rights concession covering 124,230 square kilometers in Galguduud and Mudug regions in October 1979. Through mid–1981 one well had been drilled and had proved to be dry. Deutsche Texaco signed a similar agreement in December 1979 for a concession in Jubbada Hoose Region covering 34,965 square kilometers; drilling had not yet started in mid–1981. At the latter date only preliminary work was under way on the Cities Service-AGIP 42,406 square kilometer concession in northeast Somalia.

Transportation

At independence Somalia inherited a poorly developed transportation infrastructure consisting of a few reasonably good local roads in the more populated areas in the south and northwest and four undeveloped ports having only lighterage facilities. During the next two decades considerable improvement was made with the help of substantial foreign aid in the form of loans, grants, and technical assistance. By 1981 all-weather roads connected some of the more important towns and the northern and southern parts of the country, and modern facilities had been installed at three principal ports. Regular domestic air service was also in operation (see fig.10). But the country still lacked much of the road infrastructure essential to open up still largely undeveloped areas and to tie together isolated economies in various administrative regions.

Roads

According to Somali government statistics the country's road system in 1978 totaled 19,380 kilometers. About 11 percent (2,153 kilometers) were hard-surfaced, 36 percent (7,247 kilometers) had gravel or earth surfaces, and the remaining 53 percent (10,280 kilometers) were essentially rudimentary dirt tracks. At the start of the First Five Year Plan 1963–1967 there were only about 600 kilometers of asphalt-surfaced roads (of which over half consisted of a road from Mogadishu to the Ethiopian border built during the Italo-Ethiopian War of the 1930s). The rest served




Figure 10. Transportation System

mainly the banana plantations along the Juba and Shabeelle rivers. At that time the gravel-earth roads of the north were mostly impassable during the rainy season.

By 1971 paved roads had increased to over 1,000 kilometers. Except for minor local sections all were in the south, and it was not

until 1975 that the first major paved road was completed in the north between Hargeysa and Berbera. Practically all of these new main roads were financed through multilateral assistance from IDA and the European Development Fund (EDF). The most significant road built during the 1970s, however, was the 1,045-kilometer hard-surfaced road constructed with Chinese financing and work crew participation from Beled Weyne (about 300 kilometers north of Mogadishu on the earlier Italian road) to Burco in the north. Begun in 1973 and completed in 1978, this road tied together for the first time the northern and southern parts of the country. Additional road construction was reportedly carried out in the late 1970s and in 1980, but information on completions was unavailable. In a statement made in early 1981 the government implied that further improvement of the main road system would be largely contingent on additional external aid.

In the late 1970s about 10,500 vehicles were reported in operation throughout the country. Motor transport was predominantly in the private sector, although about 20 percent of the trucks belonged to government agencies. Lack of spare parts and adequate facilities for repair and maintenance were major problems. A considerable but unknown amount of cargo was actually transported by camels and donkeys, the former primarily in the country's vast arid regions, the latter mainly in the towns and cities and between adjacent communities.

Civil Aviation

In 1981 Somalia had about twenty widely scattered civilian airfields and usable landing strips. Only three, the international airports at Mogadishu and Hargeysa and the airport at Kismaayo, had hard-surface runways. Scheduled domestic service, centered on Mogadishu, was furnished by the national air carrier, Somali Airlines (SOMALAIR), to nine regional centers. SOMALAIR provided international services to Djibouti, Nairobi, points in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, Cairo, and Rome. The airline also had landing rights at Frankfurt where, under agreement with Lufthansa, all SOMALAIR planes were serviced. There was an agreement with Pakistan to operate flights to that country, although service had not started as of late 1981. Other international service was provided by Alitalia, Aeroflot (services had continued despite the cooling of Soviet-Somali relations during 1977), and a number of other international and regional airlines (see Relations with Communist States, ch. 4). International cargo flights on a regular basis were made between London and Mogadishu by Tradewind Airways.

SOMALAIR has been operating since 1964, when it was founded as a joint stock company in which equal shares were held by the Somali government and Italy's Alitalia. Services were lim-

ited to domestic operations until 1968, when regional flights began. Overall management was by Alitalia under contract until 1970, when the government holding was increased to fifty-one percent, and active Somali participation in running the airline began. Full control of operations was assumed in 1978 without any further increase in the government equity. In 1978 SOMALAIR entered into a cooperative arrangement with Lufthansa for the training in West Germany of new pilots, mechanics, and other categories of airline personnel.

In mid–1981 SOMALAIR's aircraft consisted of two Boeing 720Bs, two Boeing 707s, two DC–3s, two Fokker F–27s, and four Cessnas. Revenue passengers and cargo both increased in the late 1970s, reaching a total of 125,528 passengers and 845 tons of cargo in 1979, the latest figures available. Until at least the early 1970s the airline operated at a loss that was covered by subsidies from the Somali government. It was said to have been profitable in the late 1970s, but the airline's accounts were unavailable for checking.

Ports and Shipping

Four main ports handled virtually all of the country's foreign trade in 1981. Three were deepwater ports, including Berbera, a natural harbor on the Gulf of Aden, and Mogadishu and Kismaayo on the Indian Ocean, both of which are protected by breakwaters. The fourth port—Marka, also on the Indian Ocean—continued in 1981 to be a lighterage facility that required ships to anchor offshore in open roadsteads while unloading and loading. Mogadishu also had been a lighterage port until 1976 when the first of five deepwater berths was completed under a project financed mainly by IDA and a grant from EDF. At the official opening in late 1977, Mogadishu's facilities included three general cargo berths, a banana berth, and a specialized livestock berth. In 1978 IDA furnished additional funds to construct a conventional tanker berth for ships of up to 50,000 deadweight tons to discharge crude oil for the Gesira oil refinery and for outward shipment of refined products. In early 1981 a contract was awarded to add two additional banana berths to the facility.

Port facilities at Berbera included in 1981 two deepwater berths, one specifically for handling cattle. These facilities, built with Soviet aid, have been in operation since 1969; two cranes installed in 1968, however, had never been used because of the lack of adequate electric power. The construction of two to three new general cargo-handling berths has been under consideration by the government since the late 1970s, but implementation was dependent on external financing, which had not yet been assured in late 1981. Since 1969 Kismaayo has had four deepwater berths (provided by United States aid) in operation. A bulk export ter-

minal for molasses was reportedly under construction in 1981 to handle production at the new sugar mill at Jilib that went into operation in 1980. Cargo handling equipment was limited at all three deepwater ports; ship's tackle was used in loading and unloading general cargo.

Information on individual port capacities was unavailable, and annual data on cargo passing through the ports showed substantial fluctuations. In 1976 total exports and imports were reportedly under 750,000 tons; in 1978 the total was close to 2.2 million tons. Mogadishu has been the principal entry point for most general cargo. Through the mid–1970s exports handled at the port were under 10 percent of the country's total, but the quantity may have increased since the opening of the port's new facilities. Berbera received general cargo for the northern part of the country and was the main export port for livestock, although an increased amount of the traffic may pass through Mogadishu since construction of the livestock berth there. Kismaayo's main function has been in the export of bananas and of meat from a processing and packing plant at the port. Marka has served principally as an export point for bananas.

International trade was carried chiefly by foreign shipping lines. In 1974 the government (51 percent holding), in conjunction with the government of Libya (49 percent), established the Somali National Shipping Line, which in 1980 operated five oceangoing vessels (refrigerator ships of 4,700 and 4,000 deadweight tons, general cargo ships of 2,000 and 1,500 deadweight tons, and a livestock carrier of 2,500 deadweight tons). During 1980 the Jiddah-based Islamic Development Bank granted Somalia funds for another livestock carrier, but whether the purchase had been made was not known in late 1981. Through 1975 Somalia had provided flag-of-convenience registry for foreign ships (numbering about 250 vessels in that year). Late in 1975, however, the government abolished the practice to "safeguard its integrity."

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments

Foreign Trade

Somalia's merchandise exports have consisted of a relatively small number of items, of which two—live animals (plus livestock products) and bananas—regularly accounted for 90 percent or more of visible export earnings. Receipts from live animals increased during the 1970s from well over 50 percent of total export earnings in the early part of the decade to more than 70 percent in 1979. Over 1 million head of goats, sheep, cattle, and camels were exported annually (except in 1976 and 1977 when a large drop in sheep and goat exports occurred reportedly mainly because of a shortage of shipping facilities). Earnings increased dur-



Port activity at Mogadishu
Courtesy Andrew Dobson

ing the decade, but this was largely attributable to rising prices rather than to the number of animals (see table 11, Appendix). Almost all live animals went to the Middle East, mostly to Saudi Arabia whose purchases during the 1970s accounted for between 87 and 96 percent of Somalia's total live animal exports. (In view of the extreme importance of livestock in export earnings, any significant change in Saudi Arabian buying patterns would have an important impact on the economy and would seriously affect Somalia's balance of payments position.) Bananas were the source of at least 25 percent of export receipts in the early 1970s, but export volume gradually declined thereafter, in part because of drought, disease, and other growing problems, in part because of export market situations. Improving unit prices as the decade progressed offset the decline only relatively, and in 1979 earnings from banana exports had declined to about 11 percent of total merchandise earnings (see table 12, Appendix).

Livestock products (meat, meat preparations, hides, and skins) have been important secondary export items. The combined export receipts from those commodities increased from 9.6 percent of total receipts in 1970 to about 18.6 percent in 1976, when they surpassed banana export earnings. The expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1977, however, was followed by the loss of the export market for meat processed by the government cannery. Largely as a result the cannery remained closed in 1978 and operated at only a

reduced level in 1979 when production was mainly exported to Italy. (Market information and production for 1980 were unavailable.) The private meat cannery closed in 1977 for financial reasons, owing in part to an inadequate foreign market, and remained closed in 1980. The export of fish and fish preparations, which had risen in the mid–1970s, also dropped after 1977, chiefly because of the loss of the Soviet market, although shortage of supplies and other factors played a part. In 1979 fuel oil exports from Somalia's new refinery became an important new source of export earnings, accounting for 4 percent of total receipts. Data for 1980 were unavailable, and it would be difficult to estimate the future potential in view of possible crude oil supply problems and unknown domestic demand growth factors.

Exports were made to about fifty countries. However, approximately two-thirds to almost three-quarters of all exports went to Arab countries, and in 1978 the proportion had risen to 90 percent (see table 13, Appendix). Saudi Arabia was the largest single customer. Kuwait and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden)] were also important through the mid–1970s, but their purchases had declined in the late 1970s for unreported reasons. Exports to the larger Arab buyers were almost entirely live animals and fruit (bananas). The only non-Arab state in Africa to which any significant exports were made was Kenya, which took mostly fish, fish products, and live animals.

Among the thirty-five to forty other countries that were destinations for Somali goods, Italy was the most important, although exports to that country, chiefly fruits, vegetables, and hides and skins, generally stagnated during the decade, resulting in a downward trend in Italy's share of Somali exports. The Soviet Union became a significant destination for canned fish and meat from the early 1970s as Somalia's new canneries, built with Soviet aid, went into operation, but this trade stopped abruptly in 1977. Export trade with Western Europe (other than Italy) and the United States was negligible; Somalia did not produce—or produce at competitive prices—commodities desired by traders in those countries.

In 1970 about half of Somalia's imports consisted of consumer goods. Intermediate goods constituted another quarter, capital goods made up 17 percent, petroleum and petroleum products 6 percent, and miscellaneous imports the remaining 2 percent. The share of consumer goods in reported imports began declining in the early 1970s and from the middle of the decade constituted under two-fifths of the total (see table 14, Appendix). At the same time the share of capital goods in imports increased to over 30 percent as the country's transportation facilites were expanded and machinery was brought in to equip new industrial operations

and reequip several major existing plants. Intermediate goods continued to make up about a quarter of imports by value through 1978. Detailed data were not available on imports during 1979 and 1980, but the influx of refugees from the Ogaden was believed to have forced considerably increased food imports. Higher oil prices in 1979 and greater volume of imports to meet the requirements of the refinery presumably altered also the share of mineral fuels in the overall import total.


Imports have come from about seventy countries. There has been substantially less concentration of trade than in the case of exports. Western European countries ranging from Greece and Austria to Spain, members of the European Economic Community (EEC—also known as the Common Market), and the Scandinavian states have accounted for about half of all merchandise imports. Italy has remained the largest supplier, furnishing close to 30 percent of the total and serving as a major source of chemicals, chemical products, manufactures, intermediate goods, machinery, and transport equipment (see table 15, Appendix). Until 1977 the Soviet Union was the second largest supplier—chiefly of petroleum products and project supplies. Arab states of the Middle East individually played relatively small roles as sources of imports. Saudi Arabia, destination of most Somali exports, has furnished principally consumer goods. Iraq became the source of crude petroleum for the new Gesira refinery in 1978, but suspended deliveries in late 1980 (see Petroleum Supply and Domestic Resources, this ch.).


Balance of Payments

Somalia entered the 1970s with a chronic adverse trade balance; published official statistics showed negative balances annually thereafter through 1979. During the decade exports declined in volume. At the same time, export receipts increased about threefold, owing largely to higher unit prices (the result of inflationary forces set in motion by oil price rises from 1973). In the case of imports both costs and volume rose; import values in 1979 were almost eight times greater than in 1970. The unfavorable trade position depicted by official figures was real, even though the accuracy of the published data was questionable because of the possible underdeclaration of export values and the partial (or lack of) inclusion of imports purchased with foreign exchange in the *franco valuta* (literally free foreign exchange) market (see table 16, Appendix). This market, which functioned legally alongside the official exchange market, consisted of foreign currency obtained abroad, mostly by private importers. An unknown but presumably substantial amount of this currency came from earnings of Somali workers employed in foreign countries, whose relatives in Somalia were compensated in turn in local currency, at usually

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better exchange rates than the official one. The *franco valuta* rate was believed to have been about two and one-half times the official rate until July 1981, when the government introduced a two-tier official exchange system. Under the latter the shilling was devalued to Sh12.46 to US$1 (for value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary) for most goods imported through official channels. Certain commodities, however, have continued to be imported at a rate of Sh6.35 to US$1 (only slightly changed from the earlier official rate) in a measure intended to hold down consumer prices. *Franco valuta* imports, which have consisted mostly of food and other consumer items, have varied greatly from year to year; for instance they were estimated to have constituted 7 percent of actual imports in 1977, 28 percent in 1978, and about 9 percent in 1979.

The net services item in the balance of payments has been consistently negative. Major factors in this have been travel, which has included pilgrimages to Mecca, and payments to foreign contractors and consultants. Unrequited transfers (transfers from Somali workers abroad, foreign official and voluntary agency grant aid, and the like) have contributed substantially to total receipts. Grant aid from foreign governments and international agencies has been on an increased scale since 1974, reflecting larger gifts to help victims of the 1974–75 drought and later for aid to refugees from the Ogaden. Beginning in 1978 an estimated value for shipments in kind from Somalis abroad (through the *franco valuta* market) has been included in private unrequited transfers.

The current account as reported was in deficit in the 1970s except for a small surplus in 1971 and was in balance in 1975. The validity of the balances again was questionable because of the unknown amount of trade through the *franco valuta* system and the possible underrecording of exports and grant aid received by the government. Reported capital inflows in the early 1970s were sufficient to maintain favorable balances of payments, but deficits were registered officially in 1973 and 1974. From 1975 through 1978 the inflow again produced favorable balances, and foreign exchange reserves increased, reaching the equivalent of US$158 million at the end of March 1978, an amount sufficient to cover about six months of imports in current values. Imports rose dramatically in 1978, and only a moderate surplus was reported in the published balance of payments data. In 1979 imports continued their rapid rise. Some increase in official capital inflow occurred, and the current account was helped by inclusion of estimated *franco valuta* imports (as it had been in 1978). But these failed to offset the great growth in imports, and a major drawdown on foreign reserves was necessary. This continued

into 1980, and reserves had declined reportedly to the equivalent of about US$41 million in mid–1980, equal to less than one and one-half months' imports.

Prices, Wages, and Employment

The primary source of information on inflationary trends in Somalia in late 1981 was the consumer price index for Mogadishu prepared by the Central Statistical Department. Until 1973 inflation in the Mogadishu area was moderate. The revolutionary government's efforts to hold down consumer food prices after the military coup were quite successful during this period. The general index, which had stood at 111 (base year, 1966) in September 1969, actually declined to 108 in March 1973. During 1973 the first effects of rising oil prices and worldwide inflation were felt. The country was not then—and in 1981 still was not—self-sufficient in food production, and in an effort to contain the prices of basic foodstuffs the government introduced subsidies for essential foods including wheat flour, rice, sugar, and edible oils. Rent controls were also introduced. The impact of imported inflation was heightened in 1974 and 1975 by the effects of the major drought that afflicted the country. Despite the subsidies the food index rose substantially, as did those for clothing and miscellaneous items, and the average annual inflation rate was over 18 percent.

In 1975 inflation ran at an average annual rate of over 19 percent. The rise was attributed in some degree to shortages of clothing, other textiles, and household appliances that reportedly developed after nationalization of import operations. The prices of foods and miscellaneous goods rose less rapidly in 1976, but pressure on the general consumer price index was exerted by higher prices for clothing that resulted from large imports through the *franco valuta* market—goods that were sold in the open market in Somalia at uncontrolled prices. The overall rate of inflation declined, however, to 14 percent for the year. The decline continued in 1977 to 10.6 percent and to 9.9 percent in 1978, as supplies of food were reasonably adequate, and the market became flooded with clothing; the war in the Ogaden appeared to have had only a moderate impact on the Mogadishu area. The situation was drastically reversed in 1979, however, when the inflation rate hit almost 24 percent. Food production was down during the year, and prices for imported foods not under controlled prices were higher. Clothing prices also rose substantially, apparently the result of shortages as *franco valuta* imports declined in reaction to the previous year's oversupply. Also important in the upward push on prices was the inadequate supply of imported tobacco in 1979 that caused an acute shortage of cigarettes and a sharp rise in price. Of major significance was the budgetary

deficit financing to which the government was forced by inadequate capital inflows, which greatly increased the money supply (see Government Finance, this ch.).

In late 1981 the most recent published data on paid employment were from a manpower survey conducted in 1971. At that time, nonagricultural paid employees (but including employees in public sector agriculture) were estimated at about 108,400; of these some 67,200 workers (62 percent) were private sector employment, and 41,200 (38 percent) had public sector jobs. Three sectors accounted for about 70 percent of all wage employment—commerce, 35 percent; transportation, 19 percent; and public administration and community services, 16 percent. Manufacturing had about 10 percent of total paid employment and public sector agriculture another 10 percent. It was then anticipated that a substantially larger growth in paid employment would occur in the public than in the private sector because of the implementation of governmental economic development projects and increases in government services; by 1976 paid employment was expected to be divided roughly equally between the public and private sectors. Expansion of private sector wage employment, especially in small-scale operations, was found to have been considerably greater than expected. Of the 167,000 individuals estimated to have had paid employment in 1976, about 95,000 (57 percent) were private sector employees, and 72,000 (43 percent) held public sector positions. In 1978 a survey of employment and manpower requirements generally comparable to that of 1971 was carried out, but except for limited, selected statistics, the results had not been issued by late 1981. It should be noted that a large number of Somalis were employed abroad, mostly in the Arab states of the Middle East. Estimates of their number ranged generally from 50,000 to 120,000, although one estimate placed the total as high as 250,000.

Wage and employment information was meager in late 1981. The government has assumed, based on comparisons with other countries having similar socioeconomic patterns, that the labor force at the time of the 1975 census constituted about 40 percent of the total population. Revised figures for the census have established a population in 1975 of about 3.7 million, in line with which roughly 1.5 million individuals would have been in the work force at the time. It was further assumed that the labor force would increase in the near future at about the same rate as the population. Accordingly the total in 1981 would be between about 1.6 and 1.7 million (see Population and Settlement Patterns, ch. 2). (It should be noted that these assumptions and estimates are no more than that and that their basic purpose is to provide only a rough scale of magnitude.) Estimates of the sectoral distribution of the labor force in the mid–1970s made by the JASPA mission placed

about 80 percent in agriculture and livestock, 7 percent in industry, and 13 percent in services.

The government has followed a policy of attempting to provide some work for everyone employable in the modern sector, at low pay levels if necessary, rather than supplying work for some at higher scales and none for others. As part of that effort, jobs have been guaranteed in the public sector to all graduates of the national university, secondary schools, and postintermediate technical institutes. From the early 1970s all public sector employees—both those in government services and in the public enterprises—were unified by law, and grades, pay, and conditions of service were made the same for equivalent positions. Few increases in wages were given during the 1970s, and it has been estimated that in real terms wages and salaries in 1978 were worth about half of their 1970 value. Productivity has suffered as a result, and an unknown number of trained and experienced personnel have left government service and the government enterprises for positions in the private sector or in the Middle East oil-producing states. Many of those who remain apparently have to work at a second job in order to support themselves and their families.

One state-owned enterprise introduced a productivity bonus system in 1975 but was forced by the government to discontinue it, apparently because of the possible effect on existing general wage levels. The public enterprises, however, were subsequently directed to set aside a small proportion of their profits for their employees that was usually distributed equally. Since the early 1970s, by law a share of the profits was also to be used to furnish housing and social amenities for employees. Many of the state enterprises have made little or no profit, and the benefits (where received) were mostly small. In October 1980 President Mohamed Siad Barre decreed a salary increase for all permanent government employees—in consideration of their financial hardship, the result of the worldwide inflation—that was to be effective beginning in January 1981. The details of this increase remained unavailable in late 1981.

Government Finance

During the 1960s the government had derived a very high proportion of its domestic revenue from indirect taxes on international and domestic transactions. Tax receipts on income and property averaged only about 7 percent of total domestic revenue annually in the decade. An attempt had been made by the Italian trusteeship administration to establish a broad direct tax base by assessing taxes on huts and small farms in the agricultural south. This had met strong opposit ,n, including armed resistance, and the total tax obtained never amounted to more than a small fraction of government revenue. After independence the new gov-

ernment imposed a land tax, but the hostile reaction and lack of registered land titles led to discontinuance of its collection. No tax was collected on livestock. As a result direct taxes were actually assessed only against a small segment of the population, consisting of the civil service and individuals and businesses in the modern sector. Tax evasion was widespread—a situation that an inadequate tax enforcement apparatus was unable to overcome—and income taxes were generally collected only from civil servants.

Throughout the 1960s the budget was in deficit annually, although the gap had been greatly reduced in size by 1969. The military government in its first year also found itself faced by a sizable budget shortfall. The new dominant role set for the public sector in development and the emphasis placed on self-reliance gave added importance to the fiscal performance of the government, and in late 1970 major steps were taken to generate domestic savings for development purposes through the current budget. An austerity program was announced that included raising the duties and taxes on luxuries and a reduction in civil service pay. Private firms also were ordered to cut pay scales and to contribute the proceeds, which came to be known as the development levy, to a government development fund. This extraordinary tax, which was equivalent to an extra income tax on nongovernment employees, was still collected at the beginning of the 1980s.

From 1970 an upsurge in tax receipts occurred, and tax revenue had doubled by 1975, continuing to grow between 1975 and 1979 at an average annual rate close to 25 percent. But international transactions remained the main source of revenue, especially import duties, which accounted for over half of total revenue in 1978 compared with about one-third in the mid–1960s. Income and property taxes still constituted a very small part of total revenue (see table 17, Appendix).

Ordinary expenditures on social and economic services rose gradually during the 1970s and in 1977 accounted, respectively, for about 26 and 18 percent of total expenditures. General services—the presidency, foreign affairs, interior (including the police), justice, planning, and finance—expended close to a third of the total during this time, a proportion maintained in the late 1970s. Defense spending accounted regularly for roughly 25 to 26 percent until 1978 when the expenditure pattern changed markedly as defense expenditures rose sharply to over 37 percent, affected by the war with Ethiopia. The increase came largely at the expense of the social and economic services sectors, which continued to bear the brunt of still growing defense spending in the 1979 budget (see table 18, Appendix).

Since the mid–1960s there has been no regular development budget, only a separate development component that comprises domestically financed expenditures on projects. Foreign fi-

nanced development expenditures, a significant part of which the government does not control, are not included. The result has been an incomplete picture of the fiscal situation. Domestic development expenditure has gradually increased and since 1973 has exceeded the surplus registered annually in the current budget through 1978. The resultant overall budgetary deficit has mounted, and in the late 1970s was increased by growing domestic budgetary funding of the item defined as "extraordinary expenditures" that covered outlays for projects not included in the regular development plans, e.g., the refugee resettlement program, and other spending of an unstated nature by certain ministries, including the Ministry of Defense. The deficit rose to large proportions in 1978 and 1979, and external aid, which had generally filled the gap in previous years, was considerably short. The government had to resort to substantial financing through the Central Bank of Somalia, and the resultant large increase in the money supply contributed to a sharply rising rate of inflation.


Foreign budgetary grants have been received since independence when Italy and Britain agreed to provide support to the new government. After 1963 British aid was rejected following a break in relations that resulted from a dispute over the frontier with Kenya. In 1964 China helped to meet the budgetary deficit. Subsequently grant aid was received generally on an annual basis from the EEC, West Germany, China, the United States (to 1971—substantial grant aid was resumed in 1978), and various UN agencies. Although the Italian agreement on budget support was to have ended in 1970, some grants were made thereafter. Egypt also furnished grants at various times, and the Soviet Union provided budgetary support through 1969. Soviet aid was extensive during the 1969–77 period, but it was not known whether any of this was in the form of budget grants. From the mid–1970s substantial budget assistance was also extended by Arab states. The refugee aid problem that emerged from the drought and the war with Ethiopia evoked large grants from a wide range of donors. For 1977 the total reached some Sh535 million, or 39 percent of total government revenue including grants; the amount was almost two-thirds as large as all government revenue for the year. In 1978 grants dropped to about half the amount of the previous year but still were equivalent to a fifth of current revenue and provided over 16 percent of total revenue. Details for 1979 and 1980 were not available, but grant totals reportedly remained large overall.

* * *

In 1981 generally available background and analytical information on Somalia's economy was extremely limited. A partial view

and some data are presented in the government's series of development plans during the period 1963–81 and in its *Country Programme for the 1980s*, prepared for a mid–1981 UN conference on the least developed nations. *Economic Transformation in a Socialist Framework*, a special report to the government by an International Labour Organisation employment advisory mission, provides an excellent employment-oriented survey of the economy. Statistical data and some analyses are available in the Central Bank of Somalia's *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts*. The Central Statistical Department of the State Planning Commission has published annually various statistical reports, including the *Statistical Abstract, Industrial Production Survey*, and *Foreign Trade Returns*. Various government ministries and agencies have produced other reports. It should be noted, however, that while governmental efforts were being made to expand and improve the collection and organization of statistics, there were wide deficiencies in the statistical data and in the reliability of the published figures available in 1981. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4. Government and Politics



Somalia's official state seal

THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT that prevailed in Somalia for nearly a decade after independence in 1960 degenerated in its final years, culminating in the assassination of the president. The military government that followed has provided the country with stability and has brought economic and social progress, but its authoritarian features had been little modified by late 1981. Assuming power by a coup d'etat in 1969, the military junta declared its intention of wiping out the excesses of corruption and tribal nepotism that had brought discredit on the politicians of the civilian era. On the first anniversary of the coup, a doctrine of scientific socialism was proclaimed by the military government. Under this label numerous achievements were realized in the early years of military rule, augmented by a determined effort to replace clan loyalty with a sense of national cooperation and unity.

Political association had been prohibited at the time of the coup, but this was amended seven years later when the government sponsored a political party of its socialist elite. The original controlling military council was phased out in favor of the new party's central committee, composed of both military and civilian members, whose role was to chart the ideological course. A second phase in civilianizing the regime was the introduction of a new constitution and the convoking of an elected legislature early in 1980. Somalia's first elections in over a decade had been staged in 1979 to demonstrate mass approval of the Constitution and the single-party slate of candidates.

The grip on political authority by the president and armed forces commander in chief, Mohamed Siad Barre, continued to tighten behind the facade of civilian government. Economic and foreign policy failures and the blunting of ideological direction sapped the earlier revolutionary vigor of the military leadership. But because internal dissidence was muffled by the state security apparatus and exiled opposition groups lacked credibility, no satisfying alternative to Siad Barre was on the horizon in 1981.

As a result of bad management, drought, a great refugee influx, and the drain of recent war, Somalia's survival has become dependent on financial support from the Western and Arab countries. Lacking a reliable arms supplier after the rift with the Soviet Union in 1977, its ambition of ending the international partition of the Somali people has been checked by economic and military realities. Projecting into the Indian Ocean and within range of the Persian Gulf, however, Somalia has gained added strategic importance as the West has moved to protect its oil supply lines. The republic hopes, through its 1980 agreement with the United States covering use of the Soviet-built naval base and airfield at Berbera, to forge a new military and political relationship that will reduce its exposure to the threat from its historic adversary, Soviet-supported Ethiopia.

The Governmental System

Until 1969 Somalia was governed under a multiparty parliamentary system based on a constitution written at independence in 1960 and ratified in 1961. In spite of the natural inclination of the Somali people to democratic expression and political organization, this Western parliamentary system gradually broke down under the temptations of personal gain and the demands of competing lineage interests.

On October 21, 1969, a group of army officers seized control of the government and established the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which arrogated to itself the power to promulgate laws, administer justice, and govern the republic. The SRC consisted orginally of twenty-five officers under the leadership of Major General Siad Barre, until then commander of the army.

The SRC's announcement of its takeover, known as the First Charter of the Revolution, set forth the objectives of the new military rule as liquidating corruption and tribal nepotism, introducing a standard written Somali language, ending illiteracy, and bringing about rapid social, economic and cultural development. This document constituted the ideological basis for governing. Law Number 1, also effective as of October 21, 1969, amplified the First Charter, vesting in the SRC the functions previously performed by the president of the republic, the ministers, the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Court. All existing legislation was to be enforced until revoked or amended by the SRC or found incompatible with the spirit of the revolution.

Steps toward replacing military rule with civilian institutions of government were spaced over the following decade. Local government reorganization was begun in 1972. A single political party, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), was created in 1976. Its standing body, the Central Committee, was to supersede the SRC as the guiding political instrument in the country. Real executive power remained, however, in the hands of Siad Barre and other senior military leaders, in particular the four officers who, with the president, functioned as the party's political bureau.

In 1979, three years after formation of the SRSP, a nationwide referendum was held to approve a new constitution that led in turn to the first general election of delegates to a national legislature and to local district councils. The new document embodied certain features of the 1961 independence constitution, including guarantees of personal rights, while tempering the nation's strong commitment to socialist ideology and to a Greater Somalia. Like the original constitution, many details of government machinery, such as those concerning the size of the legislature, were left to be



President Mohamed Siad Barre
Courtesy United States International Communication Agency

defined by subsequent legislation, thereby avoiding acknowledgment of the permanence of alien jurisidiction over Somali-populated territories.

The new civilian structure added some democratic elements to what had been an unabashed military dictatorship. By providing for Siad Barre's election as president of the republic by the legislature, it furthered the legitimacy of his rule. Yet by virtue of his continued control over the SRSP, elections, and candidates (as well as members and leadership of the legislature), and by provisions in the Constitution authorizing him to bypass normal legislative processes, Siad Barre effected a transformation in the external characteristics of the system while preserving his personal domination over the Somali government.

Structure of the Civilian Government, 1960–69

The protectorate of British Somaliland received its independence on June 26, 1960, and five days later united with the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian Administration to form the

Somali Republic. A formal constitution was not ratified until June 20, 1961. The newly created government was parliamentary, having a president as titular head of state who was elected by the members of the unicameral National Assembly. The president selected the prime minister, who then had to obtain a vote of confidence from the assembly. The prime minister and his Council of Ministers, who were usually chosen from among members of the assembly, were vested with executive powers.

The popularly elected National Assembly was the real center of political power under this system. Its 123 members were chosen in forty-seven electoral districts. Within each district, seats were assigned on a complex proportional representation basis that encouraged the proliferation of small, primarily local parties. In spite of new laws designed to reduce the multiplicity of parties before the 1969 election, sixty-four parties having a total of 1,000 candidates contested the election; only three of these parties operated nationwide. The disintegration of the party system became evident when nearly every member of the assembly immediately deserted to the winning party in an effort to reap the advantages of victory (see The Egal Government, ch. 1).

Military Government Institutions

After the bloodless coup that brought the military and police to power in 1969, the country's executive and legislative functions were absorbed by the twenty-five leading military and police officers who composed the SRC. The constitution was repealed, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court were abolished, and political parties were outlawed. Regional governors, and district commissioners were replaced by army or police officers acting as chairmen of local revolutionary councils. In addition to exercising authority as head of state and senior member of the armed forces, Siad Barre acted as chairman of the Council of Secretaries of State (CSS), a cabinet without policymaking functions, composed mostly of civil servants who served as operating heads of the government ministries.

The SRC exercised its supervisory role primarily through four committees having oversight of broad policy areas: social and political affairs, economic affairs, judicial affairs, and security affairs. SRC members also served on or chaired interministerial bodies charged with the conduct of major programs, such as efforts to ease the impact of the disastrous 1974–75 drought and to resettle nomadic families in new farming projects. The SRC members conducted inspections of national and local government agencies to ensure compliance with SRC policies and encourage efficiency. The SRC and CSS often met jointly to discuss major issues. By law both bodies had to meet to approve the national budget. The composition of the SRC remained fairly constant; twenty-one of

the twenty-five officers who were members of the coucil in 1969 were members at its dissolution in 1976, and no new members were added.

Return to Civilian Political Institutions

Under Somalia's post–1969 military rule the civilian component of government was restricted to administrative rather than policy responsibilities. At the highest level were the secretaries of state, in effect senior functionaries with the necessary education and experience to superintend day-to-day government operations. As a first step in restoring the civilian political framework, Siad Barre adopted the pattern of other Leninist-inspired socialist states by creating the SRSP as a vanguard party of committed supporters, including both civilian and military members.

The new party's Central Committee replaced the SRC while the CSS was upgraded to full cabinet status, its members holding ministerial rank as heads of the administrative departments. Military influence within this Council of Ministers was stronger than in the former CSS; the addition of five SRC members plus the president and three vice presidents brought the total of military figures to twelve among the twenty-three posts on the council (see fig. 11; see table 19, Appendix).

The Constitution introduced in 1979 after debate in SRSP channels reaffirmed the official and exclusive standing of the party as the "supreme authority of political and socio-economic leadership." The Constitution, made effective when the favorable results of a national referendum were announced on August 20, 1979, completed the civilianizing process, introducing a bill of rights and an elected legislative body, the People's Assembly. Election procedures were, however, carefully controlled to ensure that all delegates would be dedicated supporters of the revolutionary government. The assembly itself appeared to have been entrusted with little authority beyond ratifying decisions of the leadership group.

Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party

Although the SRC had disbanded the Somali Youth League and abolished political parties after the military coup, Siad Barre announced in 1971 that a national political party would be formed. Preparations for the new institution got under way only in 1974 when the National Political Office of the SRC was given the task of opening branch offices in all districts to educate and suitably indoctrinate cadres in the principles of scientific socialism. Workers' committees had been formed beginning in late 1972 in factories, farms, cooperatives, government ministries, and the armed forces. From these committees, delegations were to be elected to village councils, which in turn elected representatives to district and regional congresses as preliminary steps to the founding congress of the SRSP on June 26, 1976. Chosen by the regional military gover-




Figure 11. Organization of the Somali Government, May 1981

nors for their reliability, the 3,000 delegates to the congress elected the seventy-three members of the Central Committee, which was designated to direct party affairs between party congresses that were to be held every five years. The Central Committee, of which Siad Barre became chairman, superseded the governing body of the revolution—the SRC—although SRC officers were absorbed into the Central Committee along with members of the CSS and other civilian activists. The Central Committee was to meet quarterly while bureaus constituting the party executive were to meet weekly.

The actual locus of authority was the political bureau comprising the five leading members of the SRC: Siad Barre, who was elected secretary general of the party; the three vice-presidents—Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samantar, Major General Hussein Kulmie Afrah, and Colonel (later Brigadier General) Ismail Ali Abokar—and the head of the National Security Service, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle.

In proceeding at a cautious pace with the formation of a political party to supplant the SRC, Siad Barre was said to have acted only after constant prompting from his Soviet advisers who regarded it as an indispensable step in the institutionalization of the socialist regime that had emerged from the 1969 coup. The party structure would also comprise a reliable body of politically indoctrinated supporters through all levels of society and in all parts of the country. Formation of the party was seen as a precursor to normalization and full legitimization of the regime, leading to a new constitution and the transformation of Siad Barre from a military strongman to an elected head of state. By placing himself at the head of the party, Siad Barre might also have sought to fortify his personal authority, which until then had been based solely on his leadership of the military junta.

As the accredited source of political action in a revolutionary socialist state, the SRSP was the sponsor of all candidates running for office. Its leading role was not restricted to the political sphere but was to be pervasive in all forms of association. Other national organizations were brought into linkage with the SRSP, and their leaders were subject to endorsement by the Central Committee after nomination by the political bureau. The most prominent of these were the General Federation of Somali Trade Unions, the Somali Revolutionary Youth Organization, and the Somali Democratic Women's Organization.

The party was committed to the rules of democratic centralism; views and policy proposals were, in theory, to be gathered through lower party echelons and then, after decisions had been reached by the elite leadership, the SRSP was to be employed as an instrument for diffusing doctrine and plans, which were to be unhesitatingly obeyed at regional and local levels. Membership was made

conditional on a probationary period of six to twelve months after indoctrination in the principles of scientific socialism. The party's size has remained small, most estimates placing it at about 20,000 members and suggesting either that it has been deliberately maintained as a compact body of activists or that slack recruitment at local levels has hindered membership growth. A historian of Somali orgin, Abdi Sheik-Abdi, has classified SRSP membership into three groups: civil servants and small businessmen who are not dedicated socialists but who have learned to live with the party's rhetoric; centrists, epitomized by Siad Barre; and the Marxist left, composed in part by Somalia's intelligentsia.

The party bureaus originally numbered seventeen but have been subjected to frequent organizational shifts and mergers. After a Central Committee meeting in May 1981, new chairmen and vice chairmen of the bureaus (reduced to eleven) were announced. Among these were bureaus of ideology, foreign affairs, economics, social affairs, cooperatives, organization and mass mobilization, and personnel. These changes evidently constituted the reorganization of the SRSP insisted upon by Siad Barre when he declared a state of emergency in October 1980. It was not immediately clear whether the important role mandated for the SRSP to direct policy and to oversee the operations of the government departments and agencies had been fundamentally altered by Siad Barre's decree, but the parallel existence of the SRSP and the restored SRC seemed to create severe overlapping in an already complex structure (see Revival of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, this ch.). No changes were announced in the party's five-member political bureau of military officers, but only one of the eleven new bureau chairmen had military rank. Previously five of seventeen SRSP heads had been military officers.

Constitution of 1979

During the inaugural party congress in 1976, a committee was appointed to draft a new constitution for the republic to replace the independence constitution that was suspended in 1969. The draft constitution of 114 articles adopted at the extraordinary congress of the SRSP in January 1979 was submitted to the people for approval in a referendum in August, and elections followed at the end of the year. The results as reported by the government showed that 3,597,692 voters supported the new Constitution while only 7,898 opposed it.

Adoption of the new Constitution was viewed as a promising step toward the democratization of the government and a possible indication of the leadership's willingness to moderate the authoritarian measures that had prevailed since 1969. Nevertheless Siad Barre's political preeminence was not diffused in any material degree, and the exclusive role of the SRSP guaranteed in the



Opening ceremony at the founding congress of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington



Regional representatives listen to a speaker during a congress of women in Mogadishu.
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

Constitution virtually ensured that the new legislature would not be the breeding ground for a legalized opposition.

The Constitution vests legislative authority in the People's Assembly, members of which are to be popularly elected for five-year terms. The assembly can be dissolved, however, by a two-thirds vote of its own membership or by action of the president. The assembly is to meet in two regular sessions each year, although this requirement was not observed during the first year. The assembly is authorized to elect its own chairman and vice chairman and a Standing Committee, which has responsibility for directing the flow of assembly business and for discharging its function during periods of recess. Under the Constitution the Standing Committee is to consist of the chairman, vice chairman, and secretary of the assembly, plus ten ordinary members. It was subsequently announced that the committee would consist of the chairman, secretary, two vice chairmen, the chairmen of five subordinate committees, and five ordinary members.

Under the 1979 Constitution the president is elected to a six-year, renewable term by a two-thirds vote of the People's Assembly. If a candidate fails to receive the necessary support on the first two ballots, a simple majority suffices on the third ballot. The president is invested with far-reaching authority. He is empowered to conduct foreign affairs, to declare war, and to appoint one or more vice-presidents, the president of the Supreme Court, and members of the Council of Ministers, of which he is chairman. The president chairs joint party and state meetings, acts as commander in chief of the armed forces, and serves as chairman of the National Defense Council. The president may veto laws passed by the People's Assembly by failing to promulgate them within forty-five days, but his veto can be overridden by a two-thirds vote in the assembly.

The 1979 Constitution has adopted a number of provisions that closely correspond to the independence constitution of 1961, although the two documents differ in several essential features. Both constitutions have provided for a unicameral legislature elected for five years but subject to earlier dissolution. While the earlier government was parliamentary in form, having a prime minister and Council of Ministers who were members of the legislature, both constitutions reserved broad powers for the president. Both documents included clauses enabling the president to invoke emergency rule or to be delegated temporary lawmaking power by the assembly. The 1979 Constitution, which critics have contended is designed mainly to give a cloak of legitimacy to the authoritarian rule of Siad Barre, gives the president more sweeping emergency powers. As defined in article 83 of the 1979 Constitution, the president can take all appropriate measures throughout the country or in any part of it subject only to consultation with the National Defense Council.

In certain other features the 1979 Constitution appears to reflect the less doctrinaire approach of the Somali leadership as it has shifted closer to the West. Articles 15 and 16 declare that, while supporting national liberation movements, the Somali Democratic Republic will adopt peaceful and legal means in securing the liberation of Somali territories "under colonial occupation." This provision is in conformity with the more supple diplomatic posture of Siad Barre since the Ogaden conflict. While the Constitution reaffirms that the economy is to be founded on socialist state planning and that priority is assigned to the state sector, Article 41 explicitly recognizes a role for the private sector and for mixed ownership between the Somali state and others.

The People's Assembly

The popular elections mandated by the Constitution for the 171 seats in the People's Assembly were held on December 30, 1979. Few details were revealed by the government on the procedures followed. Voting totals were announced for each district of the sixteen regions, but these showed only votes in favor, votes opposed, and invalid ballots. Voters were reportedly permitted only to vote "yes" or "no" to the entire list of 171 candidates. Apparently no effort was made to appoint candidates representing groups or geographic areas. The government explained that members of the People's Assembly would be selected at the national level to eliminate the danger that they might campaign on the basis of individual or tribal interests. The government later announced that among the members of the assembly, twenty were military personnel, six were women, and fourteen were not party members. Under his authority in the 1979 Constitution, the president named six deputies who were "dedicated to science, arts, and culture or [who were] highly esteemed patriots," bringing membership to a total of 177.

The officially announced voting total indicated that nearly 4 million people went to the polls—even more than the 3.6 million claimed to have voted in the constitutional referendum in August 1979. These results exceeded most estimates of the entire population (exclusive of refugees) notwithstanding that large numbers of nomads would have been unable to reach polling places on the single day set aside. The results were claimed to be 99.91 percent favorable to the government, with only 1,826 negative and 1,480 invalid ballots. Many districts did not report a single negative or invalid vote, while two entire regions—Gedo with 293,500 voters and Bakool with 230,800—reported no negative votes. The government responded to criticisms by asserting that the election was more popular and democratic than those of the past. It noted that less than 1 million votes had been cast in prerevolutionary elec-

tions, that the new elections had been conducted in a peaceful atmosphere, and that the candidates were of a higher caliber, free of tribalism and corruption.

The People's Assembly was convened for the first time on January 24, 1980. In an opening address Siad Barre announced that he would be forming a new government; the names of its members were made known after a SRSP Central Committee meeting on February 7. (No provision is contained in the Constitution for assembly approval of cabinet members.) Siad Barre promised that the action program of the new government would be submitted to the assembly; but if the program was debated by the legislature, no public report of this was made. On January 27 Siad Barre was sworn in for a six-year term after unanimous election as president by the assembly.

The first chairman of the People's Assembly, Brigadier General Ismail Ali Abokar, had previously been vice-president of the republic and assistant secretary general of the SRSP. On April 28, 1981, Ali Abokar was restored to his position as third vice-president, relinquishing the chairmanship of the assembly to Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmad, a former minister of commerce. In apparent disregard for the Constitution, new first and second vice chairmen and committee chairmen were also elected during a joint extraordinary meeting of the SRSP Central Committee and the People's Assembly. In all likelihood, the personnel changes were decreed by Siad Barre, and approval by the party and legislature was simply a formality.

Little has been made public about the deliberations of the People's Assembly. The government-controlled press announced that the assembly had held its ordinary session for six days beginning in late December 1980. It reportedly approved the 1981 budget, new sugar prices, changes in passport, license, and ticket fees and other draft laws, and ratified several international agreements. Apparently doing little more than endorsing actions of the executive dominated by Siad Barre, the assembly has not yet lived up to its promise as a move away from authoritarianism.

Local Government

The independence constitution of 1961 had stated expressly that administrative functions were to be decentralized wherever possible. Provision was made for elected units in the towns and some representative features at the district level. One of the SRC's earliest acts was the abolition of the existing structure of local government. In the new order no municipal units existed. Instead the SRC increased the number of regions from eight to sixteen (see fig. 1). The number of districts was correspondingly



People's Hall in Mogadishu, headquarters of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
Courtesy United States International Communication Agency

increased from forty-eight to eighty. Each region contained from three to six districts except the capital region (Banaadir), which was subdivided into thirteen districts. A hierarchical structure of regions, districts, and village councils was created following a pattern established by the local government reform law of August 1972. At the regional and district levels these councils had both national and local representation. The chairman was the regional or district secretary. All chairmen were army officers until 1973 or 1974, when a few civilian officials were appointed. A list of new regional secretaries appointed in February 1981 showed renewed prominence of military officials, only four civilian secretaries being named to the fifteen regions outside Mogadishu.

Under the 1972 reforms, heads of regional units of the central government ministries comprised the membership of regional councils, along with chairmen of the subordinate district councils and a citizen from each district chosen by the regional council to represent community views. District councils were similarly organized using community representatives selected from among local people who actively supported the government. Only vil-

lage councils, each with seven members, were chosen by local residents and thus were the sole elective bodies in the country. The government claimed that by 1973 a clear process of local self-rule had begun to emerge, entailing a network of local committees from the level of regional and district councils downward to town and village sectors, subsectors, and even smaller units of the settled population. Orientation centers, originally only outdoor gathering places but later buildings constructed with local labor and government-supplied materials, assumed both social and political functions. Through these new political units and meetings in the orientation centers, according to the government, the popular will could find its expression and local communities could influence national policy. After the mass rural literacy campaign of 1974–75, the government sought to draw nomads into the local political process by having them elect representatives for political training at regional centers. The graduates were then to return to their own communities to act as motivators and teachers.

Direct elections of 1,074 candidates to the eighty district councils of the country were combined with the national election of December 30, 1979. A single list of candidates nominated by the SRSP was presented, but it was not clear that names of the candidates were actually inscribed on the ballots enabling voters to endorse or reject specific individuals.

The size of district councils was linked to both economic importance and population of the districts. In forty-six districts each council was composed of thirteen members; in twenty-one districts each council had twenty-one members; the city of Mogadishu, with thirteen districts, had a single council of thirty-five members. Districts with the larger twenty-one member councils included, at one extreme, the urbanized area of Hargeysa with 225,000 voters and, at the other extreme, Ceerigaabo with 40,000 voters. Districts with the smaller councils of thirteen members usually listed 20,000–40,000 voters but in a few cases more than 70,000 voters. In 1981 it was not clear whether the introduction of elections at the district level had been accompanied by any change in the procedure for selecting regional council members or the status of Mogadishu. Previously the Mogadishu city council had been nominated to represent interest groups (youth, women, workers, and the revolutionary elite) in each quarter. The quarters were supervised by district council-level units called quarter committees.

Authority over the local government structure was exercised by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, headed by a senior army officer. Regional council chairmen were responsible both to the ministry and to their councils in carrying out their administrative functions. After the declaration of emergency in October 1980, it was announced that revolutionary com-

mittees would be reconstituted at the district and regional levels. It was not clear what effect these committees would have on normal local government operations, but the reemergence of these bodies—heavily weighted with army, police, and security personnel—was a step backward from the measure of local self-government that had been introduced by the military leaders.

The operating staffs of local government units were personnel of the national civil service assigned by the central authorities. Planning for local projects was done by the local councils, which had the right to be consulted on national government projects operating in their areas. The councils were permitted to impose local taxes and were empowered, with prior ministerial approval, to borrow funds for development projects of a productive nature. Regional and district councils were required by statute to form six committees: economic development, social affairs, public security, finance, political orientation, and mediation and consultation. The total revenues of local councils in 1978, amounting to Sh105.6 million (for value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary), were only 7 percent of central government revenues. Main sources of income were sales of goods and services, taxes on consumption and expenditures, and taxes on income and property. The capital budget of local councils totaled only Sh28 million, of which Sh20 million was derived from a surplus on current account and Sh8 million received as grants from the central government. On the evidence of the small share of Somali government finances handled through local channels, it appeared that the local government network was not yet an important factor in supplying government services and in development.

The Legal System

At the time of independence Somalia was faced with the problem of absorbing four disparate legal traditions: English law, Italian law, the sharia (Islamic law), and Somali customary law. Italian Somaliland and the British Somaliland Protectorate had their distinctive colonial judicial systems. In addition Italian Somaliland had a well-developed court system of qadis (traditional Islamic law specialists) for the settlement of civil and minor penal matters, while in British Somaliland the qadi courts were recognized as having competence to decide questions of native law and custom. Traditional courts were replaced in 1950 by subordinate courts having competence to deal with minor criminal offenses. After independence the earlier court divisions were rejected in favor of a modern, unified system.

The military junta suspended the constitution when it came to power in 1969, but other sources of law were retained. Customary law was heavily modified, and a unified civil code was introduced. A major new feature of the court system was the

introduction of the National Security Court to try a broad range of offenses judged to affect security and public order. Presided over by military officers, the system lacked the usual rights of appeal.

The Constitution of 1979 reintroduced most of the guarantees of individual liberty that had been prominently featured in the independence constitution. In practice, however, the rights of free speech and publication and protection against arbitrary arrest were not respected, and many long-term political prisoners continued to be held without trial.

Sources of Law

The judicial organization and procedures introduced after independence were drawn primarily from the system of the Italian trust territory, which consisted of Italian metropolitan law and enactments of the local authorities in Italian Somaliland. Judicial decisions under the Italian system were based on the application and interpretation of a legal code. However courts were enjoined to apply English common law and doctrines of equity in matters not governed by legislation. Provisions of the sharia relating to marriage, divorce, family disputes, and wills were adjudicated during the colonial period by qadis in the northern regions. In Italian Somaliland the sharia was more widely applicable, but a Muslim plaintiff had the choice of appearing before a regional judge instead of a qadi. After independence the differences between the two regions were settled by compromise, making the sharia applicable in all civil matters if the dispute arose under that law. Customary law could also be applied in such matters as land tenure, marriage, child custody, intestate succession, and payment of *dia* (blood compensation—see Glossary).

During the 1960s a unified penal code and a code of criminal court procedures were introduced, and a unified civil code relating to inheritance, personal contracts, and house rents was completed in 1973. Customary law was sharply curtailed by the military regime's efforts to eradicate tribalism. Clan or lineage rights over land and water resources and grazing were abolished. Payment of *dia* as compensation for death or injury was limited to the victim or close relatives rather than to an entire *dia*-paying group (see Glossary). Later, payment of *dia* was entirely prohibited.

The Courts

The 1961 constitution provided for a unified judiciary independent of the executive and legislative authorities with a Supreme Court as the highest judicial organ. By a law passed in 1962 the courts of northern and southern Somalia were integrated into a four-tiered judicial system: the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, regional courts, and district courts. All members of the

Supreme Court, supplemented by four additional members, comprised the Constitutional Court, which had the power to review the constitutionality of legislative action. The full Supreme Court supplemented by six additional members, constituted the High Court of Justice, which was empowered to hear impeachment proceedings against the president or ministers of the government. No provision was made for the sharia courts in the 1962 law on the grounds that judges versed in both the sharia and civil law were better qualified to hear cases than qadis, who knew only the sharia.

When the military government came to power, it abolished the Constitutional Court and High Court of Justice, neither of which had ever been formally convoked. Some jurisdictions of other courts were assumed by the National Security Court, which was outside the ordinary legal system and under the direct control of the SRC. This court, regarded as a political instrument, had competence over serious offenses affecting the security of the state including offenses against public order and tranquility and crimes by public officials and members of the government. The court heard a broad range of cases, passing sentences for embezzlement by public officials, murder, tribalism, political activities against scientific socialism, and stealing government food stocks. The court was composed of three members: an officer of the SRC, who acted as president of the body, and two other judges, generally military officers. Similar courts were also organized into regional and district sections. A special military attorney general served as prosecutor. No other court could review its sentences; appeals from its decisions could be taken only by the SRC. It was widely believed that Siad Barre determined which cases would be brought before the National Security Court and that he personally cleared sentences imposed by it.

In 1974 a new law on the organization of the judiciary was promulgated, which appeared to make only minor changes in the system. Four levels of courts continued to be provided. District courts were as before divided into civil and criminal sections. Regional tribunals now had three divisions: an ordinary section dealing with penal and civil matters more serious than those allowed to be heard by the district courts; an assize section, which only considered major criminal cases (those punishable by more than ten years' imprisonment); and a labor law section. At the district and regional tribunals, cases were heard by a single magistrate assisted by two laymen, who with the judge decided questions of fact and voted on the guilt or innocence of the accused.

At the next level were the regional courts of appeal, comprising two sections. The ordinary section heard appeals from decisions of the district tribunals and from the ordinary sections of the regional tribunals. The second heard only appeals from the regional assize sections. In both sections a single judge presided, assisted in the ordinary section by two laymen and in the other by

four. The senior judges (or presidents) of the courts of appeal served as the administrators of the courts in their regions.

At the pinnacle of the judicial system was the Supreme Court. The court was composed of a chief justice (whose title was president), a vice president, nine surrogate justices, and four laymen. In plenary sessions the court panel consisted of the president, two other judges, and four laymen. In ordinary sessions it had a presiding judge, two other judges, and two laymen. Whether the case was to be handled in plenary or ordinary session was decided by the court's president on the basis of the importance of the matter being considered. The Supreme Court was charged with uniform interpretation of the law; it heard appeals against decisions and judgments of the lower courts and against measures taken by public attorneys and settled questions of court jurisdiction.

The 1979 Constitution appeared to confirm most of the existing court hierarchy, although the composition of the various courts and their functions were left for determination by specific laws. Provision was included for military courts, thereby apparently entrenching the National Security Court system in the Constitution. The Constitutional Court, composed of the Supreme Court and delegates to the People's Assembly nominated by the president of the republic, was restored to decide on the constitutionality of laws.

Observance of the law and prosecution of criminal matters was made the responsibility of the state attorney general. This official was assisted by ten deputies in Mogadishu and by other deputies who served at the courts of appeal and the regional or district courts.

Before the 1969 revolution the Higher Judicial Council had responsibility for the selection, promotion, and discipline of members of the judiciary. The council was chaired by the president of the Supreme Court and included justices of the court, the attorney general, and three members elected by the National Assembly. In 1970 all positions on the council were taken over by SRC members. The 1979 Constitution included provision for the Higher Judicial Council, adding amnesty matters to its jurisdiction. Its structure was not defined except to designate the president of the republic as its chairman. By making this change any pretense of the independence of the judiciary seemed to have been abandoned.

Human Rights

The constitution in force until the October 1969 revolution strongly protected the civil rights specified in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. The country's record of honoring these rights was impressive not only by the standards of developing states but even by those of developed Western democracies. They included the presumption of innocence before the courts;

the right of habeas corpus; the freedoms of political association, public expression, and personal liberty and movement; and the rights to form labor unions and to strike. The ownership of all land was vested in the state (outright ownership of land conflicts with Somali traditions), but developed property and improved land could only be expropriated on the basis of equitable compensation.

The revolution of 1969 brought to power a socialist-military government that attached considerably less importance to most of these rights. The right of habeas corpus was abolished in October 1970, although the presumption of innocence and free legal assistance for indigent defendants in serious cases continued to be provided. Equal rights were extended to women in several areas, including inheritance (see Social Change, ch. 2).

The 1979 Constitution has restored, at least in principle, many of the civil rights extinguished by the military regime. It guarantees the freedoms of speech, religion, and publication and the right to participate in an assembly, demonstration, or organization. The inviolability of the home and the privacy of correspondence are protected. These safeguards, however, are subject to important qualifications—in the case of freedom of expression and association by the condition that exercise of these rights "shall not contravene the Constitution, the laws of the land, general morality, and public order." The United States Department of State's Human Rights Report for 1981 noted that the press is government controlled, foreign publications are subject to censorship, and freedom of assembly is severely circumscribed. The report further stated that, while the Constitution provides that the state religion is Islam, adherents of other religions are allowed to worship freely but cannot proselytize.

The Constitution stipulates that anyone deprived of his personal liberty shall forthwith be informed of the offense of which he is accused, and anyone detained on security grounds must be brought before a competent judicial authority without delay. In spite of these provisions, the *Amnesty International Report 1980* estimated that at least 100 people were being held on political grounds without charge or trial, among them former Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, detained except for a brief period ever since the overthrow of the civilian government in 1969. The Mogadishu National Security Court tried seventy-four men after the failed coup attempt of April 1978, resulting in the execution of seventeen individuals. The defendants did have access to legal representation, and close relatives could attend the trials. In spring 1980 as many as several dozen military personnel, members of the Majerteyn clan, were executed secretly for allegedly having supported the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) guerrilla move-

ment. It could not be ascertained whether the victims had been executed without trial.

Politics And Ideology

The egalitarian traditions of the Somali social system under which all were free to speak out on political issues and to be equally heard were breached by the military men who came to power in 1969. Important decisions were henceforth made by the military-dominated leadership at the center, supported by the largely military structure at the regional and local levels. Political disagreements that did occur were apparently ironed out within the ranks of the SRC. Major issues concerned the speed and degree of socializing the country, the continuing intrusion of clan rivalry, foreign alignments, and Somalia's irredentist claims.

The later addition of new bodies like the SRSP and the People's Assembly have produced a complex amalgam of government but have not materially affected the underlying concentration of power in the hands of Siad Barre and his closest military collaborators. The introduction of the civilian party structure might have been expected to reinvigorate the ideological spirit of the government; but it was in fact followed by reduced stridency of official rhetoric and more pragmatic policies as Siad Barre has moved closer to the West. The proclaimed socialist course of the economy has been maintained while private economic activity has been sanctioned among the peasants, nomads, and small businessmen.

Insofar as policy debates have occurred in recent years, they have been permissible only within the upper reaches of the SRSP, the political arm of the military junta. But by 1981, in spite of stern deterrents to the expression of dissenting views, discouragement over the drift and loss of vitality of the Siad Barre regime had been increasingly voiced. This discontent did not appear to have crystallized into a coherent opposition element; while new dissident groups had been formed abroad, most appeared to be based on clan ties and rivalries without offering a distinctive national program.

The Ideological Base

On the first anniversary of the SRC coup, Siad Barre declared that Somalia was to be a "socialist state dedicated to scientific method." In subsequent speeches and pronouncements Siad Barre and other government officials elaborated on what had been designated scientific socialism, which they equated with Marxism-Leninism rather than African or other forms of socialism. Siad Barre described scientific socialism as a system in which all means of production and natural resources belong to the entire society and one that distributes the national products in accor-

dance with contributions of each individual. Although Siad Barre associated Somalia's ideology with that of the Soviet Union and other "advanced socialist countries," he emphasized that it must be applied in accordance with the conditions found in each country. Thus in Somalia the country's poverty of natural resources dictated that growth be centered on the traditional sectors of agriculture and livestock. Distinctive features of Somali socialism were the great campaigns for a standard Somali script and mass literacy and programs of self-help and collective labor. Siad Barre also insisted that Somalia's socialism was in harmony with Muslim doctrine, which he noted is a religion of social well-being and human equality (see Siad Barre and Scientific Socialism, ch. 1).

Somalia is one of several African states (including Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia) that have chosen a political doctrine they have defined as scientific socialism. Political scientist Kenneth Jowitt has drawn attention to the disparity between the terminology used in these countries and their real ideological commitment and development strategies. Jowitt postulates several possible explanations for this phenomenon: that African scientific socialist regimes are designed to secure military or economic aid from communist countries, that overwhelming resource shortcomings prevent the achievement of economic aspirations along conventional Marxist lines, that the choice of an ideological format reflects the arbitrary decision of a personal dictator or ruling clique, or that some African scientific socialist states have for particular reasons formally adopted Leninist facades while retaining a non-Leninist character. Consideration of these factors helps to explain Somali adherence to scientific socialism. In spite of its heavy reliance (until late 1977) on the Soviet Union for arms, military training, and economic aid and its exposure to the influence of several thousand Soviet advisers, Siad Barre's government never relinquished the prerogative of carrying out its socialist revolution in its own chosen fashion.

David Laitin, a specialist on Somalia, has found that during the military regime's first seven years, achievements in terms of traditional socialist doctrine were mixed at best. While banks, insurance companies, and leading industrial enterprises were nationalized, the process was based on pragmatism. The private retail sector was largely unaffected, and the most important export earners—livestock and bananas—remained in private hands. Self-help projects like sand dune stabilization were carried out in the name of scientific socialism, as were the determined efforts to bring about greater social equality through language reform and the moves to root out the prevailing kinship system. In its foreign relations the regime pursued a consciously socialist policy, becoming a leading voice for "progressive" causes and developing close

ties with the Soviet Union, China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the more radical Arab states like Syria, Libya, and Iraq. In Laitin's view, however, even before the break with the Soviet Union in 1977, scientific socialism was becoming more meaningless with every speech by Siad Barre. In retrospect another government confronting the same developmental problems might have acted in much the same way without claiming so assertively to be following the course of scientific socialism.

Since the eviction of Soviet personnel in late 1977 and the subsequent traumas of defeat in the Ogaden war and the influx of refugees, the rhetoric of scientific socialism has become muted, and the term itself has faded from official utterances. The 1979 Constitution does not employ the expression, stating simply that the republic is a socialist state led by the working class. Foreign policy is declared to be nonaligned. The Constitution affirms that the economy, while founded on socialist state planning, is composed of a state sector ("the vanguard of economic development"), a cooperative sector, a private sector, and a mixed sector consisting of joint ownership between the Somali state and others. In an address to military officers in May 1981 Siad Barre reiterated that Somalia maintains a straightforward political policy of socialism but does not insist on the universal superiority of socialist doctrine. He noted that capitalism is practiced by major Western countries having advanced agriculture, industry, and transport infrastructures, and that economic units were owned by the people through share capital. Somalia, he pointed out, is obliged to follow a socialist path because it does not have a solid infrastructure, a wealthy population, training, experience, and basic resources.

Since 1976 seemingly contradictory trends have emerged—while the fervor of socialist ideology has abated, the institutional forms of state socialism have been extended. A government-party structure has been imposed in a form resembling those of such African nations as Angola and Mozambique and more distantly related to the systems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In all these countries the national governments are based on a blurred division of responsibility between a single vanguard party and the state. Although party congresses are held only at lengthy intervals—usually five years—a central committee concerns itself with the ideological direction, and an administrative apparatus of bureaus or committees deals with day-to-day policy questions. True executive power in each country is concentrated in the political bureau, which in Somalia has consisted only of Siad Barre and four others regarded as his most loyal supporters.

As in other socialist states like Angola and Guinea, a national legislature has been introduced, but it has been relegated to a position subordinate to the military oligarchy and the party. Al-

though ostensibly holding broad powers under the new Constitution to legislate, approve budgets and development plans, ratify treaties, and elect the president, the Somali People's Assembly seems to have been accorded little more than symbolic status, meeting in brief sessions to endorse government decisions already made and to hear inspirational messages from government leaders. The constitutional referendum and assembly elections of 1979 can be explained best not as opportunities for genuine expression of opinion but as furnishing public manifestations of the legitimacy of the regime. The predictably favorable response in the voting results was heralded as an affirmation of the nation's unity and support for Siad Barre's leadership.

In accordance with its socialist commitment to egalitarian economic policies, the government exercises control over wages and prices, conducts foreign trade through import and export agencies, and monopolizes large-scale economic activity through public corporations. As of 1981 the less doctrinaire attitude toward the private sector reflected in Siad Barre's public declarations—and formalized in the Constitution—had not been matched by a strong revival of private economic activity. Approximately fifty public enterprises continued to dominate the modern sector of the economy, including banks, insurance, wholesale trade, business services, exporting, and manufacturing. In 1978 it was estimated that 77 percent of gross output in manufacturing arose from publicly owned establishments. Major projects in cement, sugar, petroleum refining, and textiles in the 1974–78 development plan period and others included in 1979–81 intensified the government's preeminence in the economy. Although the government recognized the role of the private sector in small-scale manufacture and in retail trade, few tangible forms of encouragement were offered to private entrepreneurs and foreign investors.

The government has not interfered with private agriculture by livestock- and crop-producing families, who constitute the largest part of the Somali population. Government pricing policies for the country's main export—livestock—have acted as an incentive to private producers in recent years. Government development policies, however, have tended to encourage large-scale irrigated state farming over individual crop raisers and small cooperatives, and some of the best rangelands have been reserved for grazing associations and cooperatives (see Crop Production, ch. 3).

The Somali labor force is organized within the General Federation of Somali Trade Unions, formed by the government in 1977. Seven unions claiming a membership of 200,000 are affiliated with the federation: the Industry and Minerals Union; the Agricultural and Livestock Workers Union; the Construction and Electrical Workers Union; the Transport, Telecommunications, and Infor-

mation Workers Union; the Commerce and Finance Workers Union; the Administrative and Social Affairs Workers Union; and the Local Government, Tourism, and Hotel Workers Union. The unions appear to serve chiefly as rallying points for support of the government as adjuncts to the SRSP, rather than independently representing the interests of the workers and conducting collective bargaining.

Decisionmaking

Until 1976 the policies of the military government were determined by the SRC, which was composed exclusively of senior military and police officers. When the SRC dissolved itself in July 1976, direction of the country's political course was formally vested in the newly created SRSP. Through its central committee the new party incorporated the ideological, policy formulating, and supervisory functions of the erstwhile SRC. A measure of civilian participation in the essentially military power structure had already been introduced in 1970 with the creation of a cabinet (Council of the Secretaries of State) composed largely of civilian technocrats. The secretaries of state administered the government departments, and the authority of the council, of which Siad Barre was chairman, gradually expanded. Some of its members were co-opted as advisers to the SRC in 1974.

The real reins of power, both before and after the emergence of the SRSP in 1976, continued to be held by Siad Barre in collaboration with a small group of military counselors. Those most readily identified, in addition to the president, were the three vice-presidents appointed in 1971—Ali Samantar, Kulmie Afrah, and Ali Abokar. This inner circle was augmented by a fifth member, Suleiman Abdulle, head of the National Security Service (NSS), when it was more formally constituted as the political bureau of the SRSP in 1976. Notwithstanding their long association with Siad Barre, the extent of their influence was uncertain. Some Somali critics asserted that Siad Barre had no intimate advisers and that his actions, especially since about 1974, were guided largely by his own political shrewdness.

In spite of Siad Barre's energetic campaign aimed at eliminating tribalism and clan rivalry in Somali society, tribalism remained a persistent factor that could not be ignored even by the president. Major lineage blocs were represented in the SRC, and political rewards were dealt out with an eye to avoiding discontent. This balancing of ethnic interests long maintained by Siad Barre was reported to be reverting to greater reliance on traditional clan ties as pressures mounted against the regime in 1980 and 1981.

Siad Barre is of the Marehan clan of the predominant Darod clan-family. The Marehan homeland is near the junction of the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. His position is strengthened by linkage through his mother to the Ogaden clan (also of the

Darod clan-family) originating across the border in Ethiopia. Another strategically important alliance is with a northern clan of the Darod, the Dolbahante, through his son-in-law, Suleiman Abdulle. The Dolbahante connection forms a bridge to the clans of former British Somaliland. A Somali dissident writing in the *Horn of Africa* in 1981 listed more than fifty officials allegedly related to Siad Barre. They included the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, finance, and information and national guidance; the governor of the central bank; and the president of Somali Airlines.

The opacity of the political process among Somali governing elites defies reliable assessment of the personal standing and political orientation of the high officials surrounding Siad Barre. Widespread changes have occurred in policy-level positions beginning in 1980. New SRSP bureau heads named in February of that year were superseded by an almost entirely new list of bureau chairmen in the spring of 1981. When the SRC was reconstituted in October 1980, a new list of SRC committee members was published, but the further changes in the SRC in April 1981 hinted at the eclipse of the political careers of a number of longtime military leaders not linked to Siad Barre by clan ties.

Revival of the Supreme Revolutionary Council

Beginning with the substitution in 1976 of a civilian political party for the original SRC, the introduction of the new Constitution in 1979, and the convoking of the elected People's Assembly in early 1980, Siad Barre had sought to endow his rule with greater legitimacy through token forms and institutions of civilian government. As head of the party apparatus and president after election by the People's Assembly, Siad Barre appeared in fact to have solidified his dominance over the power structure. It was thus wholly unexpected that only eight months after the introduction of civilianizing measures he felt constrained to declare a state of emergency and to reconstitute his military council, the SRC, on October 21, 1980, the eleventh anniversary of the revolution. In explaining his actions the president cited the "continued acts of aggression" by Ethiopia and its allies; the large number of refugees from the Ogaden; distortion of the objectives of the revolution through tribal, i.e. clan or lineage, favoritism, nepotism and inequality; and bribery, corruption, and malpractice in the government and the party.

In a directive a few days later, he relieved five of the military members of his cabinet and two military men acting as directors general of state agencies in order to free them to serve on SRC committees. Five of these committees were identified: defense and security; economic, commerce and finance; political; social; and public auditing. The committees (all headed by prominent military figures, including Ali Samantar and Kulmie Afrah) were

given a broad mandate aimed at correcting deviations of the revolution; revitalizing government programs; protecting defense and security; and eradicating tribalism, rumormongering, embezzlement, sabotage, favoritism, and mismanagement.

The reintroduction of the SRC was subject to several possible interpretations. One was that Siad Barre wished to blur his personal discredit for reversals in the Ogaden by forcing the military leadership to share responsibility for withdrawal of remaining Somali units. The repeated references to tribalism and nepotism caused other foreign observers to conclude that the emergency decree was part of Siad Barre's efforts to counteract dissension in the army and elsewhere by rival clan groups.

Among other steps taken during the state of emergency was the formation of revolutionary committees at the regional and district levels under the chairmanship of party secretaries; the committees included local members of the armed forces, police, and the National Security Service (NSS). These organizations were instructed to combat at the local level all evidence of tribalism, regionalism, corruption, and nepotism as well as to ensure the provision of aid for refugees in their regions and districts. The committees were empowered to detain or place under house arrest for ninety days anyone suspected of engaging in the practices that had necessitated the declaration of the state of emergency.

In the early months of 1981 the government announced several major economic changes arising from the state of emergency and the restoration of the SRC. In response to recommendations by the SRSP central committee and the SRC, government leaders had decided to dissolve the Livestock Development Agency, the Textile and Equipment Agency, and the Building Materials Agency as unproductive and incapable of carrying out their work. The Agricultural Development Corporation was reorganized to raise producer prices and further encourage small-scale farmers by providing equipment and capital. Among measures to stem the loss of reserves, more favorable exchange rates were announced, and special accounts were offered enabling Somali workers abroad to retain their earnings in hard currency form.

While these measures seemed to follow reasonably from the revived SRC's mandate to ferret out inefficiency and corruption in the economy, rapid changes in government leadership that followed a month later could not be so easily explained. It was announced on April 28, 1981, that ten leading members of the SRC had been relieved of their party, parliamentary, and government functions in order to leave them ample time to carry out their duties on the SRC committees to end the deviations from revolutionary objectives. Among these officials were Defense Minister Ali Samantar, the NSS Director Suleiman Abdulle, Peo-

ple's Assembly Chairman Ali Abokar, and Vice-President Kulmie Afrah. These four, along with Siad Barre, had constituted the political bureau of the SRSP and had been considered the president's most trusted confidants since the early years of the revolution. Other SRC leaders removed from their posts were the chairmen of the bureaus of ideology and foreign affairs, economy and finance, scientific research, and organization and mass mobilization.

Observers were baffled by what at first appeared to be a sweeping purge of the most prominent members of the SRC. One interpretation was that the president, increasingly isolated by his internal and external policies, wished to surround himself with dependable members of his own Marehan clan and that he was particularly concerned over the threat posed by the popular armed forces commander, Defense Minister Ali Samantar. His son-in-law, Suleiman Abdulle (sometimes looked upon as the president's heir apparent), was relieved of the sensitive NSS post but remained in the inner circle as presidential adviser on security affairs. A further unexplained aspect to the changes was that Ali Samantar and Kulmie Afrah were not removed from their positions as first and second vice-presidents, while Ali Abokar was simultaneously raised to the restored post of third vice-president, which he had held earlier, in spite of relinquishing his positions in the SRC and the People's Assembly.

Public Opinion

The degree to which the Somali government and its leaders are influenced by currents of popular opinion is problematic in spite of the existence of new instrumentalities—the SRSP and the People's Assembly—that might serve as forums for the expression of political views. During the first years of military rule, the government energetically sought to monitor and control public opinion. Under direction of the National Political Office, the regime's orientation centers became the focal points of government information activities at the local level. Instruction was given in the aims of the revolution and scientific socialism. Political officers were charged with gathering and disseminating information and with reporting to upper echelons on political, economic, social, and security affairs in their areas. Registers were maintained on people who were active supporters of the regime and those who appeared to resist the official ideology. Strenuous attempts were made to suppress political gossip and insinuation that had been features of Somali public life. Surveillance by the uniformed "People's Militia," also known as Gulwadayal (Victory Pioneers), who reported to the National Political Office, was pervasive; individuals who went beyond the narrow but ill-defined boundaries of acceptable criticism faced prosecution and jail sentences.

Siad Barre has supported in principle the filtering upward of ideas and preoccupations of the people through his local political representatives, but the oppressive atmosphere has not been conducive to incautious expression. To some extent the party apparatus may have provided a means for more effective dialogue, at least between lower and upper level supporters of the regime, but tangible evidence of this is scarce. The revival of revolutionary committees of police, army, and party officials under the 1980 emergency decree could not have encouraged outspokenness at the local level.

In spite of the regime's control over the instruments of government and the information media, the leadership is not insensitive to fundamental Somali concerns and aspirations. Foremost among these is the national preoccupation with the Greater Somalia issue and the enduring bitterness toward Ethiopia over the Ogaden. Siad Barre's more moderate diplomatic posture has probably been accepted as a necessity owing to military weakness and economic stress, but any action seen as relinquishing Somalia's inherent interests in the Ogaden could undermine his authority. Ejection of the Soviet personnel in 1977 resulted in part from strong public feeling against Moscow's rearming of Ethiopia and dislike of the Soviet presence in Somalia. SSF's clandestine Radio Kulmis has harshly attacked the military facilities agreement with the United States, appealing to Somali chauvinism and distrust of foreign influence from any quarter. But Siad Barre's collaboration with the United States has not been an unpopular move.

Clan attachments and Muslim identity are constants in Somali society that would be perilous for the government to ignore, however complete its grip on public expression. Although the issue of the compatibility of Islam with scientific socialism produced a sharp clash over women's rights in 1975, Siad Barre has since managed to avoid open dispute with religious leaders (see Islam in the Colonial Era and After, ch. 2). As the government sought to create a modern state, its deliberate weakening of kinship-based associations—particularly in the urban centers—created an obligation to meet social needs that were no longer available through descent groups. Although the military regime undertook to fill this gap, e.g., by providing funeral expenses for those who died without relatives at hand, its success was limited and, as economic strains have mounted, its failure to ensure the security that the descent group system once provided has become more acute. Siad Barre's growing reliance on his own clan ties to assure his continuance in power has contributed to public cynicism over his attempts to reduce clan loyalty as a preeminent factor in Somali society.

Since 1978 several observers have commented that criticism of the government has become more open, probably resulting from

both slack administration of controls and a relaxation of security measures. Dissatisfaction has been widely expressed over the shortages of food staples and consumer goods that became severe in 1980 and 1981. The feeling appeared to be widespread that the government no longer had the capacity to deal with the country's problems and was mainly occupied with perpetuating itself. If any organized internal opposition existed, it was necessarily clandestine owing to the strict prohibition against unauthorized political activity and vigilance of the security forces against potential sedition. A number of political exiles had formed themselves into opposition groups headquartered in foreign countries, but in 1981 it could not be established whether support was building for any identifiable internal or external faction or for a return to genuine representative government (see Sources of Opposition, ch. 5).

Politics and the Media

In 1981 all modern information media were in the hands of the government, and news carried in radiobroadcasts or in the few domestic publications was subject to editorial control by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance. A limited number of uncensored foreign publications such as American news magazines were available to the educated elite. Foreign radio programs could also be heard by anyone possessing a shortwave radio receiver.

Radio was the most important medium of communication. Nearly all urbanized Somalis had access to a receiver, and nomads commonly owned portable transistor models. Radiobroadcasts could also be heard in village orientation centers, which were designed as places for social activities but had as their principal purpose the political indoctrination of the people. In an interview in 1979 the director of the Somali Broadcasting Department, an agency of the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, mentioned the following as among the objectives of government broadcasting: strengthening national cooperation; spreading the spirit of solidarity; dealing with social problems; advocating adherence to spiritual and moral values; evaluating, filtering, and disseminating ideas and aspirations of the national leaders; giving listeners a ready understanding of the aims of the socialist revolution; and explaining how the people fit into the overall system.

Newscasts on the Somali radio were largely repetitions of slanted and uninformative government releases. There is evidence that educated Somalis gave the official news little credence, depending instead on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which in early 1981 carried ninety minutes of transmission in Somali each day. The Soviet Union, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Italy also had programs in Somali, and the Voice of America's English-language broadcasts to Africa could be heard in Somalia. Transmission of information by word-of-mouth has long been tra-

ditional among Somalis as a natural consequence of their deep interest in political and social events and the virtual lack of other channels of communication until well after the end of World War II. It is believed that dissemination of uncensored information in this way continues to be important in spite of government efforts to discourage "rumor-mongering."


Radiobroadcasting was operated by the Somali Broadcasting Department of the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, and transmissions originated from Radio Mogadishu and Radio Hargeysa. Programming of the two stations differed only in their treatment of area news. Radio Mogadishu conducted broadcasts fourteen hours daily in Somali, releasing forty-two programs each week in the form of light entertainment, information, education, and political orientation. Programs in Arabic were broadcast one hour daily on both mediumwave and shortwave frequencies. Fifteen-minute shortwave broadcasts were transmitted each day from Mogadishu in Amharic, French, Italian, Swahili, English, Oromo, and Afar.

During the nine years of civilian government after independence, the literate segment of the population had access to daily, weekly, and monthly periodicals that presented relatively freely the views of all significant elements in Somali politics. In 1968 some fifteen such publications appeared fairly regularly, but only four had circulations of more than 1,000 copies; three of these were owned by the government, and the fourth belonged to the then-dominant party, the Somali Youth League.

All independent periodicals ceased publication after the military takeover in 1969, and journals appearing thereafter were under government aegis. The only daily newspaper was *October Star*; editions in Italian, English, and Arabic were published by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance. When the new Somali script was introduced in 1973, a new Somali-language newspaper, *Xiddigta Oktoobar* (October Star), replaced the earlier English and Italian editions. An Arabic version also appeared as *Najmat Oktobar*. Combined circulation of the two editions of the newspaper was believed to be about 12,000. *Horseed* (Vanguard), a weekly published in Italian and Arabic, was described as independent but was believed to be controlled by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance; it had a circulation of about 4,000. In 1978 a six-page English-language weekly *Heegan* (Vigilance) began to be published by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, replacing a monthly called *New Era*. Circulation figures were not available.

Foreign Relations

Somalia's vision of world affairs has been dominated by the dedication of the country's political leaders and its people to the Greater Somalia cause. In its foreign policy, described in the new



A ground station near Mogadishu provides a Somali link to transmissions via international communication satellites.
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

Constitution as based on peaceful coexistence and positive neutrality, Somalia has been an active partisan of both African and Arab causes. It has committed itself, along with other states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to the eradication of the remnants of white rule in Africa and is aligned with the Arab League (League of Arab States) in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Somalia's leaders have also carried on an energetic bilateral diplomacy with the countries of Africa, Asia, and Europe. In the principles and conduct of its foreign relations, however, the issue of pan-Somalism takes precedence over all other considerations.

Somalia has common borders with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, all of which include ethnic Somalis in their populations. Successive Somali governments have continued to regard this fragmentation as a result of the unjust division of the Horn of

Africa by European colonial powers. During the early years of Somali independence until 1967, Somalia was involved in almost constant strife with neighboring states, leading them to regard Somali irredentism as the paramount cause of instability in the area. During the final years of the civilian government and early phase of the military regime, some progress was made toward the peaceful conciliation of differences with Kenya and Ethiopia, but the enlargement of Soviet influence under the leftward-oriented military regime injected a dangerous new element into the situation. An augmented flow of Soviet military advisers and modern equipment nourished Somalia's irredentist claims. Somalia's allocation of bases for Soviet use as a quid pro quo contributed to a sharp adjustment in military balance among the great powers in the volatile Middle East by facilitating an increased Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf areas.

His alliance with Moscow formalized by a treaty of friendship in 1974, Siad Barre simultaneously adopted a more expansive international posture, ranging Somalia with the militant African states on the issues of Portuguese colonialism and white minority regimes. Reasserting historical and religious ties with the Arab world and coveting financial support from Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Persian Gulf, Somalia became a member of the Arab League in 1974. In spite of Somalia's active presence in the OAU and its intensive courting of individual African countries, the OAU has treated the Greater Somalia issue in terms of its resolute attachment to the status quo on African territorial disputes, thereby tacitly siding with Ethiopia over the Ogaden. Even the Arab League, while attentive to Somalia's economic vulnerability, has stayed aloof on pan-Somalism.

Somalia's overt intervention in the Ogaden fighting in 1977, apparently triggered by the turmoil in Ethiopia after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and fears of Ethiopia's military buildup under Soviet patronage, was disastrous in both military and diplomatic terms. It made Ethiopia appear as the victim of aggression, helped legitimize Soviet and Cuban involvement, and deterred Western support for Somalia. Somalia's dramatic foreign policy realignment, precipitated by the Soviet shift of client states in the Horn, obliged Somalia to address urgent appeals for military support in Western capitals. Met with initial rebuff because no Western power wanted to encourage Somali adventures or defy the OAU, Somalia nevertheless continued its border encroachments and supplied the guerrilla forces of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF).

Unable to counter Ethiopian military ascendancy in the Ogaden and stymied by the Western arms embargo, the government in Mogadishu swung around to a policy of détente in 1980, curbing direct military activity in the Ogaden, reducing its support for the WSLF, and calling for direct talks with Ethiopia. Siad Barre has

argued that he has not staked out territorial claims but has only sought self-determination for Ogaden Somalis. Such statements have not been taken seriously by Ethiopia, which has regarded the Ogaden claims as deeply rooted in Somali nationalism and has not been willing to negotiate over the territory. While deep suspicions have persisted in Kenya and Djibouti over Mogadishu's true aims, the Somali clans in those countries have not been as closely linked politically, culturally, or economically to Somalia, and the Somali government has been less demanding because it has acknowledged that the political and legal conditions are dissimilar.

The flood of refugees driven into Somalia by Ethiopian oppression, border warfare, and drought combined with Somalia' own deteriorating economic situation have engendered growing sympathy and have brought massive development and relief aid from Western and Arab sources. A new chapter in Somalia's external relations opened in August 1980 after the conclusion of an agreement with the United States covering military facilities at Berbera. While the United States has undertaken to provide only limited amounts of defensive military equipment, the Somalis see in the emerging relationship the outlines of a long-term commitment to their country's security (balancing the Soviet presence in Ethiopia) and the prospect of a reliable source of equipment for the depleted Somali armed forces.

Greater Somalia

The issue transcending all other considerations of Somalia's foreign relations has been the status of fellow Somalis in adjacent countries: the Ogaden and Haud regions of Ethiopia, generally called simply Ogaden; the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (NFD), which since the 1970s has been part of Kenya's North Eastern Province; and the southern half of the Republic of Djibouti around the port of Djibouti. The inclusion of the contested areas as parts of Somalia would roughly double its size and increase its population by up to 50 percent; this addition, however, would not necessarily increase the national wealth because, with the exception of the built-up areas of Djibouti and the prospect of oil and gas discoveries in the Ogaden, the contested areas are at best dry pastureland and at worst simply desert without natural resources.

Although the constitution of 1961 stated that "the Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali territories," the Constitution of 1979, adopted when the country was seeking to divert censure arising from its intervention in Ogaden, is more circumspect: "The Somali Republic adopting peaceful and legal means shall support the liberation of Somali territories under colonial occupation and shall encourage the unity of the Somali people through their free will."

Siad Barre's military government, like its civilian predecessor, did not insist directly on the territorial unification of all Somali-occupied areas but on the right of Somali people in the three contested areas to a free referendum, citing Article 1 of the United Nations Charter on the principle of the self-determination of peoples. The conviction by Somalia's neighbors that Mogadishu harbored territorial ambitions seemed substantiated when Somalia's regular forces joined the WSLF in its campaign against Ethiopia in 1977. But Somalia has respected the sovereignty of Djibouti since that country became independent in June 1977, acknowledging that the independence referendum there represented the freely expressed will of the people.

The Northern Frontier District of Kenya

During the time of European colonization at the turn of the twentieth century, the Somalis were still on the move in the south, expanding their presence in the area then called the Trans-Juba, which extended from the Juba River southwestward to the northern shore of the Tana River in present-day Kenya. The entire area was at first claimed by Britain as part of Kenya. In 1916, however, the British agreed to cede about half of the Somali-occupied territory to Italy as part of Britain's settlement in exchange for Italy's entry into World War I on the side of the Allies.

By the time colonial control in the NFD was solidified after 1925, Somalis dominated most of the area north of the Tana River, having driven all the weaker ethnic groups southward or westward. To prevent further interethnic warfare the British authorities set up a line—virtually an internal frontier—beyond which the Somalis were not permitted to travel. Other distinctions that remained in effect at the time of Kenya's independence in 1963, such as taxation of Somalis at a higher rate than other African groups, reinforced alienation of the Somalis and induced them to look to their politically and economically advanced brethren across the border for leadership.

In connection with Kenya's independence negotiations in 1961, a British survey found that the Somalis and the Oromos, who together formed a majority in the NFD, overwhelmingly preferred separation from Kenya. The leaders of Kenya's two major parties were, however, determined not to give away any part of the country that was shortly to be theirs; as a result the British, reluctant to oppose the Kenyans, failed to act on the demands of the Somalis in the NFD for separation. The North Eastern Region, composed of the Somali district of the NFD, was established as a federal unit but was absorbed when Kenya adopted a highly centralized system in late 1964.

Soon after Kenya's independence an uprising by Somali guerrillas in the NFD kept the small Kenyan security forces busy.

Remembering that experience, Kenya feared that a Somali victory in the 1977–78 Ogaden war against Ethiopia would lead to a renewed campaign for the return of the NFD. Its suspicions were heightened by claims of defecting Somali officers after the coup attempt against Siad Barre in 1978 that plans had been laid for the invasion of Kenya. Mutual antipathy toward Somalia induced Kenya and Ethiopia to join in a ten-year treaty of friendship and cooperation in January 1979, although their political systems had little in common. The government in Nairobi refrained from directly blaming Somalia for a resurgence of *shifta* (bandit) activity in 1980, but Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi joined Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam in a harsh condemnation of Somali goals and activities during their meeting of December 1980. The two leaders demanded that Somalia renounce all territorial claims to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, and pay reparations for damage caused during the Ogaden war. Kenya also objected to delivery of military equipment by the United States, remaining unmollified by the defensive nature of the arms and the stringent restrictions over their use.

The goverment in Mogadishu has sought to appease Kenya, asserting that it has no territorial claims and that it does not lend support to Somali insurgents in the NFD because, unlike Ethiopia, it does not regard Kenya as a predatory colonial power. The Somali dissidents were reported in May 1981 to have formed a Northern Frontier District Liberation Front, based on independence of the North Eastern Province, to be followed by a referendum to decide whether to join Somalia. They were denounced by the Kenyan vice-president as a group of "con men"; he urged Arab countries to reject their fundraising efforts in the Middle East.

Although Kenya has remained distrustful of Somali intentions, a thaw appeared to be developing by mid–1981 when, after an OAU summit conference in Nairobi, Moi and Siad Barre met to commit themselves to promotion of better understanding and collaboration and to hold regular meetings in the future. Lower level talks followed on trade and on curbing *shifta* activity through the use of joint border patrols.

Conflict in the Ogaden

The Ogaden area between the highlands of Ethiopia and the sea has been the scene of intermittent conflict for hundreds of years. The roots of modern Somali irredentism can be traced to the recognition of Ethiopian jurisdiction by Britain and Italy in separate treaties in 1897, confirmed by the British when control over Ethiopia was restored to Emperor Haile Selassie during World War II (see Division of Somali-Occupied Territory, ch. 1). The unification and concurrent independence of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960 was followed by open frontier hos-

tilities, although under the Egal government (1967–69) and during the early years of the SRC a policy of détente was maintained. The guerrilla movement among Ogadeni nomads that later became the WSLF continued to operate with increasing support from the military government until the fateful decision of Somalia to become directly involved in mid–1977 (see Pan-Somalism, ch. 1; War in the Ogaden, ch. 1; Performance in the Ogaden Conflict, ch. 5).

Somalia's humiliating military defeat in early 1978 did not result in its total disengagement from the Ogaden. Incursions of regular Somali forces of up to battalion size were reported until a series of Ethiopian victories in 1980, based on superior armaments and control of the air, forced Somalia to curtail the use of regular units in Ethiopian territory. Ethiopian oppression in the Ogaden, combined with renewed drought, brought destruction of farms and herds and resulted in a flight into Somalia of refugees numbering in the hundreds of thousands, intensifying the strains on Somalia's economy (see Refugees, ch. 2).

Ethiopian military superiority and Somali war weariness added to crushing economic burdens, and Siad Barre was induced to adopt an increasingly conciliatory attitude. He declared that his country was no longer giving direct military support to the WSLF and was prepared to negotiate its differences with the Ethiopians. In a tour of West African countries before the OAU summit meeting in June 1981 and during the conference, Siad Barre underscored his goal of a peaceful solution of differences in the Horn. While his new posture apparently impressed Kenya's president enough to agree to a fresh start, the Ethiopian leadership again rejected any talks centering on the status of the Ogaden.

The OAU has been occupied with the dispute over the Ogaden since its formation in 1963. It has repeatedly confirmed a resolution passed at the Cairo summit in 1964 pledging all members "to respect the borders existing on their achievement of independence." Somalia regards this resolution as irrelevant because Ethiopia did not achieve independence in the modern era and has always been, in the Somali view, a colonial power. Somalia's lack of diplomatic success in the OAU forum stems from the fears of other African states that any readjustment of frontiers in the Horn would unloose pressures from their own tribal groups fragmented by boundaries imposed during the colonial period.

In May 1973 the OAU created a Good Offices Committee of eight states (Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Sudan, Cameroon, Tanzania, Mauritania, and Lesotho) under the chairmanship of the Nigerian foreign minister to mediate differences over the Ogaden. The committee has reflected the predisposition of the OAU itself, condemning Somalia's aid to the WSLF as meddling in Ethiopia's internal affairs, reaffirming the inviolability of frontiers, and in

effect recognizing the Ogaden as an integral part of Ethiopia. Siad Barre rejected the committee's report at the OAU summit in June 1981 as an obstacle to meaningful attempts at solving the problem and a misreading of the struggle between the WSLF and the "Abyssinian colonizers."

Skepticism over Somalia's calls for peaceful settlement in the Ogaden has been accentuated by the Siad Barre regime's continued support for the WSLF, supplying most of its arms and permitting WSLF guerrillas to use Somali territory as a refuge. Although by no means a pawn of the Somali government, as is often alleged, the WSLF under its former secretary general, Abdullah Hassan Mohamed, lent its weight to the goal of a Greater Somalia. At a congress in January 1981, the older WSLF leadership was replaced by a group headed by Mohamed Diriyeh Urdoh, which adopted a new policy stressing self-determination and the creation of a free state of Western Somalia rather than incorporation into Somalia proper.

The WSLF originally included within its ranks both Ogaden Somalis and the Oromos, the largest single ethnic group in Ethiopia, found mainly in three provinces to the south and west of the Ogaden. The two factions divided during the WSLF congress in 1976, the Oromos becoming organized as the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) in 1978. Following the example of the WSLF, the SALF installed a new leadership group in 1981 under Secretary General Mohamed Haji Dobane and called for self-determination for the main Oromo areas of Ethiopia without necessarily leading to union with Somalia. Neither the WSLF nor the SALF appeared to have a well-formulated political doctrine, although both were inclined to Islamic nationalism and rejection of major power blocs.

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), active in the southern Oromo areas of Ethiopia, is looked upon as a rival group to the SALF. Although less closely linked with Somalia than the SALF, the OLF was officially recognized by Siad Barre in 1980, and it established an office in Mogadishu for contact with the WSLF, which maintained its headquarters there.

The Djibouti Question

The ultimate disposition of the small area around the port of Djibouti had been a prime source of contention in the Horn of Africa. Attainment of Djibouti's independence from France on June 27, 1977, deflected Somali irredentist pressures and brought at least transitory political stabilization to the territory.

Originally called French Somaliland, the area of some 20,000 square kilometers was officially known as the French Territory of Afars and Issas after 1966. This smallest fragment of the Horn contains the important modern port of Djibouti, which is the ter-

minus of the only railroad line linking Addis Ababa with the Gulf of Aden. Although the area is not of great economic importance to Somalia, roughly half the population of the country is composed of Somalis, mostly the Issa section of the Dir clan-family. The urbanized Somalis who form a majority in the city of Djibouti, while active in the political affairs of the territory, have maintained strong ties with the SRC. Although the Somalis were few in number in relation to those in the Ogaden and Kenya, Djibouti's orientation after the French administration ended was a matter of intense concern to Somalia.

In a referendum in 1966 roughly 60 percent of those voting favored the territory's continued association with France. Ten years later, after revision of the citizenship law, which had hitherto favored the Afar minority, 99 percent voted for independence in a second referendum. The leading parties of the Afars, who represent about 35 percent of the population and are part of an ethnic group more heavily represented in Ethiopia, boycotted the referendum, but 77 percent of the registered voters cast their ballots. The first president, Hassan Gouled, was an Issa, but the independence government was a coalition with nine ministerial posts held by Issas and six by Afars.

The referendum results were hailed by the SRC as a victory over French colonialism, although the Somalis of Djibouti manifested little interest in rejoining their brethren in a Greater Somalia. Heading a delicate coalition of Afars and Somalis, Gouled pursued an evenhanded course between his neighbors, entering into friendship treaties with both Ethiopia and Somalia and urging a negotiated peace in the Horn. Somalia became the first country to recognize the new state and has refrained from interference, acknowledging the right of the people of Djibouti to opt for independence in a free referendum. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti rail link, dynamited in 1977 by Somali guerrillas, was restored to service a year later, but the line and port of Djibouti have suffered because Ethiopia transferred much of its commerce to the Eritrean port of Mitsiwa.

Djibouti has receded as one of East Africa's danger spots, but its situation has remained uneasy because of its strategic position and the possibility that its ethnic and factional divisions or the influx of refugees from the Ogaden could lead to a breakdown of coalition government. French support for the new country and the presence of some 4,000 French troops have acted as restraints against Somali or Ethiopian intervention.

Arab Ties

After independence Somalia looked to the Arab world for diplomatic and economic support. In addition to its cultural and religious affinities with the Arab states, pan-Arabism was regarded by militant irredentists as the counterweight to pan-Africanist poli-

cies that imposed on Somalia moderate policies for settling its differences with Kenya and Ethiopia. The post–1969 military government found that its scientific socialism and receptivity to Soviet aid and influence brought Somalia into conflict with the conservatism of many Arab states, especially the wealthier ones. When the world oil crisis began to develop and Arab oil producers raised their prices in late 1973, Somalia chose to accept the offer of membership in the Arab League extended years earlier. It thus became the first non-Arab member of the organization.

After joining the league, Somalia sent economic delegations to a number of Arab states and entered into aid agreements, notably for a power station in Mogadishu financed by Kuwait and a refinery built by Iraq, which also agreed to supply crude oil. Saudi Arabia remained cool toward Somalia, especially after the treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union was announced in 1974. Orthodox Arab opinion was also shocked by Siad Barre's execution of ten religious figures in 1975. Somalia had no reservations with the Arab League's strong pro-Palestinian anti-Israeli stand and sought to win Arab sympathy by claiming an analogy between the Palestinians' conflict with Zionism and the Ogadenis' subjugation by Ethiopia.

Until 1977 Mogadishu was closer to the radical Arab states that were friendly to the Soviet Union. But Somalia's rift with the Soviet Union and the realignments occasioned by the Ogaden war led Libya and Algeria to support Ethiopia while troops of Yemen (Aden) were engaged on Ethiopia's side in the war. Although Somali actions in the Ogaden did not enjoy unanimous Arab support, as hostilities widened Saudi Arabia and Egypt saw an opportunity to reduce Soviet influence and strike a blow at the leftist Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. Both countries remained supportive after Somalia's debacle, Saudi Arabia increasing its financial aid and Egypt providing replacement military equipment and spare parts from its own stockpile.

Somalia has remained on good terms with Egypt, in appreciation of its military aid and its adamant opposition to Soviet influence in Africa. This has presented Somalia with a delicate problem of balancing its affinity with Egypt against the benefits it has sought as an anti-Israeli, pro-Palestinian member of the Arab League. Siad Barre has tried to meet this dilemma by remaining nonpolemical when faced with issues dividing the Arab world. Although he felt constrained to join the Arab consensus in condemning the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel at the Arab League summit of November 1979, he did not follow the other Arab nations in breaking diplomatic relations with Egypt. In this respect Somalia and Sudan stood alone among Arab League members in showing tolerance for Egypt's settlement with Israel. Somalia's

hitherto good relations with Sudan suffered a damaging blow in November 1980 when, in a meeting with Ethiopia's Mengistu in Addis Ababa, President Jaafar al Nimeiri brought Sudan to Ethiopia's side by rejecting Somalia's claims in the Ogaden.

The signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation at Aden in August 1981 by Libya, Yemen (Aden), and Ethiopia led to fears of a new axis of radical forces in the Horn and of Libyan mischief-making in the area. Accusing Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhaafi of offering Ethiopia money and weapons to suppress Ogadenis, Somalia announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Libya.

Relations with Communist States

Somalia's dramatic break with Moscow in November 1977 brought to an abrupt end a relationship that had transformed Somalia into a valued client state of the Soviet Union. In return for supplying modern weaponry and training to Somalia, Moscow secured facilities at Berbera permitting the permanent stationing of naval forces in the Indian Ocean adjacent to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Soviet involvement in Somalia's economic development further entrenched Moscow's influence in a country that had adopted a course of scientific socialism under Marxist-Leninist banners and slogans. Somalia's expulsion of Soviet advisers had a positive effect on its already good relations with China, whose presence in Somalia was less conspicuous yet productive in economic terms. China was, however, unprepared to step in as a large-scale source of military aid in substitution for the severed supply lines from the Soviet Union. After the breach with Moscow, only Romania among East European countries has remained on close terms with Somalia, providing technical aid in agriculture, fisheries, and livestock raising.

The Soviet Alliance

Although Somalia's civilian leaders during the period 1960–69 regarded communism as incompatible with their strong Islamic convictions, the Soviet Union was approached as early as 1963 after the Western nations showed little willingness to meet Somalia's arms needs. The Soviets responded by lending Somalia the equivalent of US$32 million for equipping its expanding army at a time when a modern military force was the most important national issue. Thus, even under the civilian government, Moscow had become the leading military patron of Somalia and was making ideological inroads on the Somali army leadership through the training, by 1969, of more than 800 Somali officers in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets reacted generously when the military government of Siad Barre turned to them for augmented military aid, although the new government's appeal was inspired more by the desire for arms from whatever source than by ideological affinities. The

presence of Soviet advisers had little effect on the doctrine or practice of Somalia's socialists program with its nationalist and Islamic overtones. In 1976 the substitution of a civilian political party (the SRSP) for the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and the accompanying effort to develop party structures and institutions at local levels were carried out under Moscow's influence, although these actions brought no real change in the authoritarian power structure. A Soviet-sponsored solution to tensions in the Horn—a "progressive" federation embracing Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Yemen (Aden) proposed in a speech by Cuban President Fidel Castro in March 1977—was summarily rejected by Somalia.

Moscow supplied armor, MiG–21 aircraft, air defense missile systems, and other arms for a Somali military establishment that was doubled in size by the new regime (see Foreign Military Assistance, Ch. 5). This militarization magnified the threat posed by Somalia's irredentist claims and introduced a fresh source of tension in the Horn.

In February 1972 during a visit to Somalia by Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko, agreement was reached on access to military facilities to be constructed by Moscow, including oil storage depots and missile loading equipment for the Soviet navy, communications sites, and new airfields for long-range reconnaissance flights. A Soviet contingent of 1,500 advisers was detailed to all levels of the armed forces, and 60 percent of the Somali officer corps had received training in the Soviet Union by the time of the rupture in 1977. Until Moscow shifted its support to Ethiopia in 1976, Somalia was the largest client in Black Africa for arms from the Soviet Union and the first to enter into a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets.

Soviet economic aid was somewhat less generous, amounting to the equivalent of US$154 million over a fifteen-year period, of which only 60 percent had been used when the breach occurred. The loss of Soviet economic aid was of far less consequence than the cutoff of support for the Somali army, which had been entirely dependent on Soviet equipment. Somalia had, moreover, been promised more than the equivalent of US$675 million in Arab loans to cushion the economic consequences of the Soviet withdrawal.

Strains in Soviet-Somali relations had arisen from Somali dissatisfaction over the repayment terms of the military debt, the disappointing economic aid level, and friction resulting from the insensitive and arrogant behavior of Soviet advisers. The collapse of the alliance stemmed, however, from the Soviet decision to exploit the power vacuum in Ethiopia resulting from the American withdrawal. After the initial Somali successes in the Ogaden

in 1977, Moscow branded Siad Barre's government an aggressive military dictatorship and cut off military shipments. Siad Barre's pilgrimage to Moscow in August 1977 to salvage his arms link ended in failure. Formal termination of the Soviet presence came only on November 13, 1977, when the Mogadishu government renounced the 1974 friendship treaty, ordered immediate evacuation of the Soviet advisers, and withdrew Soviet access to military facilities at Berbera and elsewhere. Soviet equipment was quickly removed, and 600 Somali officer trainees were repatriated from the Soviet Union.

Notwithstanding the sweeping nature of the Somali action, the rift was not absolute. Diplomatic relations were not severed, although a reduction was ordered in the Soviet embassy staff, and all Cuban diplomats were ejected. In opening the SRSP congress in January 1979, Siad Barre said that it was not inconceivable that cooperation might resume. Somali restraint, in spite of Moscow's all-out support of Ethiopia, was attributed variously to a lingering hope that the Soviet Union might yet release equipment for the Somali army, to the influence of a pro-Soviet faction the leadership that had looked upon the expulsion as precipitate, and to a tactic to bring pressure on the West to be more forthcoming. In January 1980, however, Somalia voted in favor of a United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement calling the Soviet action a grave threat to peace and a gross violation of international law. By 1981 Somalia's heavy economic dependence on the West and the moderate Arab states and its base facilities agreement with the United States made reconciliation with the Soviet Union seem increasingly remote.

Relations with China

In contrast to the Soviet Union, China has maintained cordial relations with Somalia since diplomatic ties were established in 1961. Most of China's economic assistance projects have been built under credits equivalent to US$130 million extended between 1963 and 1971. In April 1978, in the aftermath of the rift with Moscow and defeat in the Ogaden war, Siad Barre visited Beijing to seek emergency military and economic help. China responded with a token shipment of light arms and spare parts (although military aircraft were supplied in 1981) and agreed to provide the equivalent of US$18 million to finish abandoned Soviet economic projects. A conspicuous Chinese achievement was the construction of a section of hard-surfaced road linking northern and southern Somalia. About 1,000 Chinese technicians remained in Somalia to carry out economic projects.

Somalia has increasingly aligned itself with the Chinese position on issues dividing the communist countries. During a visit to Beijing by Somali Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre in

1979, the Chinese hosts condemned Cuba and the Soviet Union for creating tension in Africa. Jama Barre praised China for restraint in its border warfare with Vietnam and condemned the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia).

North Korea has also remained on good terms with Somalia, providing a cement plant, an iron foundry, a vegetable oil factory, and a technical college. During a visit to Somalia in March 1981, the head of a North Korean delegation noted that both countries had been "unscrupulously partitioned by colonialists" and were struggling for unification.

Western Relations

After the withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Somalia in 1977, the country sought to rebuild its former close ties with the countries of Western Europe. The refugee situation and Somalia's deepening economic crisis attracted a mounting flow of aid, not only in bilateral form but also through the European Economic Community (EEC) and UN agencies. But Somalia's urgent efforts to find help in refurbishing its army after the Ogaden war were less successful. Although the United States, Britain, and France had been initially disposed to approve the export of arms for the defense of Somalia's borders and to alleviate the effects of the Soviet cutoff, the three Western countries reinstated their embargo policies when it became apparent by August 1977 that Somalia was embarked on a large-scale offensive in the Ogaden.

The success of the Ethiopian counteroffensive in January 1978 with Soviet and Cuban assistance presented the Western powers with the problem that Somalia's belligerency had left it virtually defenseless against a possible Soviet-directed invasion. The United States, joined by the other Western countries, called for a negotiated settlement and extracted assurances from the Soviet Union that the advancing Ethiopian forces would not cross the Somali border in return for agreement by Somalia to withdraw its remaining military units from the Ogaden.

While Western military aid was withheld pending Somalia's complete cessation of activity in the Ogaden, economic aid from Western Europe and the United States increased measurably. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), which had been a moderate donor, phased out its assistance in 1970 when Somalia recognized the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Aid was resumed in 1978, initiated by an unconditional loan of the equivalent of US$12 million that was regarded as a token of gratitude form Somalia's cooperation in the overpowering of hijackers of a Lufthansa airliner at Mogadishu airport.

Italy has sought to maintain working relations with the parties in the Ogaden dispute, regarding its historic role in the Horn as qualifying it to assist in finding a settlement. Although Italy had cut back its substantial aid program in Somalia after 1970, it was

resumed in 1977. Subsequently Somalia has become the single most important beneficiary of Italy, accounting for 20 percent of Italian aid worldwide. During a visit to Mogadishu in mid–1981, the Italian foreign minister signed a three-year agreement promising the equivalent of nearly US$200 million for projects in agriculture, irrigation, and energy development. By virtue of its former ties with Italy, Somalia was entitled to associate status with the EEC. EEC aid allocated through the European Development Fund (1980–85) will be equivalent to US$75–85 million, over half of which is intended for the Baardheere dam hydroelectric and irrigation project. The EEC had also provided food aid equal to US$53 million as of mid–1980.

French-Somali relations had long been rancorous, Somalia charging France with "colonialism" for its continued presence in Djibouti, and the French suspecting that Somalia, intent on annexation, would subvert that territory's course toward independence. The successful transition of Djibouti to independent statehood brought an end to Somalia's agitation against France and a measure of reconciliation. A number of French firms have been engaged in development-oriented projects, including a large cement works at Berbera financed with Arab credits, and mining and hydrology surveys have been carried out by France.

Somalia's relations with the United States have followed an erratic course, negatively affected by Somalia's use of force, directly or indirectly, in pursuit of its Greater Somalia goal and by its earlier military alignment with the Soviet Union. A decisive turn in relations appeared to have been reached when a military access agreement was signed on August 22, 1980, although abundant possibilities remained for future differences and misunderstandings.

During the 1960s the United States was the largest source of nonmilitary aid to Somalia after Italy. Political relations were nonetheless distant owing to Somalia's encouragement of insurrection by ethnic Somalis against Kenya and Ethiopia, countries friendly the United States. United States military aid to Ethiopia, significant by African standards, was in turn an irritant to Somalia. The diplomatic climate became more positive after the shift to a policy of accommodation with Kenya and Ethiopia by the Shermarke-Egal government in 1967.

The military coup in 1969 was followed by a long period of strained American-Somali relations. As leader of the capitalist world, as Israel's protector in the Middle East, and as a primary benefactor to Kenya and Ethiopia, the United States seemed antagonistic to the SRC's purposes. Peace Corps volunteers, mostly working as teachers, were expelled on trumped-up espionage charges, as were several officials from the United States embassy

and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). United States retaliation took the form of closing its USAID mission and terminating its assistance programs, although two projects already under way—a water supply system for Mogadishu and port improvement at Kismaayo—were completed. The justification for the aid cutoff was a United States legal prohibition against assistance to countries lending their flags to vessels engaged in trade with Cuba and Vietnam.

While American aid continued to reach Somalia in the form of contributions to multilateral aid programs and disaster relief grain shipments, official contacts remained at a low ebb until Somalia's differences with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1977 resulted in the visit of an economic aid team to Mogadishu. United States officials, seeking to present Somalia an alternative to its military dependence on Moscow, also responded to Somali government appeals by indicating that the United States was prepared "in principle" to supply a limited amount of defensive weaponry. One possibility was that such aid would be financed by friendly Arab states. While this offer was revoked at the outbreak of open conflict in the Ogaden, other factors were by then also working against the arrangement. Congressional reluctance to become more deeply involved in the Horn, Somalia's anti-Israeli posture, and Mogadishu's unwillingness to break conclusively with Moscow until Western aid was firmly pledged were among the constraints acting on the United States.

Somalia later asserted that it had been encouraged by the United States through unofficial channels in committing regular units in the Ogaden and that Washington had agreed to replace the Soviet Union as a major arms supplier because the United States wanted to punish Ethiopia for its defection to the Soviet side. American officials rejected this account, pointing out that the arms transaction had been suspended as soon as the presence of the Somali troops in the Ogaden had been verified.

As the Soviet and Cuban role in the Ogaden expanded in early 1978 and the Somali situation became more critical, Siad Barre's appeals for arms continued to be rebuffed by the Western powers. The United States objected strongly to the harmful actions of Moscow in supplying excessive arms to both sides and dispatching Cuban troops to Ethiopia. A warning was issued against invasion of Somalia. The OAU was also urged to bring its weight to bear in securing an end to the fighting in the Ogaden. On March 9, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that in a telephone conversation Siad Barre had promised to withdraw his remaining troops from the Ogaden. Carter called upon Somalia for a renewed commitment not to dishonor the boundaries of Kenya or Ethiopia before the United State would be willing to discuss economic aid

or defense supplies. Later that month a delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose visited Somalia for detailed talks. Pledges were sought that the Somali government would not use force against any country and would not use American arms except for internal security or to defend the internationally recognized territory of Somalia. Satisfactory assurances were obtained from Siad Barre, but continued Somali operations in the Ogaden deterred the United States from consummating the agreement.

In 1979 increased tension in the Persian Gulf and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impelled the United States to reinforce its presence in the Indian Ocean area and to seek access to military facilities in Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. Negotiations were reopened with the regime in Mogadishu in early 1980 but were stalled when the Somalis, in an apparent miscalculation of the importance attached by the United States to the military facilities at Berbera, submitted an initial list of its military needs, the cost was estimated at US$2 billion. Agreement was reached, however, in August 1980 covering the use of the naval installations at Berbera and the adjacent airfield. Refurbishing of the port was expected to be completed by 1983. The United States agreed to provide Somalia US$53 million in economic aid and US$40 million in military credits over two years for the purchase of air defense equipment. Somalia was required to reaffirm the written assurances given in 1978, and the United States Congress added a restriction insisting on verification that all Somali regular forces were out of the Ogaden. Such verification was not made by the United States Department of State until January 1981.

The military aid package, although falling short of Siad Barre's expectations, assumed considerable symbolic importance to Somalia because it was regarded as representing a political commitment to the country's safety and territorial integrity. The visible presence of United States forces in Somalia would accordingly have been welcomed, although it was expected that only a small number of American troops would be assigned as support personnel. While the new military superiority of Ethiopia in the Ogaden and Somalia's diminished military effectiveness were in 1981 the main factors discouraging Somali incursions, preservation of the new relationship with the United States acted as a further restraint. It appeared, however, that the Somalis would be greatly disappointed if the small initial commitment by the United States were not followed by future military assistance to alleviate equipment deficiencies within the Somali armed forces.

United States economic aid resumed after the USAID mission was reopened in 1977. Development assistance has since averaged about US$12 million annually, and food aid from US$35 to US$45 million annually. For fiscal year 1982, US$78.5 million was requested from Congress, of which US$58.5 million was for eco-


nomic aid and US$20 million for military credits. In addition the United States had been providing about 75 percent of all food relief to the Somali refugees. Contributions to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees totaled US$53 million while direct food grants were US$32 million in fiscal year 1980.

* * *

An indispensable introduction to Somalia's political situation is contained in the review of domestic policies of the military government and the circumstances surrounding the Ogaden war of 1977–78 in the final two chapters of I.M. Lewis' *A Modern History of Somalia* (1980 edition). A comprehensive analysis of the "civilianizing" process of the Somali government since 1976 was not available in 1981, but an interesting interpretation of this period could be found in Abdi Sheik-Abdi's article, "Ideology and Leadership in Somalia" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies.* Sheik-Abdi, who acknowledges the earlier achievements of Siad Barre's rule, describes the growing demoralization among the elites of the country and the revival of clan politics by the leadership. Scientific socialism in Africa and the extent to which Somalia has conformed to its determinants are examined by Kenneth Jowitt and David Laitin, respectively, in successive articles in *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.*

The important turning point in the politics of the Horn represented by the Ogaden war and Somalia's realignment of its diplomacy is treated by Mohammed Ayoob in *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World.* Former American Ambassador to Somalia Raymond L. Thurston gives an authoritative recapitulation of United States-Somali relations in "The United States, Somalia, and the Crisis in the Horn" in *Horn of Africa.* Scanty treatment of Somalia in the world media makes it advisable to consult the annual *Africa Contemporary Record* and the monthly *Africa Research Bulletin* for accounts of the republic's domestic politics and international relations. The periodicals *Africa* and *New African* also contain periodic reports on Somali developments. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security



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Detail from bronze relief on monument in Mogadishu depicting deeds of Somali patriot Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan, the legendary "Mad Mullah"

SOMALIA HAS EXISTED in an inhospitable international environment since being defeated decisively in the 1977–78 war to determine political control over the people of the arid, Somali-populated areas of eastern Ethiopia. Although in proportion to the nation's population of 4.3 million the 50,000–man Somali army was the largest in Africa, in 1981 it was dwarfed by its 225,000–man Ethiopian counterpart. Somali military equipment that survived the war has been increasingly inoperative since the 1977 expulsion of Soviet advisers.

In order to rebuild the armed forces, the government in Mogadishu has sought arms from Arab countries, China, and the West. Military aid has not been forthcoming in the amounts the Somalis desire, however, and no arms patron to replace the Soviet Union has been found. Foreign nations have been reluctant to provide assistance because of their past dealings with Somalia, its former association with the Soviet Union, its continued involvement in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and its inability to pay for military purchases. By 1981 the withdrawal of Somali regular forces from the Ogaden and decreased support for anti-Ethiopian guerrillas had removed one obstacle to increased aid. But the prospects for substantial arms deliveries could not be determined, partly because of the unknown willingness of donors to risk provoking an Ethiopian response.

The government of Mohamed Siad Barre built an effective internal security apparatus after coming to power in a military coup that overthrew a faltering parliamentary regime. In the 1960s the Somali Police Force had received extensive United States and West German aid, but the 8,000–man force declined in importance after the 1969 military coup. Following Soviet advice, the new regime sought to control opponents through the widespread use of arrest and imprisonment for broadly defined crimes against the state, including rumormongering and unreported association with foreigners. A "People's Militia" of young vigilantes—also known as the Gulwadayal, or Victory Pioneers—and the Soviet-trained National Security Service became prominent. Although there were indications that the government had become somewhat more tolerant of domestic opposition, these organizations remained powerful after Somalia's rift with the Soviet Union. In the early 1980s domestic intelligence was also provided by a number of official and informal organizations controlled by relatives of Siad Barre.

As a result of strains caused by the Ogaden war, the government's internal difficulties increased, and its political basis of support apparently diminished. The difficulties in raising (or maintaining) the standard of living in a country long plagued by drought and flood—the world's eighth poorest nation according to

figures from the World Bank—apparently combined with criticism over President Siad Barre's handling of the Ogaden war to exacerbate political opposition. As the regime's popularity apparently waned in the late 1970s, the government became increasingly dominated by Siad Barre and trusted members of his Marehan clan.

Although the governing regime (which appears to have been held in high esteem among Somalis for several years after coming to power) may have declined in popular favor, in 1981 there was no sign of a broad-based, coherent opposition. Numerous government officials have defected or have been removed from power, but antagonism has remained generally clan-based. Because of the pervasiveness of the Somali security forces, opposition to the government has been forced to organize outside the country and has been limited to conducting a propaganda compaign and occasional guerrilla forays into Somalia. Given Somalia's continuing political and economic difficulties, however, it appeared that Siad Barre's political skills and security apparatus would be increasingly tested.

International Security Concerns

Somali national security perceptions in 1981 were largely dominated by neighboring Ethiopia and by the Soviet Union which, with its Cuban and East European allies, had supplied the training, military equipment, troops, and advisers to place Ethiopia in an overwhelmingly powerful position in the Horn of Africa. Since the 1977–78 war, Somali-supported guerrillas have operated in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia while the Ethiopians have supported a Somali insurgency and conducted air raids and border probes into Somalia. In that effort to "liberate" Somalis living in Ethiopian territory, Somalia had lost much of its military equipment and personnel, its Soviet ally, and the international support necessary to replace its losses.

Irredentism and the Changing Balance of Power

Somalia's military weakness since the Ogaden conflict, Ethiopian hostility, the continuing Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa, and international isolation have resulted largely from the republic's claims against its neighbors that have shaped its foreign policy since independence. Somalia has been unwilling to recognize political boundaries drawn by British, French, and Italian colonialists in conjunction with Ethiopia, which divided the Somali people among five jurisdictions. Since the republic's independence in 1960, successive governments have pursued policies to bring under one flag Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. (see Pan- Somalism, ch. 1; Greater Somali, ch. 4).

For fifteen years a balance of power limited conflict in the Horn. In 1960–64 guerrillas supported by the Somali government battled with local security forces in Kenya and Ethiopia, and in 1964 Ethiopian and Somali regular forces clashed. By late 1964 it had

become obvious that the initial campaign to unify all Somalis was a failure. Ethiopian forces had overmatched Somalis in the Ogaden, conducting air raids in Somali territory and, with assistance from British counterinsurgency experts, Kenya controlled Somali guerrillas in its Northern Frontier District. In late 1964 Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta and Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie signed a mutual defense agreement aimed against Somali aggression. These factors, combined with complete opposition to Somali aims by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and burdensome defense costs that amounted to 30 percent of the national budget in the mid–1960s, forced Somali circumspection.

The last civilian government under Mohamed Ibrahim Egal openly initiated—and the military regime of Siad Barre continued—a policy of détente with Somalia's neighbors to win at the conference table what could not be won on the battlefield. In the 1970s, however, Somali military strength gradually increased with substantial Soviet support. The Soviet Union, which had been Somalia's most important military patron since 1963, supplied the Somali National Army with the largest tank force in sub-Saharan Africa, transport vehicles (including armored personnel carriers) for a largely mechanized infantry, and aircraft that included supersonic MiG–21 fighter-bombers. The close ties between the Siad Barre regime, which by the early 1970s was espousing scientific socialism, and the Soviet Union were formalized by the treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by the two countries in 1974. The Ethiopian army at this time remained twice as large as Somalia's 23,000–man force, but because of reduced military aid from the United States, the Ethiopians were not as well equipped. More importantly, the Ethiopian government collapsed in stages during this period: Haile Selassie was overthrown, violent conflict ensued among those responsible for his deposition, and several groups sought to secede from the empire.

The result of the Somali army buildup, when combined with Ethiopian weakness, was the complete breakdown of the balance of power that had limited tensions in the region. It has remained unclear to what degree the government in Mogadishu orchestrated the 1976–77 guerrilla campaigns by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) to seize the Ogaden region from Ethiopia and to what degree the regular Somali army was involved at the start (see War in the Ogaden, ch. 1). By the late summer of 1977, however, Somali armored forces and mechanized infantry supported by aircraft had thrust deeply into the Ogaden, capturing 90 percent of the disputed territory within several weeks.

The Soviet Union which by early 1977 supported the Marxist-Leninist military regime that was attempting to consolidate its power in Ethiopia, also sought to maintain Somalia as a client state. Moscow was unsuccessful in attempts at mediation and was forced to choose between one side and the other. With Somali forces

deep within Ethiopia's legal borders, the Soviet Union in August 1977 suspended arms shipments to the Mogadishu regime and accelerated military deliveries to Ethiopia. Three months later Siad Barre renounced the treaty of friendship and cooperation, expelled all Soviet advisers and their dependents, and broke diplomatic ties with Cuba, ejecting all of its personnel from his country.

The Soviet Union's decision to lend its support to Ethiopia and to abandon Somalia led to massive shipments of Soviet arms to Ethiopia and the arrival there of an estimated 15,000 Cuban combat troops plus Soviet military advisers. This assistance turned the tide of the war decisively in Ethiopia's favor by early 1978. The Somali armed forces lost 8,000 men—one-third of the regular army—as well as three-quarters of their armored units and half of the air force. In March 1978 Siad Barre announced the withdrawal of Somali regular forces from the Ogaden.

Implications of the Ogaden Defeat

Since the Ogaden war Ethiopia has moved steadily into a position of overwhelming strength in the Horn. Supplied lavishly with Soviet equipment and assisted by an estimated 12,000 to 13,000 Cuban troops in addition to 1,200 to 1,300 Soviet and East European advisers, the Ethiopian regime was able to maintain a measure of internal stability. Most outside observers in 1981 did not think Ethiopia would use its superior military forces to subjugate Somalia, but it had the ability and, given the historical enmities in the Horn, the Siad Barre government was concerned.

Although their movement did not necessarily portend an invasion of Somalia, Ethiopian armed forces in 1980–81 reinforced their government's position in the Ogaden. In mid-1980 the WSLF was able to claim control over 60 percent of the Ogaden; but Somali forces suffered a series of reversals in the latter half of the year, and Ethiopian forces advanced, assuming positions along the border and conducting several border probes into Somali territory.

Beyond the threat of invasion, the presence of the Ethiopian army near Somalia's frontier had undermined Somali security by exacerbating a burdensome refugee problem and by supporting an insurgency aimed at toppling the Siad Barre regime. Since the Ogaden war the combination of drought and Ethiopian military successes in the Ogaden had forced great numbers of refugees into Somalia (see Refugees, ch. 2). In addition the Ethiopian presence along the frontier had augmented Addis Ababa's abilities to support Somali movements opposed to the Siad Barre government. In late 1981 the most conspicuous of these opposition groups—the Majerteyn clan-oriented Somali Salvation Front (SSF)—united with other opponents of the Siad Barre regime to form the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), which was based in Ethiopia (see Sources of Opposition, this ch.).



Guerrilla soldiers of the Western Somali Liberation Front army
Courtesy Somali Embassy, Washington

The Ethiopian air force had also mounted periodic air attacks against Somali villages and towns. According to Somali sources Ethiopian military aircraft made 152 attacks on fifteen locations between December 1979 and June 1981, killing 196 people and wounding approximately 400 others. These raids were seen by some as a concerted attempt to undermine the Siad Barre government's authority by demonstrating the Somali military's inability to oppose the attacks. The periodic nature of the air strikes, however, and their coincident timing with guerrilla activity in the Ogaden led others in 1981 to explain them as reprisals for WSLF guerrilla attacks against Ethiopian targets.

Somali concerns were heightened in August 1981 when the Ethiopian government joined with those of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden)] and Libya in a pact "to coordinate their anti-imperialist, anti-reactionary, anti-Zionist

and anti-racist stand." Somalia, which immediately severed diplomatic relations with Libya, and some outside observers were concerned that the oil-rich North African country would use financial inducements to encourage Ethiopian military adventurism or a DFSS terrorist campaign against the Siad Barre government. According to this view, action could be motivated by Libyan and Yemeni antipathy toward the United States, which in 1980 concluded an agreement with Mogadishu for access to Somali naval and air bases. Most observers felt, however, that an invasion by Ethiopian forces would be costly in military, economic, and diplomatic terms and, if successful, would yield only a hostile and hungry populace.

Foreign military aid to Somalia was limited after 1977 in part because Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden was seen by most of Africa and the outside world as a simple use of opportunistic expansion. By early 1981, however, outside observers had generally concluded that the last Somali regular units had been withdrawn from the Ogaden three years after the Siad Barre government announced their departure. Thus the most obvious political fact in the Horn became Ethiopia's emerging military hegemony rather than Somalia's nationalist claims. That the government of neighboring Kenya (which in 1979 signed a ten-year friendship and cooperation treaty with Ethiopia and as late as December 1980 joined in a harsh condemnation of Somali policies and goals) recognized the changed situation was indicated in 1981 by an apparent reconciliation with the Siad Barre government (see Greater Somalia, ch. 4). But it was not clear whether changing international opinion would lead to increased arms shipments or whether new military equipment deliveries would enhance Somali national security. The balance of forces in the Horn was so tenuous in 1981 that a massive reequipment program of the Somali military could, according to some observers, simply provoke a response by overwhelmingly strong Ethiopian forces.

The Armed Forces

The Somali military establishment in 1981 was a completely changed organization from the one that fought Ethiopia in the 1977–78 Ogaden war. Its size had increased from a manpower level of 23,000 to nearly 50,000. But as a result of combat losses and maintenance difficulties caused by the departure of Soviet military advisers, Somalia's armored and mechanized forces, the largest in Black Africa before the Ogaden war, had been decimated. The Somali Aeronautical Corps, manned by 1,000 personnel, and a navy of 550 were also severely affected by inoperative equipment. Adjusting to the new realities, the army was reorganized around infantry rather than mechanized forces as its leaders sought increased foreign military assistance to replace its depleted Soviet equipment stocks.

Armed Forces in the National Life

Military virtues have always figured prominently in Somali life, and the armed forces have enjoyed correspondingly high prestige. The popularity of the military has been reflected in the fact that the Somali armed forces always have been maintained without resorting to official conscription. Because of the republic's international claims and others' claims against it, the armed forces have been used extensively in traditional martial roles, especially during the Ogaden war. But since the 1969 coup the military has also participated in the national government and has become a leading force for social change and development. A well-organized body, representing all sections of society, the military has played a central role in contemporary Somalia.

The Warrior Tradition and Development of the Modern Army

The warrior has traditionally occupied an important place in Somali society. Except for a few "men of religion" (*wadaddo*) all Somali males were considered warriors (*waranle*—see Glossary). Aggressiveness and military prowess were rewarded in Somali nomadic life, and force or the potential to use force often decided who prevailed in the harsh environment. As a result, readiness for armed conflict flourished throughout a long history of foreign invasion and colonial occupation.

Warfare had always been important, both in relations with outsiders—the Ethiopian Christians and the Oromos, for example—and in relations among Somali clans and clan segments (see The Segmentary Social Order, ch. 2). Antagonists in intra-Somali conflicts generally belonged to groups bound by their commitment to pay or receive *dia* (blood compensation). Because the entire group was responsible for paying *dia* to compensate for damages inflicted and received *dia* for its own losses, war began only with the unanimous approval of its participants. Peace was usually restored by a meeting of elders of the involved groups. They would determine which group was responsible for starting the war and would decide compensation—usually in the form of livestock—for the damages incurred. The group judged responsible for starting the war was usually the only one fined unless it emerged the clear-cut victor. In a jihad (holy war) against infidels and in most conflicts against non-Somalis, such rules did not apply.

The strength of rival clans and *dia* paying groups (see Glossary) was traditionally defined by the number of warriors belonging to each party, but after the rapid and large-scale introduction of firearms in the Horn in the late nineteenth century, firepower became the primary determinant. Although matchlock guns may have been used by the Somalis as early as the sixteenth century, firearms became numerous in the region only in the 1890s when they were supplied to Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II. Shipped

through the port of Djibouti, some of these rifles fell into Somali hands, and significant numbers came into use against the Ethiopians and the British in the jihad of Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan, which lasted from 1899 until his death in 1920. After 1920 possession of firearms was common among the Somalis, and the Italian and British colonial governments pursued a policy of disarming the nomads. For a number of years preceding national independence, however, nomads were frequently more heavily armed than the colonial forces that were responsible for maintaining public order.

The need of the British and Italian regimes to preserve civil peace and maintain political control resulted in the establishment—beginning in 1884—of constabularies that eventually evolved into the modern Somali army and police force. Somalis composed the bulk of personnel in these forces, although they did not serve as officers until after World War II. The organization and duties of the constabularies went through a series of changes over the years, but in general they served as police responsible for internal security rather than as military units oriented to external threats (see State Security Forces, this ch.).

On the eve of independence in 1960 the provisional government in the Italian-administered trust territory requested permission of the United Nations (UN) Trusteeship Council to establish a national army to protect its borders. Permission was granted, and a few months before independence a small army was created in the trust territory, the bulk coming from the Mobile Group (Darawishta Poliska—commonly known as the Darawishta) of the Somali Police Force. At the time that the trust territory was amalgamated with British Somaliland to form the Somali Republic, troops from the Darawishta combined with those of the British Somaliland Scouts—a military unit that had existed since World War II—to form a 5,000-man army. The first commander was Colonel Daud Abdullah Hersi, who had served in the Somalia Gendarmerie, the police force of the British Military Administration. He was succeeded at his death in 1965 by Siad Barre.

From its inception the Somali National Army, which before the 1969 coup was responsible to the civilian government, played a central role in foreign policy. Although the constitution of 1961 renounced war as a means of settling international disputes, it also urged the unification of all Somali territories, and the army was used agressively to support Somali irredentism in Ethiopia.

The army was battle-tested in 1964 when the conflict with Ethiopia over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden, simmering since independence, erupted in open fighting. Somali guerrillas initiated a rebellion in June 1963 after Haile Selassie rejected their demand for self-government in the Ogaden. The government in Mogadi-

shu initially refused to give the guerrillas official support; but in January 1964, after Ethiopia responded to guerrilla successes by reinforcing the Ogaden, Somali forces staged ground and air raids across the Ethiopian border. The Ethiopian air force responded with punitive strikes across its southwestern frontier against Feerfeer and Gaalkacyo. After heavy fighting a truce was established, although it was broken several times within the following month. At a conference of representatives of the two nations held in Sudan, both sides agreed to withdraw behind their frontiers and submit the dispute to discussion by the OAU. The definitive cease-fire began on April 2, 1964.

Both sides probably exaggerated their successes, and both lumped together enemy civilian and military casualties in their public reports. The Somalis apparently destroyed Ethiopian installations and equipment, but their personnel losses seemed to have been far greater than those of the Ethiopians. More telling, by the end of the conflict the heaviest fighting was reported in the area where it had initially broken out. This suggests that, even using their tanks and heavy weapons on ground of their choosing, the Somalis were unable to advance into Ethiopia. They could not defend against Ethiopian air raids, and they were unable to extend their control over the Ogaden Somalis. The army's disappointing performance led to reluctance by the Mogadishu authorities over the next decade to resort to military action against Somalia's neighbors, preferring instead to disrupt them by supporting guerrilla activities. In 1967 the government of Abdirashid Ali Shermarke and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal officially sought to ease tensions with Ethiopia because of the failure of aggressive policy and the ruinous expense such a policy imposed.

Despite détente and cessation of military actions, the military establishment in the late 1960s continued to be highly regarded by the population. The army was seen as less influenced by the class divisions and corruption that characterized civilian institutions, and it gained a reputation for discipline and integrity. It also had succeeded in integrating British- and Italian-trained units more rapidly than had civilian institutions. The armed forces, moreover, maintained contact with the people through limited civic action projects and public relations programs, including the staging of traditional dances and drama, music and poetry competitions, and sports activities. An army-trained, quasi-military youth group called the Young Pioneers, patterned on its Soviet counterpart, was used in agricultural and construction work connected with national development projects. The widespread acceptance of the national army, however, continued to be largely based on the recognition of its major role if the goal to unify all Somalis was to be realized.

The Military and the Government

Before the successful coup d'etat of October 21, 1969, the civilian government had constitutional control over the military. An attempted coup in 1961 by British-trained Somali officers objecting to favoritism allegedly shown those trained by the Italians was an exception in a nine-year period during which the army played no direct role in the internal affairs of the government. Some officers enjoyed good political connections, but there was no evidence to suggest that the army was directly used to support (or undermine) domestic policies of the civilian authorities. Rather, the army served as a barrier to external threats and as a symbol (and potential instrument) in the quest for Somali unification.

The military's apolitical stance changed, however, in 1969. According to Siad Barre in a speech to the people soon after taking power, "Intervention by the armed forces was inevitable. It was no longer possible to ignore...corruption, bribery, theft of public funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country." (see Coup d'Etat, ch. 1). The Soviet-supported armed forces found backing in their venture, or at least acquiescence, from the police.

When first established in 1969 as the country's governing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was balanced with northern and southern officers and representatives of the major clans. Junior officers down to the rank of captain were included, but headstrong young colonels, who had long agitated for the overthrow of the civilian regime, were not. Siad Barre quickly established himself as a skillful politician and the dominant force within the SRC.

Recognizing that they had limited experience in government, the coup's leaders established under the SRC the largely civilian Council of Secretaries of State (CSS) to administer various ministries. Although ideally the SRC refrained from interfering in day-to-day administration of the ministries, it did closely supervise the implementation of their programs. The Ministry of Interior, which controlled the means of enforcing government decisions, was always headed by a police general. After the coup military officers were placed as the head of district and provincial offices and embassies abroad while civilian administrators and diplomats were recalled to the capital for military training and education in revolutionary principles. Beginning in 1971 senior civil servants were required to take a three-month course at Camp Halane in Mogadishu. Trainees—including administrators, doctors, teachers, and ambassadors—wore military uniforms and underwent military training, including the assembly and use of various types of small arms.

Military dominance of political affairs was modified beginning in 1974 when reorganization brought more civilian participation at all levels of government (see Return to Civilian Political Institu-

tions, ch. 4). Military participation in the government remained strong, however, and continued during the period when the SRC was dissolved and the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) emerged as the basis for political authority. In 1980 the SRC was reconstituted as an element of the national power structure, and military officers were appointed to administer most of Somalia's districts and regions. Among other explanations given for the moves was Siad Barre's respect for the virtues of discipline and order, which made military officers easier to manage than civilian officials. In late 1981 a number of high-ranking military officers occupied important positions within the government structure, including the four highest offices (see table 19, Appendix). The military establishment, however, was viewed not as a source of political power but as an instrument of Siad Barre's increasing personal control over governmental affairs.

The Military and the Economy

In 1981 the defense budget, like most other official matters in Somalia, was strongly influenced by the president. The needs of the armed forces were assessed annually by the army command in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense. Budget recommendations were passed directly to Siad Barre who was responsible for all final budget decisions. It is believed that the SRC did not play a role in the process unless the president, at his own discretion, chose to consult its members.

Since the formation of the national army in 1960, the cost of maintaining the military establishment has been the most expensive item in the national budget. According to figures released by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Somali government, defense costs have consistently exceeded the combined amounts budgeted for health and education. In 1977, according to World Bank (see Glossary) figures, the government spent in equivalent per capita amounts approximately US$7 on the military US$5 on education, and US$2 on health. The following year, in the wake of the reverses in the Ogaden, per capita military spending jumped to a level estimated to be as high as US$17. Military expenditure increased at an average rate of over 9 percent a year in real terms in the first decade after Somali independence when the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) was estimated to have grown at an annual rate of less than 3 percent. After Siad Barre came to power, defense spending did not increase significantly, contrary to the expectations of outsiders who had observed earlier African military coups. Between 1972 and 1977, funding for the armed forces amounted annually to about 26 percent of total government expenditures. In 1978 military spending increased to 37.1 percent of the national budget, and 39 percent was allocated to defense the following year.

Because of statistical deficiencies, figures on total military costs in relation to government spending and GNP sometimes have

been contradictory, and specific expenditures within the defense budget have been generally unavailable because of government restrictions. In 1981, however, it was known that personnel costs accounted for an overwhelming share of the total defense budget. For several years before 1974, when the government embargoed the information, personnel emoluments of the Ministry of Defense averaged 80 percent of the defense budget.

Personnel costs have dominated because Somali defense budgets have allocated funds only for current expenditures (wages, equipment maintenance, and so forth) and not for capital expenditures (hardware, all of which is imported). During the period of close military relations with the Soviet Union, most payments were thought to have been made indirectly by bartering goods, base rights, fishing rights, and the like. After Moscow stopped its military support in 1977, Somalia continued its policy of including only current costs in the defense budget. Perhaps because since the Ogaden war arms sales could not always be anticipated and budgeted in advance, they may have been funded by extrabudgetary appropriations that amounted to half of total expenditures in 1979 (see Government Finance, ch. 3). It was assumed that a substantial amount of defense spending, including procurement of military equipment since the Ogaden war, had resulted from foreign (mostly Arab) grants or credits and did not appear in the budget.

After the war Somali defense spending increased dramatically from Sh200 million (for value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary) in 1977 to Sh512 million in 1978. Nearly Sh600 million was budgeted for 1979 primarily because of the large increase in military manpower. (These figures did not include spending on police and militia forces, which also increased significantly in size and funding.) In late 1981 there was no indication that military costs would decrease unless a reduction in tensions with Ethiopia allowed a partial demobilization or unless a wealthy foreign state assumed Somalia's military burdens. Neither possibility appeared close at hand.

Before the size of the armed forces doubled in 1977–78, the number of military personnel on active duty never exceeded 1 percent of the total population. In 1981 it was difficult to measure the impact of the armed forces in siphoning off talent from the rest of the economy because information on military manpower was not generally made available by Somali authorities. It was known that the army absorbed many unemployed urban Somalis as well as nomads living on parched land incapable of supporting them and their herds. But a number of Somalia's comparatively few educated and technically trained persons served in the armed forces, presumably to the detriment of the national economy.

The government, especially in the early 1970s, had frequently sought to ameliorate economic problems inherent in the maintenance of a large army by making the defense forces contribute to the national economy. In 1971 military salaries (as well as those for all government employees) were drastically reduced, and the military began to engage more frequently in government- sponsored civic action projects. The army played an important role in evacuating nomads from regions of the country stricken by the 1974–75 drought. Using Soviet transport aircraft and trucks, the military moved 100,000 nomads and distributed food, medicine, and other supplies to refugee camps where the inhabitants awaited resettlement.

The army also participated in government-sponsored "crash programs" to mobilize resources for labor-intensive projects designed to reduce unemployment and to increase national self-sufficiency. Initially it concentrated on self-help projects to improve its own facilities, constructing and repairing roads, barracks, and other facilities in Shabeellaha Hoose Region, Mogadishu, and other locations. The army later became involved in construction in the civilian sector. Some of its projects included cleaning up towns and villages, digging and maintaining wells and irrigation canals, and stabilizing sand dunes. Members of the army also help construct the Somali National University, hospitals, prisons, orphanages, and factories. Even in districts where the army did not formally participate, those who worked in the crash programs were frequently supervised by district commissioners (all of whom were military men before 1974) or by lieutenants and noncommissioned officers. It appears, however, that since the Ogaden war army involvement in civil projects has diminished because of preoccupation with national security requirements.

Performance in the Ogaden Conflict

The Somali army's defeat in the war with Ethiopia has defined the country's current difficult strategic situation. The battles to retake and then defend the area stripped the formerly potent Somali armed forces of many troops, much of their equipment, and their Soviet supplier, forcing the military establishment into a difficult period of rebuilding. Although the armed forces in 1981 were considerably changed and weaker than they had been four years earlier, the war had provided a valuable glimpse of their performance in battle.

Before the Ogaden war, the most striking feature of the 23,000-man army was its large armored force equipped with approximately 250 T–34 and T–54/55 Soviet-built medium tanks and over 300 armored personnel carriers. This gave the Somali Army a tank force more than three times as large as Ethiopia's. The pre-war Somali air force was also larger than Ethiopia's in the mid–

1970s. In 1976 Somalia had fifty-two combat aircraft; twenty-four of these were newly delivered, Soviet-built supersonic MiG–21s. Facing them was an Ethiopian air force of thirty-five to forty aircraft; it was also in the process of taking delivery of several American-built Northrup F–5 fighters from Iran. At the outbreak of fighting, Ethiopia had about sixteen F–5A/Es, which were roughly comparable to the Somali MiG–21s.

As chaos spread throughout Ethiopia in 1975 after the overthrow of Haile Selassie, pro-Somali liberation groups that had been ignored by Somali authorities during the earlier period of détente with Addis Ababa gained increased support from Mogadishu. The WSLF, operating in the Ogaden, was committed to unification of the territory with Somalia. The Somali-Abo Liberation Front (SALF) was linked to the WSLF but was made up of Oromos, who were ethnically and linguistically distinct from Somalis. Beginning in 1977 the SALF operated in the Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi provinces south and west of the Ogaden. A separate Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) also challenged Ethiopian control in these areas. Somalia supported a variety of other Ethiopian groups opposed to the regime in Addis Ababa but had no control over and little, if any, coordination with these organizations.

By late 1975 WSLF guerrillas were mounting successful attacks against Ethiopian outposts in the Ogaden. Hostilities escalated in early 1977 despite vigorous attempts by Moscow and Cuba's Fidel Castro to mediate the dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. In June 1977 the Ethiopian regime began to accuse Siad Barre of committing Somali regular units to the fighting. At the same time WSLF communiqués began to be broadcast on Radio Mogadishu. In their communiqués the WSLF claimed hundreds of Ethiopians killed, planes shot down, tanks destroyed, and towns captured. Although these reports were exaggerated, it appeared that Somalia was committing substantial resources to the Ogaden conflict at a time when the Soviet Union and Cuba were clearly demonstrating their support of the Ethiopian regime.

Contrary to considerable evidence, Mogadishu consistently denied until February 1978 that units from the regular Somali army were engaged in the fighting. Rather the government conceded only that "volunteers" were given leave from the army to fight with the armed guerrillas of the WSLF. The manned strength of the WSLF, estimated at about 6,000 in June 1977, increased throughout the year as ethnic Somalis living in the "liberated" areas of the Ogaden joined the organization. When regular Somali forces operated with the WSLF they flew the WSLF flag and included in their ranks a high proportion of soldiers from the Ogaden clan, which was also well represented in the WSLF. By late 1977 the combined strength of the WSLF and Somali army

units in the Ogaden probably approached 50,000, of which 15,000 appeared to be irregulars.

After the army was committed to the Ogaden, the conflict ceased to be a guerrilla action and assumed the form of conventional war in which armor, mechanized infantry, and air power played decisive roles. Somali officers under the command of Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samantar were given credit by some foreign observers for quickly adapting army organization to battlefield realities. The centralized Somali logistics system was designed to control supplies at battalion level (600 to 1,000 troops) from Mogadishu—an extremely unwieldy arrangement, especially given Somalia's limited transportation and communications network. To facilitate operations the logistics center and headquarters for forces fighting in the northern Ogaden was moved to Hargeysa, the army's northern sector headquarters, because it was much closer to the important Ogaden battlefields than was Mogadishu. Before the war all elements of the Somali ground forces had been organized into battalions, but during the war the standard infantry and mechanized infantry unit became the brigade, comprised of two to four battalions and having a total strength of 1,200 to 2,000.

After Siad Barre committed his regular forces, Somalis in the Ogaden enjoyed marked success in the summer of 1977. In July they captured Gode, which had previously resisted attacks by the WSLF. By late July the WSLF announced that 60 percent of the Ogaden was liberated; by mid-September the Ethiopians conceded that 90 percent of the disputed region was in Somali hands. The Somali army had suffered two setbacks in August when it mounted quick armored thrusts in efforts to capture Dire Dawa and the major Ethiopian forward tank base at Jijiga. At Jijiga, which was heavily defended by two brigades of the Ethiopian Third Division and at least two divisons of militia, the Somalis lost over half of their attacking force of three tank battalions, each of which contained over thirty tanks. A Somali attack by one tank battalion and a mechanized infantry brigade supported by artillery units was repulsed with heavy losses at Dire Dawa, where the airfield had the only remaining concrete surfaced runway available for use in Ethiopian air strikes into northern Somalia and the northern Ogaden. Siad Barre later was criticized for not having committed adequate forces to capture the important airfield. Moreover his generals complained that he had centralized command without the ability to receive communications from the field or to transmit instructions quickly and accurately.

Somalia's greatest victory of the war came in mid-September in the second attempt to take Jijiga, when three tank battalions overwhelmed the defending Ethiopian garrison after several days of seesaw fighting. After inflicting heavy losses on Somali armor, demoralized Ethiopian troops mutinied and withdrew from the

town, leaving its defense to the militia, which was incapable of slowing the Somali advance. The Ethiopians retreated beyond the strategic Marda Pass, the strongest defensive position between Jijiga and the city of Harer, leaving Somali troops in a commanding position within the region.

But as Somali forces reached the limit of their advance, several factors precluded an ultimate victory. Somali tank losses had been heavy in the major battles around Dire Dawa and Jijiga, and the Somali Aeronautical Corps had been dominated by the numerically inferior Ethiopian air force. Having wrested complete air superiority from the Somalis (despite the loss of an important ground control radar at Jijiga), Ethiopian F–5s were able to harass overextended Somali supply lines with impunity. The attacks were hampered only by the rainy season, which also bogged down Somali reinforcements on the dirt roads.

Moscow's action halting the flow of military equipment to Somalia in August 1977 and its support of Ethiopia soon turned the tide of battle in the Ogaden. From October 1977 through January 1978 some 20,000 WSLF guerrillas and Somali regulars pressed attacks on Harer where nearly 50,000 Ethiopians had been regrouped, backed by Soviet-supplied armor and artillery and gradually reinforced (according to official American estimates) by 11,000 Cuban troops and 1,500 Soviet advisers. Although Somali forces reportedly fought their way into Harer in November, they had neither the supplies nor the manpower to take the city and were forced to regroup on the outskirts in anticipation of an Ethiopian counterattack.

As expected, Ethiopian and Cuban forces, directed by Soviet generals Grigory Grigoryevich Varisov and Vasily Ivanovich Petrov, launched a two-stage counterattack toward Jijiga in early February. Unexpectedly, however, a Cuban and Ethiopian column, moving north and east, crossed the highlands between Jijiga and the Somali border, bypassing Somali troops dug in around the Marda Pass. Somali troops were assaulted from two sides, and Jijiga was retaken on March 5 after two days of fierce fighting in which four Somali brigades were cut to pieces and 3,000 troops were killed. Within a week all major towns in the region were once again in Ethiopian hands. The undeclared war was brought to an end on March 9 when Siad Barre announced that his troops had been recalled from Ethiopian territory. Somalia had lost an estimated 8,000 men—one-third of its prewar army. The army also had lost over three-quarters of its tank force and nearly half of its aircraft. Because of the cutoff of Soviet supplied spare parts, only a half dozen MiGs were still reported to be flying in March 1978.

After the withdrawal of Somali regulars, the WSLF reverted to its guerrilla tactics against what spokesmen characterized as "Abyssinian colonialist troops." In May 1980 the guerrilla force

was able to claim control over 60 percent of the Ogaden, and Western journalists confirmed that the WSLF once again controlled the countryside as well as many of the roads. But Ethiopian forces, which since defeating Somali forces had been mainly occupied in attempting to control the secession movement in Ethiopia's Eritrea region, steadily extended their control over the Ogaden. Somali government troops (who had continued to fight in small units after Siad Barre announced their withdrawal) and WSLF guerrillas suffered further defeats, most notably in the battle around Wardair in June and July 1980 when the Ethiopians claimed they defeated a 14,000-man Somali force. By early 1981 Somali regulars had been withdrawn from the Ogaden, and the WSLF changed its top leadership, electing a group tied less closely to Mogadishu than its predecessor had been. In late 1981 reports indicated that the WSLF continued to conduct hit-and-run attacks against Ethiopian targets, although on a reduced scale.

Postwar Composition

In 1981 the Somali armed forces were adjusting to changed circumstances brought about by the Ogaden war: manpower had doubled, but equipment had been sharply reduced. The army's organizational structure had been somewhat altered because of wartime experience and the necessity to adapt to the changed ratio of troops and equipment. The shortages of military hardware, inadequate maintenance, and unavailability of spare parts for what remained of Soviet-supplied equipment considerably limited the effectiveness of all elements. Units of the army, however, had been battle-tested in the Ogaden and were among the world's most recently experienced fighting forces.

In April 1981 the military command structure underwent a shakeup of indeterminate but possibly major proportions when Siad Barre made personnel changes within his government. For a decade Lieutenant General Ali Samantar had been a central figure in the defense establishment, serving simultaneously as minister of defense, commander of the Somali National Army, and first vice-president in the government. When the SRC was reconstituted in October 1980, Ali Samantar had also become chairman of its Defense and Security Committee, although he had previously given up his position as army commander to Brigadier General (later Major General) Omar Haji Mohamed. After Siad Barre's personnel shuffle, Ali Samantar retained his position as first vice-president and appeared to have kept his post on the SRC Defense and Security Committee, but Haji Mohamed, through his appointment as acting minister of defense, became Somalia's leading military figure. Although some reports indicated that the committee was designed to implement SRC decisions, it appeared that under the reconstituted SRC the Ministry of Defense—which possessed

command authority over the armed forces as well as significant administrative responsibility—was the more important of the two sources of authority. The replacement of the loyal but popular veteran Ali Samantar by Haji Mohamed, a member of the president's Marehan clan, indicated conclusively that ultimate authority rested with Siad Barre.

Mission, Organization, and Strength

Since national independence the armed forces' primary mission has been to protect Somalia's territorial integrity from foreign aggression. Assistance to the Somali Police Force in maintaining internal security has been a secondary mission. In 1981 the defense establishment was composed mainly of ground forces. Organizationally it consisted of the Somali National Army and its subordinate air and naval elements. The military command structure extended from Siad Barre, president and commander in chief of the armed forces, through the minister of defense (who served also as commander of the Somali National Army) to army corps commanders who exercised authority over forces stationed in the country's three military sectors.

In 1981 one of three corps headquarters for the ground forces was situated at Hargeysa in Woqooyi Galbeed Region. Others were believed to be at Gaalkacyo in Mudug Region and at Beled Weyne in Hiiraan Region. The ground forces were organized tactically into seven divisions. Allocated among the divisions were three mechanized infantry brigades and twenty-three artillery battalions, ten of them antiaircraft artillery units.

The heavy equipment losses and increased numbers of recruits had dictated major structural reorganization of the army. Whereas the large tank force was grouped in armored battalions that operated as independent units before and during the war, the remaining tanks had been integrated with lighter armored vehicles and truck-mounted mechanized infantry to form the army's first line brigades. Before losing much of its transport to capture, destruction, and poor maintenance, most infantry units were mechanized with trucks and over 300 armored personnel carriers available to transport men into battle. In 1981, however, most of the increased army manpower had been assigned to infantry brigades, and units were equipped for battle with little more than rifles (the bulk of them believed to be Soviet-made Kalashnikovs).


Military equipment was largely a mixture of Soviet-made weapons that had survived the Ogaden war or items that had been delivered subsequently by Egypt and certain Western countries. Serviceability was believed to be extremely low, especially for the Soviet equipment. Even before the war when Soviet assistance was available, observers noted that as little as 20 percent of the armored force was capable of operating at any given time. Soviet-

built T–54, T–55, and T–34 medium tanks, some apparently received from Egypt, continued to serve as the primary armored weapon. Reports in 1980 indicated that eighty to 100 remained in the inventory, less than half of which could be put into operating condition. The vast majority of the service vehicles used by the armed forces were of Western (mainly Italian) origin and had been delivered after the war. Of the Soviet transport equipment, according to a 1980 article in the Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, "Virtually nothing remains."

Some of the army's armored personnel carriers were of Italian origin, and some Soviet models had been delivered by Egypt to replace those sent earlier by Moscow. Although much had been abandoned to the Ethiopians in the Ogaden and much of what remained was unserviceable, Soviet weapons continued to serve as basic equipment in the artillery units. Included were 76mm, 85mm, 122mm, and 130mm field gun and 122mm howitzers. The army was also equipped with a variety of Soviet-supplied antiaircraft missiles and guns, but it was assumed that the missiles—SAM–2s and SAM–3s allocated among three battalions—were largely inoperative and that many of the approximately 250 antiaircraft guns reportedly in inventory were not operational (see table 20, Appendix).

The Somali Aeronautical Corps operated most of its aircraft from bases near Mogadishu and Hargeysa. Its primary mission was to support the ground forces, a task thwarted during the Ogaden war by Ethiopian pilots. Since the war the air corps' performance has been limited—like that of other service elements—by a shortage of equipment, spare parts, and maintenance. Several sources stated in 1980 that of approximately twenty-one combat aircraft in the air corps, less than a half dozen—MiG–17s and MiG–21s—were kept operational by Pakistani mechanics. Six Italian single-engine SIAI Marchetti SF–260W trainer tactical support aircraft delivered in late 1979 were reportedly grounded in 1980 because of a lack of 110-octane gasoline in Somalia for the piston-engine aircraft. The shortage of combat aircraft was being redressed in 1981 when Somalia began to take delivery of thirty F–6 Shenyang fighter-bombers from China. (The F–6 is a Chinese version of the MiG–19 and is considered inferior to the MiG–21.) addition of the aircraft and associated training was expected to enhance the capabilities of the air corps.

The air element also had a transport squadron composed of a variety of aircraft delivered over the years. These included several Soviet-built Antonov An–2s, An–24s, and An–26s, believed to be grounded for lack of spare parts. (Egypt, which may have been willing to supply necessary parts, only had the larger An–12 model in its inventory.) In 1981 Somalia was in the process of taking delivery from Italy of four G–222 twin-turboprop medium transports. These new aircraft, in addition to several lighter planes—





Somali's declining military arsenal includes Soviet weapons of low serviceability such as MiG–21 aircraft (top), T–55 tanks; and (facing page)





...BTR–60 armored personnel carriers (top) and AK–47 Kalashnikov automatic rifles.

and four Boeing 707s and 720Bs that could be borrowed from the national airline—were to compose the backbone of the Somali transport force (see table 21, Appendix).

The navy was established in 1965 with the aid of the Soviet Union and was organized to support army forces in maintaining coastal security. Having bases located near Berbera, Mogadishu, and Kismaayo, the navy in 1981 was equipped with two Soviet Osa II missile-armed fast attack craft, eight torpedo-armed fast attack craft, and several patrol boats. Apparently the navy also had an amphibious support capability as it had a Soviet Polnochniy-class landing ship capable of carrying six tanks and four ninety-three-ton landing craft. All naval vessels had been delivered by the Soviet Union and were believed to have deteriorated significantly. One source indicated that as few as three of the twenty ships were operational in 1980 (see table 22, Appendix).

Army strength was supplemented by paramilitary forces. These included a 1,500-man elite force of border guards (Darawishta), which had increased from a prewar level of 500, the People's Militia (increased from 2,500 to less than 10,000 as a result of the war), and the 8,000 members of the Somali Police Force (see State Security Forces, this ch.).

In the event of a concerted attack by Ethiopia's Soviet-equipped 225,000-man army, it appeared unlikely in 1981 that Somalia's armed forces could halt the advance. Rather, according to at least one source, the attacks would be opposed by popular resistance, described as the "people's deterrent." The Ministry of Defense was rumored to have under its authority a High Command for Mobilization to coordinate popular opposition. There were reports that mobilization plans called for the distribution of arms to groups throughout the country under the military leadership at the regional and district levels.

Whether complex national mobilization procedures would operate in such a crisis was a matter for conjecture. It appeared highly likely, however, that given historical enmity between Ethiopians and Somalis, invasion would lead to widespread Somali resistance. Somalis—particularly the nomads—were well organized in clan-families, (see Glossary) clans, and smaller lineage groups accustomed to defending themselves against a harsh environment, outsiders, and each other. The availability of firearms in the Horn—unknown but, as a result of long conflict, assumed to be widespread—would aid the defenders in waging long-term guerrilla warfare, although they would be hindered by limited water supplies.

Manpower, Training, and Conditions of Service

Despite the assumption that in the event of an invasion virtually every Somali would contribute to the country's defense, the country suffered from a manpower shortage. In February 1978 the

government announced that 30,000 recruits had enlisted for fourteen to sixty days of training and that military and paramilitary forces were able to triple their size in 1977–78 without officially resorting to conscription. But with a population of only 4.3 million, military manpower potential was limited. By one estimate Somalia had roughly 464,000 males between fifteen and forty-nine years of age who were fit for military service compared to its major antagonist (Ethiopia), which had about 4 million. (The loyalty of many Ethiopians in an empire gained through conquest and maintained through subjugation may be questioned, however.)

Conscription has not been practiced officially, but since the advent of the military government in 1969—and especially since the army expansion related to the Ogaden war and its aftermath—there have been frequent reports that some Somalis have been impressed into military service. Whereas poverty-stricken town dwellers without compensating family or clan ties were recruited to work on farms and on construction projects in the early 1970s, by 1981 these people were reportedly being recruited for military service along with many male residents of the refugee camps. By presidential decree originally promulgated by the civilian government in 1966 and apparently extended by the SRC, all students over the age of eighteen were required to have certificates from the army as evidence that they had completed short-term military training or alternate national service. In 1980 it was reported that young Somalis unable to produce such a document when questioned by the authorities would be inducted by the army.

Somalia first felt compelled to organize a reserve force during the 1964 border clashes with Ethiopia. At that time the National Assembly passed legislation authorizing mobilization of large numbers of volunteers to be trained by the army at special camps in the regional capitals. A force of about 2,000 regulars was hastily recruited, but these troops were not needed in the border war and were subsequently released from duty. These men received cards identifying them as reservists, but they received neither pay nor training and had no official status.

The Home Guard was established in 1967 when 3,000 men were called up for six months of training. Having completed their tours of duty, they were discharged but were carried in a reserve pool, and an additional 3,000 men were called up for the next six months. It was not known whether the Home Guard reserve system continued to function. In 1981 the People's Militia and the Somali Police Force constituted the country's most important reserve forces.

Despite reverses in the war with Ethiopia and the apparently diminished popularity of the military government, many Somalis continued to be attracted to service with the armed forces. Nomads with their strong martial traditions have been drawn to the

army, where they have also found more comfortable accommodations and more regular meals than have been possible in civilian life. From the beginning of the colonial period, soldiers (as well as the bulk of government employees in general) have been recruited from the nomadic areas rather than from the cultivated (and wealthier) riverine areas. According to I.M. Lewis, a noted authority on Somalia, this reflected the harsh environment and the pressure of limited resources in regions of the country populated by nomads.

Apart from the fact that nomadic Somalis were traditionally more heavily represented than those from the sedentary Digil and Rahanweyn clans, little was known about the clan representation in the armed forces in 1981. Balanced clan representation had long been a sensitive issue, and recruitment notices had specified the proportional number of men to be recruited from each district in an attempt to establish a clan balance in the officer corps and enlisted ranks. In the 1960s traditional group animosities had created disciplinary problems where serious clan imbalance occurred, but it was not known whether these problems persisted in 1981 in a national army tested in combat against an outside force. After it assumed power, the military government had followed a practice of mixing recruits from throughout the country to cultivate a national spirit among the soldiers.

Since the military coup in 1969 little information has been available on the makeup of the officer corps and its training. Before the coup the army relied on two sources for its officer personnel: volunteers for officer candidate training and outstanding noncommissioned officers from the army or the police force. To fill unit vacancies for officers of lower rank the Ministry of Defense usually advertised through the information media. Announcements were in the form of specified numbers of vacancies in the Somali Army Officers' Academy. To be eligible, applicants had to be citizens between seventeen and twenty-eight years of age and willing to serve for four years.

Completion of the third level of middle school (seven years of education) constituted the minimum acceptable academic experience for officer training, although it was desirable for cadets to have a diploma from upper middle school or its equivalent. Officer candidates were given written tests covering mathematics, language, and general information. High moral standards were also required; convictions for acts against the state, offenses against other persons, or violations of marriage laws disqualified an applicant. He could also be barred for previous expulsion from a military organization or educational instituion for disciplinary reasons. Officer candidates had to be in good health, and a physical examination was necessary.

Although there were no indications that the official requirements for a commission had changed substantially since the

Ogaden war, it was possible that in view of wartime losses and the buildup of army manpower the military had lowered its standards for officer candidates. At least one source suggests that the officer corps has tended to be staffed largely by members of lower middle class urban families or families of traders from the interior. On the other hand enlisted men tended to come from remote villages or nomadic life where opportunities for formal education were most limited.

Before the coup basic enlistment was for four years, but in 1981 there were indications that this term had been increased to six or more years. Prerequisites for joining any branch of the armed forces were that a man had to be between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five, physically fit, of high moral caliber, and have "youthful vigor." (In 1981, however, many enlisted men were reportedly in their thirties.) Before 1969 enlisted men were recruited for three categories of service: general duty with a line unit, administration, or assignments requiring technical skills. Recruits for administrative positions had to have an elementary education, and those for technical positions needed a government certificate attesting to their special qualifications. There were no special requirements for general duty.

In 1961 the Women's Auxiliary Corps was established. Enlistments were for two years, and recruits were selected and trained to fill positions in administration, personnel, and military welfare Qualified enlistees received a five-month period of basic training and instruction in typing, recordkeeping, and related administrative subjects. The corps was small, and most duty assignments were with National Army headquarters in Mogadishu or with subordinate headquarters in the field.

From the early 1960s until 1977 the Soviet Union played a major part in officer training. Many of the higher ranking Somali officers had served in the British and Italian colonial forces, and some had been trained at Italian military and police academies. By the mid-1970s it was estimated that as many as 60 percent of all officers on active duty had been exposed to the Soviet Union and its training systems. The army adopted Soviet methods of organization and tactical concepts, and its officers were schooled in Marxist-Leninist ideology and politics. All military training during the 1970s emphasized the army's role as a revolutionary force within the society as well as strategy and tactics. But it seemed in 1981 that defeat in the Ogaden war had modified these priorities.

In the early 1980s at least two major military academies provided training for officers; both were situated in Mogadishu. One offered general instruction, and the other was a staff school for senior officers. Foreign training was still available, although it appeared to emphasize technical instruction in the care and main-

tenance of specialized equipment purchased abroad, particularly in Italy. During the 1960s Egypt also had provided training for the army and its naval component, and there were indications that this was again being offered on a moderate scale.


During peacetime, enlisted recruits have received a six-month training course conducted by the appropriate service element. Elimination of illiteracy from the ranks has been a primary goal, and garrisons and detachments have provided educational improvement courses for new recruits. Attendance by illiterate recruits is mandatory. Noncommissioned officers have received leadership training at a special school in Mogadishu. Other specialized instruction has included commando, artillery, and driver training.

In addition to the quality of its manpower, equipment, and training, the ability of any military establishment to perform its assigned missions depends to a marked degree on whether it has a sense of institutional solidarity and esprit de corps. Somali military and paramilitary organizations recognize and accept this principle and have sought to foster allegiance through their own distinctive uniforms and systems of ranks and insignia. In 1981 the regular army wore summer uniforms of khaki and winter (rainy season) uniforms of olive drab. Members of the Darawishta, the elite paramilitary mobile unit, wore the traditional headcloth of national hero Mohamed Abdullah's warriors. Uniforms of the Women's Auxiliary Corps were buff-color, and those of the militia were bright green. In the Somali National Army, chevrons indicated enlisted ranks, and combinations of stars and shields indicated commissioned officer grades (see fig. 12).

In 1981 the Somali soldier was regarded by observers as disciplined and competent especially when operating in small units. Technical competence was generally lacking, however, and it was felt by some that wartime losses and political-clan maneuvering in the government were leading to morale problems (see Internal Security, this ch.).

Foreign Military Assistance

Lacking an indigenous arms industry, Somalia has had to rely on foreign sources for equipping its military and internal security forces. Because of domestic economic insufficiencies, however, the government has been unable to pay for significant military purchases and has had to depend on donor countries whose aid has been linked to perceived national interests. Foreign military aid has been difficult to obtain because of Somali irredentist claims against neighbors in the Horn and the widespread perception that Somalis would use their weapons offensively if given the opportunity. Except for the period when the Soviet Union was a close arms partner, Somalia has had to seek sources of military aid aggres-



Source: Based on information from Irving Kaplan, et. al., *Area Handbook for Somalia*, Washington, 1977, p. 324.

Figure 12. Army Ranks and Insignia

sively. As a small country in need of weaponry, "The problem for us is not choosing between independence and alignment," according to one Somali, "but rather figuring out which sauce we would prefer to be eaten with...perhaps we are better off selling ourselves than being sold by others."

The close fifteen-year relationship between Somalia and the Soviet Union developed from the Somali appraisal immediately after independence that its interests demanded a 20,000-man army. Government leaders first sought financial support for the army from the United States, but Washington—already a large supplier of arms to Ethiopia—initially refused to supply any aid. United States policymakers, in concert with Italy and West Germany, later agreed to provide US$10 million in aid for a 5,000-man force that would be oriented to internal security functions. Somalia looked elsewhere and in 1962 found the Soviet Union ready to grant loans worth US$32 million to expand and modernize the republic's army. The loan later was increased to the equivalent of US$55 million, and Moscow began to equip and train an army scheduled to reach a total of 14,000. The loan was made unconditionally, and Moscow allowed a leisurely repayment schedule over as much as twenty years.

During the rest of the 1960s the Soviet Union furnished small arms and artillery pieces as well as a substantial number of T–34 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and MiG–15 and MiG–17 aircraft. About 300 Soviet advisers in Somalia began training the army, while more than 500 Somali pilots, officers, and technicians received training in the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Until the 1969 coup Soviet aid to the army was counterbalanced to some extent by two factors: the Mogadishu government's Western political inclinations, and aid to the police force from the United States and West Germany. But by 1969 the army had become dominant over the police. After the coup the Soviet Union became Somalia's only major supplier of military matériel.

Close ideological ties and mutual interests reinforced the Somali-Soviet military relationship over the next several years. From Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko's visit to Mogadishu in 1972 came the agreement to improve and modernize the port of Berbera in return for use of the facility for communication, docking, and repairs. The Soviet Union thus built Berbera into an important base that contained a missile storage facility for its navy, an airfield with runways nearly 5,000 meters long capable of handling large bombers, and extensive radar and communications facilities. The Somali government denied that the installation was a Soviet military base and offered guided inspection tours to prove its point. But some of the visitors, notably a mission headed by United States Senator Dewey F. Bartlett in 1975, reported that the Soviet Union had complete control over the facility; it was de-

scribed by some observers as Soviet-operated, including the buildings' maintenance staff.

The base agreement was a marriage of mutual advantage. Somalia wanted military equipment, and the Soviet Union wanted a base in the strategic Indian Ocean Persian Gulf region from which to show the flag and to counter the United States' deployment of Polaris A–3 submarine-launched missiles, which Moscow viewed as having made the Arabian Sea a potential launching site for a strike against the Soviet Union. The Berbera facilities acquired additional importance when Soviet advisers were expelled from Egypt in July 1972, the Suez Canal was reopened in 1975, and oil shipments from the Persian Gulf through the canal increased.

After the signing of the 1974 treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow, the Somalis began taking delivery of improved military hardware: MiG–21 supersonic jet fighters, T–54 tanks, a SAM–2 missile defense system for Mogadishu, and modern torpedo and missile-armed fast attack and landing craft for the navy. Soviet military advisers were increased to about 1,500, supplemented by about fifty Cubans. One unconfirmed report stated that, in a secret clause in the treaty, Moscow agreed to write off Somalia's arms debt. During the fifteen-year association approximately 2,400 military personnel underwent training in the Soviet Union and 150 more in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union also provided the training and organizational model for the Somali army's intelligence apparatus and for the National Security Service (NSS).

Somalia's ideological ties with the Islamic world were reinforced by interests shared with several Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and have provided the basis for military assistance. Saudi attempts over several years to induce Mogadishu to break ties with Moscow met with little success before the Ogaden war; but in August 1977 a Saudi offer of a loan equivalent to US$400 million may have influenced Siad Barre's actions in the following months. Egypt was also active in its support of Somalia during the war, supplying the equivalent of approximately US$30 million in military aid, according to a report prepared for the United States Congress in 1978. Iran sent small arms to assist Somalia in the war, and there was considerable speculation that the Iranian shah had violated a United States restriction on the shipment of American-supplied military equipment to third parties—in this case, vehicles.

After the war Siad Barre and his representatives made a number of trips to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf to secure military assistance or financing. Egypt became Somalia's largest military donor after 1977, although relations between the two countries were strained by Somalia's refusal to pay for the equipment. Cairo

reportedly supplied large quantities of ammunition, spare parts from Egyptian stocks for some of the Soviet-made equipment, and military equipment that included T–54 and T–55 tanks and armored personnel carriers. Egypt, however, did not have the resources to do much more than slow the erosion of Somalia's military capability. It was not known in late 1981 what effect the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al Sadat would have on Egyptian-Somali military ties.

Although other Arab states were a major source of Somali finances, Siad Barre was reportedly disappointed in the aid he had received from them, including the conservative Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Arab attitudes toward Somalia were reportedly influenced by Siad Barre's unwillingness to break ties with Egypt after that country's 1978 peace treaty with Israel. Iraq has also objected to the Somalis offering the use of Berbera's military bases to the United States in return for American military equipment and economic aid. In 1980 Iraq was reported to be willing to give Somalia "important military aid" including Soviet-made tanks and spare parts if Mogadishu refused Washington's request for use of the Berbera facilities. The exact amount of aid given by Arab states, repayment arrangements (if any), and eventual use in civilian or military projects were unknown. Arab funds supported the purchase of foreign military equipment, most notably the acquisition of F–6 fighter-bomber aircraft from China in 1981.

Although China had maintained a close economic aid relationship with Somalia since 1963, it did not emerge as a major arms supplier until the F–6 deliveries. Previously the Chinese had only provided limited military aid—mostly small arms. President Siad Barre attached great importance to Somalia's relationship with Beijing, but China's own economic and military weaknesses would appear to preclude its supplying of military equipment to Somalia on the scale of the Soviet Union.

Before strained relations between the Soviet Union and Somalia became apparent in early 1977, the United States and West European countries had been unwilling to support the Mogadishu government militarily. Soviet influence and Somali agitation against the French colonial presence in neighboring Djibouti militated against even economic aid from the United States and Italy (which had been strong in the 1960s) or French support. In early 1977, responding to Somali disillusion with the Soviet Union and United States problems with Ethiopia, President Jimmy Carter instructed his government to "do everything possible to get the Somalis to be our friends."

In late July 1977, when the Somalis' Ogaden offensive was well under way, the United States announced that it was not opposed in principle to supplying defensive weapons to Somalia. This statement was preceded by extensive United States consultation with

its Middle East and European allies and was followed by announcements by Britain and France that they too would be willing to sell defensive weapons to Somalia. The three countries changed their policies within a month, however, because of the clear involvement of Somali regulars in the stepped-up hostilities in the Ogaden and the opposition of other African states, particularly Kenya.

The United States and most European countries took the position that no military items would be transferred to Somalia either directly or through third parties until Mogadishu withdrew its forces from the Ogaden. Siad Barre's March 1978 announcement of Somali troop withdrawal was followed by numerous written assurances in the hope of concluding an arms deal with Western nations. Western military assistance, however, may have in fact begun at the height of the Ogaden war when the West German government, in appreciation for Somali cooperation in the rescue by German commandos of passengers hijacked to Mogadishu aboard a German airliner, extended to Somalia credit equivalent to US$12 million. This February 1978 loan was not tied to any specific economic projects and could have been used, the Germans admitted, to purchase military equipment.

Since 1978 Italy has provided more military assistance to Somalia than has any other Western country. This aid included several large shipments of Fiat trucks, which were the backbone of Somalia's military transportation in 1981. In addition Italian companies, aided by generous export credits subsidized by the Italian government, supplied aircraft and training for Somali flight and ground crews beginning in 1979. Aircraft included six SIAI-Marchetti SF–260W single-engine trainer/tactical support aircraft and four G–222 twin-engine transports. Fiat, encouraged by government-subsidized export credits, sought to expand its commerce in Somalia by selling light tanks and armored cars. Total Italian exports to Somalia amounted to the equivalent of US$124 million in 1980, but following year, reports indicated that the Italian government was dissatisfied with Somali financing arrangements and had delayed delivery of the G–222s. A visit in 1981 by Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo to Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, which resulted in an aid package for Somalia equivalent to US$40 million, apparently resolved these difficulties.

Relations with France improved significantly after Djibouti achieved independence in 1977. The two countries also shared concern over Soviet activities in the Horn. Although a small number of French armored cars were delivered to Somalia in 1977 (possibly from a third country) and although the French firm Renault had sold a number of trucks to Somalia, friendship had not

been translated into significant arms sales by 1981 because of financing difficulties. In 1980 extensive negotiations were held between the two countries on the sale of C–160 Transall twin-engine transports, light tanks, and helicopters, but agreement could not be reached. According to a Somali general familar with the negotiations, "France is prepared to sell us arms, and we want to buy from France. However, we must find funds because France's attitude is purely commercial, which we feel is fair...."

The United States and Somalia were motivated more by strategic than commercial considerations in the arms agreement initialed in August 1980. "Our main objective," according to Siad Barre, "...is to have the Americans contribute to our national security." Washington was searching for military facilities to bolster the American presence in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region after the shah of Iran's fall from power in 1979. In December 1979 a United States Department of State mission concluded an agreement in principle allowing American access to Somali naval and air facilities in return for military equipment. The following month United States negotiators returned to Somalia and to Oman and Kenya, where they also sought facilities. Although final agreements were quickly completed with Kenya and Oman, Washington's negotiations with Mogadishu lasted eight months.

Differences between the two governments revolved around the amount of equipment to be sold by the United States. Somalia originally requested a list of items estimated by the Americans to cost US$2 billion, while the United States was interested in selling only defensive weaponry worth approximately US$40 million. Eventually agreement was reached that would provide three TPS–43 long-range air defense radars, twelve M–167 (towed) Vulcan 20mm air defense guns and associated communications equipment, support gear, spare parts, and training. The equipment and training, valued at US$42 million, were to be supplied on concessionary terms and delivered in 1982, although the Somalis were considering the purchase of weapons other than the relatively ineffective Vulcan guns. The agreement did not become official until February 1981 because of insistence by the United States Congress on the verified withdrawal of Somali troops from the Ogaden. By late 1981 numerous American military survey teams had been granted unprecedented access to Somali military installations, and it appeared that Somalia would be sent an additional US$20 million in military aid under fiscal year 1982 appropriations.

Internal Security

The Siad Barre government—aware of its birth by coup d'etat—has always been extremely conscious of protecting itself against possible domestic threats. After coming to power the military

regime sought to remove rival sources of political power and to replace the country's clan-based political and socioeconomic system with centralized national control. Since the mid–1970s, however, in the wake of disruptions caused by drought and the war, the government's internal security apparatus and the president's political skills appear to have been directed almost exclusively toward maintaining its grip on power rather than achieving societal reforms.

Governmental Security Policy

Immediately after the 1969 coup the military government moved to concentrate in its own hands control of all legislative, administrative, and judicial functions. Roughly sixty leaders of the previous government, businessmen, important lawyers, and senior military personnel who did not support the coup were arrested and tried by the National Security Court (NSC), which was created in April 1970 (see The Legal System, ch. 4). The following September the SRC proclaimed that any person who harmed the unity, peace, or sovereignty of the nation could be sentenced to death. Severe punishment could also be meted out to anyone who spread false propaganda against the government.

The Siad Barre government has generally shunned capital punishment (with some notable exceptions) in favor of the widespread use of imprisonment and reeducation of actual, suspected, or potential opponents. The earlier parliamentary government had been able to hold people without trial for up to ninety days during a state of emergency, but the military regime removed most legal restrictions on preventive detention. After the coup a local revolutionary council or the NSS could detain people regarded as dangerous to peace, order, good government, or the aims and spirit of the revolution. Regional governors could also order the search and arrest of persons suspected of a crime or of activities that threatened public order and security and could also requisition property or services without compensation.

The number of political prisoners held by the Somali government in 1980 was estimated by Amnesty International to number at least 100 and possibly many more. Most notable among these were former Prime Minister Egal and the respected former Chief of Police Mohammad Abshir Musa, both of whom had been in detention for more than a decade. Many who had served in Somalia's parliamentary government or had fallen from the regime's favor were known to have been "rehabilitated" and given official posts after attending reorientation courses or serving prison sentences. According to a former Somali official in 1981, many if not most influential citizens had been jailed at least once, indicating that imprisonment was used as a means of keeping

potential opponents off balance. The Siad Barre government, beginning three months after it assumed power, has occasionally declared special amnesties for prisoners, often on the anniversary of the SRC's ascension to power. These occurred most recently in April 1980 when 2,658 were released and in October 1981 when 5,009 were freed, including some political prisoners.

In 1974 all government employees were required to sign statements of intent to abide by security regulations. Contacts with foreigners had to be referred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; this measure was apparently sometimes ignored, but Somalis who had contacts with non-Soviet foreigners reportedly did so cautiously. By one account security officers conducted monthly interviews with government workers in which questions were asked about the loyalty of the workers' families and acquaintances. By the late 1970s it appeared that these restrictions were no longer in force or that they were frequently ignored by Somalis who were reportedly associating more freely with foreigners.

The Somali government apparently became most repressive immediately after the attempted coup in 1971—a period when Soviet advisers were most influential (see Challenges to the Regime, ch. 1). The government's explanation was that the coup attempt by some members of the SRC was aimed at protecting interests of the trading bourgeoisie and the tribal structure. Many expected that the government would announce clemency for the conspirators. Instead they were executed, with thousands observing. Many Somalis considered this an act of revenge inconsistent with Islamic principles and with past standards of justice in the country. It has been suggested that Siad Barre was counseled by his Soviet advisers to make an example of the plotters.

During its first years in power the SRC sought to undermine traditional Somali allegiance to Islamic religious leaders and descent groups. Although the military regime tried to avoid alienating religious leaders, it did not want them interfering in politics. During the early 1970s some Islamic leaders affirmed that Islam could never coexist with scientific socialism while Siad Barre stressed that they were entirely compatible.

The government also attempted during the mid-1970s to substitute allegiance to the nation for traditional allegiance to family and clan, thus eliminating a potential rallying point for opposition. Although the government itself was based ostensibly on an alliance between the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dolbahante clans, it was seen by many Somalis—except the Majerteyn, who had been systematically excluded because of their dominance in the old regime—to be as non-tribal as could be expected in Somalia. The authorities consistently stressed individual responsibility for all offenses, undermining the concept of collective responsibility that existed in traditional society and was the basis for the existence of

dia-paying groups. Traditional clan leadership responsibilities and titles such as sultan and sheikh were abolished, and by 1975 imprisonment on charges of "tribalism and nepotism" were reported to be accepted features of life under the regime. The persistence of clan-related loyalties was described at this time as the problem causing the most concern to the government.

Sources of Opposition

Despite its repressive features—or perhaps because its authoritarianism allowed it to act with a decisiveness not displayed by the previous civilian governments—the Siad Barre regime appeared relatively popular with most Somalis in the mid-1970s. The leading personnel of the military regime showed a remarkable stability after the coup attempt of 1971, but in the wake of decisive defeat in the Ogaden war and the expulsion of Soviet advisers new tensions emerged.

Even before the war the president was criticized for not moving to support guerrillas in annexing the Ogaden immediately after the Ethiopian emperor's death in 1975. Open criticism of his caution was not easily stifled because the Somali claim to the Ogaden had overwhelming national support and the approval of many government officials (see War in the Ogaden, ch. 1). The regime's commitment of regular troops to the Ogaden proved highly popular, as was Siad Barre's expulsion of the Soviet advisers, who had generally been resented by Somalis. But defeat in the field focused Somali criticism on the government.

After the retreat toward Hargeysa, Siad Barre met with his generals to discuss the battlefield situation, and reportedly six of them were summarily executed for activities against the security of the state. Opposition to the government was demonstrated on April 9, 1978, when a group of military officers (mostly Majerteyn) attempted a coup described as ill-timed, ill-planned, and ill-supported. The attempt was crushed within hours by forces loyal to Siad Barre, and seventy-four suspected plotters were arrested, although several escaped. After a month-long series of trials, thirty-six of those implicated were imprisoned and seventeen were shot the following October.

The coup plotters reportedly disapproved of the way the president had conducted the war. Although only a small group was implicated, discouragement over Somalia's predicament apparently was widespread throughout the armed forces and Somali society in general. There seems to have been a strong element in the officer corps that believed expulsion of the Soviets was precipitate. These views may have been reinforced by Somalia's continuing inability to obtain new military armament from other sources. Much of the criticism centered on Siad Barre's overreliance for advice and administration on members of his Marehan clan, few of whom were assigned to front line units during the war.

After the war it became increasingly obvious that the ruling alliance between the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dolbahante clans had been broken. The Ogaden—the clan of Siad Barre's mother, which had the most direct stakes in the war and reportedly suffered tremendously—broke openly with the regime over the president's wartime leadership. Since the war Siad Barre has protected his position by relying more on members of his own clan, placing them in important positions in the government, the armed forces, the security services, and other state agencies.

Increased disaffection with government policies and personalities was evidenced by numerous defections by government officials and the establishment of movements calling for the overthrow of Siad Barre. Because of prohibitions against unauthorized political activity, these organizations were based abroad. The best known was the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) operating from headquarters in Ethiopia. It appeared to have absorbed its predecessor, the Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF), which had been formed in Rome in 1976 and was thought to be comprised principally of Majerteyn under the leadership of former Minister of Justice Osman Nur Ali. The SSF was led by Lieutenant Colonel Abullahi Yusuf Ahmad (a survivor of the failed coup of 1978) and included former Minister of Education Hassan Ali Mireh and former Ambassador Muse Islan Farah. The SSF, which was supported by Ethiopia and Libya, claimed to sponsor a well-armed and well-trained guerrilla force of several thousand. Ethiopia had put a radio transmitter at the disposal of the SSF from which Radio Kulmis (Unity) beamed invective against Siad Barre to listeners in Somalia. Several bombings and sabotage attempts in 1981 were attributed to the SSF, but its guerrilla operations and propaganda broadcasts were not regarded as especially effective.

The SSF appeared to offer only limited potential as a rallying point for the opposition to the government. Although it claimed no ideological or political premise other than bitter hostility to the governing regime, its nationalist appeal was severely undercut by Ethiopia's support. The SSF claimed to encompass a broad range of opposition forces, but its leading figures, with important exceptions, were of the Majerteyn clan. Some of them, according to reports, have even urged independence for northern Somalia.

Leftist opposition to the Somali government was strengthened in October 1981 with the formation of the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), created when the SSF merged with the radical-left Somali Workers Party (SWP) and the newly formed Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia (DFLS). The latter groups, both based in Yemen (Aden), included some former members of the SRSP Central Committee who faulted Siad Barre for compromising Somalia's revolutionary goals. The DFSS was to be led by an eleven-man committee including Yusuf Ah-

mad as chairman, former SWP leader Idris Jama Hussein as vice chairman and, as secretary for information, Abdar Rahman Aidid Ahmad, former chairman of the SRSP ideology bureau, who with the reported backing of the Soviet Union had earlier united several smaller groups to form the DFLS. The leaders of the DFSS pledged to intensify "the armed and political struggle" against the Siad Barre regime, which had "destroyed the unity and solidarity of the Somali people" and "surrender[ed] to American imperialism and international reaction." The new organization had no identifiable clan orientation, but its close links with the Ethiopian government would appear to jeopardize its support among Somalis.

In April 1981 the Somali National Movement (SNM) was launched in London at a press conference reportedly attended by 500 Somali exiles living in Europe. It advocated for the republic a mixed economy and a neutralist foreign policy, rejecting alignment with either the Soviet Union or the United States and calling for the dismantling of all foreign military bases in the region. The numerical strength and full identity of the group were not revealed, although among its leaders were Hassan Adan Wadadi, former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and Ahmed Ismail Abdi, former minister of planning. The SNM sought to attract more broad-based support than other opposition groups, but at the time of its organization most of its leaders were reported to be of the Isaaq clan.

There were indications after the Ogaden war that the army continued to suffer from internal tensions that characterized other sectors of Somali society. As many as several dozen Somali military personnel—all from the Majerteyn clan—were executed secretly in the spring of 1980 for allegedly having supported the SSF. In 1981 further divisions were brought to the surface after Lieutenant General Ali Samantar, who was widely respected in the SRSP and the military as a nationalist not tied to narrow regional interests, was dismissed as minister of defense and replaced by Siad Barre's clansman, Haji Mohamed. Ali Samantar's removal reportedly resulted in incidents at a number of military camps, including a unit mutiny near the Ethiopian border and a work stoppage by some officers serving in the Ministry of Defense. According to some reports Siad Barre felt it necessary to call a special meeting at Defense Headquarters with senior military officers—including Haji Mohamed and Ali Samantar—to assert that the lieutenant general's removal had not been a demotion.

The flight of political and military officers into exile has mounted as Siad Barre has resorted increasingly to placing trusted relatives and clansmen in key positions to consolidate his personal authority. In late 1981 it seemed doubtful that the opposition groups formed abroad and linked to specific clans or dependent on regimes hostile to Somalia represented an imminent threat to

Siad Barre's leadership. Whether the existing government faced a more serious threat from domestic military and civilian dissidents could not be estimated. While dissatisfaction seemed to be growing and the base of Siad Barre's support had narrowed, any challenge by a rival clique would have to contend with a leader who had amply demonstrated his skill in retaining and reinforcing his power and in placating or neutralizing potential opponents. Given the prominent role of the military and the security apparatus, any serious attempt to overturn his rule probably would arise from within these institutions.

State Security Forces

In 1981 several police and intelligence organizations operated under centralized control to maintain public order, control crime, and protect the government against domestic threats. These units included the Somali Police Force, the NSS, the People's Militia, and a number of other intelligence-gathering operations; most of them were headed by trusted members of the president's family. Since 1976 control of the security apparatus has been increasingly concentrated in the presidency under the authority of Presidential Adviser on Security Affairs Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle, Siad Barre's son-in-law.

The Somali Police Force


The Somali Police Force, which numbered approximately 8,000 in 1981, was originally established as the government's primary organ for maintaining public order and internal security. Its influence and usefulness to the central government, however, had declined since the 1969 coup, and its law enforcement role was largely duplicated in the 1970s by the People's Militia.


The police force, considered a part of the armed forces since 1960, ultimately was responsible to the head of state, who was also commander in chief of the armed forces. It was not a branch of the Somali National Army, however, and did not operate under the army's command structure. Until 1976 the force's national commandant and his central command were under the control of the minister of interior.

Each of the country's administrative regions had a police commandant, and other commissioned officers were responsible for maintaining law and order in the districts. After 1972 the police outside Mogadishu comprised northern and southern group commands, divisional commands (corresponding to the regions), subdivisional commands (corresponding to the districts), station commands, and police posts. The responsibilities of officials commanding police stations varied, but regional and district police elements were under the authority of regional governors and district commissioners. It appeared that in 1981 the police commandant—Major General Adan Abdi Dualeh—followed in-

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

structions received directly from the president and from Suleiman Abdulle. The local authorities, however, were thought to retain significant control over regional and district police commands in order to facilitate local police work.

The national force grew out of police forces employed by the British and Italians to maintain the peace during the colonial period. Both European powers used Somalis as armed constables in rural areas, and Somalis eventually staffed the lower ranks of police forces, which had as officers only Europeans. The colonial forces were the source of the senior officers and commanders—including Siad Barre—who led the Somali Police Force and the army after national independence.

In 1960 the British Somaliland Scouts were integrated with the Police Force of Somalia from the trust territory, resulting in a force of about 3,700 men. Roughly 1,000 of them were organized as the Darawishta Poliska, a mobile group used to keep peace between warring clans in the interior. The new government could also call on it for assistance in military actions near Somalia's disputed borders.

Major General Abshir Musa commanded the Somali Police Force from 1959 until he resigned in early 1969. Under his leadership the force expanded to 6,000 men, acquired a reputation for professionalism and excellence, and remained committed to the rule of law and basic civil liberties. To a remarkable extent the police were able to remain above the nation's internal political struggles. Abshir Musa frequently complained of political interference with the judiciary, and during the national election in 1969 the police did much to preserve order. Abshir Musa resigned as a result of his conflict with the precoup civilian government over the use of the police for political purposes. His resignation greatly demoralized the force.

Under the parliamentary regime, police received training and material aid from West Germany, Italy, and the United States. Although the government was able to use the police to counterbalance the Soviet-supported army, no police commander actually opposed the army's coup in 1969. It was reported that much of their docility was a result of Siad Barre's negotiating skill.

The popular Abshir Musa was arrested shortly after the coup although he no longer held the post of police commandant. The commandant at the time was General Jama Ali Korshel, who became the government's first vice-president. Several months after the SRC's establishment Korshel was accused of leading a countercoup attempt and was arrested. The police have been represented in Somali governments since that time but with apparently diminishing influence, particularly since the post of minister of interior (held by police generals since 1969) was abolished in 1976.

By the late 1970s the Somali Police Force was organized to carry out a broad range of internal security responsibilities. The elite mobile police groups consisted of the Darawishta and the Birmadka Poliska (Riot Unit). The Darawishta, which was a mobile unit operating in remote areas and along the frontier, may have been absorbed into the army during the Ogaden war. The Birmadka was regarded as a crack unit for emergency action and also provided honor guards for ceremonial functions.

A police air wing, equipped with Cessna light aircraft and one Douglas DC–3, was established in 1961. The unit was able to operate from improvised landing fields near most of the remote police posts. The wing provided assistance to the field police units and to the Darawishta through airlift of supplies, reconnaissance, and the transport of personnel. It was not known what equipment the air wing was using in 1981.

Technical and specialized units included the Tributary Division, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the Traffic Division, a communications unit, and a training unit. The CID, the best known of these units, handled investigations, fingerprinting, criminal records, immigration matters, and passports and operated in both rural and urban areas. Although headquartered in the capital, the CID in the late 1960s had a communications network that allowed it to communicate with outlying stations. It had maintained close liaison with medical authorities involved in forensic science. The operational effectiveness of the CID in 1981 was not known but, according to one of Siad Barre's political critics, it was headed by an uneducated relative of the president.

A small unit of policewomen was formed in 1961. They were generally assigned to investigation, inspection, and interrogation of female offenders and victims. Policewomen were also assigned to cases involving female juvenile delinquents, ill or abandoned girls, prostitutes, and child beggars.

Service units included the Gadidka Poliska (Transport Department) and the health service. The Police Custodial Corps served as prison guards—the most difficult police job, according to Siad Barre in a 1972 speech. In 1971 a national fire brigade was established and staffed with fifty persons under the control of the Somali Police Force. It operated exclusively in Mogadishu, but the Three Year Plan 1979–1981 called for the expansion of the brigade into several other growing towns, including Kismaayo, Hargeysa, Berbera, Marka, Jowhar, and Beled Weyne.

In the early 1970s police recruits had to be seventeen to twenty-five years of age, of high moral caliber, and physically fit. After joining they received six months' training at the National Police Academy in Mogadishu. Once this training was completed, recruits sat for an examination and, if they passed, served two years on the force. When this service was completed, the policemen

could request renewal of their contracts. Pay and allowances were thought to be the same as for members of the armed forces except that there were extra allowances for certain specified kinds of duty.

At least until 1972 no Somali with a university education had ever applied to join the police, although some policemen had earned degrees while serving. The force still had a policy of recruiting secondary school graduates as cadet officers, but by 1972 the trend was toward making officers of men who had earned their secondary school education while serving as police. Recruiting from the ranks undoubtedly improved morale and meant that more officers had previous police experience.

Officers at this time underwent a stiff training course of nine months' duration. The force emphasized supervision of policemen's field performances and provided for their periodic retraining. Darawishta members received special training in a six-month tactical training course, and Birmadka personnel were trained in public order and riot control. Training at the local level was increased after the United States and West Germany ceased training support for Somali policemen in 1970 and when Italy curtailed its instruction. During the 1970s the Somali Police Force was assisted by security advisers from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). After relations with Western nations improved in the late 1970s, West German and Italian advisers were again actively training units of the force, European-made vehicles were supplied to police units, and Somali policemen underwent instruction in West Germany and Italy. In mid–1980 a delegation headed by the general commandant of the Italian Carabinieri Corps held talks with Somali officials on increasing cooperation between the two forces.

People's Militia

In 1981 the People's Militia, known as the Gulwadayal or Victory Pioneers, was a large paramilitary force that had strong political connections and was described by one former Somali official as politically more influential than the army. Organized by the SRC in August 1972 as a wing of the army, it nevertheless worked under the separate supervision of the political bureau of the presidency. It was not known what connection, if any, existed between the militia and the Young Pioneers, an organization established by the army during the era of civilian government. Since the formation of SRSP in 1976 the militia had been, in effect, part of the party apparatus. Largely because of the increased need for military reserves, militia membership increased from 2,500 in 1977 to less than 10,000 members of both sexes in 1979. They were reportedly commanded in 1980 by Abdirihan Hussein, a son-in-law of the president.

The militia operated throughout the country, staffing govern-

ment and party orientation centers that were located in all settlements. Officially its duties were to aid in self-help schemes; to spread principles that would encourage revolutionary progress; to fight laziness, misuse of public property, and reactionary ideas and actions; and to promote and defend Somali culture and traditional heritage. The most visible duties of the organization, however, involved law enforcement—responsibilities that paralleled the duties of regular policemen. The militia had authority, used extensively in the mid–1970s, to perform such duties as checking contacts between Somalis and foreigners. It had powers of arrest independent of the police. Members of the organization were more highly visible than the regular police, reportedly keeping both government officials and ordinary members of the population under their scrutiny. In rural areas they formed vigilance corps, performing police and guard duties over grazing areas and in towns. Before the Ogaden war they played an important role in initiating self-help schemes and "crash programs," but these activities had apparently decreased since the war.

According to government statements, the militia comprised youths, workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Most members, however, were from the ranks of the unemployed and were frequently described by Somalis as "misfits" or "thugs." Students were reportedly tapped for positions of leadership in the organization; but according to one foreign observer in 1980, they were usually ostracized by their peers who felt they could no longer be trusted.

Intelligence and Protective Services

The NSS and a number of other intelligence organizations have operated, like the militia, outside the bureaucratic structure to protect the governing regime. Established after 1969 with assistance from the Soviet Committee of State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti—KGB), the NSS developed into a pervasive and effective instrument of domestic surveillance having broad powers of arrest and investigation. Members of the civil service and the military were reportedly under constant watch, and NSS reports played an important role in the promotion and demotion of government officials. The service was headed for a decade before April 1981 by the president's son-in-law, Suleiman Abdulle. The identity of his replacement has not been revealed but the NSS and Suleiman Abdulle, in his post as presidential adviser on security affairs, have remained influential in day-to-day decisions on domestic security matters and have been reported to be influential in foreign policymaking.

The NSS in 1981 was an elite organization staffed by men from the army and the police force who had been chosen for their loyalty to Siad Barre. Although it was organized along KGB lines and reportedly employed Soviet advisers until the break between the two countries, lasting Soviet influence appeared to be of a

technical—not ideological—nature. After 1977 the NSS was perceived by outside observers as being less pro-Soviet than other branches of the security apparatus, including the army.

Among the organizations engaged in protecting key government officials was the 5,000-man army unit that provided presidential security. Many of its members were from the Marehan clan and they were stationed at the Mogadishu army headquarters, where the president lived much of the time. The commander of the unit was reported in 1980 to have been Colonel Mohamed Siad Morgan, another son-in-law of the president.

A number of other organizations—staffed largely by members of the Marehan clan, operated by trusted relatives, and ultimately controlled by the president—engaged in gathering intelligence. According to a report published by opponents of the government, in 1980 military intelligence, formerly headed by Suleiman Abdulle, was under the supervision of Colonel Mohamed Samantar, a cousin of Siad Barre. The same report stated that the president's elder wife, Khadiija Maalim, headed the section of the NSS concerned with counterespionage. Trusted Marehans were placed throughout the government in the late 1970s; this "old boy" network filtered information directly to Siad Barre.

The Prison System

The government's extensive use of imprisonment to punish criminals and politically threatening persons has strained the physical resources of a penal system that had been inadequate even earlier. The few prisons that existed before 1960 had been established during the British and Italian colonial administrations. By the time of independence these facilities had deteriorated and were inadequately staffed.

Aware of the deficiencies of its prisons, the government at independence included in the constitution an article asserting the premise that criminal punishment must not be an obstacle to moral reeducation of those convicted. This article implied a complex form of prison organization and a strong emphasis on prisoner rehabilitation.

In 1962 the Somali Penal Code laid down the underlying principles for reorganizing the prison system. The code required that prisoners of all ages work during prison confinement. In return for labor on prison farms, construction projects, and roadbuilding, prisoners were paid a modest sum, which they could spend in prison canteens or retain until their release. The Siad Barre government retained compulsory labor as part of most prison sentences because of its concern with the rehabilitation of prisoners. It apparently held the same view as the earlier parliamentary government: that labor contributes to rehabilitation by guarding against idleness and promoting socially constructive activity for inmates.

According to the 1962 penal code, juvenile offenders were not to be imprisoned with adult offenders. In practice during the 1960s they were usually segregated in special juvenile sections of the Mogadishu and Mandheera central prisons.

By the time of the 1969 coup the system included forty-nine facilities, the best equipped of which was Mogadishu's central prison. Four large, modern, well-equipped prisons were known to have been constructed with East German assistance during the 1970s. Since 1969 the prison system has been characterized by severe overcrowding; as a result schools, military and police headquarters, and even part of the presidential palace have been used as makeshift jails. The size of the country's prison population was unknown in 1981 but was estimated to number several thousand. Overcrowding was apparently relieved only by periodic amnesties granted by the government.

Amnesty International and the United States Department of State have reported that there was no evidence to indicate that prisoners were physically ill-treated by prison guards, who were from the Somali Police Force Custodial Corps. An unknown number of prisoners have been kept in solitary confinement, however, often in small, continuously lit cells without access to reading materials or fresh air.

* * *

There are no definitive studies describing the full scope of national security affairs in contemporary Somalia, but several works provide significant elements of the overall theme. A useful introduction to the military's role in the society can be found in the concluding chapters of I.M. Lewis' *A Modern History of Somalia* and in several of his articles published after the advent of military government. David Laitin also has written informative articles about the Siad Barre government that touch upon national security policy, the military, and the security services. The dispute with Ethiopia is well covered in *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa* by Bereket H. Selassie and in Tom J. Farer's *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa.* Both books provide brief overviews on the Somali armed forces and the internal security system. Useful information on the historical development of Somali security forces can be found in the 1970 and 1977 editions of the *Area Handbook for Somalia.*

Readers who wish to do further research on Somali national security matters using publicly available sources will find useful the International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual, *The Military Balance; Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents,* edited by noted British Africanist Colin Legum; the periodical *Horn of Africa;* and the monthly *Africa Research Bulletin.* Translations of relevant foreign publications and radiobroad-

casts regarding Somali national security can be found in the *Sub-Saharan Africa Report* series published by the Joint Publications Research Service, and Foreign Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Report, Middle East and Africa.* (For further information see Bibliography.)

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Table 1. Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
.....	1.1	short tons
.....	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9, divide by 5, and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

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Table 2. Population by Category and Region, 1975
(in thousands)

Region	Total		Nomadic		Settled Farming		Nonagricultural	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage[1]	Number	Percentage[1]	Number	Percentage[1]
Woqooyi Galbeed	440	11.8	271	7.3 (62)	118	3.2 (27)	51	1.4 (12)
Togdheer	258	6.9	198	5.3 (77)	42	1.1 (16)	18	0.5 (7)
Sanaag	145	3.9	113	3.0 (78)	22	0.6 (15)	10	0.3 (7)
Bari	154	4.2	116	3.1 (75)	27	0.7 (18)	11	0.3 (7)
Nugaal	87	2.3	66	1.8 (76)	15	0.4 (17)	6	0.1 (7)
Mudug	215	5.8	170	4.6 (79)	32	0.8 (15)	13	0.3 (6)
Galguduud	182	4.9	119	3.2 (65)	44	1.2 (24)	19	0.5 (10)
Hirraan	147	3.9	116	3.1 (79)	22	0.6 (15)	9	0.2 (6)
Shabeellaha Dhexe	263	7.1	166	4.5 (63)	68	1.8 (26)	29	0.8 (11)
Shabeellaha Hoose	398	10.7	193	5.2 (48)	143	3.9 (36)	62	1.7 (16)
Banaadir	380	10.2	—	—	—	—	380	10.2 (100)
Gedo	212	5.7	181	4.8 (85)	22	0.6 (10)	9	0.3 (4)
Jubbada Dhexe	216	5.8	141	3.8 (65)	52	1.4 (24)	23	0.6 (11)
Jubbada Hoose	223	6.0	155	4.2 (70)	48	1.3 (22)	20	0.5 (9)
Bakool	100	2.7	79	2.1 (79)	15	0.4 (15)	6	0.2 (6)
Bay	302	8.1	100	2.7 (33)	141	3.8 (47)	61	1.6 (20)
Total[2]	3,722	100.0	2,184	58.7	811	21.8	727	19.5

[1] Percentage in parenthesis is proportion of each category in each region.
[2] If nomads were undercounted by 700,000, then total is 4,422,000; nomads are 2,884,000; and nomadic population is 65.2 percent; settled farming, 18.3 percent; and nonagricultural, 16.4 percent.

Source: Based on information from Somalia, State Planning Commission, *Three Year Plan, 1979–1981*, Mogadishu, 1979, Table 19–1.

Table 3. Primary and Secondary Education, 1968–69 to 1978–79

Year[1]	Classes	Enrollment		Teachers	
		Total	Female	Total	Female
Primary					
1968–69	1,052	35,306	7,937	1,186	119
1969–70	1,427	48,609	9,576	1,542	82
1970–71	1,510	50,384	12,091	1,654	204
1971–72	1,767	59,846	14,547	1,946	253
1972–73	2,085	78,133	20,075	2,454	263
1973–74	2,544	96,903	27,399	2,842	287
1975–76	5,148	219,517	75,526	4,281	627
1976–77	5,640	229,030	81,119	6,540	1,263
1977–78	5,994	230,189	83,876	8,496	2,149
1978–79	6,856	263,751	95,200	8,141	2,070
Secondary					
1968–69	97	3,133	358	201	34
1969–70	196	6,412	737	334	5
1970–71	203	7,088	1,131	349	38
1971–72	231	8,153	1,267	453	69
1972–73	262	9,457	1,452	579	68
1973–74	316	10,500	1,773	640	76
1975–76	227	7,046	1,062	572	68
1976–77	356	13,666	3,128	988	109
1977–78	363	14,178	3,523	916	92
1978–79	474	18,416	4,373	1,201	87
Total					
1968–69	1,149	38,439	8,295	1,387	153
1969–70	1,623	55,021	10,313	1,876	87
1970–71	1,713	57,472	13,222	2,003	242
1971–72	1,998	67,999	15,814	2,399	322
1972–73	2,347	87,590	21,527	3,033	331
1973–74	2,860	107,403	29,172	3,482	363
1975–76	5,375	226,563	76,588	4,853	695
1976–77	5,996	242,696	84,247	7,528	1,372
1977–78	6,357	244,367	87,399	9,412	2,241
1978–79	7,330	282,167	99,573	9,342	2,157

[1] Statistics for 1974–75 are not available in official sources.

Table 4. Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1977

Region	Doctors	Medical Assistants	Dispensaries	Hospitals	Hospital Beds
Bakool	4	2	8	3	173
Banaadir	111	297	13	4	2,560
Bari	2	19	8	6	99
Bay	7	31	17	3	175
Galguduud	1	18	11	4	61
Gedo	2	21	13	5	81
Hiiraan	10	35	14	5	282
Jubbada Dhexe	3	51	7	2	280
Jubbada Hoose	15	20	24	5	290
Mudug	10	7	11	4	90
Nugaal	1	14	7	4	122
Sanaag	1	22	8	3	115
Shabeellaha Dhexe	2	54	16	4	131
Shabeellaha Hoose	10	18	25	5	170
Togdheer	3	27	10	2	275
Woqooyi Galbeed	16	117	17	7	1,052
Total	198	753	209	66	5,956

Source: Based on information from Somalia, State Planning Commission, *Three Year Plan 1979–1981*, Mogadishu, 1979, Table 19–10.

Table 5. Number of People Served by Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1977
(in thousands)

Region	Per Doctor	Per Medical Assistant	Per Dispensary	Per Hospital	Per Hospital Bed
Bakool	25	50	12	33	0.6
Banaadir	3	1	28	92	0.1
Bari	77	8	19	26	0.8
Bay	43	10	18	101	1.7
Galguduud	182	10	17	26	3.6
Gedo	106	10	16	43	2.6
Hiiraan	15	4	10	29	0.6
Jubbada Dhexe	72	4	32	108	0.8
Jubbada Hoose	15	11	9	45	0.8
Mudug	22	31	20	54	2.4
Nugaal	87	5	12	22	2.0
Sanaag	145	7	18	48	1.3
Shabeellaha Dhexe	132	5	16	45	2.0
Shabeellaha Hoose	40	22	16	79	2.3
Togdheer	86	10	26	129	0.9
Woqooyi Galbeed	28	4	26	63	0.4
COUNTRYWIDE	18	5	17	53	0.6

Source: Based on information from Somalia, State Planning Commission, *Three Year Plan 1979–1981*, Mogadishu, 1979, Table 19–11.

*Table 6. Somalia's External Public Debt, Including Undisbursed, by Credit Source, as of December 31, 1979** (in thousands of United States dollars)

Credit Source	Disbursed	Undisbursed	Total
Bilateral Loans			
Arab Countries			
Abu Dhabi	67,048	39,999	107,047
Algeria	1,000	—	1,000
Iraq	14,535	1,964	16,499
Kuwait	27,139	17,531	44,670
Libya	3,000	—	3,000
Qatar	10,000	—	10,000
Saudi Arabia	81,867	45,912	127,779
Subtotal	204,589	105,406	309,995
Eastern Europe			
Bulgaria	4,876	—	4,876
East Germany	1,095	—	1,095
Soviet Union	109,974	—	109,974
Subtotal	115,945	—	115,945
China	87,177	74,389	161,566
United States	12,691	17,700	30,391
Total	420,402	197,495	617,897
Multilateral Loans			
African Development Bank	2,938	—	2,938
African Development Fund	7,061	28,700	35,761
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development	34,688	25,338	60,026
International Development Association	62,502	67,531	130,033
Islamic Development Bank	7,658	30,968	38,626
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries Special Account	7,300	2,660	9,960
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Special Fund	2,050	7,700	9,750
Total	124,197	162,897	287,094
Nationalization Compensation			
Italy	1,106	—	1,106
Total	1,106	—	1,106
TOTAL	545,705	306,392	906,097

— means none.

* Debts of more than one year (original or extended) maturity, repayable in foreign currency and/or merchandise.

Table 7. Estimated Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin at Current Prices, Selected Years, 1970–78
(in millions of Somali shillings)*

	1970	1972	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, and Fishing	1,190.2	1,589.2	1,125.9	2,509.6	2,777.0	3,294.2	3,917.2
Agriculture	269.1	359.3	322.6	405.0	429.2	520.3	561.4
Foods crops	(205.6)	(287.4)	(253.6)	(309.4)	(382.8)	(418.6)	(463.1)
Industrial crops	(63.5)	(71.9)	(69.0)	(95.6)	(96.9)	(101.7)	(98.3)
Livestock	758.0	1,052.7	600.5	1,881.6	2,081.3	2,480.2	3,052.0
Forestry	158.0	171.0	190.0	205.0	225.0	253.0	287.0
Fishing	5.1	6.2	12.8	18.0	41.5	40.7	16.8
Mining and Quarrying	23.0	26.0	30.0	35.0	36.0	40.0	28.0
Manufacturing	186.2	214.0	199.7	226.2	334.6	439.0	433.2
Of which small establishments	(80.1)	(87.0)	(83.0)	(88.0)	(125.0)	(158.0)	(165.0)
Electricity and Water	4.9	10.1	16.9	20.0	31.7	32.9	39.0
Construction	105.0	128.0	257.0	204.0	219.0	302.0	206.0
Transport and Communications	95.2	138.6	168.6	210.1	258.2	316.5	365.3
Trade, Hotels, and Restaurants	110.6	137.7	175.9	240.0	285.0	340.0	378.6
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	90.5	102.3	160.3	228.2	260.0	311.5	450.2
Government Services	147.5	172.0	248.6	268.0	308.0	368.8	608.0
Other Services	51.6	63.0	85.6	107.5	129.0	148.6	169.6
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST	2,004.7	2,580.9	2,468.5	4,048.6	4,646.6	5,593.5	6,494.5
Indirect taxes, net of subsidies	253.5	329.4	474.9	522.8	536.2	678.6	1,010.1
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES	2,258.2	2,910.3	2,943.4	4,511.4	5,182.8	6,272.1	7,504.6

* For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Somalia, Ministry of National Planning, *Somalia: Country Programme for the 1980s for Presentation to the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries*, Mogadishu, January 1981, p. 16.

Table 8. Estimated Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin in Constant 1970 Prices, Selected Years, 1970–78[1]

(in millions of Somali shillings[2])

	1970	1972	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, and Fishing	1,190.2	1,243.3	768.3	1,330.4	1,338.0	1,411.2	1,431.9
Agriculture	269.1	294.3	191.2	233.8	241.1	241.3	246.9
Foods crops	(205.6)	(236.1)	(146.6)	(176.0)	(189.3)	(189.6)	(197.9)
Industrial crops	(63.5)	(58.2)	(44.6)	(57.8)	(51.8)	(51.7)	(49.9)
Livestock	758.0	776.3	387.7	897.4	879.1	947.4	970.0
Forestry	158.0	167.0	180.0	188.0	197.0	205.0	215.0
Fishing	5.1	5.7	9.4	11.2	20.8	17.5	6.2
Mining and Manufacturing	209.2	225.8	167.1	179.9	165.2	183.9	155.6
Electricity and Water	4.9	9.5	12.3	13.8	21.6	22.2	26.6
Construction	105.0	105.7	104.9	88.4	80.6	114.1	70.0
Transport and Communications	95.2	133.3	72.8	105.2	111.6	109.8	143.9
Trade, Hotels, and Restaurants	110.6	142.8	144.8	165.5	172.3	185.0	185.0
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	90.5	106.1	132.0	157.3	162.0	170.3	219.9
Government Services	147.5	178.3	204.7	184.8	186.2	201.7	297.0
Other Services	51.6	65.3	70.5	74.1	78.0	81.3	92.9
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST	2,004.7	2,210.1	1,677.4	2,299.4	2,315.5	2,479.5	2,629.0
Indirect taxes, net of subsidies	253.5	341.6	391.0	360.5	324.1	371.1	493.5
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES	2,258.2	2,551.7	2,068.4	2,659.9	2,639.6	2,850.6	3,122.5

[1] For agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing, value added has been calculated on the basis of the value of gross output in constant 1970 prices. For other industry sectors the following deflators were used: mining and manufacturing—the import price index of industrial inputs; electricity—the price index of electricity; construction—the import price index of building materials; transport—the import price index of petroleum products, excluding kerosine; finance, insurance, real estate, government services, and other services—the consumer price index for Mogadishu.

[2] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Somalia, Ministry of National Planning, *Somalia: Country Programme for the 1980s for Presentation to the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries*, Mogadishu, January 1981, p. 17.

Table 9. Production of Principal Crops, Selected Years, 1970–78
(in thousands of tons)

	1970	1972	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Staple Foods							
Sorghum	158.1	149.1	125.7	134.7	139.9	145.1	141.1
Maize	122.1	114.9	96.8	103.6	107.6	111.3	107.7
Rice	2.9	3.5	4.1	4.9	5.4	8.4	12.1
Beans	10.9	10.3	8.8	9.4	9.8	10.2	10.1
Industrial Crops							
Sesame	43.4	41.0	34.7	37.3	38.8	40.6	40.0
Groundnuts	3.0	2.9	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.8
Cotton	3.6	3.3	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.2
Sugarcane	450.4	401.0	382.6	370.0	333.3	320.0	311.5
Export Crops							
Bananas	145.5	188.5	157.5	106.0	96.6	65.2	69.7
Other							
Vegetables	28.8	27.2	23.0	24.7	25.7	26.9	26.5

Table 10. Production of Principal Manufacturing Industries, 1975–79

Product	Unit of Measure	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Sugar	thousand tons	30.60	33.20	30.00	24.00	21.12
Canned meat	million tins	14.43	10.90	6.63	—	1.50
Canned fish	thousand tons	2.22	1.84	2.33	---	---
Milk	million liters	2.16	3.67	3.84	3.31	2.71
Pasta and wheat flour	thousand tons	—	7.85	8.42	8.11	5.78
Pasta	-do-	—	(4.62)	(7.23)	(7.74)	(5.73)
Wheat flour	-do-	—	(3.23)	(1.19)	(0.37)	(0.05)
Canned fruits and vegetables	-do-	0.94	1.45	1.17	0.87	0.97
Textiles	million yards	5.50	7.30	12.92	13.80	9.93
Packaging materials	thousand tons	5.20	6.77	5.04	4.75	5.20
Cardboard boxes	-do-	(4.80)	(6.40)	(4.76)	(4.50)	(4.90)
Plastic bags	-do-	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.30)
Cigarettes	-do-	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.24	0.26
Matches	-do-	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.09
Petroleum products	-do-	—	—	—	—	223.26

— means none.
--- negligible.

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Somalia, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1979: 19th Financial Year, 1 January–31 December 1979*, Mogadishu, pp. 12, 19.

Table 11. Live Animal Exports, 1970–78
(number in thousands; unit value in Somali shillings; value in millions of Somali shillings)*

	Sheep			Goats			Cattle		
Year	Number	Unit Value	Value	Number	Unit Value	Value	Number	Unit Value	Value
1970	546	78.8	43.0	605	69.3	41.9	45	344.4	15.5
1971	608	77.0	46.8	576	71.9	41.4	56	330.4	18.5
1972	789	79.8	62.9	828	73.1	60.5	77	289.6	22.3
1973	684	106.3	72.7	639	102.7	65.6	70	501.4	35.1
1974	655	141.2	92.5	556	140.5	78.1	27	800.0	21.6
1975	773	199.5	154.2	754	194.7	146.8	39	859.0	33.5
1976	374	216.3	80.9	374	211.2	79.0	76	946.1	71.9
1977	461	207.2	95.5	442	212.9	94.1	54	772.2	41.7
1978	738	264.1	192.3	723	352.7	255.0	74	1,363.5	100.9

	Camels				
Year	Number	Unit Value	Value	Total Number	Total Value
1970	26	730.8	19.0	1,222	119.3
1971	24	691.7	16.6	1,264	123.4
1972	21	700.0	14.7	1,715	160.5
1973	28	832.1	23.3	1,421	196.7
1974	24	1,258.3	30.2	1,262	222.4
1975	33	1,436.4	47.4	1,599	382.0
1976	37	1,335.1	49.4	861	281.2
1977	35	1,377.1	48.2	992	279.5
1978	21	1,928.6	40.5	1,546	588.7

* For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Table 12. Principal Exports, 1975–79[1]

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
In Millions of Somali Shillings[2]					
Bananas	80.9	88.2	53.1	59.0	73.2
Live animals	364.4	301.9	299.5	570.4	474.1
Meat and meat products	59.3	37.1	32.1	0.7	7.3
Hides and skins	20.7	44.4	23.6	29.7	56.4
Fish and fish products	17.4	23.3	21.2	4.3	2.7
Myrrh	14.4	11.3	11.7	14.8	21.0
Other	6.3	4.1	7.8	10.2	32.7
TOTAL	563.4	510.3	449.0	689.1	667.4
Percentage of Total					
Bananas	14.4	17.3	11.8	8.6	11.0
Live animals	64.7	59.2	66.7	82.8	71.0
Meat and meat products	10.5	7.3	7.1	0.1	1.1
Hides and skins	3.7	8.7	5.3	4.3	8.5
Fish and fish products	3.1	4.6	4.7	0.6	0.4
Myrrh	2.6	2.2	2.7	2.1	3.1
Other	1.1	0.8	1.7	1.5	4.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[1] Values according to export receipts.
[2] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Table 13. Principal Destinations of Exports, 1973–78

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
In Millions of Somali Shillings[1]						
Arab States						
Saudi Arabia	194.1	221.5	360.4	282.1	263.8	575.1
Yemen (Aden)[2]	26.1	12.1	12.4	2.9	2.4	1.9
Kuwait	11.0	18.2	21.2	4.6	1.1	1.3
Other	8.1	12.9	27.1	25.0	20.1	25.2
Subtotal	239.3	264.7	421.1	314.6	287.4	603.5
Other Countries						
Italy	56.2	39.9	41.0	105.9	57.8	53.5
Iran	5.9	25.4	26.0	6.1	1.1	—
Soviet Union	9.3	21.2	30.7	41.6	13.9	0.1
China	11.0	15.1	15.8	15.0	2.3	6.0
Other	18.7	24.3	39.5	21.8	34.0	7.9
Subtotal	101.1	125.9	153.0	190.4	109.1	67.5
TOTAL	340.4	390.6	574.1	505.0	396.5	671.0
Percentage of Total						
Arab States						
Saudi Arabia	57.0	56.7	62.8	55.9	66.5	85.7
Yemen (Aden)[2]	7.7	3.1	2.2	0.6	0.6	0.3
Kuwait	3.2	4.7	3.7	0.9	0.3	0.2
Other	2.4	3.3	4.7	4.9	5.1	3.7
Subtotal	70.3	67.8	73.4	62.3	72.5	89.9
Other Countries						
Italy	16.5	10.2	7.1	21.0	14.6	8.0
Iran	1.8	6.5	4.5	1.2	0.3	—
Soviet Union	2.7	5.4	5.3	8.2	3.5	—
China	3.2	3.9	2.8	3.0	0.6	0.9
Other	5.5	6.2	6.9	4.3	8.5	1.2
Subtotal	29.7	32.2	26.6	37.7	27.5	10.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

— means none.

[1] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

[2] People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Table 14. Imports by Major Use Categories, 1973–78[1]
(in millions of Somali shillings)[2]

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Consumer Goods						
Food	134.0	175.7	235.0	221.2	305.6	250.5
Cereals and cereal products	(57.5)	(71.5)	(161.0)	(134.1)	(191.4)	(31.1)
Fruits and vegetables	(12.3)	(13.2)	(18.8)	(5.0)	(6.3)	(7.9)
Sugar and sugar products	(42.3)	(61.5)	(4.4)	(1.4)	(1.6)	(78.4)
Dairy products	(1.2)	(1.5)	(7.4)	(12.5)	(23.9)	(66.3)
Coffee, tea, and cocoa	(11.0)	(13.9)	(12.3)	(22.4)	(20.7)	(32.4)
Oilseeds	(0.1)	—	(0.1)	(1.5)	(5.2)	—
Animal and vegetable oils	(7.9)	(12.8)	(29.5)	(41.4)	(51.4)	(32.0)
Other food	(1.7)	(1.3)	(1.5)	(2.9)	(5.1)	(2.4)
Beverages and tobacco	19.8	7.3	18.4	22.9	19.9	64.2
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	37.2	24.2	25.3	27.9	47.5	20.0
Personal and household toiletries	9.1	6.5	1.2	1.0	2.0	4.4
Textile articles, fabrics, and yarns	56.5	95.2	29.4	33.9	52.0	68.2
Clothing and footwear	21.5	20.2	7.8	11.4	24.7	54.3
Other manufactured goods	22.6	23.8	31.9	43.1	35.4	127.1
Subtotal	300.7	352.9	349.0	361.4	487.1	588.7
Mineral Fuels						
Petroleum and petroleum products	28.6	60.1	59.4	66.5	61.4	100.5
Other	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.5	1.1	0.3
Subtotal	28.8	60.3	60.0	67.0	62.5	100.8

Table 14. Continued)
(in millions of Somali shillings)[2]

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Intermediate Goods						
Fertilizers (manufactured)	5.4	3.1	5.9	0.1	3.9	—
Other chemicals	25.6	33.7	27.6	38.0	9.1	49.6
Rubber products	8.6	16.0	15.9	22.5	43.4	21.4
Paper and paper products	36.4	49.2	45.5	27.1	51.7	16.2
Wood, lumber, cork, and products	10.8	24.5	13.5	17.3	20.5	9.9
Cement and building materials	10.3	29.9	46.1	34.9	55.5	42.1
Iron and steel	18.3	68.2	22.9	29.1	53.3	26.3
Metal and mineral manufactures	30.1	36.9	37.0	42.8	43.1	121.1
Other	20.1	27.4	39.2	57.5	78.5	61.1
Subtotal	165.6	288.9	253.6	269.3	359.0	347.7
Capital Goods						
Nonelectrical machinery	69.6	88.1	152.1	93.9	196.7	112.7
Electrical machinery	26.3	37.8	36.2	31.9	118.5	59.8
Transportation equipment	84.5	67.9	120.4	150.2	195.0	298.3
Subtotal	180.4	193.8	308.7	276.0	510.2	470.8
Other	1.9	2.5	2.4	4.3	14.0	10.9
TOTAL	677.4	898.4	973.7	978.0	1,432.8	1,518.9

— means negligible

[1] On cost, insurance, and freight basis. Imports through the *franco valuta* market not included.

[2] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

Table 15. Merchandise Imports by Area and Principal Countries of Origin, 1973–78[1]
(in millions of Somali shillings)[2]

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Western Europe						
Italy	212.0	249.1	311.5	251.7	406.1	459.2
West Germany	35.4	29.9	60.0	67.7	74.1	159.7
Britain	32.5	31.7	52.8	55.7	132.2	146.7
France	28.1	33.2	15.7	13.9	18.2	10.2
Other	25.7	39.6	58.7	86.7	57.3	111.3
Subtotal	333.7	383.5	498.7	475.7	687.9	887.1
Eastern Europe						
Soviet Union	63.5	112.7	74.8	119.6	174.7	9.2
Other	9.8	14.7	8.2	20.3	39.5	5.4
Subtotal	73.3	127.4	83.0	139.9	214.2	14.6
Africa						
Kenya	26.7	43.2	56.0	71.7	41.8	70.3
Ethiopia	12.8	11.9	13.1	24.5	36.1	30.2
Other	9.5	47.7	30.8	16.1	20.7	86.5
Subtotal	49.0	102.8	99.9	112.3	98.6	187.0
Asia						
China	126.3	56.6	60.4	71.6	93.5	51.0
Thailand	—	33.2	71.5	40.4	66.7	—
Japan	24.8	32.8	5.8	11.2	13.0	39.1
Hong Kong	3.3	5.2	5.5	2.5	34.5	14.3
Other	21.2	82.2	52.6	47.3	92.2	101.9
Subtotal	175.6	210.0	195.8	173.0	299.9	206.3
Middle East						
Saudi Arabia	5.8	13.6	8.5	13.3	14.3	58.3
Yemen (Aden)[3]	13.2	15.8	8.3	6.0	9.4	8.6
Other	7.8	23.3	45.8	12.0	71.2	74.6
Subtotal	26.8	52.7	62.6	31.3	94.9	141.5
Western Hemisphere						
United States	16.5	19.9	23.5	42.8	11.6	38.7
Other	1.9	0.6	9.4	1.6	19.7	42.6
Subtotal	18.4	20.5	32.9	44.4	31.3	81.3
Other	0.6	1.5	0.8	1.4	6.0	1.1
TOTAL	677.4	898.4	973.7	978.0	1,432.8	1,518.9

— means none or negligible.

[1] On cost, insurance, and freight basis. Imports through the *franco valuta* market not included.

[2] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.

[3] People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Table 16. Balance of Payments, 1974–79
(in millions of Somali shillings)[1]

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979[2]
Goods and Services (net)	–650	–643	–693	–885	–1,072	–1,887
Trade balance	–564	–463	–598	–847	–1,043	–1,814
Exports, f.o.b.[3]	(403)	(558)	(510)	(449)	(689)	(667)
Imports, c.i.f.[4]	(–967)	(–1,021)	(–1,108)	(–1,296)	(–1,732)	(–2,481)
Services (net)	–86	–180	–95	–39	–30	–73
Transportation and insurance	(–12)	(–18)	(–20)	(–7)	(–4)	(12)
Travel	(–14)	(–32)	(–40)	(–15)	(20)	(–86)
Investment income	(12)	(2)	(8)	(13)	(22)	(15)
Government, n.i.e[5]	(–54)	(–11)	(52)	(3)	(5)	(29)
Other services	(–18)	(–121)	(–95)	(–33)	(–73)	(–43)
Unrequited transfers (net)	326	643	257	680	666	592
Private	23	12	7	14	491[6]	226[6]
Official	303	631	250	666	175	366
Current Account Balance	–324	—	–436	–205	–406	–1295
Capital Account (net)	203	194	539	342	413	640
Private	9	59	22	97	2	24
Central Government	255	269	424	355	494	527
Commercial Bank	–61	–134	93	–110	–83	89
Errors and omissions	–5	–6	—	41	45	123
Basic Balance	–126	188	103	178	52	–532
Monetary movements (net)[7]	126	–188	–103	–178	–52	532
IMF[8]	–1	–4	2	31	–1	–44
Bilateral Payment Agreement	47	–10	–19	46	–8	26
Assets	(22)	(3)	(–10)	(31)	—	(4)
Liabilities	(25)	(–13)	(–9)	(15)	(–8)	(22)
Other assets and liabilities (net)	80	–173	–89	–253	–43	550

Note: Export and import totals and official capital inflows believed underreported.
Table totals may not add because of rounding.

— means none.
[1] For value of Somali shilling—see Glossary.
[2] Provisional.
[3] Free on board.
[4] Cost, insurance, and freight.
[5] Not included elsewhere.
[6] Includes value of *franco valuta* imports.
[7] Net monetary movement totals: increase –, decrease +.
[8] International Monetary Fund.

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Somalia, *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts 1979: 19th Financial Year, 1 January–31 December 1979*, Mogadishu, p. 66.

Table 17. Central Government Revenue, 1975–79
(in millions of Somali shillings)[1]

	1975	1976	1977	1978[2]	1979[3]
Tax Revenue	491.3	529.1	647.2	1154.6	1380.0
Taxes on net income and profits	45.2	54.0	59.1	74.4	65.0
Taxes on earned income	(40.8)	(47.4)	(55.8)	(68.0)	(60.0)
Ordinary tax on income	(17.8)	(21.3)	(25.3)	(32.1)	(30.0)
Extraordinary tax (development levy)	(23.0)	(26.1)	(3.05)	(35.9)	(30.0)
Other income taxes	(4.4)	(6.6)	(3.3)	(6.4)	(5.0)
Taxes on property	10.5	12.3	16.0	45.0	40.0
Registration tax	(10.5)	(12.3)	(16.0)	(45.0)	(40.0)
Taxes on goods and services	148.1	164.8	179.6	227.2	390.0
Excise tax on sugar and spirits	(93.2)	(100.0)	(78.2)	(98.5)	(210.0)
Fiscal monopolies (tobacco and matches)	(49.6)	(60.0)	(96.3)	(118.6)	(170.0)
Motor vehicle taxes	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(2.8)	(4.0)
Other	(4.0)	(3.5)	(3.8)	(7.3)	(6.0)
Taxes on international trade and transactions	246.7	354.2	341.5	704.5	765.0
Import duties	(230.7)	(241.0)	(329.4)	(687.1)	(750.0)
Customs duties	(177.9)	(189.7)	(255.0)	(572.8)	(550.0)
Administrative and statistical tax	(52.8)	(51.3)	(74.4)	(114.3)	(200.0)
Export duties	(16.0)	(13.2)	(12.1)	(17.4)	(15.0)
Stamp taxes	40.8	43.8	51.0	103.3	120.0
Nontax Revenue	137.1	141.6	190.2	239.6	316.3
Operating surplus of departmental enterprises[4]	—	14.8	—	0.3	—
Property income	106.0	102.1	153.0	182.3	308.0
From public enterprises	(101.3)	(99.8)	(141.8)	(179.6)	(302.1)
Turnover tax[5]	(53.4)	(47.3.)	(61.4)	(108.0)	(132.8)
Share of profits	(43.3)	(51.3)	(72.7)	(66.3)	(141.0)
Share of depreciation[6]	(4.6)	(1.2)	(7.7)	(5.4)	(28.3)
Other	(4.7)	(2.3)	(11.2)	(2.7)	(5.9)
Administrative fees and charges	23.2	16.2	25.4	24.5	5.3
Fines and forfeits	1.7	3.0	2.9	3.6	1.0
Other	6.2	5.5	14.9	28.9	2.0
TOTAL REVENUE	628.4	670.7	843.4	1394.2	1696.3

— means none.
[1] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.
[2] Preliminary.
[3] Budget.
[4] Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.
[5] Levies on certain profitmaking state-owned corporations.

Table 18. Central Government Ordinary Expenditures, 1975–79
(in millions of Somali shillings)[1]

	1975	1976	1977	1978[2]	1979[2]
General Public Services					
Presidency	19.9	20.1	21.6	43.0	44.8
Justice and religious affairs	25.0	26.7	30.6	44.5	49.1
Interior and police[4]	57.9	60.7	69.3	128.5	130.8
Foreign affairs	23.3	27.6	40.3	45.6	50.0
Finance[5]	66.3	70.8	87.8	209.6	199.7
Planning[6]	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.8	3.2
Subtotal	192.4	205.9	249.6	475.0	477.6
Defense	145.2	165.4	199.7	502.1	592.3
Social Services					
Education	56.7	77.7	97.0	115.1	135.4
Higher education	13.6	19.1	23.8	31.9	36.7
Health	41.3	45.6	57.8	63.9	70.3
Information	12.8	14.3	16.1	9.1	21.5
Labor[7]	2.8	3.6	2.6	6.5	4.2
Sports[7]	n.a.	n.a.	1.3	—	4.3
Subtotal	127.2	160.3	198.6	226.5	272.4
Economic Services					
Agriculture	24.6	29.4	27.3	26.2	30.9
Livestock	15.2	17.0	19.8	20.0	22.0
Fisheries	2.2	4.0	0.5	3.0	4.7
Mineral and water resources	0.6	9.2	6.6	7.0	17.4
Industry	2.2	3.9	0.8	1.3	1.2
Commerce	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.3	5.6
Public works	17.6	21.0	24.2	23.1	21.5
Transportation	28.3	30.1	34.4	40.0	46.9
Posts and telecommunications[8]	—	—	1.4	21.4	3.3
Tourism	1.1	—	—	—	1.7
Marine transport[9]	n.a.	n.a.	3.4	4.1	2.9
Subtotal	101.4	117.7	121.7	149.4	158.0
TOTAL	566.2	649.3	769.6	1,353.0	1,500.3

— means none.
n.a.—not applicable.
[1] For value of the Somali shilling—see Glossary.
[2] Preliminary.
[3] Budget.
[4] In 1977 became Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development; at the time the police were placed under the president's office.
[5] Mainly subsidies and contingencies.
[6] Through 1977 under the Presidency.
[7] Until 1977 combined in the Ministry of Labor and Sports.
[8] Expenditure covering operating deficit.
[9] Until 1977 part of Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Transport.

Table 19. National Executive and Council of Ministers, September 1981

Office	Incumbent
President	Mohamed Siad Barre, Major General
1st Vice-President	Mohamed Ali Samantar, Lieutenant General
2d Vice-President	Hussein Kulmie Afrah, Major General
3d Vice-President	Ismail Ali Abokar, Brigadier General
Presidential Adviser on Security Affairs	Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle, Brigadier General
Minister of	
Agriculture (Acting)	Mohamed Abdi Nur
Commerce	Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud
Culture and Higher Education	Ahmed Ashkir Botan
Defense (Acting)	Omar Haji Mohamed, Major General
Education	Adan Mohamed Ali
Finance	Abdullahi Ahmed Addu
Fisheries	Osman Jama Ali
Foreign Affairs	Abdurahman Jama Barre
Health (Acting)	Mohamed Farah Issa
Industry	Ali Khalif Gulaid
Information and National Guidance	Mohamed Aden Sheikh
Justice and Religious Affairs	Ahmed Shire Mohamud
Labor and Social Affairs	Mohamed Burale Ismail
Livestock, Forestry, and Range	Mohamed Ali Nur
Local Government and Rural Development	Jama Mohamed Ghalib, Major General
Mineral and Water Development	Hussein Abdulkadir Kassim
National Planning	Ahmed Habib Ahmed
Ports and Sea Transport (Acting)	Jama Gass Ma'awiye
Posts and Telecommunications	Mohamed Hawadle Madar
Public Works	Mohamud Nur Galal, Brigadier General
Sports and Youth	Mire Aware Jama, Colonel
Tourism and National Parks (Acting)	Abdirahman Mohamed Araleh
Transport (Land and Air)	(VACANT)
Minister in President's Office Responsible for Political Affairs	Mohamed Said Samantar
Minister in President's Office Responsible for Social Affairs (Acting)	Abdillahi Jama Mohamed

Table 20. Major Army Weapons, 1981[1]

Type	Description	Country of Manufacture	Estimated in Inventory
Tanks			
T–54/–55	Main battle tank; 100mm quick firing gun; most transferred 1974–76	Soviet Union	40
T–34	Medium tank; 85mm gun	-do-	60
Centurion	Main battle tank; 105mm gun	Britain	40
Armed personnel carriers (APC)			
BTR–40	9–passenger wheeled APC	Soviet Union	)
BTR–50	12–passenger tracked APC	-do-	) 50
BTR–60	10–12–passenger wheeled APC	-do-	)
Fiat 6614	10–passenger wheeled APC	Italy	) 200
Fiat 6616	Armored car; 20mm gun	-do-	)
BTR–152	12–passenger wheeled APC	Soviet Union	150
Artillery			
130mm	Field gun, towed	-do-	)
122mm	Field gun, towed	-do-	) 80
122mm	Howitzer, towed	-do-	)
100mm	Antitank gun/field gun, towed	-do-	)
85mm	Antitank gun, towed	-do-	) 150
76mm	Divisional gun, towed	-do-	)
120mm	Heavy mortar	-do-	n.a.
82mm	Medium mortar	-do-	n.a.
106mm	B–11–type recoilless rifle	China	n.a.
Antiaircraft guns			
100mm	Towed	Soviet Union	)
57mm	Towed	-do-	) 250
37mm	Towed	-do-	)
23mm	ZU 23–2–type, towed	-do-	)
Missiles			
SAM–2 Guideline	Land-mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM)	-do-	)) 30[2]
SAM–3 Goa	Land-mobile SAM; short-range defense vs. low flying aircraft	-do-	))
Milan	Surface-to-surface, man-portable, antitank guided weapon	France/ West Germany	100[2]

n.a.—not applicable.
[1] Serviceability low.
[2] Estimated number of launchers.

Table 21. Major Air Force Weapons, 1981[1]

Type	Description	Country of Manufacture	Estimated in Inventory
Combat aircraft			
MiG–17 Fresco	Mach 0.9 fighter-bomber	Soviet Union	9
MiG–21 Fishbed	Mach 2.1 fighter-bomber with AA–2 Atoll antiaircraft missiles	-do-	3
Shenyang F–6	Mach 1.3 fighter-bomber	China	30
I1–28 Beagle	Subsonic jet light bomber	Soviet Union	3
SF–260W	Single-engine light attack craft	Italy	6
Transport aircraft			
An–2	Single-engine light transport	Soviet Union	3
An–24/–26	Twin-turboprop transport	-do-	3
C–47	Twin-engine transport	United States	3
C–45	Twin-engine light transport	-do-	1
G–222	Twin-turboprop transport	Italy	4
Helicopters			
Mi–4	Twelve-seat transport	Soviet Union	4
Mi–8	Twin-engine medium transport	-do-	8
AB–204	General utility helicopter	United States/ Italy	1
AB–212	General utility helicopter	-do-	4
Trainers			
P–148	Single-engine, two-seat primary trainer	Italy	6
Yak–11	Single-engine, two-seat advanced trainer	Soviet Union	20
MiG–15 UTI	Two-seat advanced jet trainer	-do-	4
SM–1019	Single-engine training, observation, and light attack aircraft	Italy	6[2]

[1] Serviceability extremely low.
[2] On order or being delivered, 1981

*Table 22. Major Naval Weapons, 1981**

Type	Description	Country of Manufacture	Estimated in Inventory
Fast attack craft (FAC)			
Osa II-class	FAC (missile) with four SS-N-2 Styx antiship missiles; transferred 1975	Soviet Union	2
Mol-class	FAC (torpedo) with four 21-inch tubes; transferred 1976	-do-	4
P6-class	FAC (torpedo) with two 21-inch tubes; transferred 1968	-do-	4
Patrol craft			
Poluchat I-class	Large patrol craft; transferred 1965-66	-do-	5
Amphibious forces			
Polnochniy-class	Landing craft (tank); transferred 1976	-do-	1
T-4-class	Landing craft (medium); transferred 1968-69	-do-	4

* Few of these ships believed to be fully operational in 1981, four years after the withdrawal of Soviet advisers.

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Glossary

abbaan—Patron, in a relationship between a member of a dominant group and a member of a servile group; also used to refer to a host who bears some responsibility for a guest in his camp, village, or territory and to a man who acts as the protector of a merchant traveling through an area.

baraka—Blessing. To have baraka is to be in a state of special blessedness and therefore to have special power.

chaalle—See jaalle.

clan—A large group of people believed to be descendants through males of a common ancestor whose name is also the name of the clan. Several clans constitute a clan-family (*q.v.*), and each clan is divided into a number of lineages (*q.v.*).

clan-family—A group of clans (*q.v.*) believed to be linked ultimately by descent from a common ancestor. The six clan-families are Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, Dir, Digil, and Rahanweyn.

contract (*heer*)—An agreement, often written, among members of an existing group (lineage, *q.v.*) or of more than one such group explicitly setting out their rights and duties in specified circumstances. A contract is the basis of a *dia*-paying group (*q.v.*).

dia-paying group—A group bound by contract either to pay blood compensation (*dia*) or to collect it if one of its members is the perpetrator or victim of homicide or other damage. Members of the group may also be bound by other rules agreed to by contract.

fiscal year (FY)—An annual period established for accounting purposes. The Somali fiscal year is coterminous with the calendar year.

GDP—Gross domestic product. The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders during a fixed period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of compensation of employees, profits, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Subsistence production is included and consists of the imputed value of production by the farm family for its own use and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

GNP—Gross national product. GDP (*q.v.*) plus the income received from abroad by residents, less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents.

Haud—Wet season grazing area, lying partly in southern part of northern Somalia and partly in Ethiopia.

heer—Contract (*q.v.*), compact, or treaty.

jaalle—Sometimes *chaalle*. Somali term translated as comrade and widely used in public and official contexts. Precedes

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other titles, e.g., comrade general.

jamaha—An agricultural community established by an Islamic brotherhood.

jiffo-paying group—A narrow group of kin responsible for paying or receiving that portion of the blood compensation (*dia*) that goes to the close kin of the victim of a homicide. *See dia*-paying group.

lineage—A group of persons tracing descent from a common ancestor; in Somalia the ancestor is male, and descent is traced through males. The group carries his name. A lineage may be part of a larger one and may consist of several smaller ones.

Northern Region—Sometimes used in official documents before the coup of October 1969 to refer to that part of Somalia formerly under British rule (British Somaliland).

qadi—A magistrate applying the sharia (*q.v.*) usually in subordinate courts.

reer—Meaning descendants of; applied to the members of a lineage (*q.v.*) of any size and genealogical depth; *reer* is followed by the name of the ancestor; the term is sometimes applied to a group even if its members are not necessarily descended from a common ancestor; *reer* is then followed by the name of the group.

Sab—Applied to the sedentary, agricultural Somalis living between the Juba and Shabeelle rivers and comprising the members of the Digil and Rahanweyn clan-families. Contrasted to Samaal (*q.v.*).

sab—Low. Term used by Somalis to refer to groups having low occupational and social status. To be distinguished from Sab (*q.v.*).

Samaal—Those Somalis of pastoral nomadic tradition, principally of four clan-families (Darod, Dir, Isaaq, and Hawiye), in contrast to the Sab (*q.v.*).

sharia—Islamic law. In Somalia the Shafii school of Islamic law.

sheikh—A term sometimes used for a *wadad* (*q.v.*) and granted as a title to the more learned religious figures.

shir—Council of elders (all adult males) of a clan (*q.v.*) or lineage (*q.v.*).

Somali shilling (Sh)—Currency of Somalia since national independence in 1960; divided into 100 Somali cents. Sh1 equaled US$0.14 (US$1 equaled Sh7.143) from July 1960 to August 1971. The rate varied slightly thereafter until December 1971 when Sh1 equaled US$0.144 (US$1 equaled Sh6.925). Sh1 equaled US$0.160 (US$1 equaled Sh6.233) in February 1973. From December 1973 until June 1981 Sh1 equaled US$0.159 (US$1 equaled Sh6.295). Effective July 1981 a two-tier rate system related to categories of imports was introduced; Sh1 equaled US$0.08 (US$1 equaled Sh12.46) in one case, in the other Sh1 equaled US$0.158 (US$1 equaled Sh6.35).

Southern Region—Sometimes used in official documents before October 1969 to refer to that part of Somalia formerly under Italian rule (Italian Somaliland or Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian Administration).

sultan—A term used for the head of a clan (*q.v.*) or lineage (*q.v.*) where such an office existed; a sultan did not have substantial secular authority.

tariqa (pl., *taruq*)—In Islam an order of religious devotees: a religious brotherhood.

tribe—A term sometimes applied to a clan-family (*q.v.*).

wadad (pl., *wadaddo*)—A religious figure or functionary; member of a *tariq* (*q.v.*) or of a hereditary lineage of religious figures; the Arabic term sheikh is sometimes used for *wadad*.

waranle—Spear carrier (warrior). Applied to adult males, particularly those of the pastoral tradition; excluded from this category are religious figures. See *wadad*.

World Bank—Group of three institutions consisting of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Development Association (IDA); established in 1945, the World Bank in 1981 was owned by the governments of approximately 140 countries, which subscribe the institutions' capital. The IFC works with the private sector in developing countries. The IDA operates in the same sectors and using the same policies as the IBRD but provides credits only to the poorer developing countries and on easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans.

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